Set D- Bill of Rights

Included:
Sec. 14. Trial Rights of the Accused
Sec. 15. Habeas Corpus
Sec. 16. Speedy Disposition of Cases
Sec. 17. Right against Self-Incrimination
 Trial Rights of the Accused
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
• (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process
to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused:
Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.
• Questions:

• 1. Why the concern for people suspected

of committing crimes?
• 2. What distinguishes a trial from the
search for truth through science?
 Section 14: Trial Rights of the Accused

• 1. Right to due process

• 2. Presumption of innocence
• 3. To be heard
• 4. To counsel
• 5. To be informed
• 6. To speedy trial
• 7. To impartial trial
• 8. To public trial
• 9. To meet witnesses
• 10. To compulsory process
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

1. Due Process:
Due process here is procedural, not substantive. It has no
application to civil and administrative cases. Put another way, they are
the procedures to be followed in trying persons accused of committing
crimes. It’s elements are:
1. A court or tribunal cloth with judicial power to hear and decide
the case;
2. Jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the person of the accused
and over the offense (the offense was triable by that court);
3. Accused was given an opportunity to be heard; and
4. Judgment was rendered upon lawful hearing.
• Illustrative Cases:
• 1. Pagasian v. Azura, 184 SCRA 342
(1990) (judge convicted a witness and
sentenced him to 2 days in jail and fine of
P200) ANS: Remember your due process.
Victim was not charged at all. He was not
even given any opportunity to defend
himself.
• 2. Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., 287 SCRA 245 (1998)
• After accused was arraigned, the prosecution presented the rape victim
who identified her affidavit of desistance and reaffirmed that she had no
further interest in prosecuting accused. The judge then asked clarificatory
questions to determine the truth and voluntariness of both her affidavit-
complaint and affidavit of desistance. Counsel for the accused did not
anymore cross-examine the witness. The prosecutor then moved to dismiss
the case as she could no longer prove the guilt of the accused. About two
months later, the court convicted accused of rape and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua.
• Held: The right of the accused to due process was violated. No trial was
conducted based on the procedure in the Rules of Court and accused was not
given his full day in court. It cannot be argued that accused waived his right
to confront and cross-examine the witness because the existence of the waiver
must be shown to have been done knowingly and with sufficient awareness of
the consequence. The case should be remanded for further proceedings.
• 3. Olaguer v. Military Commission – a civilian
convicted by a military court during Martial Law.
Reversed: Trial by judicial process, not by
executive or military process [appointed by
convening authority, no security of tenure, not
independent  as to military courts) .  What
due process means here.
• Can military courts never try civilians? Not
absolute.
• Sec. 18, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution: A state of
martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are
able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
• 2. Presumption of innocence:
• Does the Constitution textually require that the guilt of
accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt? No.
• “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,”
• But Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:

•    Section 1. Rights of accused at trial. – In all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the
following rights:
• (a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Effect on the Procedure:
• If after the Prosecution rests, accused or
the court feels that the evidence presented
failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence, what is the remedy? –Demurrer
to Evidence
• Reversed Presumption:
• Reversed presumption is allowed in malversation, anti-
fencing, rules of evidence, Illegal Fishing, Intellectual
Property Law, Plunder.
• Example: Rules 131, Revised Rules on Evidence:
• (3a)SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions.— The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
• (j)  That a person found in possession of a thing taken in
the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer
of the whole act;  applies to robbery and theft.
• Reasons:
• 1. It is prima facie (can be rebutted)
• 2. There is a logical connection between the
fact proved and the fact presumed. 
You’re in possession of a stolen carabao.
Hence…
• No. 5, 2004: OZ lost 5 head of cattle which he reported to the police.
He requested several neighbors, including RR, for help in looking for
missing animals. After an extensive search, the police found 2 head in
RR’s farm. RR could not explain to the police how they got hidden in
a remote area of his farm.
• Insisting on his innocence, RR consulted a lawyer who told him he
has a right to be presumed innocent under the Bill of Rights. But there
is another presumption—of theft arising from his unexplained
possession of stolen cattle—under the penal law.
• Are the 2 presumptions capable of reconciliation in this case? If
so, how can they be reconciled? If not, which should prevail?
• 3. To be heard: Pertains to the right to present
evidence or to defend yourself:  does not
mean “auditory”
• a. To testify in his own behalf
• b. To call witnesses
• C. right to present documentary and object
evidence.
• Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., 287 SCRA 245 (1998)
• People v. Diaz, 311 SCRA 585 (1999)
• Accused was convicted of raping his own daughter and sentenced to
death. It appears that after the prosecution rested, the case was set for
reception of defense evidence. However, in all four settings counsel for the
accused failed to appear despite notice. This was treated by the trial court as a
waiver by the accused of his right to present evidence, and it considered the
case submitted for decision.
• Held: Accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel. He has also
the right to present evidence. Accordingly, denial of due process can be
successfully invoked where no valid waiver of rights has been made. In this
case, we find that under the circumstances, the accused was denied due
process when the successive non-appearance of his counsel was construed as a
wavier of his right to present evidence. Since the imposable penalty may be
death, the trial court should have been more circumspect in outrightly denying
accused his opportunity to present his side, particularly since he himself was
present during the four hearings.. Clearly, such presence is a strong indication
that accused was interested in defending himself.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
4. Right to counsel
People v. Holgado:, 85 Phil. 253 (1950)
Judge: Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?
Accused: I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty. (20 years)
Also People v. Silvestre, 51 SCRA 286 (1979) robbery with
homicide
Elements of Right to Counsel:

1. The court is duty – bound to inform accused of his right before

the arraigned;
2. The court must ask him if he desires the service of counsel;
3. If he does, and is unable to get one, the court must assign him a
counsel de oficio;
4. If accused wishes to get a private counsel, the court must give
• 1. What is the effect if accused is convicted and it turned
out that his lawyer is fake? [Delgado, Santocildes, Tulin,
Inacay v. People, 810 SCRA 610 (2016)
• 2. Can a conviction be nullified if one’s lawyer is
incompetent? (not error of procedure or lapse in strategy-
mistake of counsel binds client – public policy) [Liwanag,
except Callangan]
• 3. Can a person defend himself without a lawyer? [Rules
of Court/Sesbreno]
• 4. What is the extent of the right to retain? [Chiongbian]
• People v. Santocildes, 321 SCRA 310 (1999)
• Accused was charged and convicted of the crime of rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. During trial, he was represented by a
certain Gualberto C. Ompong, who turned out to be a non-lawyer. On
appeal, he argues that his right to counsel was violated so that he
should be acquitted of the crime charged.
• Held: The right of accused to counsel was violated, no matter that the
person who represented him had the ability of a seasoned lawyer and
handled the case in a professional and skillful manner. This is so
because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member
of the bar in a criminal case filed against him. Unless he is
represented by a lawyer, there is a great danger that any defense
presented will be inadequate considering the legal skills needed in
court proceedings. The judgment is set aside, and the case remanded
for new trial.
• Amion v. Chiongbian, 301 SCRA 614 (1999)
• Due to several postponements sought by a lawyer of accused, the judge
appointed a counsel de oficio for him during trial. Accused objected to the
services of counsel de oficio since he can afford to hire a counsel de parte of
his own choice. Was there a violation of the right of the accused to counsel of
his own choice?
• Held: No. An examination of related provisions in the Constitution
concerning the right to counsel will show that the “preference in the choice of
counsel” pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under custodial
investigation rather than one who is an accused in a criminal prosecution. But
even if we were to extend the application of the concept of “preference in the
choice of counsel” to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential
discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would
make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predeliction of accused.
Otherwise, the pace of criminal prosecutions would be entirely dictated by the
accused.
• People v. Liwanag, 363 SCRA 62 (2001)
• Accused was convicted of highway robbery with multiple rape. During trial he was assisted by
counsel de oficio, a PAO lawyer. In the middle of the trial, he retained the services of counsel de
parte. After he was convicted by the trial court, another lawyer filed the notice of appeal but failed
to file the appellant’s brief. Before the Supreme Court he was represented by another counsel de
officio. He now claims that his right to counsel was violated because his counsel made insufficient
cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, and failed to impeach the testimony of complainant
through the use of contradictory evidence.
• Held: The “right to be assisted by counsel” does not presuppose “the right to an intelligent counsel.”
The requirement is not for counsel to be intelligent, but to be effective. While fairness is the object
of Art. III, Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution, the assistance afforded by counsel to an accused need
only be in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In the Philippine setting, a counsel assisting an accused is presumed to be providing
all the necessary legal defense which are reasonable under the circumstances in accordance with said
norms. The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under
prevailing norms. Coupled with the presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable under
the circumstances, as long as the trial was fair in that the accused was accorded due process by
means of an effective assistance of counsel, then the constitutional requirement that an accused shall
have the right to be heard by himself and counsel is satisfied.
• People v. Sesbreno, 314 SCRA 87 (1999)
• Accused was charged with murder. Being a practicing lawyer,
he insisted on representing himself. Despite proddings by the court
and an offer of the possibility of assistance from the Public Attorney’s
Office, he handled his own defense and was convicted. On appeal, he
claims that his right to counsel was violated.
• Held: Accused acted as his own counsel. To allege now that his right
to be assisted by counsel was violated is to bend the truth too far. The
constitutional right of the accused to counsel is not violated where he
was represented by a prominent and competent member of the Bar,
namely himself, even if there were others available. He is now
estopped from claiming that the trial court violated his right to be
represented by counsel of his own choice.
• People v. Nadera, 324 SCRA 490 (2000)
• After the rape victim testified, the following dialogue occurred:
• COURT:
• Any cross?
• ATTY. BROTONEL:
• If Your Honor please, we are not conducting any cross-examination,
because this representation, from the demeanor of the witness, I am convinced
that she is telling the truth.
• Held: Counsel’s decision not to cross-examine the witness is a glaring
example of his manifest lack of enthusiasm for his client’s cause. It may be
that defense counsel personally found the testimony to be believable.
Nevertheless, he had the bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant’s
testimony to ensure that the accused’s constitutional right to confront and
examine the witnesses against him was not rendered for naught.
• Rule 138, Sec. 34. By whom litigation conducted.
In the court of a justice of the peace (first level
courts) a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.
• 5. To be informed of the accusation
• Purposes:
• 1. To enable accused to defend himself
• 2. To enable himself to avail of the protection of
double jeopardy of prosecuted for the same offense
• 3. To inform the court of the facts alleged so that
it can decide whether it is sufficient to support a
conviction
• How is this determined? You go to the
information (charge sheet).
• 1. People v. Del Rosario, 234 SCRA 246 (1994) -
sale and possession
• 2. People v. Barte, 230 SCRA 401 (1994) –murder
and murder with the use of unlicensed forearm

