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‘ HO W D I D C OV EN T RY V L AW RE N C E

[2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822


C H A N G E T H E L AW O F P R I VAT E
NUISANCE?’
FA C T S :

D1 operated a stadium, constructed in 1976, where speedway and stock-car


racing had since taken place. D2 operated a motocross track at the rear of the
stadium used for motorcycle racing. Planning permissions were granted covering
the speedway racing and motocross activities, and a certificate of lawful use
covered the stock-car racing. In 2006, C bought a residential bungalow about 600
yards from the stadium. The bungalow was built before the stadium and was
about 1.5 miles away from the nearest village. C sued D1 and D2 for nuisance.
THE 5 ISSUES RAISED IN THIS CASE

1. Prescription,
2. Coming to the nuisance,
3. The relevance of defendants' activities to the character
of the neighbourhood,
4. The relevance of planning permission
5. Remedies.(Injunctions vs damages)
PRESCRIPTION
 The defendant argued that he has established a prescriptive right to commit a noise
nuisance
 The court acknowledged that the right to commit a nuisance by noise can be acquired by
prescription
 The Supreme Court held that the defendant did not have prescriptive rights because the
defendant could not prove that the situation 20 years before the action began constituted
an actionable nuisance. (The first complaints had been lodged only 16 years prior to the
case.)
 There can be gaps within the 20 years (we accept in Coventry a gap of up to 7 years)
COMING TO THE NUISANCE
 Supreme Court reaffirmed the orthodox position that coming to the nuisance is
no defence
 This rule is acknowledged in Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966 where though
the majority found that there was a nuisance, a different majority refused ti
grant an injunction and awarded damages instead
 The only exception to this Lord Neuberger who distinguishes Sturges v
Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch. D. 852 and said that it might be a defence where the
claimant erected a new building affected by the defendant's activities.
T H E R E L E VA N C E O F D E F E N D A N T S ' A C T I V I T I E S T O T H E
CHARACTER OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD,

 The claimants said that the character of a neighbourhood as an area where motor sports is
established should not be defined by nuisances.
 Lord Neuberger says that the defendant's activities were relevant to the character of the
neighbourhood except when they were actionable nuisances.
 Lord Neuberger suggested the character of the locality should be assessed on the basis that (i) it
includes the Stadium and the Track, and (ii) they could be used for speedway, stockcar, and
banger racing and for motocross respectively, but (iii) only to an extent which would not cause a
nuisance.
 He concludes that an activity can be a nuisance even if it conforms to the character of the locality
T H E R E L E VA N C E O F D E F E N D A N T S ' A C T I V I T I E S T O T H E
CHARACTER OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD,

 Lord Carnwath pointed out that in cases such as Rushmer v Polsue & Alfieri Ltd. [1907],
the court would accept actual levels of interference as characterising the neighbourhood
but would go on to find as a fact that the defendant had intensified the interference
beyond the established level.
T H E R E L E VA N C E O F P L A N N I N G P E R M I S S I O N

 Lord Neuberger said, to the "somewhat paradoxical" result that "the greater the likely disagreeable impact of a
change of use permitted by the planning authorities, the harder it would be for a claimant to establish a claim in
nuisance".
 This rejected the approach that Planning permission, could not justify a nuisance, but a development plan or
even a single "major" or "strategic" planning permission might change the nature of a neighbourhood.
 If the implementation of a planning permission results in the Page 22 creation of a nuisance to a claimant, then,
subject to one possible point, it cannot be said that the implementation has led to a change in the character of
the locality - save, as explained above,
 (i) to the extent that the implementation could have been effected in a way which would not have created a
nuisance, or
 (ii) if the defendant can show a prescriptive right to create the nuisance, or
 (iii) the court has decided to award the claimant damages rather than an injunction in respect of the nuisance.
T H E R E L E VA N C E O F P L A N N I N G P E R M I S S I O N

 This rejected the approach that Planning permission, could not justify a
nuisance, but a development plan or even a single "major" or "strategic"
planning permission might change the nature of a neighbourhood.
 The issue of common law nuisance is reserved to the court rather than
the relevant planning authority.
 However, where planning permission stipulates limits as to the
frequency and intensity of noise then such conditions within a planning
permission may be relevant in assisting the claimant’s action.
REMEDIES.(INJUNCTIONS VS DAMAGES)

 public interest is considered when considering the issue whether to grant an injunction or award
damages.
 Believes that following binding authority like Regan and Watson is wrong in principle and is very
constraining, rather cases should be exercised with discretion considering each case is so fact-sensitive.
 He thought that that the prima facie position is that an injunction should be granted, so the legal burden
is on the defendant to show why it Page 32 should not.
 If damages were be to awarded, those damages should not always be limited to the value of the
consequent reduction in the value of the claimant’s property but also include the loss of the claimant’s
ability to enforce her rights, which may often be assessed by reference to the benefit to the defendant of
not suffering an injunction. (Jaggard)

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