FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR

ACCIDENT
11 March 2011

SRI GHANESH MUNIANDY

METE221011
• The Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant is in the
town of Okuma sits on the
country's east coast,
• about 220km (137 miles)
north-east of the capital
Tokyo.
• On 11 March 2011 at 14:46
local time (05:46 GMT) the
earthquake - known as the
Great East Japan Earthquake,
or the 2011 Tohoku
earthquake - struck east of the
city of Sendai, 97km north of
the plant.
What happened
at Fukushima?
• Systems at the nuclear plant detected the earthquake and
automatically shut down the nuclear reactors. Emergency diesel
generators turned on to keep coolant pumping around the cores,
which remain incredibly hot even after reactions stop.
• But soon after a wave over 14 metres (46ft) high hit Fukushima.
The water overwhelmed the defensive sea wall, flooding the plant
and knocking out the emergency generators.
• Workers rushed to restore power, but in the days that followed the
nuclear fuel in three of the reactors overheated and partly melted
the cores - something known as a nuclear meltdown.
• The plant also suffered a number of chemical explosions which
badly damaged the buildings. Radioactive material began leaking
into the atmosphere and the Pacific Ocean, prompting the
evacuations and an ever-widening exclusion zone.
CAUSES OF THE FUKUSHIMA
ACCIDENT 
Failure of the plant owner (Tokyo Electric Power Company) and the principal regulator
(Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency) to protect critical safety equipment at the plant from
flooding in spite of mounting evidence that the plant's current design basis for tsunamis was
inadequate.

The loss of nearly all onsite AC and DC power at the plant—with the consequent loss of real-
time information for monitoring critical thermodynamic parameters in reactors,
containments, and spent fuel pools and for sensing and actuating critical valves and
equipment—greatly narrowed options for responding to the accident.

The lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities within the onsite emergency response center
and between the onsite and headquarters emergency response centers may have contributed
to response delays.

Multiunit interactions complicated the accident response. Unit operators competed for
physical resources and the attention and services of staff in the onsite emergency response
center.

Failures to transmit information and instructions in an accurate and timely manner

hindered responses to the accident. These failures resulted partly from the loss of
communications systems and the challenging operating environments throughout the plant.
LESSONS LEARNED

Improve nuclear
plant systems, Strengthen
resources, and capabilities for
training to enable assessing risks from
effective ad hoc beyond-design-
responses to severe basis events.
accidents.

Examine offsite
Strengthen
emergency
capabilities for
response
assessing risks from
capabilities and
beyond-design-
make necessary
basis events.
improvements.