Automation of Ships and the

Human Factor

Rijeka, 25th October 2017

 Automation Systems

Automation has had a major role in the development of the modern society by
improving productivity and safety
Distributed digital machinery automation systems introduced in 1970’s/1980’s
->> operator was deeply involved in the control loop

Rapid development of automation in 1990’s

• busses & network, increased amount of process data, high flow of information
->> operator is mainly out of the control loop, supervising and dealing with
emergency situations

Nowadays, we are witnessing:

• further sophistication and integration of all equipment onboard
• drastic improvement of ship-to-shore communication.
 Automation Systems
Technology changes but the user is still the same human-being with many
weaknesses
Are we humans in general, getting more or less intelligent ?

 increased automation -> increased flow of info -> high mental workload
->> fatigue -> delayed reaction and poor decisions

 rules and constant passive monitoring of electronic devices

->> lack of innovation and ability to manage abnormal situations

 high degree of automation distances the operator from the process

->> the operator has no relevant information in an emergency situation

 difference between training/simulators and the real world

 Automation Systems
Specific issues related to operator errors identified by IMO:
 over-reliance on automation ->> false sense of security
 over-confidence in presented data ->> lack of additional checks
 lack of standardization by different manufacturers
 lack of understanding of automated control systems
 not knowing limitations & weaknesses of automation
 some displayed data on the screen can be very confusing
 improper ergonomic devices, poor design of equipment
 high flow of information - overload with information
 errors in the maintenance and calibration
 The Human Factor
Human is the weakest link in the loop
The human factor is present throughout the life time of the system:
-> design -> assembly -> maintenance -> operation
(Levana collision 2010 – HF at the design stage)

The human factor plays an important role in maritime casualties:

 In the 1960s the impact of human error was around 30%
 the number grew during the following decades and at present is over 75%
(>85% of tanker accidents)
 multiple human error occurs in most accidents
 According to the UK P&I Club, human error costs the maritime industry
$541 million per year
 Changes & Developments

Recognition of human factor has led to many changes and developments:

 in ship design and classification Rules
 introduction of the IBS and the ISM
 revised chapters in SOLAS for safe navigation
 revised IMO Code on Alarms and Indicators
 revision of performance standards for INS & IBS
 changes to STCW 1995/2003/2010
 established European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)
 Unification of Marine Education and Training (UniMET)
 etc…………….
 Marine Casualties
• Accidental events in Europe (2011-2015)

Source: European Maritime Safety Agency (2016)

 How to deal with automation?

 recognizing important and unimportant data & options

 shorter and longer reading intervals of data
 simplification with focus on a basic principle in an emergency
What else?
 audible feedback monitoring? (instead of listening music)
 better prioritization of alarms & messages to user (IMO 2006)
 to reduce number of alarms appearing at blackout
 restriction of mobile phone usage (MCA: red zones in V.P.)
 type-specific simulator
 general training to be followed by system-specific training (every ship
should be studied individually (->> Videotel)
 Management of Abnormal Situations

Trainings are often focused on operation of the system under normal conditions
->> management of abnormal situations gets very little attention

Problem-solving approach at an abnormal situation:

 younger/less experienced operators….?
 older/more experienced operators……?

Abnormal situation requires instant action based on training, intuition,

knowledge and experience, not on prepared procedures

Examples:
 Human factor at airplane crash-landing into Hudson River (2009)
 black out in a very critical situation for ship safety
Management of Abnormal Situations
 Management of Abnormal Situations
Blackout ->> Power Selector Switch on the Navigation Lights Panel

MAIN EMERGENCY
Management of Abnormal Situations

Power Selector Switch on the Bridge (Levana & Lemonia)

Where is the same on Admiral…..Avalon…..Leander?
 Loss of Power - Blackouts

- pressing the wrong button

- start of heavy consumers
- too fast load increase

-diesel engine
safety & control system
MSB

Source: UK P&I Club 2017

 Loss of Power - Blackouts

Overall quality and reliability of the equipment is crucial

Diesel generator engagement process takes some time:
…….start/acceleration – synchronization – load sharing…….

How to prevent blackouts?

 proper maintenance – PMS
 deep familiarity with ship-specific fuel system
 generators running in parallel
 checking for sufficient power before equipment start/loading
 etc.
 Future?
 The first automated containership – (Yara & Kongsberg, 2018-2020)
 Unmanned & autonomous ships added to IMO agenda (2018)
 First remotely operated commercial vessel (Copenhagen, June 2017)
 Wärtsilä tests remote vessel control from 8,000 km (September 2017)

Rolls-Royce
Drone Shipping
 ‘One Sea’ Project - autonomous ships in the Baltic Sea by 2025
 MUNIN Project - Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks
 Globally available test area for autonomous vessels (Finland & Norway)
 Unmanned Cargo Ship Development Alliance launched in China
 Japanese shipping stakeholders joined forces on unmanned ships project
 Rolls-Royce & Google – working on intelligent awareness systems for unmanned ships

(Google's AlphaGo 2016)
 Thank you for your attention!

……. and feel free to ask any question!