Power Supply Chain

Power Power Power Power Power Revenue

Transmitted Stepped Metered Billed Collected
Generated
Down

Generation & Transmission Power Distribution-The Last Mile

Technical Loss Commercial Loss

 Distribution Scenario

Burgeoning Losses

Dilapidated Distribution Network – Couple of

transformers and plenty of cables bursting
every day.
Harassed Consumers with poor fault management
system, wrong billing, inadequate payment channels,
Pending Complaints and no one to listen to them.

A huge work force but with nil to very little

skill level.

No Corporate structure.
Lack of accountability, initiative & service
attitude
No administrative infrastructure and
Dilapidated/Unsanitary buildings/Offices
 Utility’s Dilemma

Front-end Back-end

Generator

UTILITY
Tx. Utility

Govt.

Consumer Trader
Regulator SLDC
Distribution Scenario In General
This Distribution Scenario Is Not A Fiction
 Consumer Priorities
Redresser Consumer
Payments Relationship
Convenience Management

Ow
n
Ch ersh
Billing Ad ange ip
Re ditio /
du
ctio n /
Lo n o
ad f
Meters
Reading
Fault
Management
New Connection
Power
Reliability
Quality
 Customer Delight

Quality Value

Customer
Satisfaction

Service
 Losses Jan;2013

 Capacity of 2,11,000 MW, generated 878 BU of energy in the year.

 More than 276 Billion Units never came in circulation.
 These losses are 4 times those in Europe and Japan and amount to $ 9
Billion equivalent to 2% of GDP of India.
 And twice of what country spends on health and education.
 Cutting these down by 12% amount to Rs. 15,000 Crores
 In India energy intensity is 3.7 when in countries like Japan it is just 1.2

 Losses of SEBs and utilities have increased from 400 Crores in 1991-
92 to 22,500 Crores in 2004-05, 22,600 Crores in 2005-06 and 24,000 in
2006-07& more than 82,000 Crores in 2010-2011, and more than
137,000 Crores by now.
 Ignominy Of High AT&C Losses
 With population above one billion India is second only to China.
 With area 3.3 MKms2, it is 1/3 size of USA with population five times.
 India is the sixth largest global consumer of energy.
 LT to HT Ratio of the country is 5, with Gujarat, the best at 0.82, lower
than International Index of 1
 INDIA’S ENERGY INTENSITY AMONGST HIGHEST IN WORLD
 3.7 times of Japan, 1.55 times of US, 1.44 times Asian average
 India has 2% of the land while population is 17% of the globe.
 High power costs severely impact our share of International Trade.
 India’s share of Global Trade is just 3.5%, less than five times of China.
 Our losses are more than 25% of the energy generated.
 AT&C losses hover from 18% to 72% & amount to 2% of India’s GDP.
 80% of technical and 100% of commercial losses occur in distribution
 Distribution is usurping investments in all upstream sectors.
COMPARISON OF SPECIFIC ENERGY USED IN INDIA
& ABROAD
(million kcal/tonne)

COUNTRY STEEL CEMENT PULP & FERTILISERS

PAPER
INDIA 9.50 2.00 11.10 12.23

USA 6.06 0.95 9.70 11.32

UK 6.07 1.30 7.62 11.25

GERMANY 5.21 0.82 - -

SWEDEN 5.02 1.40 7.56 -

JAPAN 4.18 1.20 - -

ITALY 4.03 0.89 - 9.92

Source: TERI
T&D LOSSES: INDIA TOPS THE WORLD

Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators

T&D LOSSES: INDIA TOPS THE WORLD
 Distribution Circles Above 25% Loss Level

State/Discom Circle AT&C State/Discom Circle AT&C Loss

Loss
Punjab Tarantaran 26 Raj-Jaipur Bharatpur 42

Bhatinda 31 Dausa 35

Ferozpur 28 Jhalawar 44

Muktsar 28 S.Madhopur 25

A.P.-Central Hyderabad-S 50 Haryana-Uttar Rohtak 44

M.P.-Paschim Khandwa 38 Sonepat 25

Khargone 40 Jind 44

Barwani 41 Panipat 26

Dhar 37 Jhajjar 33

J&K > 70% Ujjain 35 Uttarakhand Ranikhet 35

Manipur > 65% Dewas 34 Haldwani 40

Shajapur 47 Srinagar 39

Ratlam 33 Dehradun 25
 AT&C LOSSES: MAJOR
FACTORS
Total Losses
Technical
Losses Commercial Losses Collection Efficiency

