THE FEDERALIST

PAPERS
“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected.”

– Publius (James Madison), Federalist No. 45, January 26th, 1788

 Hamilton, Federalist # 78

• But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate

authority, of an original and derivative power, the nature and reason of
the thing indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be followed.

• They teach us that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred

to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and
that accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the
Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to
the latter and disregard the former.
 Hamilton, Federalist # 78

• It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a

repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case
of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every
adjudication upon any single statute.

• The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be
disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence
would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative
body. The observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that there ought
to be no judges distinct from that body.
 The Judicial Power

 The power of our Federal Judiciary comes primarily

from two sources:
 Article III of the Constitution
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
 Judiciary Act of 1789
 The Judicial Power

Although most studies of the US Supreme Court consider that its

true power only begins after Chief Justice Marshall’s landmark
decision in 1803, there were some important decisions prior to that
time.
 Court determines that law authorizing justices to hear disability pension
claims of veterans violates separation of powers
 Hayburn’s Case 2 (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)
 Court declines to issue advisory opinions--Neutrality Act of 1793
 Controversies between individual states and citizens of other states were
under the jurisdiction of federal courts and state conduct was subject to
judicial review.
 Chisholm v Georgia 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)
 Overturned by the 11th Amendment in 1794
 Hamilton, Federalist # 81

• But this doctrine is not deducible from any circumstance peculiar to the plan
of the convention, but from the general theory of a limited Constitution; and as
far as it is true, is equally applicable to most, if not to all the State
governments.

• There can be no objection, therefore, on this account, to the federal

judicature which will not lie against the local judicatures in general, and
which will not serve to condemn every constitution that attempts to set
bounds to legislative discretion.
 Hamilton, Federalist # 84

The most considerable of the remaining objections (to the

proposed constitution) is that the plan of the convention
contains no bill of rights.
 Hamilton, Federalist # 84

• It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their
origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgements of
prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the
prince.

• Such was MAGNA CHARTA, obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King John.
Such were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding princes.

• Such was the PETITION OF RIGHT assented to by Charles I., in the beginning of his
reign. Such, also, was the Declaration of Right presented by the Lords and Commons to
the Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of parliament
called the Bill of Rights.
 Hamilton, Federalist # 84

• It is evident, therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they have no

application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and
executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the
people surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have no need of
particular reservations.

• "WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity, do ORDAIN and ESTABLISH this Constitution for
the United States of America.'' Here is a better recognition of popular rights, than
volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our
State bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics
than in a constitution of government.
 Hamilton, Federalist # 84

• I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the
extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the
proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous.
• They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and,
on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more
than were granted.
• For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of
the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which
restrictions may be imposed? 
 Hamilton, Federalist # 84

• I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is
evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for
claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the
Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the
abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the provision against restraining
the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper
regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national government.

• This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would be given
to the doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal
for bills of rights.
 Hamilton, Federalist # 84

• On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much as has been said, I cannot
forbear adding a remark or two: in the first place, I observe, that there is not a
syllable concerning it in the constitution of this State; in the next, I contend, that
whatever has been said about it in that of any other State, amounts to nothing. What
signifies a declaration, that "the liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved''?
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not
leave the utmost latitude for evasion?

• I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever
fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must
altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and
of the government. And here, after all, as is intimated upon another occasion,
must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights.
 Hamilton, Federalist # 84

• The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the
Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful
purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS. . . the proposed Constitution, if adopted,
will be the bill of rights of the Union. . .
 Judiciary Act of 1789
Section 13

SEC. 13. And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its
citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter
case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction. And shall have exclusively all such
jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their
domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the
law of nations; and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors,
or other public ministers, or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party. And the trial of
issues in fact in the Supreme Court, in all actions at law against citizens of the United States,
shall be by jury. The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit
courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for; and
shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding as courts
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the
principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under
the authority of the United States.
 Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Background
• Election of 1800
• Federalist Party loses presidency and both Houses of Congress to
Republicans
• Before Jefferson takes office on March 4, 1801 Chief Justice Oliver
Ellsworth retires and John Marshall is appointed and confirmed
• Lame duck Congress passes Judiciary Act of 1801
• Created 58 federal circuit judgeships and 42 justices of the peace for
the District of Columbia
• Last commissions appointed, confirmed, signed and sealed on
March 3, 1801
• William Marbury’s commission to justice of the peace never
delivered.
 Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Madison takes over as Secretary of State, refuses to deliver

Marbury’s commission
Marbury sues directly with U.S. Supreme Court, asking for a “writ of
mandamus” directing Madison to deliver his commission, as authorized
under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
Court considers three questions:
1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?
2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his
country afford him a remedy?
3. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?
 Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Chief Justice Marshall:

The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the
law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to
their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric
has been erected.
The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor
ought it to be frequently repeated.
 Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Chief Justice Marshall:

It is a proposition too plain to be contested, either that the
Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that
the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground.
The constitution is either a superior, paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it.
 Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States

confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is
void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution, the court must determine
which of these conflicting rules governs the case.
This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
 Judicial Review

• The exercise of the power of judicial review by the

Supreme Court remained a matter of considerable
controversy for decades after Marbury.
• The Supreme Court did not declare another law of
Congress unconstitutional until 54 years later
• The infamous Dred Scott v Sandford (1857) case, where the
Court declared the Missouri Compromise of 1820
unconstitutional.
.
 Hamilton, Federalist # 81

• In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan under

consideration which DIRECTLY empowers the national courts to
construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, or
which gives them any greater latitude in this respect than may be
claimed by the courts of every State.

• I admit, however, that the Constitution ought to be the

standard of construction for the laws, and that wherever there is
an evident opposition, the laws ought to give place to the
Constitution.