• Rule: an accused can be convicted of a lesser offense

if the elements are necessarily included in the
Information charged [but not the opposite]
• -Antido  since charged only of one offense,
cannot be convicted of more than 1 count of rape.
Otherwise, this will violate his right to be informed.
New Cases:

1. The Information for Murder alleged that accused

committed the crime “with deliberate intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there…” Can accused be convicted of
Murder? People v. Delector, 841 SCRA 647
(2017).
Held: It did not sufficiently aver acts constituting
either or both treachery and evident premeditation.
He can only be convicted of Homicide.
2. The Information alleged that accused had “carnal
knowledge and intercourse with [AAA], a mentally
defective lady, against her will and consent.” Can accused
be convicted of Qualified Rape?
• Held: Considering that the Information failed to state that
the accused-appellants knew of the mental condition of
AAA, the accused-appellants should be held guilty of
simple rape. People v. Martinez, 858 SCRA 41 (2018) and
People v. Urmaza, 860 SCRA 535 (2018)
•
• 6. To speedy trial
• Factors:
• 1. Extent of the delay
• 2. Reasons for the delay
• 3. Invocation of the right – if accused does not invoke,
deemed waived. Accused must insist that he must be
tried.
• 4. Prejudice to the accused
• Right is only violated if delay is capricious or whimsical.
• Lumanlaw v. Peralta, 482 SCRA 396 (2006)
• Accused was detained on a charge of illegal possession of Dangerous
Drugs. Despite the lapse of one year, nine months and four days, he was not
arraigned due to 14 postponements. Should the information be quashed on the
ground of violation of his right to speedy trial?
• Held: Yes. The repeated postponements violated the right of the accused to
speedy trial. Under Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98
(implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as “The Speedy Trial
Act of 1998”), which provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty
days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused. There
were fourteen postponements in all. Going over the causes for the delays, we
see the lack of earnest effort on the part of judge to conduct the arraignment as
soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could
have easily been avoided if the judge had been more keen on respecting and
upholding the constitutional right of accused to speedy trial and speedy
disposition.
• Tai Lim v. CA, 317 SCRA 521 (1999)
• Accused was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Arraigned on August 8, 1995, trial never commenced despite the lapse of 1
year and 3 months due to 11 postponements, 9 of which were secured by the
prosecution. The grounds for postponements ranged from the absence of
witnesses for the prosecution, absence of the prosecutor and re-raffling of the
case to another branch. Must the case be dismissed on the ground of speedy
trial?
• Held: No. The reasons for the prosecution’s postponements were reasonable
and were not intended merely to delay the proceedings of the case. It would
be unjust to pounce on the absence of the witnesses as a basis for dismissing
the case when there was a valid excuse for their absence, that is, there was no
proof that they were duly served with subpoena. The other reasons for
postponements were due to circumstances beyond the control of the
prosecution. The right of the accused to speedy trial should not be utilized to
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals.
• De Zuruarregui vs. Roesete, 382 SCRA 1 (2002)
• Two years after arraignment of the accused for falsification of a private document,
trial has not commenced due to 15 postponements. Five were secured upon agreement
of the prosecution and the defense and 6 were on motion or due to non-appearance of the
accused. The last 2 postponements were secured by the prosecution without objection
from the accused because complainant had to leave for abroad for a medical treatment.
On the last scheduled hearing, however, the judge dismissed the case for failure of the
prosecution to present evidence. Was there a violation of the right of the accused to
speedy trial?
• Held: No. The right to speedy trial is a relative one, subject to reasonable delays and
postponements arising from illness, as in the present case, where it was duly proven that
complainant had to undergo carotid operation. Speedy trial means one that can be had
soon after indictment is filed as the prosecution can, with reasonable diligence, prepare
for trial. For this reason, in determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts
should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings. What offends the right to speedy trial are unjustified postponements
which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. This is not the case here
 I. Continuous Trial Rule (A.M. No.15-06-
10-SC)