• I2R Losses in HT • Meter Reading • Poor & Inefficient

and LT lines related Revenue Collection
• Transformation • Metering related of energy
losses at different issues
voltage levels
 Energy Produced & Energy Billed- 2010-11
Domestic 131383 MUs

Commercial 44432
Agriculture 123724
Industry 181168
Railway 10064
Inter-state 12697
Others 43733
Total 547202
Ex-Bus 788355
Not Sold 241153
Country Losses 30.59%
 Discoms Losses- ,000
Particulars 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 Total
Crs

Revenue 150 134 119 107 90 600

Subsidies 30 25 17 13 12 97

Other income 7 6 6 5 5 29

Total 187 165 142 125 107 726

% subsidy/revenue 20 19 14 12 14 16

Total expenditure 214 191 156 135 112 808

Net loss before subsidies (57) (51) (31) (23) (17) (179)

Net loss after subsidies (27) (26) (14) (10) (5) (82)
 ALL INDIA ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES 
PROFIT & LOSS STATEMENT (Rs in Crores)
2011-
  2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2012# 2006-2012
REVENUE              
Revenue from sale of power 106599 118744 133708 150379 181218 191894 882543
Rev. subsidies and grants 12645 16562 25497 29692 28538 15200 128133
Other Income 4849 6086 6374 6938 7142 5354 36743
TOTAL REVENUE 124093 141392 165579 187010 216898 212448 1047419
Percentage of subsidies in Revenue 12 14 19 20 16 8 15
EXPENDITURE              
Purchase of Power 103661 121277 148580 164348 185009 193666 916541
Repairs & Maintenance 2359 2566 3886 4634 4559 2310 20314
Employees cost 12284 13027 16087 18216 20946 19253 99813
Adm. & General exp. 1610 2322 2715 2912 2858 1462 13879
Other Expenses 2607 4175 3305 3533 3045 3040 19705

Depreciation & other related debits 4951 5003 5553 6412 6799 4397 33115
Interest & Financial Expenses 7128 8161 10432 14053 17624 13522 70920
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 134601 156530 190558 214109 240840 237650 1174288
Profit/Loss Before Prior Period
Adjustment -10509 -15138 -24979 -27099 -23942 -25202 -126869

UNIT CONSUMED 35371 38780 40930 44509 48972 44198 252760

UNIT AVAILABLE 48306 52224 54181 58635 62601 56356 332303
UNITS LOST 12935 13444 13251 14126 13629 12158 79543
% of Units Loss 27 26 24 24 22 22 24
Cost of Units / Energy 134601 156530 190558 214109 240840 237650 1174288
Average cost per unit sold 3.81 4.04 4.66 4.81 4.92 5.38 4.65

Average Revenue Realisation ARR) 3.51 3.65 4.05 4.20 4.43 4.81 4.14
Total Loss for units lost 49222 54265 61693 67953 67027 65373 369546
 Power Cost Comparison
 COUNTRY COST (In Cents/kWh)

 Canada 2

 Norway 1

 Sweden 2

 Thailand 5

 Egypt 7

 India 12
 Example Of Price Trend-Germany
 The graph indicative of electricity prices since 1990 in Germany, shows
that the energy prices have never gone up.
 EU has made enormous progress in restructuring its electricity market.
The most satisfying result so far is the drop in electricity prices for all
groups of consumers.
 On an average industrial consumers have seen a drop of 25%.

