Deconstructing Agrarian

Reform in the Philippines

Characteristics of Agrarian Reform
Regulation on tenancy
Resettlement to public lands
Appropriation and redistribution of private lands

“Since the Commonwealth period, among these three broad categories of land reform
measures, governments in the past tended to rely more heavily on the first two
(tenancy regulation and resettlement) rather than on the politically contentious land
redistribution” (Fuwa, 2000).
History of Land Reform in the Philippines
The present land tenure system in the Philippines is mainly the result of several centuries of
Spanish colonial rule which displaced or discouraged small native landholders and
concentrated land ownership in the hands of a relatively small number of wealthy Spanish and
Filipino individuals, families and associations. The displaced native landowners became largely
sharecroppers or hired labor on the lands acquired by the Spanish, mestizo and Filipino elites.

1933 Rice Share Tenancy Act became the first law to regulate landlord tenant relationships
providing for a 50-50 sharing contract where the “tenant’s share was exempted from
repayment claims of debt to landlords.

 “The 1954 Agricultural Tenancy Act limited land rent at 30%, placed an interest rate cap of 8 –
10% per annum, and increased tenants’ exceptions from creditors’ liens” (Fuwa, 2000).

“The 1955 Land Reform Act embraced the idea of compulsory land expropriation for rice lands
but the retention limit was set generously at 300 contiguous hectare for private lands planted
with rice, 600 hectare for corporate farms, and 1024 hectares for private farms other than rice”
(Takigawa et al 1976 as cited by Fuwa).

Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963- stated goal “to establish owner-cultivatorship and the
economic family-sized farm … to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant…”
(Hayami et al as cited by Fuwa, 2000)
Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963