1. Under the Continuous Trial rule, when can postponements be allowed

by the court and what are the requirements?
A motion for postponement is prohibited, except if it is based
on acts of God, force majeure or physical inability of the witness to
appear and testify. If the motion is granted based on such exceptions,
the moving party shall be warned that the presentation of its evidence
must still be finished on the dates previously agreed upon. A motion
for postponement, whether written or oral, shall at all times be
accompanied by the original official receipt from the Office of the
Clerk of Court evidencing payment of the postponement fee under
Sec. 21 (b), Rule 141, to be submitted either at the time of the filing of
said motion or not later than the next hearing date. The Clerk of Court
shall not accept the motion unless accompanied by the original receipt.
• 2. How should the testimonies of witnesses be presented?
Form of Testimony (a) For First Level Courts. In all criminal
cases, including those covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure,
the testimonies of witnesses shall consist of the duly subscribed
written statements given to law enforcement or peace officers or the
affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted before the investigating
prosecutor, and if such are not available, testimonies shall be in the
form of judicial affidavits, subject to additional direct and cross-
examination questions. The trial prosecutor may dispense with the
sworn written statements submitted to the law enforcement or peace
officers and prepare the judicial affidavits of the affiants or modify or
revise the said sworn statements before presenting it as evidence.
(b) For Second Level Courts, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals. In
criminal cases where the demeanor of the witness is not essential in
determining the credibility of said witness, such as forensic chemists, medico-
legal officers, investigators, auditors, accountants, engineers, custodians,
expert witnesses and other similar witnesses, who will testify on the
authenticity, due execution and the contents of public documents and reports,
and in criminal cases that are transactional in character, such as falsification,
malversation, estafa, or other crimes where the culpability or innocence of the
accused can be established through documents, the testimonies of the
witnesses shall be the duly subscribed written statements given to law
enforcement or peace officers or the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted
before the investigating prosecutor, and if such are not available, testimonies
shall be in the form of judicial affidavits, subject to additional direct and
cross-examination questions. In all other cases where the culpability or the
innocence of the accused is based on the testimonies of the alleged
eyewitnesses, the testimonies of these witnesses shall be in oral form.
3. How long are the periods given to the parties to complete
the presentation of their evidence?
i. Summary Rules – 60 days period for the entire trial
ii. Regular Rules - 60 days for the Prosecution and 90
days for the accused
iii. Drug Cases - 5 days for the Prosecution and 25 days
for the accused (trial to be finished not later than 60 days
from filing of Information)
Trial . xxx (b) Absence of counsel de parte. -In the
absence of the counsel de parte, the hearing shall proceed
upon appointment by the court of a counsel de officio.
4. How long are the period given to judges to
decide?
• Period of Decision:
• i. Summary Rules – 30 days
• ii. Regular Rules - 90 days
• iii. Environmental Cases 60 days
• iv. Drug Cases - 15 days
• [v. Small Claims – if settled, same day. If not,
within 24 hours)
• 7. Right to impartial trial
Standard: “A litigant is entitled to the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.”
The appearance of neutrality is as important as the
reality of impartiality.
Judge should not talk to litigants or their lawyers.
The ideal is that he must live a secluded life.