 In Finland and Sweden, household bills have dropped by 15%.

 Responsible Regulations have improved Public standards .

 Electricity Commissions are out to protect consumer rights.

 
 State Indiscipline
 At the time of worst ever successive Grid Blackouts on 30Th July
and 31St July;2012,Unscheduled Interchange (UI) transactions
peaked at Rs. 882 Crores when Grid Frequency was dangerously
fragile with power cost at its ceiling of Rs.10/KWh.
 Discretionary overtures of the States drawing power wantonly
and Central Load Dispatcher watching haplessly at the looming
grid disaster was as a sequel to more than one System Operator.
 The collision course set with the State Operator, nonchalant to
rapidly falling Frequency and the Central Operator sending one
telegram after another, in this age of electronics, forecloses any
debate on the inevitability of Grid Discipline.
 UI Ram p Rate

1200

1000
1000

800

600

400 352
298 316 334
280
200

0 8 16
0
50.50 50.48 50.46 49.80 49.78 49.76 49.74 49.72 49.02

Frequency
 Financial Distress

 States such as Uttar Pradesh, Madhya

Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu with
significant loss levels displayed high deficits
between availability and requirement.   This
concludes that the States in financial distress
are unable to procure power so greatly
needed by their customers because the
Discoms do not have the money to do so.
 Actual for 2011-12 consist of data provided by 12 States and estimated data for the remaining 3
[1]

States of Rajasthan, Punjab and Jharkhand which have still to submit information at the close of
FY 2011-12.
Actual Actual
  2009-10 2010-11 2010-11 2011-12 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17
Revenue from sale
157473 189274 188361 208712 225252 229295 251687 276310 303109 334087
of power
Subsidies and
29691 32721 28538 36090 27782 39520 43039 46943 51145 55780
grants
TOTAL REVENUE 187164 221994 216899 244802 253034 268815 294726 323252 354254 389867
TOTAL
214121 249754 240840 272351 283332 296024 321291 348879 378418 411977
EXPENDITURE
Profit/Loss -26957 -27760 -23941 -27549 -30298 -27209 -26565 -25626 -24164 -22110
Units consumed
44509 52634 48972 57992 53320 63652 69792 76546 83889 92299
(Mkwh)
Units Available
58635 68909 62601 75096 67963 81566 88506 96073 104175 113388
(Mkwh)
Units Lost (Mkwh) 14126 16275 13629 17104 14643 17914 18714 19527 20286 21089
% of Units Loss
24 24 22 23 22 22 21 20 19 19
(T&D)
Cost of Energy 214121 249754 240840 272351 283332 296024 321291 348879 378418 411977

Average cost per

4.81 4.75 4.92 4.70 5.31 4.65 4.60 4.56 4.51 4.46
unit sold (Rs/Kwh)

ARR (Rs/Kwh) 4.21 4.21 4.43 4.21 4.75 4.21 4.21 4.21 4.21 4.21

Out of which
0.51 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.41 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
subsidy is (Rs/Kwh)
 Gap Between PAF & PLF
 It is believed that declining availability of power is
due to fuel, low plf, and obsolete equipment.
 The fact is to the contrary.
 Inability of Discoms to meet demand is due to lack of
finances to pay for power.
 Constraint is evident from following graph and table
Trend of average PAF and PLF of coal and lignite based power stations in India and gap between the two

Source: CEA
Note: PAF and PLF are for coal and lignite based stations as reported by CEA. Lignite based capacity is very significant in India.

