Truth and The World: DR David J. J. Austin University of York Spring Term 2023 (PHI00137H)

TRUTH Dr David J. J.
Austin
University of York
AND THE Spring Term 2023

(PHI00137H)
WORLD Lecture 8
RECAP
TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
Truth-maker theory says that there is an intimate link between truth and
ontology:
Between what is the case and what there is.
According to truth-maker theory, for a proposition to be true requires there
to be some entity or entities that make it true.
The truth-makers are the ontological ground of the truth – their existence
explains why the proposition in question is true.
TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 3

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
More formally:
TM: is true if, and only if, is made true by some existing
entity or entities.

TRUTH-MAKER THEORY
It looks very much as if by endorsing TM we are endorsing the thought that

all truths depend on what exists:
For any , is true if, and only if, it is made true by some
existing entity or entities.
This is called ‘truth-maker maximalism’.

NEGATIVE TRUTHS
THE PROBLEM OF NEGATIVE
TRUTHS
What are negative truths?

Negative truths are true propositions. Specifically, they are true
propositions that:
represent particular entities, or collections of entities, as not
existing.

TRUTHS
Examples:
<There is no hippopotamus in the room>
<there are no unicorns>
<there are no arctic penguins>
<the Lock Ness monster does not exist>

TRUTHS
If truth-maker maximalism is true, then, like any other true propositions,

negative truths must have truth-makers.
That is, negative truths must have entities that make them true – entities
in virtue of which they are true.

TRUTHS
But this raises the question:

What kind of entities are suitable to play the role of truth-makers for
negative truths?

Bertrand Russell, in 1918,
reluctantly settled on the idea
that the solution to negative
truths must be the acceptance of
negative facts…
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NEGATIVE FACTS?
So, just as there could be a fact in the world of

a hippopotamus being in the room
there might in its place be a 'negative fact’ of
there being no such hippopotamus.
The acceptability of this solution, however, rests on the metaphysical
credentials of negative facts…

David Armstrong thinks that
Russell is on to something!
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ARMSTRONGIAN STATES OF
AFFAIRS
Armstrong is a truth-maker maximalist.

He is also an immanent universalist (i.e., properties are universals exist
only at their instantiations), who holds a two-category ontology:
(i) Thin particulars
(ii) Universals (both monadic and polyadic)
But for him, the world is a world of states of affairs.

AFFAIRS
Consider the following:

<David is a lecturer>
It can’t be that the particular ‘David’ is the truth-maker for this truth, since
if we take ‘David’ alone, it’s possible that David does not instantiate the
property of being a lecturer.

AFFAIRS

Similarly, it can’t be that the (monadic) universal ‘___’s being a lecturer’
alone is the truth-maker for this truth, since it’s possible that someone else
is a lecture, not David.

AFFAIRS

Moreover, it can’t be that the mereological sum of the particular ‘David’
and the (monadic) universal ‘___’s being a lecturer’ is the truth-maker for
<David is a lecturer>, because both may exist without <David is a
lecturer> being true.

AFFAIRS
What we need, according to Armstrong, is some non-mereological sum of

the particular, David, which instantiates the universal of being a lecturer,
where the instantiation of universals by particulars supervenes upon what
particulars and what universals there are.
This is the state of affairs that makes <David is a lecturer> true.
Although the particular, David, and the universal ‘___’s being a lecturer’,
as well as their non-mereological sum are all contingent existents…
The state of affairs necessitates the truth <David is a lecturer>.
AFFAIRS
In other words:
If the state of affairs of David’s being a lecturer makes true <David is a
lecturer>, then there is no alternative world in which that state of affairs
obtains and <David is a lecturer> is false.
For Armstrong, then, the relation between a truth-maker and a truth is an
internal relation. If it were not, i.e., if it were an extrinsic relation, it
would be contingent.
But it is not contingent since the truth-maker necessitates the truth.
AFFAIRS
If the world is a world of states of affairs, then given all the non-
mereologically united states of affairs, one is given the whole world.
Molecular states of affairs, e.g., David’s being a lecturer and a musician,
plus all their mereological relations to each other, e.g., David’s being a
lecturer, Gordan Ramsey being a chef, Luna being the name of my cat,
thus all supervene on this world of states of affairs.

