FORENSIC ENGINEERING

Willow Island Collapse

By: Pragya
 Introduction


Case Study- Overview C
Cooling Towers- Construction Details
 Construction Methodology O
 Failure of the Towers
 Cause of Failure N
 Investigation by NBS
 Investigation by LZA T


Health and Safety
Conclusion Of Investigation
E


Cost
Legal Consequences
N


Future after the Failure T
Lessons Learnt
 Victims S
 Conclusion
 References
 INTRODUCTION

• FORENSIC ENGINEERING IS THE APPLICATION OF ENGINEERING

PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGIES TO ANSWER QUESTIONS OF
FACT. THESE QUESTIONS OF FACT ARE USUALLY ASSOCIATED
WITH ACCIDENTS, CRIMES, CATASTROPHIC EVENTS,
DEGRADATION OF PROPERTY, AND VARIOUS TYPES OF
FAILURES.
• USING ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, A FORENSIC
ENGINEER ANALYZES THE COLLECTED EVIDENCE AND MAKES
AN OFFICIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CAUSES OF STRUCTURAL
FAILURE.
 OVERVIEW
OF THE
CASE
• COLLAPSE OF A COOLING TOWER
UNDER CONSTRUCTION.
• DATE : APRIL 27, 1978

• LOCATION : WILLOW ISLAND, WEST

VIRGINIA, U.S.A
• CAUSE : THE SCAFFOLDING FAILED
BECAUSE THE CONCRETE HOLDING IT
HAD BEEN GIVEN INSUFFICIENT TIME TO
CURE.
• INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY OSHA
AND NBS.
• OUTCOME : 51 CONSTRUCTION
WORKERS KILLED.
 CONSTRUCTION
DETAILS
• 2 NATURAL DRAUGHT HYPERBOLIC COOLING
TOWERS WERE TO BE BUILT FOR THE PLEASANTS
POWER STATION.
• THEY WERE WITH THE SHAPE OF DISTORTED
HOURGLASS, TO ENABLE AIR TO CIRCULATE
WITHOUT FANS.
• THE BASE DIAMETER WAS CONSTANT AT 109M.
• HANON COOLING TOWER DIVISION OF RESEARCH-
COTTRELL, INC. (R-C), NEW JERSEY DESIGNED
THESE 2 TOWERS.
• R-C HELD A $12 MILLION SUBCONTRACT FOR THE
PAIR OF 131-M TALL TOWERS.
• THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR OF THE PROJECT WAS
UNITED ENGINEERS AND CONSTRUCTORS.
 CONSTRUCTION
METHODOLOGY

• THE LIFT-FORM SCAFFOLDING WAS

MADE UP OF FIVE BASIC
COMPONENTS: JUMP-FORM BEAMS,
ANCHOR ASSEMBLIES, JACKING
FRAMES, FORMWORK, AND
SCAFFOLDING PLATFORMS.
• AT THE TOP LEVEL, THE
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS WERE
RECEIVED BY THE HOISTING SYSTEM.
• THE SECOND LEVEL WAS USED ONLY
DURING THE FORMWORK
ADJUSTMENT PROCESS.
• THE THIRD AND FOURTH LEVEL
PROVIDED ACCESS TO THE JUMP-
FORM BEAMS, ALONG WITH FINAL
SURFACE PREPARATION LIKE
• THE SCAFFOLDING SYSTEM WAS ENTIRELY
SUPPORTED BY THE PREVIOUSLY COMPLETED
PORTION OF THE TOWER.
• HE CONCRETE AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
WERE DELIVERED BY 6 CATHEAD GANTRY
CRANES, TO THE WORKING PLATFORMS. THE LEGS
OF EACH CATHEAD GANTRY WERE ATTACHED TO
THE ALUMINUM JUMP-FORM BEAMS, 3.7M APART.
• A STATIC LINE GUIDED ALL OF THE MATERIALS AS
THEY WERE HOISTED TO THE WORKING
PLATFORMS.
• BOTH THE CATHEADS AND STATIC LINE HAD TO
BE ADJUSTED PERIODICALLY DURING
CONSTRUCTION DUE TO THE CHANGING
GEOMETRY OF THE TOWER.
 FAILURE OF THE COOLING TOWER