A distinct feature of the Code was that, unlike in the earlier land reform initiatives,
land reform was considered as a means to increase agricultural productivity, which, in
turn, was based on the need for supply of cheap food for urban consumers as well as the
‘Marshallian view’ of inefficient share tenancy which was widespread among young
economist-technocRats of the day (ibid).
 The Code stipulated a two step procedure for land redistribution: (1) “Operation
Leasehold,” which was to convert share tenancy to leasehold with the fixed rent at 25
percent of the average harvest in the three normal years preceding the Operation, and
(2) “Operation Land Transfer,” where the government was to expropriate land in excess
of the retention limit of 75 hectares, with compensation to landowners of 10 percent of
the land value in cash and the rest in interest free Land Bank bonds, and then was to
resell to tenants for annual amortization payments within twenty five years (ibid).
Limitations of Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963
The reform Code covered only rice and corn land.
This meant that landowners could avoid land reform implementation simply by shifting
their crop away from rice or corn.
Another fault in design was that there was no sanctions against evasion through
transforming land use or transferring ownership to family members, which were
common means of sabotaging land reform implementation.
The Code required that the National Land Reform Council should first declare a given
region to be covered by the program before actual implementation could proceed in a
given region
Land Reform Under Marcos Presidency
 Congress passed the Code of Agrarian Reform (Republic Act No. 6389). It established
the Department of Agrarian Reform, which declared the entire Philippines a land reform
area.
 The law provided for the automatic conversion of tenancy to leasehold tenancy in all
areas and declared share tenancy illegal, included regulations on interest rates, on the
sale of farm animals and implements and on the conversion of agricultural land into
other uses, and finally, reduced the landlord retention limit from 75 hectares to 24
hectares.
 P.D. 27- The Tenant Emancipation Act- was pronounced to convert small fanners who
had been tenants into owners of the land they cultivated. eligible tenant farmers receive
a Land Transfer Certificate, issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, for the land they
occupy and cultivate, up to a maximum three hectares if irrigated or five hectares if
unirrigated land.
Agrarian Reform Post Marcos Era to the Present
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program- R.A. 6657
•It is the redistribution of public and private agricultural lands to farmers and
farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement.
•Land Tenure Improvement, which seeks to hasten distribution of lands to landless
farmers. Similarly, the Department offers Support Services to the beneficiaries such as
infrastructure facilities, marketing assistance program, credit assistance program, and
technical support programs. 
•CARPER or Republic Act 9700, signed 7 August 2009, gave the original Republic Act
6657 or CARP five more years to be completed. 
Agrarian Reform Comparison
JAPAN
Land Reform Committee
•Consisted of 13 members was created for each
village
•More importantly, the Japanese Land Reform
Committee consisted of representatives of the
tenant farmer (5), of the owner-farmer (3) and of
the landlord (2) plus (at least) 3 staff
PHILIPPINES
DAR
•Consisted of 20 members covered one municipality
which in turn covered more than 20 villages, indicating
the extremely heavy burden placed on the Philippine
reform institution.
•While the Philippine Agrarian Reform Team members
were all DAR staff members
•This meant that in the Philippines, unlike in Japan, the
land reform implementation design had no direct
involvement by the peasant beneficiaries.
•“Interestingly, as to the studies of Philippine farms
under the land reform experience, the comparative
performance of farms that are recipients of CARP have
lower average productivity than non-CARP farms.”
(Sicat, 2014)
State and Challenges for Agrarian Reform
Culture- the hacenderos took paternalistic care of ‘their’ people from birth to death,
serving as godparents, providing medical care, and even bailing them out of jail, on
occasions – a form of complete subservience or loyalty to their masters.
Other land reform acts were passed under the Magsaysay and Macapagal
administrations, but were failures given the lobbying efforts of landlords and
insufficiency of government funding.
“Many LGUs are still susceptible to narrow interests of clientilist politicians who give
priority to their longevity in office than to the development of their territory. Hence,
they tend to focus on tactical financial gains then on longterm development
objectives and people’s participation in governance.” (Quitoriano as cited by
Macaranas, 2009)
“Worse, politicians in the provinces maintain so-called Partisan Armed Groups (PAGs)
which serve as their private armies, pawns in effect, protecting their political and
economic power. These act as assassins of their political rivals to ensure their electoral
victories.” (Paredes, 2004)
Lack of reliable (i. e., undisputed) land registration records as well as of ‘well-
disciplined bureaucracy
Furthermore, since the reform program covered lands planted with only rice and
corn, the reform program created an incentive for landowners, who would have
continued rice or corn production without land reform, to shift from rice or corn
production to other crops excluded from the reform program for the sake of avoiding
being subject to the reform program.
 State and Challenges for Agrarian Reform
This likely distorted incentives for agricultural production contributing to inefficiency
in land (and other) resource allocation although it is difficult to quantify the effect of
the reform program on such crop-shifting.
Agrarian reform mainly applied only to the lands cultivated by tenants and non-
tenanted lands (i. e., lands under the direct management by landowners with hired
laborers) were exempt from land reform. This provided an incentive for landowners, in
an attempt to avoid land reform application, to evict tenants and convert their lands
into farms with direct management using hired laborers.
Studies based on micro-level surveys suggest that conversion of share tenancy into
leasehold was equally slow and uneven, and there are reports of areas where tenancy
contract, once converted to leasehold, was reverted back to share tenancy.
The technical working paper of the World Bank (2009) further posited that the modest
impact of CARP on poverty alleviation and growth had been mainly due to DAR’s
inability to prioritize the acquisition of private agricultural lands through compulsory
acquisition.
As a consequence, there have remained areas where (supposedly illegal) share
tenancy is the dominant contract on rice fields (Fuwa, 2000).
References
Fuwa, N. (2000). Politics and Economics of Land Reform in the Philippines: a
survey. Matsudo City: Chiba University.
Macaranas, B. (2009). Feudal Work Systems and Poverty: The Philippine
Experience. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
Paredes, A.K. (2004, September 8). Special Report: The assassins of Abra, ‘Just
like killing chicken.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. A1.
Sicat, G. P. (February 26, 2014). Agrarian reform and economic
development: ‘equity’ with efficiency. Philppine Star. Accessed December
21, 2017, from, http://www.philstar.com/business/2014/02/26/1294499/agrari
an-reform-and-economic-development-equity-efficiency
Thank You!