ARMSTRONG ON
NEGATIVE TRUTHS
ARMSTRONG ON NEGATIVE
TRUTHS
With all that in place, how exactly does Armstrong deal with the case of
negative truths?

TRUTHS
He starts by inviting us to suppose a simple world in which:

a is F and b is G
and where no other states of affairs obtain. He then asks
What is the truth-maker for the truths <a is not G> and
?
He wonders whether these truths are simply made true by the positive
states of affairs, a is F and b is G.
TRUTHS
He claims, however, that this can’t be the case because the relation between
truth and truth-maker is internal.
That is, the mere state of affairs of, say, a is F, can’t necessitate the truth
<a is not G>.
Why? Because, for example, the state of affairs
there is tea on the table
cannot serve as the truth-maker for <there is no wine on the table>.
TRUTHS
One thing, Armstrong claims, that would ensure the two negative truths <a
is not G> and are true is this:
that the two positive states of affairs, a is F and b is G, are the only
‘first-order’ states of affairs in this simple world.
But this produces another state of affairs, i.e., that the two first-order states
of affairs are all the first-order states of affairs.
What type of state of affairs is this? A ‘second-order’ state of affairs!

TRUTHS
The idea, here, is this:

With this second-order state of affairs, i.e., that the two first-order
states of affairs are all the first-order states of affairs, as the truth- maker,
the two negative truths, <a is not G> and , and any other
negative truths that obtained in this world, for that matter, would
supervene.

TRUTHS
According to Armstrong, a totalling state of affairs is constituted by a

relational property of ‘totalling’ (or ‘exhausting’ or ‘limiting’) the
particular states of affairs that belong to the totality.
This relation holds if and only if the members of the collection are all the
items that instantiate the state of affairs type.
He calls this the ‘totalling relation’.

TRUTHS
Armstrong is aware that positing higher-order states of affairs might be

objectionable, because it is a sin against economy.
But he observes that even if we ignore negative states of affairs, we still
need what he calls states of affairs of totality, which are high-order states
of affairs.
For example, if we have two states of affairs, a is F and b is G, in this
simple world, it seems necessary to postulate another state of affairs,
namely, that the world contains only these two first-order states of affairs!
TRUTHS
As an aside, notice that Armstrong’s totality states of affairs also provide

the truth-makers for general truths!

TRUTHS
Consider the following question:

What makes <All dalmatians have spots> true?
Why not nothing over and above each particular dalmatian having spots?
That is, if F is taken to be the property of having spots, then the truth-
maker for ‘All dalmatians have spots’ is each particular dalmatian – a, b, c
and so on – being F, right?

This idea, however, is subject to
the following objection, voiced
by Russell:
‘It is perfectly clear, I think, that
when you have enumerated all
the atomic facts…it is a further
fact…that those are all the
atomic facts.’

TRUTHS
Russell’s point is that we need a ‘closure fact’ to the effect that that those
are all the dalmatians there are as part of the proposed truth-maker for ‘All
dalmatians have spots’.
Without a ‘closure fact’, the proposed truth-maker for ‘All dalmatians have
spots’ will be too permissive, making ‘All dalmatians have spots’ true in
worlds in which it shouldn’t be…

TRUTHS
To claim that the truth of a proposition (e.g., <Fa>, or <Fb>, or <Fc>, etc.)
supervenes upon the existence of each spotted dalmatian is unproblematic
according to the truth-maker principle.
Why? Because given the existence of Fa, for example, it will not be
possible for ‘Fa’ to be false – necessitation!