90% 10.0%

85% 9.0%

80% 8.0%

75% 7.0%

70% 6.0%

65% 5.0%
F Y07 F Y08 F Y09 F Y10 F Y11 F Y12 F Y13e
PAF % PLF % Gap % (R HS)
Estimate of generation shortfall under coal and lignite based power stations in India due to
demand constraints
FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13e
Actual PAF % 85.1% 84.2% 82.5% 81.2%
Actual PLF % 77.5% 75.1% 73.3% 72.0%
Actual Generation (MU) 769,178 810,516 876,888 922,654
Notional PLF % (at levels of 78.0% 78.0% 78.0% 78.0%
FY08/09) assumed
Generation if coal based plants 772,688 832,428 916,344 979,550
operated at notional PLF seen in
FY08/09 (MU)
Generation shortfall 3,509 21,912 39,456 56,896
% shortfall to actual generation 0.5% 2.7% 4.5% 6.2%

Source: CEA
Note: PAF and PLF are for coal and lignite based stations as reported by CEA.
 Tariff Structure

Flat Rate- single part (p/kWh) -prior to 1991

Two part Tariff ( K.P.Rao) - 1991 to till date

Fixed Charges
Variable Charges

Availability Based -Proposed from 2001

Capacity charge
Energy charge
Unscheduled interchange
AVAILABILITY BASED TARIFF
 Energy Charges
 Energy Charges is realized in two Parts
1. Scheduled Interchanges
2. Unscheduled Interchanges
 SI- would be priced on the Basis of Variable Cost per KWh
 UI- priced on a Frequency Sliced Rate - High for Low
Frequencies and Low for High Frequencies
 Capacity Charge Elements
 Capacity charge or Fixed cost covers:
 Interest on loan,
 Return on equity,

 Depreciation,

 O&M Expenses,

 Insurance,

 Taxes,

 Interest on working capital.

 Distribution Corporate Configurations

 There are 73 utilities in India-40 Govt Discoms, 3-SEBs, 17-Pvt

Discoms, 13 –DFs + (PPPModels)- These 13 are -9-DF, 3-Delhi-1 NPCL
 MSEDCL is the biggest Utility in Asia with 200 Mn consumers and 3000
Crs revenue.
 25 SERCs, + JERCs
 Open Access is nothing in reality
 Franchisee is just a seedling
 Regulators have to be knowledgeable, and win trust of stakeholders.
 AT&C losses, > 75% in J&K and 60% in Manipur.
 Punjab and TN are only tick marking the restructuring.
 Institutional maturity-Why L1 and H1(As in DF) ?
 Financial maturity-debt only for 10 years, when contract is for 25 years.
Performance Indicators Of Discoms
  A Well Run Utility Envisages:-
 Autonomy
 Accountability
 Customer Focus
 Market Focus

 Earns Revenue without raising tariff

 Sensitization and involvement right from Chairman to Line

man.
 Capex Work Sheet Bhiwandi, Agra , NDPL and BSES
Capex Rs
Town Consumer Population Total Capex Per Consumer Per
Yr.
Bhiwandi 2.2 Lacs Year Crores  
    2006-07 9  
    2007-08 172  
    2008-09 91  
    2009-10 120  
    2010-11 35  
    Total 486 4418
         
Agra 2.85 Lacs 2010-11 145
    2011-12   3 Years
    2012-13   Rolling Plan
    Total 360
        4211
NDPL 8 Lacs 2003-2004 288  
    2004-05 303  
    2005-06 361  
    Total 952 3967
         
BSES 19 Lacs 2003-04 197  
    2004-05 928  
    2005-06 903  
    Total 2028 3558
 Performance Indicators
Technical Performance
a. Metering
i. 11 kV level
ii. Consumer level
b. Peak and Energy Shortage
c. Outage duration per feeder
d. No. of Outages per feeder
e. Failure Rate of Distribution Transformers
f. IT Interventions
i. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
ii. Automated Meter Reading (AMR)
iii. Common Billing System
 Performance Indicators
Demand Management
a. ToD tariffs
i. Introduction of ToD
ii. Customer classes covered under ToD

iii. Reduction in Peaking Load due to ToD

b. Energy Efficiency Initiatives

i. Purchase of surplus power from CPPs
 Performance Indicators
Benefit to consumers
a. % of complaints responded to in a year
b. Average response time for Normal Fuse-Off calls
c. Average response time to replace meters
d. % of bills that are estimated
e. Average time for issuing new service connection
f. % of customers covered by Spot billing, hand-held computers
g. No. of Customer care personnel per 100 customers
 Distribution Models

40.
 Discom Models and Performance Indicators
S. No. Ownership/ PPP Discom Ownership
Structure

1 State Owned Discom Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam 100% Public

Limited (JVVNL)

North Delhi Power Limited 49% State Govt.