Bilbao v. People, 761 SCRA 156 (2015) Judge was the Public
Prosecutor though there was a Private Prosecutor  Judge should be
impartial not only in appearance but also in reality. He should have
inhibited.
 Trial by Publicity and the Right to
Impartial Trial
• People v. Sanchez, 302 SCRA 21 (1999)
• Mayor Sanchez was convicted of seven counts of rape with
homicide. Considering the position of accused, the trial was accompanied by
widespread media coverage. On appeal, Sanchez claims that his right to a fair
trial was violated due to the intense publicity.
• Held: The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible with a free
press. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to
fair trial. It does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind
of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. At best appellant can only
conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage
of publicity. But the test is not the possibility of prejudice but actual
prejudice. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be. Appellant must discharge this burden. In this case, there is no
proof that the judge acquired a fixed opinion, or actual bias as a consequence
of extensive media coverage.
• Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 109 (2001)
• Petitioner seeks a reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme Court declaring that having
resigned from the presidency, he may be prosecuted for Plunder. Among others, he contends that his
right to an impartial trial has been affected by the prejudicial pre-trial publicity of the proceedings
before the Ombudsman. He also points to the alleged hate campaign launched by some newspapers
so that the prosecution and the judiciary can no longer assure him of a sporting chance. He urges the
Court to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitor. Has petitioner’s right to fair trial been violated?
• Held: No. The mere fact that the proceedings was given a day to day coverage does not prove that
the publicity so permeated the mind of the tribunal and impaired his impartiality. To warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be. In this case, petitioner has failed to adduce any proof of
actual prejudice developed by the members of the Panel of Investigators of the Ombudsman. We
cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The latter rule assumes
that an injury has been suffered and then shifts the burden to the panel of investigators to prove that
the impartiality of its members has not been affected by said publicity. Such a rule will overturn our
case law that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. For
this reason, we continue to hold that it is not enough for petitioner to conjure possibility of prejudice
but must prove actual prejudice on the part of his investigators for the Court to sustain his plea.
• Re: Request Radio…, 360 SCRA 248 (2001)
• The Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas, an association representing duly
franchised and authorized television and radio networks, requested the Supreme Court to
allow live media coverage of the trial of former President Estrada. The request was
anchored on the need to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings. In
effect, the request seeks reconsideration of the 1991 resolution of the Court which barred
live media coverage of all court proceedings.
• Held: The issue involves the weighing out of constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of
the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control
its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against each
other, the right of the accused must be preferred. With the possibility of losing his life or
liberty, it must be ensured that accused receives a verdict decreed by an unprejudiced
judge. Television coverage, however, can impair the testimony in criminal trials, can
affect the performance of the judge, and can destroy the case of the accused in the eyes
of the public. Accordingly, to protect the parties right to due process, to prevent the
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid
miscarriage of justice, the request is denied.
• Re: Request for Live…, 365 SCRA 62 (2001)
• The Secretary of Justice seeks a reconsideration of the resolution denying
permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. Among others, he argues that if there is a clash between the rights of
the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and the
right of the accused to fair trial, it should be resolved in favor of the right of the people,
because the people, as repository of democracy are entitled to information; and that live
media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as
instruments for the pursuit of selfish interest.
• Held: The motion is denied. However, because of the significance of the trial and the
importance of preserving the records, there should be an audio visual recording of the
proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for
documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the
Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision. The master film shall be deposited
in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical
preservation and exhibition pursuant to law. The audio-visual recording shall be made
under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan.
• Re: Petition for Radio and TV..., 652 SCRA 1 (2011)
• Following the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre,
charges for 57 counts of murder were filed against 197 accused.
Various entities filed a petition before the Supreme Court praying that
live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be
allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be
permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists. In
effect, petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television
and radio coverage of court proceedings imposed by the 1991 ruling in
Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon
C. Aquino’s Libel Case. Should the Court allow live media coverage
of the trial?
• Held: It is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not
compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice
press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity
and solemnity of judicial proceedings. Compliance with regulations,
not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution. The
peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already
necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be
gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused
have as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the
proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants. It
bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have
listed more than 200 witnesses each.
• The Court allows pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of
the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the following guidelines: (a)
Media entities must file a written application with the trial court; no selective
or partial coverage shall be allowed. (b) A single fixed compact camera shall
be installed inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of
the sala of the trial court, operated by an employee of the Supreme Court; no
panning and zooming shall be allowed. (c) The transmittal of the audio-visual
recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted
in such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured. (d) The
broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in
its entirety. (e) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the
proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the
day’s proceedings are adjourned. (f) To avoid overriding or superimposing the
audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be
broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted
therein. (h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed
until after the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images
derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes.
• 1996, No. 2: At the trial of a rape case where the
victim-complainant was a well known personality
while the accused was a popular movie star, a TV
station was allowed by the trial jduge to televised
the entire proceedings like the OJ Simpson trial.
The accused objected to the TV coverage and
petitioned the Supreme Court to prohibit the said
coverage.
• As the Supreme Court, how would you rule on
the petition?
• 8. Public Trial – This right is intended to avoid the
experience of the Inquisition and the “Trial of
Witches”, which were done in secret. Suspects
were tried in secrecy and subjected to threats and
tortures to make them admit their guilt. Purposes:
a. to prevent abuse of judicial power
b. to prevent courts from being instruments of
persecution
Questions:
1. How is it observed? “The right is
satisfied for as long as the public is not
excluded and friends and relatives of the
parties could be present.
2. Is it waivable? Garcia v. Domingo
3. When may the public be excluded
without violating the right?
• 9. Right to Meet Witnesses –
• Rule 115, Sec. 1. (f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him at the trial
• Purposes:
• 1. To test the testimony of the witnesses by cross-examination
• 2. To allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses
• -This is the reason why hearsay evidence, affidavit, police blotters and
medical certificates are not admitted as evidence
• [People v. Nadera] Go v. People, 677 SCRA 213 (2012) (deposition in
Cambodia)
Cases:
1. People v. Encipido: One lawyer was representing 3 accused. At the
trial, one accused testified against his co-accused and the lawyer
was in a quandary.
2. Tampar v. Usman, 200 SCRA 652 (1991): Special Rules of
Procedure for Sharia Courts provides that in an action, plaintiff has
the burden of proof. If plaintiff has no evidence and defendant
takes the oath, defendant wins the case. If defendant does not take
the oath, plaintiff shall take the oath and judgment will be rendered
in his favor. (Yamin)
3. Go v. People, 677 SCRA 213 (2012) (deposition in Cambodia)
4. Child Witness Rule – Live-link Television
5. Covid-19 – Video Conference Trial
10. Right to compulsory process
1935 Constitution – to secure the attendance of witnesses
1973/1987 – to secure the production of evidence
Ensures the right to obtain a subpoena from the court to
compel attendance of witnesses. If you disobey, you can
be arrested for contempt. Along this line, in People v.
Montejo, 21 SCRA 926 (1967), the Supreme Court stated
that a witness is not bound by a subpoena if he resides
more than 50 kilometers from the venue (now 100) does
not apply to criminal cases.
• 2016, No. 16. Jojo filed a criminal complaint against Art for theft of a backpack worth
P150.00 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. The crime is punishable with
arresto mayor to prision correccional in its minimum period, or not to exceed 4 years
and 2 months. The case was assigned to Prosecutor Tristan and he applied Sec. 8(a) of
Rule 112 which reads: "(a) If filed with the prosecutor. - If the complaint is filed directly
with the prosecutor involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in Sec. 3(a) of this
Rule shall be observed. The Prosecutor shall act on the complaint within ten (10) days
from its filing."
• On the other hand, Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112 provides: "(a) The complaint shall state the
address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and
his witnesses as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. x x x"
• Since Sec. 8(a) authorizes the Prosecutor to decide the complaint on the basis of the
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant, Prosecutor
Tristan did not notify Art nor require him to submit a counter-affidavit. He proceeded to
file the Information against Art with the Metropolitan Trial Court. Art vehemently
assails Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112 as unconstitutional and violative of due process and his
rights as an accused under the Constitution for he was not informed of the complaint nor
was he given the opportunity to raise his defenses thereto before the Information was
filed. Rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 8(a) of Rule 112. Explain. (5%)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Section 14: Trial Rights of the Accused

Requisites for Trial in Absencia:

1. Accused has been arraigned;

2. He was notified of the proceedings; and
3. His failure to appear is unjustified.

When he is tried in absencia, he waives the right to cross-examine

the witnesses against him.

