Week 7, 3 March

rd

WORLD HUNGER
Focusing on Peter Singer’s
“Famine, Affluence, and
Morality”
The Plan 1

1. Singer’s Argument and Conclusion

2. Assessing Singer’s Moderate Principle
3. Assessing Singer’s Argument from the Perspectives of our Three
Major Ethical Approaches
4. Considering the Implications of Singer’s Conclusion
Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and 2

Morality”
 Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at
Princeton University
 Our text: (1972). "Famine, Affluence, and
Morality". Philosophy and Public Affairs. 1 (3):
229–243.
 Other works:
 Animal Liberation (2009)
 Practical Ethics (1980)
 Public philosopher, controversial views
 Singer’s Project 3

 To establish a radical-seeming conclusion about our moral

obligations (and about how far short of those obligations we
fall) from seemingly innocuous premises
 Singer’s Argument 4

(P1) “…[S]uffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are [very] bad.” (231)

(P2)“…[I]f it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby
sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought morally, to do it.” (231)

(P3) Without sacrificing anything morally significant, we can contribute (at least financially) to the
prevention of suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care, and we can do this
at least to the point where we live merely “modestly comfortable” lives.

(C) We ought to contribute (at least financially) to the prevention of suffering and death from lack
of food, shelter, and medical care, and we ought to do this at least to the point where we live
merely “modestly comfortable” lives.
 Singer’s argument appears valid. So, it appears, either one of its premises is false or it is sound
and, consequently, its conclusion is true.
The Implications of Singer’s Conclusion 5

 “People do not feel in any way ashamed or guilty about spending money on new
clothes or a new car instead of giving it to famine relief…This way of looking at the
matter cannot be justified. When we buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but
to look ‘well-dressed’ we are not providing for any important need. We would not be
sacrificing anything significant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and
give the money to famine relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person
from starving. It follows from what I said earlier that we ought to give money away,
rather than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep us warm. To do so is not
charitable, or generous. Nor is it the kind of act which philosophers and theologians
have called ‘supererogatory’ – an act which it would be good to do, but not wrong not
do. On the contrary, we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so.”
(p. 235)
The Implications of Singer’s Conclusion 6

“…[I]t should be clear that we would have to give away

enough to ensure that the consumer society, dependent as it is
on people spending on trivia rather than giving to famine
relief, would slow down and perhaps disappear entirely.” (p.
241)
The Implications of Singer’s Conclusion 7

 An action is supererogatory iff it is morally good (and morally praiseworthy)

to do it but not morally wrong (and not morally blameworthy) not to do it.
 If Singer’s conclusion is correct:
 Significant self-sacrifice for the sake of relieving hunger is not
supererogatory.
 Our conception of the line between duty and charity must be radically
redrawn.
 Most of us are regularly acting in morally bad ways.
 We ought to act in a way that, as a matter of fact, may cause on end to
consumer society.
 Reconsidering Singer’s Argument 8

(P1) “…[S]uffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care
• It seems that:
are [very] bad.” (p. 231)
• the argument is valid.
(P2)“…[I]f it is in our power to prevent something very bad from
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we • premises 1 and 3 are true
ought morally, to do it.” (p. 231) (given a plausible
understanding of
(P3) Without sacrificing anything morally significant, we can contribute (at “morally significant”).
least financially) to the prevention of suffering and death from lack of
food, shelter, and medical care, and we can do this at least to the point •So, it seems that the
where we live merely “modestly comfortable” lives. argument turns on Premise
(2).
(C) We ought to contribute (at least financially) to the prevention of
suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care, and we
ought to do this at least to the point where we live merely “modestly
comfortable” lives.
 (P2) The Moderate Principle 9
 (P2) “…[I]f it is in our power to prevent something very bad • It seems that:
from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally
significant, we ought morally, to do it.” (p. 231) • the argument is valid.
• premises 1 and 3 are true
 A stronger claim: “[I]f it is in our power to prevent
(given a plausible
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing understanding of
anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, “morally significant”).
morally to do it.” (p. 231, my emphasis)
•So, it seems that the
 Singer defends the Moderate Principle (and, really, the stronger argument turns on Premise
claim) by analogy… (2).
 Singer’s Defense of the Moderate Principle 10
 The Child in the Pond: “…[I]f I am walking past a shallow pond
and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child
out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is
insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a
very bad thing.” (p. 231)
 Singer’s Defense of the Moderate Principle 11
(2a) I ought to save the drowning child even though it means ruining my nice
clothes, for the death of the child would be very bad whereas my ruining my
clothes is not morally significant.
(2b) There is no morally relevant difference between the case of the drowning
child and any other case in which the Moderate Principle would apply.
Therefore,
(2) “…[I]f it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening,
without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought morally, to
do it.” (p. 231)
 Assessing (2b): What differences are there? Are they morally relevant?
 Candidate Morally Relevant Differences 12
 Other people could help
 Imagine others are standing around the drowning boy…
 Distance
 No longer practically significant.
 A personal connection to the boy?
 He’s a stranger.
 Other options?
 Should this make us question another part of the argument?
Assessing Singer’s Argument from the Perspectives of our 13
Three Major Ethical Approaches
MILL’S KANT’S ARISTOTLE’S VIRTUE
UTILITARIANISM DEONTOLOGY ETHICS
 Presumably: The  Presumably: The  Difficult to say. What
argument is sound. argument is sound, at factors might be
least provided a strong relevant here?
 Is there any way to
understanding of our
resist this?
positive duties, e.g.,
duties to help further
other’s ends.
 What other factors might
be relevant here?
Considering the Implications 14
 If Singer’s conclusion is correct:
 Significant self-sacrifice for the sake of relieving hunger is not
supererogatory.
 Our conception of the line between duty and charity must be radically
redrawn.
 Most of us are living morally bad lives.
 We ought to act in a way that, as a matter of fact, may cause on end to
consumer society.
 Would accepting Singer’s argument without radically changing our behavior
would be hypocritical?
 How “should” we react?