• ON APRIL 27, 1978, TOWER NUMBER 2 HAD REACHED A HEIGHT OF 166 FEET (51 M).
• JUST AFTER 10:00 A.M., AS THE THIRD BUCKET OF CONCRETE WAS BEING RAISED, THE CABLE
HOISTING THE BUCKET SLACKENED, AND THE CRANE PULLING IT UP FELL TOWARD THE
INSIDE OF THE TOWER.
• THE PREVIOUS DAY'S CONCRETE THEN STARTED TO COLLAPSE. CONCRETE BEGAN TO
UNWRAP FROM THE TOP OF THE TOWER, FIRST PEELING COUNTER-CLOCKWISE, THEN IN
BOTH DIRECTIONS.
• A JUMBLE OF CONCRETE, WOODEN FORMS, AND METAL SCAFFOLDING FELL INTO THE
HOLLOW CENTER OF THE TOWER.
• ALL FIFTY-ONE CONSTRUCTION WORKERS ON THE SCAFFOLD FELL TO THEIR DEATHS.
 CAUSE OF THE FAILURE

•INSTANTLY AFTER THE COLLAPSE, THE

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS (NBS)
BEGAN AN INVESTIGATION ON THE
AUTHORITY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA) TO
WORK OUT THE MAIN BEHIND THE ACCIDENT.
•ASSUMING THE FAILURE OF THE TOWER TO
HAPPEN APPROXIMATELY 20 HOURS AFTER
THE COMPLETION OF THE TOWER SECTION
DETECTED NEAR CATHEAD GANTRY NUMBER
FOUR AND CURING THE CONCRETE AT 4.4°C.
HENCE THE TOWER WAS THE MAIN CAUSE OF
THE FAILURE.
•THE ENTIRE SYSTEM WAS DIVIDED INTO THREE SECTION:

•THE HOISTING SYSTEM - THIS WAS INVESTIGATED FIRST AS THE

FAILURE WAS INITIATED AT THE LOCATION OF THE CATHEAD
GANTRY FOUR. THE DEBRIS, THEY WERE EXAMINED TO SEE WHICH
PART FAILED FIRST. THEY LAB TESTED THE HOISTING CABLE,
STATIC LINE, CHAIN HOIST AND ANCHOR DEVICES OF THE SYSTEM.
THIS INDICATED THAT THE HOISTING SYSTEM WAS NOT THE CAUSE
OF THE FAILURE.

•THE SCAFFOLDING SYSTEM – THE LAB TESTS DETERMINED THAT

THE BOLT FAILURE WAS NOT THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE
FAILURE AS THE HOISTING SYSTEM COULD NOT PRODUCE A LARGE
FORCE.

•THE TOWER- THE STRENGTH AND OTHER MECHANICAL

PROPERTIES OF THE CONCRETE IN THE NUMBER 28 LIFT HAD TO BE
EXAMINED. THE WEATHER THAT WEEK HAD BEEN COLD AND RAINY.
 • Was the collapse caused by the

Investigation by
collision of concrete bucket?
• Was the collapse by the snapping of
cable?

National Bureau
• Was the collapse caused by a
component failure of the hoisting,
scaffolding, or formwork systems?
• Was the collapse caused by overload or

of Standards overpressure?
• Was the collapse caused by system's
hoisting cable, static line, chain hoist,

(NBS)
and anchor mechanism?
• Was the collapse caused by bolt
failure?
 INVESTIGATION BY
LEV ZETLIN