TRUTHS
However, the actual truth, for example, of ‘All dalmatians have spots’
cannot supervene merely upon the existence of each actual spotted
dalmatian – Fa, Fb, Fc, and so on.
Why? Because in another possible world the same dalmatians might exist
yet ‘All dalmatians have spots’ might be false.

TRUTHS
Suppose <All dalmatians have spots> is true, and there are one hundred
dalmatians.
On the picture being considered, the truth-maker for <All dalmatians have
spots> is merely the existence of Fa1, Fa2…Fa100.
So, because of supervenience, whenever you have the state of affairs Fa1,
Fa2…Fa100, ‘All dalmatians have spots’ will be true.

TRUTHS
But now imagine another possible world in which there are one hundred
and one dalmatians, one of which has no spots.
In this world, ‘All dalmatians have spots’ should be false, yet given that the
states of affairs Fa1, Fa2…Fa100 exist, it seems that on the account under
consideration ‘All dalmatians have spots’ must be true in this world, which
is absurd!

‘You must admit general facts as
distinct from and over and above
particular facts.’

Armstrong’s totality states of
affairs seem to do the job!

Having looked at
Armstrong’s solution
to the problem of
negative (and
general) truths, do
you think there’s a
paradox involved in
saying that there is a
fact over and above
all the facts that there
are?
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A PROBLEM FOR
ARMSTRONG
In his classic paper ‘Truthmakers for
Negative Truths’, George Molnar
discusses the problem of how, if
everything in the world is positive, there
can be negative truths…

MOLNAR ON ABSENCES
Consider the following proposition:

<there are no arctic penguins>
Initially, we might think that the absence of arctic penguins is suitable
ontological ground for the truth of this proposition.
Molnar thinks not…

MOLNAR’S FOUR THESES
Molnar holds that the problem of negative truths arises because we are
prone to accept the following metaphysical theses:
(Mi) The world is everything that exists.
(Mii) Everything that exists is positive.
(Miii) Some negative claims about the world are true.
(Miv) Every true claim about the world is made true by something that
exists.
AGAINST NEGATIVE ONTOLOGY
Molnar claims that (i)-(iv) jointly imply that all negative truths must have
positive truth-makers.
Essentially, Molnar is arguing against negative ontology.

Molnar provides three arguments against negative ontology:

• The argument from mysteriousness
• The argument from causation
• The argument from perception



THE ARGUMENT FROM
MYSTERIOUSNESS
Molnar asks:
What are absences?
How would absences fit into our ontology?

THE ARGUMENT FROM
MYSTERIOUSNESS
Normally we think of things, and those things as having properties, but this
sort of analysis is ruled out for absences. Why?
Because absences would also have to be things, things with properties, but
things and properties, as the constituents of absences, do not exist…

THE ARGUMENT FROM
MYSTERIOUSNESS
Consider:
<There is no hippopotamus in the room>
Can it really be a fact in the world that there is no hippopotamus in the
room?
This sounds like an absence of a fact, and an absence is nothing at all.
Indeed, such talk seems to suggest that negative facts are as misconceived as
thinking of ‘nothing’ in <nothing is black and white all over> as a
something!
Alice and the King of Hearts:
“Just look down the road and tell me if you
can see either of them.“
"I see nobody on the road." said Alice.
"I only wish I had such eyes," the King

remarked in a fretful tone. "To be able to see
Nobody! And at such a distance too!”

The King of hearts and the Messenger:
“Who did you pass on the road?" the King went
on, holding out his hand to the Messenger for
some more hay.
"Nobody," said the Messenger.
"Quite right," said the King; "this young lady

saw him too. So of course Nobody walks slower
than you.“
"I do my best," the Messenger said in a sullen

tone. "I'm sure nobody walks much faster than I
do!“
"He can't do that," said the King, "or else he'd

have been here first.”