The right to appear in your trial can be waived. But during arraignment,
identification and promulgation, the court can compel your
appearance.
Bar Question 2011:
57. Accused X pleaded not guilty to the charge of
homicide against him. Since he was admitted to
bail, they sent him notices to attend the hearings of
his case. But he did not show up, despite notice, in
four successive hearings without offering any
justification. The prosecution moved to present
evidence in absentia but the court denied the
motion on the ground that the accused has a right
to be present at his trial. Is the court correct?
Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion
or rebellion when public safety requires it.

-A writ of habeas corpus is an order issued by

a court directed to a person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the
prisoner at a designated time and place, and to
explain the cause of detention.
Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution:

• …A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the

Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able
to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
• The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.
• During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.
Questions:
1. What does it mean when we say that
only the privilege is suspended, not the writ
of habeas corpus itself?
2. What are the grounds for its suspension?
3. What are the effects of a valid
suspension?
4. What is the effect on the right to bail?
As a rule, the Writ is only available in cases of illegal deprivation of
liberty:
1. detention w/o charge
2. sentence that has been served out (Lamen v. Director), but see In
Re:Correction/Adjustment of Penalty pursuant to RA No. 10,951, GR
No. 240394, Aug. 14, 2018
3. custody of children
4. practice of hospitals of not releasing a patient with unpaid bills
5. house-helper compelled to work for unpaid advances (Cruz)
Expanded application:
1. Villavicencio v. Lukban (restraint on freedom of movement)
2. Moncupa v. Enrile (release subject to conditions)
3. Andal v. People (if a violation of a constitutional right is shown to
exist during the proceedings that resulted to his conviction, the court is
ousted of jurisdiction
Other situations where court refused to apply:
1. In re: Aquino v. Esperon, (2007) [conditions of confinement]
2. Ampatuan v. Macaraig, (2010) [“restrictive custody”] nominal
restraint, not actual
Usual defenses of detaining officers:
1. Denial (Fr. Romano)
2. Escape
3. Release (without proof)
4. Filing of a case (legal defense)
Other important habeas corpus cases:
1. Aberca v. Ver – the suspension of the privilege
of the writ only suspends your right to secure
your immediate release, but not suits for
damages arising from your continued illegal
detention
2. Ilagan v. Enrile (re-affirmed in Velasco) – the
filing of a case before the Office of the
Prosecution or before the court renders the
petition moot and academic.
1991, No. 1. What is the constitutional Writ of
Amparo and what is the basis for such remedy
under the Constitution?

AM No. 07-9-12, Sept. 25. 2007

Borrowed from the Mexican Constitution-
Amparo –mean “protection” – broader in country of
origin because it is used to enforce all individual
rights.
 Writ of Amparo - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available
to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
• [REMEDY AVAILABLE AGAINST UNLAWFUL DEPRIVATION
OF LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY or THREATS thereof]
• -Broader than Habeas Corpus because the latter is only limited to
cases of illegal confinement or detention.
• -If identity of the detaining officers or the whereabouts of the victim is
unknown, Amparo is the better remedy
SECTION 1. Habeas Data.—The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
[A REMEDY AVAILABLE TO PROTECT THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY AS AGAINST THOSE GATHERING,
COLLECTING OR STORING ONE’S PERSONAL
INFORMATION.]
Antecedent: Council of Europe’s Convention
on Data Protection of 1981.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, January 22, 2008
Rough translation of Habeas Data: “You
should have the information”
Constitutional Basis:

• Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have

the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-
privileged
Common to both remedies:
1. Jurisdiction: Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts (no first
level courts)
2. Petition may be filed directly before the
Supreme Court (disregards the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts)
3. The decision of the RTC must be appealed
directly to the Supreme Court
What differentiates the 2 remedies:
1. The petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo can be
filed on any day and at any time, but not so provided in
Habeas Data
2. The petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo can be
filed with “any of the justices” of the three collegiate
courts”, but not so provided in Habeas Data
3. Jurisprudence holds that the Writ of Amparo can not be
availed of against acts of individuals not acting as agents
of the State, but Habeas Data can be availed of against
purely private entities.
• Possible reliefs in Writ of Amparo:
1. Protection order - in a government agency or
accredited private institution
2. Inspection order – permitting entry, inspection
and photographing of property or area.
3. Production order – production of documents,
photos and objects
4. Release of the person of there is no legal basis
for detaining him
Possible reliefs in Habeas Data Petition:
1. Enjoin the act complained of (cease the
gathering or collection of information)
2. Deletion, destruction and rectification of
the erroneous data or information
• Questions:

1. Will the filing of a criminal case render the

petition for a writ of amparo and a writ of
habeas data moot and academic?