WHILE THE NBS WAS INVESTIGATING FOR OSHA,

LEV ZETLIN ASSOCIATES (LZA) WAS PERFORMING
ANOTHER INVESTIGATION, ON BEHALF OF THE
GENERAL CONTRACTOR . LZA’S FINDINGS
DISAGREED WITH THOSE OF THE NBS
INVESTIGATION. LZA CLAIMED THAT THE MOST
PROBABLE CAUSE OF FAILURE WAS THE EARLY
REMOVAL OF ANCHOR BOLTS AND CONES FROM
THE LOWER PORTION OF LIFT NUMBER 27. LZA
BELIEVED THAT IF THE ANCHOR BOLTS HAD BEEN
LEFT IN PLACE AND STAYED ATTACHED TO THE
JUMP-FORM BEAMS, THE COLLAPSE WOULD HAVE
NEVER OCCURRED.
CONCLUSION OF INVESTIGATION
THE CONCLUSION GIVEN BY NBI
INVESTIGATORS WAS THAT IF THE BASE OF
STATIC LINE WAS NOT REMOVED , THERE
WOULDN’T BE THE OCCURRENCE OF
COLLAPSE AND FAILURE OF THE CONCRETE
IN LIFT NUMBER 28.
AT THE TIME OF COLLAPSE IF THE LOCATION
OF THE BASE OF STATIC LOAD LINE WAS NOT
MOVED NEARER TO THE CENTRE OF THE
TOWER, THE CRITICAL STRESS RESULTANTS
WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS THAN THE
ULTIMATE STRENGTH OF THE CONCRETE IN
LIFT NUMBER 28, WAS DETERMINED.
 HEALTH AND SAFETY
Possible reasons for the accident are:

Construction workers were working too fast

-Concrete was left to dry for only a day
-Workers were too impatient

Workers were too inexperienced

-Poor handling of crane
-Main cause of the accident

Poor evacuation system

-There was only one emergency exit
-Workers could have sustained at most injuries rather
than death
 COST
• THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
(OSHA) CHARGED THE WILLOW ISLAND CONTRACTORS FOR 10
DIFFERENT VIOLATIONS
• OSHA AND THE WILLOW ISLAND CONTRACTORS SETTLED ON A
PRICE OF $85,500 FOR THE CASE ($1700 PER DEAD WORKER)
• A PENALTY WAS PUT FORWARD FOR APPROXIMATELY FOR
$108,300
• ALTHOUGH OSHA SUGGESTED THE CASE BE PUT UNDER
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, THERE WERE NO CHARGES IN THE
END
 LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
DESIGNERS
OSHA issued ten willful citations and six serious citations against R-
C. Five of the willful citations appeared to be directly related to the
collapse. The charges included:

Before removing the framework, they failed to test test field- cured
concrete specimens.

Anchoring of scaffolding and frameworks were improper.

Specifications were not designed properly.

Lack of proper erection instruction on site.

Training of employees wasn’t adequate.

FUTURE AFTER COOLING
TOWER FAILURE
• THE THREE COMPANIES THAT FACED LEGAL
REPERCUSSIONS WEREN’T THE SOLE ONES
VULNERABLE AFTER THE DISASTER. OSHA
WAS CRITICIZED FOR NOT APPLYING STRICT
ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS.
 