THE ARGUMENT FROM
MYSTERIOUSNESS
Molnar concludes:
It is not obvious that absences can find a home in our existing ontological
categories, because it is not clear what it means to say that absences are
complexes of non-existent elements.





THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION
Molnar assumes that causal power is the mark of the real:

Absences are radically acausal which is a reason for thinking that
they are not real.
However, in order to make his argument work, he needs to make a
distinction…

To see why, consider the following:

'Lack of air caused him to suffocate’
Molnar concedes that there is a sense in which the absence of air is doing
something in this causal story, and so he introduces the following
distinctions:
• Causally operative
• Causally explanatory
Causally operative:
• A relation between particulars occurring in nature.
• An objective and mind-independent natural relation, a 'primary' relation.
• When this natural relation holds between events that are the behaviour of
physical objects, it can be explained as a physical process.

The idea, here, is that a something can be the starting point or the terminus
of a causal process, but an absence cannot.
That is, events involving objects can stand in the causal relation only if the
objects have the relevant dispositions.
Molnar coins the slogan:
No causality without exercised powers.
'A causes B’ entails ‘The objects involved in A and B have certain powers’.
Causally explanatory:
• It holds between the particulars that we cite as explanandum (i.e., that
which is to be explained) and explanans (i.e., the explanatory account)
respectively.
• An objective natural relation but a ‘rational’ relation.
• The relation is context-dependent.

The idea, here, is that although we say things like:

'Lack of air caused him to suffocate’,
we do not say things like,
'Lack of poison caused him to remain alive’.
Among the particulars that are selected for mention in an explanans, which
are referred to as a ‘cause’, Molnar claims we may properly include some
that are causally explanatory without being causally operative.
Molnar concludes:
‘Cause’ is ambiguous. The only ontologically relevant sense of ‘cause’ is
‘causally operative’ and we never say that absences are causally operative.
We do, however, say that absences are causes, in the sense of ‘cause’ in
which it means ‘causally explanatory’, but in that sense of ‘cause’ being a
cause does not entail having any powers.





THE ARGUMENT FROM
PERCEPTION
Molnar’s final argument concerns whether or not we perceive absences.

He starts by inviting us to consider the following pair of circles:
Fig. 1 Fig. 2

THE ARGUMENT FROM
PERCEPTION
According to Molnar, when we see Fig. 1, what we perceive directly is the

dot's being in the circle.
By 'direct perception’, he means non-inferential perception.
That is, although when we look at Fig.1 we see a circle and a dot, our
perceptual knowledge of the fact that the dot is inside the circle is not the
result of any inference.
Instead, we non-inferentially perceive the fact that the dot is inside the
circle.
THE ARGUMENT FROM
PERCEPTION
Molnar then asks whether the same explanation can plausibly be given for
Fig.2.
That is, when we see Fig. 2, is it the case that we perceive directly the
dot’s not being in the circle?
If so, then negative facts are perceivable as well as positive ones, and in
identically the same way, namely, directly!

THE ARGUMENT FROM
PERCEPTION
Molnar claims that the answer to the question, ‘When we see Fig. 2, is it
the case that we perceive directly the dot’s not being in the circle?’ is
‘No!’
For he argues that the important difference between the perception of the
negative state of affairs in Fig. 2, and the case of our seeing the dot's being
in the circle in Fig. 1, is this:
The latter does not depend on our looking for the presence of any
particular.
THE ARGUMENT FROM
PERCEPTION
But then what is happening when we look at Fig.2? According to Molnar:

We infer (though do not perceive) the absence of the dot from the
perception of the second circle and the failure to perceive the dot.
What licenses the thought that we only infer (rather than perceive) the
absence of dots in this case, he claims, is that what kind of absence we
perceive depends upon our expectations.

THE ARGUMENT FROM
PERCEPTION
Making sense of the role of expectations in Molnar’s argument:

He argues that if, for example, in the first circle we were to perceive a
cross, rather than a dot, it would be very natural to describe the second
circle as including an absence of crosses.
This, he thinks, suggests that the difference between the two ‘seeings’ is
cognitive, rather than perceptual.