2. Does the suspension of the privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus also suspend the remedies of
petition for a writ amparo or a writ of habeas
data?
• Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, 737 SCRA 92 (2014)
• Is the Writ of Habeas Data available only against an entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party?
• Held: No. There is nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection
shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data. Section 1 of the Rule, when taken in its proper
context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against
unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the
business of collecting or storing data. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his
or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one
pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or
even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to
said person or entity.
• Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012)
• Ben disappeared after he was taken into custody by security guards of Asian Land, a
private entity. His wife filed a petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which the
trial court granted. Considering that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states that it is “a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity”, is the writ available?
•
• Held: No. It is clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof
that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and
proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of
said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government
participation. See also Sps. Martin v. Tulfo, 773 SCRA 558 (2015)
• Canlas v. Napico Homeowners, 554 SCRA 208 [2008]
•
Petitioners for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo are settlers in a certain parcel of
land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City.  Their houses have either been
demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant
to a court judgment. Claiming that the land titles of the landowner were spurious and
that they were deprived of their “liberty, freedom and/or right to shelter,” they sought
relief from the Supreme Court via the Writ of Amparo. Is it proper?
• Held: The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose “right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by any unlawful act or
omission.” The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the
court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court, is not included among
the enumeration of rights for which the remedy of a Writ of Amparo is made available.
Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and
executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and
security.  There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
• Reyes v. CA, 606 SCRA 280 (2009)
• Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on
November 30, 2007. An inquest was conducted by a panel of prosecutors to determine
whether he should be held for trial on a charge of Rebellion. On Dec. 7, 2007, the
Secretary of Justice issued a Hold Departure Order (HDO) against him. While the RTC
subsequently dismissed the rebellion charge, the government appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Meanwhile, because of the HDO, every time petitioner left the country, he
would be briefly detained by the Immigration authorities. For this reason, he filed a
petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo. Should the writ be issued?
• Held: No. The Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof. The right to
travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As stated in Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan, "xxx a person's right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed
by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the
accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter
of the court's sound discretion." Here, the restriction on petitioner's right to travel as a
consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful.
Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner
and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and
security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
• Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211 (2010)
• In a petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, may the court
order the return of personal property allegedly taken by respondents
who detained, investigated and tortured her?
• Held: No. A person’s right to be restituted of his property is already
subsumed under the general rubric of property rights—which are no
longer protected by the writ of amparo. Section 1 of the Amparo
Rule, which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes
the protection of property rights. In addition, an order directing the
high-ranking military officers to return the personal belongings of the
petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of
liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted
once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and
exhaustive proceeding. Matters of liability are not determinable in a
mere summary amparo proceeding.
• Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008)
• In connection with a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo, the Court of
Appeals ordered the military to furnish all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken against petitioners who were suspected as rebels, abducted,
tortured and threatened with death by their captors. Must the production order comply
with the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) the application must
be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place
to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one
specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce?
• Held: No. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a
search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable
intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the
people such as respondent. Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the
production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is no different from the subpoena in civil procedure that "cannot be
identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..."
• Boac v. Cadapan, 649 SCRA 618 (2011)
• Can the doctrine of command responsibility be applied in writ of amparo petitions?
• Held: Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to
identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement
whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court
does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to
be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. As we stated in
Rubico:
• If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it
should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable
for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so
as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the
premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however,
the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents
preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary
proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
• In re: Petition…, 681 SCRA 678 (2012)
• Can the President, as commander-in-chief of the military be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in Amparo
proceedings?
•
Held: Yes. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the
following elements must obtain: a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship
between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b.
the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. Pursuant to the doctrine of
command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be
held liable for affront against the rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial
evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed
with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable
diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules. The Court
also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence
with the president’s incumbency.  Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity
cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her
tenure.
• Art. 28, Statute of Rome:
•   In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:
• (a)     A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and
control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his
or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:
 
• (i)     That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing
or about to commit such crimes; and (ii)     That military commander or person
failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.
2010, X: A, the wife of an alleged victim of enforced disappearance,
applied for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo before a Regional Trial
Court in Tarlac. Upon motion of A, the court issued inspection and
production orders addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff to allow entry at
Camp Aquino and permit the copying of relevant documents,
including the list of detainees, if any. Accompanied by court-
designated Commission on Human Rights (CHR) lawyers, A took
photographs of a suspected isolation cell where her husband was
allegedly seen being held for three days and tortured before he finally
disappeared. The CHR lawyers requested one Lt. Valdez for a
photocopy of the master plan of Camp Aquino and to confirm in
writing that he had custody of the master plan. Lt. Valdez objected on
the ground that it may violate his right against self-incrimination.
Decide with reasons. (4%)
2013, IX. Conrad is widely known in the neighborhood as a drug addict. He is also suspected of being a
member of the notorious "Akyat-Condo Gang" that has previously broken into and looted
condominium units in the area.
Retired Army Colonel Sangre - who is known as an anti-terrorism fighter who disdained human and
constitutional rights and has been nicknamed "terror of Mindanao" - is now the Head of Security of
Capricorn Land Corporation, the owner and developer of Sagittarius Estates where a series of
robberies has recently taken place.
On March l, 2013, Conrad informed his mother, Vannie, that uniformed security guards had
invited him for a talk in their office but he refused to come. Later that day, however, Conrad
appeared to have relented; he was seen walking into the security office flanked by two security
guards. Nobody saw him leave the office afterwards.
Conrad did not go home that night and was never seen again. The following week and after a
week-long search, Vannie feared the worst because of Col. Sangre's reputation. She thus reported
Conrad's disappearance to the police. When nothing concrete resulted from the police investigation,
Vannie - at the advice of counsel - f1led a petition for a writ of amparo to compel Col. Sangre and
the Sagittarius Security Office to produce Conrad and to hold them liable and responsible for
Conrad's disappearance.
(A) Did Vannie's counsel give the correct legal advice? (6%)
(B) If the petition would prosper, can Col. Sangre be held liable and/or responsible for Conrad's
disappearance? (6%)