Private Discom (in (NDPL)
2 joint venture with the
State Government) Noida Power Company
Limited (NPCL) 27% GNIDA

Private Discom (full Reliance Infrastructure

3 ownership with the Limited- Mumbai 100% Private
Private Entity) Distribution Operation (R-
Infra)

4 Public Private Torrent Power Bhiwandi Distribution

Partnership Limited (TPBL) Franchisee
Sales Mixes
Sales Mixes
 Load and Customer densities
Load Density
• NPCL and TPBL have very
high levels of load densities
because of higher levels of
industrial sales
• Load densities of other
companies are relatively lower
because of pre-dominance of
domestic/ agriculture
consumption

Customer Density
• R-Infra and NDPL have high
levels of customer densities
because of highly dense areas
that are being served by them.
• JVVNL has very low customer
density due to a large area of
supply including rural areas as
well
 Cost Recovery

Source: NDPL True-up order FY 10, R-Infra Tariff Oder FY 10, NPCL Tariff Order FY 10, JVVNL

 Cost Recovery in case of private Discoms, is better as compared to JVVNL.

 In case of JVVNL, % cost recovered from revenues is only 49%.
 Distribution Losses

Source: Data provided by the selected companies.

 R-Infra and NPCL have been operating their distribution systems for a longer time and have
maintained their distribution loss levels between 8% to 10%.
 NDPL has brought down its distribution losses to 16% and may be single digit by end;2013.
 JVVNL too has brought down its distribution losses to 22% from 37% in the five year time
period. However, actual loss level needs to be investigated, as the Discoms claims 32% of
its total sales to agriculture consumers where there is a possibility of manipulation of losses.
 Since its takeover in January 2007, Torrent Power has brought down the distribution losses
to 19% from 46%.
 O&M Cost Break-up

Source: Annual Reports. Data for Torrent Power is not available.

 While private Discoms have been spending about 25 to 35% of their O&M expense
towards Repair & Maintenance of their network, majority of JVVNL’s O&M costs is
towards employee and administration.
 Distribution Transformer Failure-%

Source: Data provided by the selected companies.

 DTR failure rate lowest for R-Infra. Reasonably low for NDPL and NPCL.
 JVVNL too has managed to bring down DTR failure rate to 8.4% from 18% in five
years
 Significant reduction in DTR failure rate in Bhiwandi circle - from 32.5% in 2006-07
to 3.8% in FY 2009-10.
 Distribution Franchisee

49.
 Political Aberrations
 After experiment number one in Orissa, experiment number two of privatization of
Distribution was consummated in Delhi in 2002. Making key departures from the
Orissa Model, though Delhi has brought certain satisfying results, yet travails
continue in many aspects.
 Since 2002 no other State has imbibed Delhi Model or any other Model to fetch
positive turn round of their power sectors. So privatization started with and stalled at
Delhi.
 Privatization of distribution having been vetoed by substantial political and apolitical
pressures, gave birth to the idea of Franchisee System which does not require
disinvestment of ownership but fetches the private sector management .
 Ownership of the following three key elements remain with the State:
 License