AS A RESULTS OF THIS DISASTER, OSHA
ADOPTED NEW GUIDELINES:-
• FIRST BIG STEP THAT OSHA TOOK TOWARD
PROTECTING FUTURE CONSTRUCTION
WORKERS WAS MAKING CHANGES WITHIN
THE U.S. CONSTRUCTION SAFETY ACT.
• ANOTHER MAJOR CHANGE WAS THAT OSHA
REMOVED A SCHEDULE TABLE FOR
FORMWORK REMOVAL.
• OTHER GUIDELINES THAT OSHA ADOPTED
AFTER THE ACCIDENT INCLUDED HAVING A
SPECIALIST REVIEW CONSTRUCTION PLANS
FOR COOLING TOWERS AND REQUIRING THAT
AN IN DEAPTH SAFETY MANUAL BE
DEVELOPED AS A PART OF THE
DEVELOPMENT PLAN.
• ALSO, OSHA IMPROVED THEIR INSPECTION
PROCEDURES.
 • The significance of wellbeing norms during the
development cycle
• A development plan and has expanded wellbeing
examinations to ensure that another Fiasco like
this doesn’t occur.
LESSON • Unacceptable materials and plan blunders are
recognized as significant reasons for part
LEARNT: disappointment. Building breakdowns can
demonstrate hazardous and unforgiving to both
inhabitant and rescuer.
• stay cautious, prepared and prepared in
expectation for anything that we are gathered to
deal with. Remaining prepared keeps responders
safe and offers the best assistance for the clients
whom we are committed to Protect.
 Chet Payne, St. Marys
Edgar A. Phillips, Marietta, Ohio
Raymond W. Poling, Thornton
Robert C. Riley, Parkersburg
Ray R. Rollyson, Pennsboro
Floyd Rupe, Dexter, Ohio
Alan W. Sampson, Parkersburg
Glen E. Satterfield, St. Marys
Jeffry F. Snyder, Vienna
Earnest Steele, St. Marys
Emmett R. Steele, St. Marys
Larry G. Steele, St. Marys
Miles E. Steele, St. Marys
Ronald D. Steele, St. Marys
Richard A. Stoke, Waverly
Richard P. Swick, Beverly, Ohio
Brian H. Taylor, St. Marys
Dale Martin Wagoner, Belington
Charles Warren, Parkersburg
Jackie R. Westfall, Newport, Ohio
Lewis D. Wildman, Stouts Mills
VICTIMS
Ronald W. Yocum, Parkersburg
Gary Hinkle, Parkersburg
Larry Deem, Parkersburg
Fred Pride, St. Marys
Joseph V. Bafile, Washington, Pa.
James B. Blouir, St. Marys
Robert W. Blouir, St. Marys
Steve D. Blouir, St. Marys
Kenneth E. Boring, Salem
Richard L. Bowser, Parkersburg
Thomas E. Cross, St. Marys
William R. Cunningham, Parkersburg
Roy F. Deem, Waverly
Ray Deulley, Glenville
Darryl Glover, Moundsville
Loren K. Glover, Moundsville
Alvin W. Goff, Tuppers Plains, Ohio
Gary L. Gossett, Walker
James A. Harrison, Parkersburg
Claude J. Hendrickson, St. Marys
Daniel R. Hensler, Newport, Ohio
Kenneth V. Hill, Midland, Pa.
Roger K. Hunt, Parkersburg
Tom G. Kaptis, Cairo
C. Randy Lowther, St. Marys
Ronald Lee Mathers, Walker
Howard R. McBrayer Jr., St. Marys
Willard H. McCown, Pennsboro
Clayton P. "Paul" Monroe, Parkersburg
Robert B. Moore, Flatwoods
 CONCLUSION
• BY APRIL 27, 1978, THE FIRST TOWER AT WILLOW ISLAND WAS DONE, AND THE
SECOND TOWER HAD REACHED A HEIGHT OF 166 FEET.

• THE WILLOW ISLAND DISASTER HAD SEVERAL CAUSES, MOSTLY PREVENTABLE.

 THE CONCRETE HADN’T CURED. 

 THE SCAFFOLDING WASN’T SECURED PROPERLY. 

 THE HOISTING SYSTEM WAS MODIFIED WITHOUT CONSULTING AN ENGINEER. 

 THE CONSTRUCTION TEAM WAS RUSHING.

• CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENTS HAPPEN WHEN SAVING MONEY IS VALUED MORE THAN

PROTECTING LIFE.

• OVERALL, DUE TO THE RECKLESSNESS THROUGHOUT THIS PROJECT, THE LACK OF

EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE WORKERS, THE ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE THE TOWER IN
A SHORTER TIME, AND THE FAILURE TO TAKE PROPER SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
CAUSED THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND COOLING TOWER, RESULTING IN THE
DEATHS OF 51 CONSTRUCTION WORKERS.
 REFERENCES
1. 30 Years Ago: 51 Workers Die at Willow Island | The Pump Handle. (n.d.).
Retrieved from https://thepumphandle.wordpress.com/2008/04/27/30-years-ago-51-
workers-die-at-willow-island/
2. 30 Years Ago: 51 Workers Die at Willow Island – The Pump Handle. (n.d.).
Retrieved from http://scienceblogs.com/thepumphandle/2008/04/27/30-years-ago-51-
workers-die-at-willow-island/
3. Failure of Cooling Tower West Virginia 1978. (n.d.). Retrieved from
http://www.nist.gov/el/disasterstudies/construction/failure_cooling_tower_1978.cfm
4. Mohawk College Library - Off Campus Login. (n.d.). Retrieved from
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.mohawkcollege.ca:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/
pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=f8a6f494-5112-4eef-bb4d-a205c93f6e5a
%40sessionmgr113&hid=102
5. Willow Island disaster - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. (n.d.). Retrieved
December 7, 2015, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Willow_Island_disaster