THE ARGUMENT FROM
PERCEPTION
He goes on to say that if this is right – if we don’t perceive absences, we

merely infer them – then we lose one source of potential information about
the nature of negatives.
We also deny ourselves a reason for thinking they exist.
In view of this, we should regard negative ontology as an ill-motivated
posit.

MOLNAR VS.
ARMSTRONG
MOLNAR VS. ARMSTRONG
Recall: Armstrong claims that what ensures that the two negative truths <a
is not G> and are true is this:
But this produces another state of affairs, i.e., that the two first-order states
of affairs are all the first-order states of affairs.
What type of state of affairs is this? A ‘second-order’ state of affairs!

Molnar argues that an Armstrongian totality fact is not a positive fact at

all!
Why?
Because they are the non-existence of certain entities.

To be clear, Armstrong claims that what ensures that the two negative
truths <a is not G> and are true is this:
This produces another state of affairs, i.e., that the two first-order states of
affairs are all the first-order states of affairs.
Molnar: that that the two first-order states of affairs are all the first-order
states of affairs = there are no more facts! (A negative state of affairs)
According to Molnar, we should reject totality facts, along with all other
offers of negative states of affairs, which leaves our principal problem
unsolved.
As they stand, negative truths, such as <Tea is all there is on the table> are
negative, and they seem to be perfectly all right as they stand.
However, if they are true they must have truth-makers.
But we still do not know what they are…

exists.
exists.
Molnar concludes that we do not
have a satisfactory theory of
truth-makers for negative
truths…

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
1. Argue against Molnar somehow and stick with Armstrong, or at least

stick with truth-maker maximalism (the view that all truths – even
negative truths – are made true).
2. Concede to Molnar and accept that negative truths don’t have truth-
makers but stick with truth-maker theory nonetheless, by becoming a
truth-maker minimalist (the view that only some truths are made
true).
3. Abandon truth-maker theory altogether.
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MODULE QUESTIONNAIRE
Please take a moment (right now) to complete this short questionnaire, where the rating is
numerical, with 5 being the most positive score.
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScX5FN0QJKXi05tUyVezI7In-BQmOfa8V3vmtacIm
imWb05aA/viewform
You will need to be logged in to your university email account to be able to complete the
questionnaire.
Apparently, if you have any other email account open on your computer, along with your York
email account, you won't be able to access the form.
So, you will have to log-out of all signed-in accounts that aren't your York account to access the
form.
Dr David J. J. Austin david.Austin@york.ac.uk

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TRUTH Dr David J. J.

AND THE Spring Term 2023

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 3

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 4

It looks very much as if by endorsing TM we are endorsing the thought that

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 5

What are negative truths?

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 7

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 8

If truth-maker maximalism is true, then, like any other true propositions,

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 9

But this raises the question:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 10

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So, just as there could be a fact in the world of

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 12

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Armstrong is a truth-maker maximalist.

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 14

Consider the following:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 15

Consider the following:

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Consider the following:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 17

What we need, according to Armstrong, is some non-mereological sum of

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 20

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 22

He starts by inviting us to suppose a simple world in which:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 25

The idea, here, is this:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 26

According to Armstrong, a totalling state of affairs is constituted by a

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 27

Armstrong is aware that positing higher-order states of affairs might be

As an aside, notice that Armstrong’s totality states of affairs also provide

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 29

Consider the following question:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 30

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TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 32

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TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 34

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 35

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 36

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Consider the following proposition:

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Molnar provides three arguments against negative ontology:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 45

Molnar provides three arguments against negative ontology:

TRUTH AND THE WORLD 2023 46

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"I see nobody on the road." said Alice.

"I only wish I had such eyes," the King

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"Nobody," said the Messenger.