 Assets

 Employees
 Privatization And/ Or PPP
 An alternative to state owned utility is a privately owned company or
thru PPP with a privately owned company.
 BSES & TPC in Mumbai, Torrent in Ahmedabad and Surat, RPGoenka
owned CESC in Calcutta and RPG owned Noida Power Company,
Reliance Energy owned NESCO, WESCO and SOUTHCO in Orissa
and CESCO earlier owned by AES, USA in Orissa (at present managed
by an administrator appointed by the Regulator), Reliance Energy
owned Rajdhani BSES and Yamuna BSES in Delhi and Tata Power
owned NDPL(Now TPDDL) in Delhi are operating at present in Private
or PPP Models in the country.
 Outsourcing Is Not Privatization
 Outsourcing of Company's responsibilities not to a panel of wise men
but to private companies is not a road to success.
 An outsourced contractor quite often fails to make sure that the
principal client gets the best price
 Frequently the work is further steered to their subsidiaries or business
partners instead of competitors.
 A Private Company will do a worse job if its political connections
insulate it from accountability.
 There is a fundamental error in judging that virtues of market
competition and private ownership is a magic matrix.
 There is no substance that a private company would do better than the
people employed direct.
 Private Sector can do no wrong and Government Sector can do no
right is a preposterous presumption.
 There have been terrible failures of jobs outsourced by US in
Afghanistan (Training a Police Force), Iraq (Reconstruction work),
USA(Hurricane Katrina) to contractors.
 Maharashtra Starts DF
 As in the case of outright Privatization, the biggest resistance
which is faced in introduction of input-based Franchisee Scheme
is by the personnel of Electricity Boards Distribution Companies.
Vested interests don't want this to be introduced and create all
types of difficulties .
 The most powerful of the initiatives taken in the recent years is the
one that Maharashtra Electricity Distribution Company took by
introducing Franchisee arrangement in Bhiwandi.
 Current Status of DF
 Torrent has put in concentrated efforts to upgrade the network, improve
metering and billing efficiency and bring down the AT&C losses.
 Because of tenacious and perseverant business acumen of Torrent, Bhiwandi
experience is proving to be a rewarding one. Maharashtra has already
adopted this scheme for Nagpur, Aurangabad and Jalgaon
 Emulating Maharashtra, UP has since gone ahead in Franchising
Distribution Circles of Agra and Kanpur to Torrent.
 4 more have been assigned, namely, Sagar, Indore and Gwalior (in Madhya
Pradesh) and Patna (in Bihar)
 Kanpur remains assigned but work has yet to commence.
 Currently 11 Towns have gone in for DF
 The potential has been highlighted for 235 Towns .
 There have, however, been dissatisfying results too, as in case of Nagpur and
Aurangabad , where the investments by the DF did not pour in.
 Up Front Capex
Franchise model is as capital intensive as any other model. It has now emerged
that not only is the model capital intensive, the capital intensity is front loaded.
In other words during the first few years of the franchise, large amounts of
money need be invested before effective progress can be accomplished. A
review of operations in Agra would show dramatic progress vis-a-vis Nagpur,
Aurangabad, Jalgaon etc. for this very reason. In Agra heavy capital investment
has been made upfront. A little over Rs. 12 Crores every month during the last
39 months (ending November 2012). Other Franchisees have not been able to do
so with the result that their progress remains very modest up-to date.
STATUS OF IMPROVEMENT IN FRANCHISED AREA
  DTR Failure Distt. Losses%) Collection No. of Consumers Capex (Rs.
Rate (%) efficiency (%)   Crs.
 

Bhiwandi

(Dec. 06 to 40 1.61 42.11 17.24 67.7 96.4 1,41,857 2,66,408 500

Sept. 12)

Agra 61,000

Apr (2010 to 31 8 70 50       (customers 379

Nov. 12) added

Augrangabad  

(Apr 11 to 3.29 2.21 20.30 22.30 99.18 100 2,24,806 2,38,123 15

Dec. 12)  

Nagpur  

Apr 11 to Dec. 3.49 3.33 29.99 27.16 99.06 99.18 3,89,665 4,30,063 29
12  

Jalgaon  

(Oct. 11 to 5.40 3.20 27.90 25.63 95.91 88.65 1,20,991 1,23,736 4

Dec. 12)  
 Distribution Franchisee –
Experience & Overview

57.
 BHIWANDI : AT THE TIME OF TAKEOVER
 AT&C losses : 58%
 Collection Efficiency : 68%
 Mandatory load shedding of 6 hours at the
time of takeover and subsequently increased
to 8 hours
 Further distress load shedding due to deficit
of 300 MVA in EHV Network
 Overstressed distribution Network
 Overloading
 Breakdowns / trippings
 Transformer failure rate of 40%
 Poor reliability of supply
 Only 23% of the customers metered & large
unregistered consumers
 Major Improvements
 Revamped all the transformers
 Replaced 1499 Nos of transformers
 Added 150 MVA of DT Capacity by adding and
replacing existing transformers by higher size
 Changed more than 1 lakhs meters

Improving supply quality, reliability and safety

 LT Network Revamping

Creating a safe and robust distribution network

Bhiwandi Franchisee Model Of
Consumer Comfort
By Torrent Power Limited
Operations taken over from 26th
January, 07
 Major Accomplishments :
Distribution Transformer Failure Rate

At the time of takeover-26.1.2007

As on Sept 2011

40% 2.25%

DT Failure Rate reduced by 38%

Major Accomplishments : Load Shedding
At the time of takeover

At present

10 to 12
hours

Reduction in losses has improved power

reliability
 Major Accomplishments :
Accurate Metering
At present

At the time of takeover

23% 99.9%
Major Accomplishments: AT&C Loss
At the time of takeover

As on Sept 2011

17%
12 month
58%
Moving
Average

Reduction of 41%
Agra Franchisee Model Of Power
Distribution
Torrent Power Limited
Operations taken over from 1St
April;2010
 Major Accomplishments : Agra
Distribution Transformer Failure Rate
At the time of takeover-1.4.2010

As on Dec; 2012

31% 8%

DT Failure Rate reduced by 74%

Major Accomplishments : Load Shedding-Agra

At the time of takeover-1.4.20`10

At present-
Dec;2012

10 hours

Reduction in losses has improved power

reliability
Major Accomplishments : Accurate Metering-Agra

At present-Dec;2012

At the time of takeover 1.4.2010

23% 97%
 Major Accomplishments: AT&C Loss-Agra
At the time of takeover 1.4.2010

As on Dec; 2012

78% 50%

Reduction of 29%
 PGCIL To Control SLDCs

 The essence of previous slide is that PGCIL should

control all SLDCs to thwart the misgivings of the type
of 30 & 31St July;2013
 PGCIL, the CTU , shall form JVs with STUs
 Thus UFRs(Under Frequency Relays) will not be
under the control of SLDC but RLDC
 National Grid, Formation Of NLDC
 At 12.22 PM,26Th Aug;2006, four of five Grids ; NR, WR, ER and NER were
integrated.
 Installed capacity of these four Grids was 88,000 MW and connected load 66,000
MW.
 Before that the transfer capacity was only 1100 MW.
 National Grid was provisionally formed in April;2009 at a total cost of about 16
Million USD

 The transfer capacity, now at 30,000 MW, will be scaled up gradually.

 NLDC is a derivative of National Grid.
 All Grid Operations, carried out by Power System Operation
Corporation(POSOCO), a wholly owned subsidiary of PGCIL.

 Inter regional Power transfer capacity of National Grid increased from 18,700
MW to 19,800 MW in Dec2008. By March 2010, this capacity was enhanced to
23,400 MW and doubled to 37,500 MW by 2012

 NLDC is linked to five RLDCs, 31 SLDCs 51 Sub LDCs and 1080 RTUs

 NLDC is likely to be fully operational by March;2014, when SR also will be fully

integrated.
 European Grid

 Current discussions amongst TSO operators of 11

countries of Central Europe suggest the evolution
of a European Grid in place of National TSOs.
These have become necessary for common
security assessments, day – ahead congestion
forecast and congestion management.