• Sps. Martin v. Tulfo, 773 SCRA 558 (2015)

• 2018, II Agnes was allegedly picked up by a group of military men headed by Gen. Altamirano, and
was brought to several military camps where she was interrogated, beaten, mauled, tortured, and
threatened with death if she would not confess her membership in the New People's Army (NPA)
and point to the location of NPA camps. She suffered for several days until she was released after
she signed a document saying that she was a surenderee, and was not abducted or harmed by the
military. After she was released, and alleging that her rights to life, liberty and security had been
violated and continued to be threatened by violation of such rights, she filed with the Supreme Court
(the Court) a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data with prayers for Temporary
Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The
case was filed against President Amoyo (who was the President of the Philippines when the
abduction, beating, mauling and life threats were committed), General Altamirano, and several
military men whom Agnes was able to recognize during her ordeal. The Court, after finding the
petition to be in order, issued the writ of amparo and the writ of habeas data and directed the
respondents to file a verified return on the writs, and directed the Court of Appeals (CA) to hear the
petition. The respondents duly filed their return on the writs and produced the documents in their
possession. After hearing, the CA ruled that there was no more need to issue the temporary
protection orders since the writ of amparo had already been issued, and dismissed the petition
against President Amoyo on the ground that he was immune from suit during his incumbency as
President. Agnes appealed the CA ruling to the Court. The appeal was lodged after President
Amoyo's term had ended.
• (a) Was the CA correct in saying that the writ of amparo rendered unnecessary the issuance of the
temporary protection order? (2.5%)
• 2017, XIII.
• Command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders
for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflicts. The doctrine has now found application in civil actions for
human rights abuses, and in proceedings seeking the privilege of the
writ of amparo.
• (a) What are the elements to be established in order to hold the
superior or commander liable under the doctrine of command
responsibility? (4%)
• (b) May the doctrine of command responsibility apply to the President
for the abuses of the armed forces (AFP and PNP) given his unique
role as the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces? Explain your
answer. (4%)
 Speedy Disposition of Cases
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.

1. How is it distinguished from speedy trial? (3 areas)

a. speedy trial (Sec. 14) applies to criminal cases only, Sec. 16
applies to criminal, civil and admin cases;
b. speedy trial applies only at the trial stage, but Sec. 16 applies to
pre-trial (preliminary investigation or period before arraignment)
and the post trial stage, while the case is on appeal and during
execution.
c. speedy trial applies only to courts of law (since it is the one that
holds trials), but speedy disposition applies to quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies).
2. What are the factors to determine violation? (extent of the
delay, reasons for the delay, the invocation of the right by
the accused and the prejudice to the accused)
-right may be invoked only when the delay is capricious,
vexatious and oppressive
-Reasonable causes of delay-
1. voluminous records
2. complex issues
3. frequent reorganization in an office
3. Is the right waived by inaction?
Violated Years Not Violated Years
1. Cervantes 6 years 1. Binay 6 years
2. Lopez 4 2. Castillo 3
3. Abardo 5 3. Dela Pena 4
4. Licaros 10 4. Albert (2009) 12
5. Pp. v. SDGN (2013) 5. Garcia (2013)
5 6
Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018
1. Delays during the conduct of the preliminary investigation shall be
counted against the Prosecution, but delays during the fact-finding
stage are excluded in the computation;
2. The right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial
must be timely raised. The respondents must file the appropriate
motion upon the lapse of the procedural periods. Otherwise, they are
deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.
3. Determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts
must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of
evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues
raised.
• 16. _______________ Based on Cagang,
which is not computed in determining whether
the right to speedy disposition of cases has been
violated?
• (a) the fact-finding investigation case

• (b) the preliminary investigation stage

• (c) the trial proper stage
• (d) the appellate stage
 Right Against Self-Incrimination

• Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be

a witness against himself.

Right Against Self-Incrimination - motivated

by fair-play. Its basis is public policy and
the principle of humanity.
Outline of Topics:
1. Incriminating Questions
2. Right in Various Proceedings
3. Scope of Right
• 17. _______________ Which question propounded to
an accused is violative of the right against self-
• incrimination?
• (a) Did you borrow P1,000,000.00 from complainant?
• (b) Is it true that the debt has not been paid until now?
• (c) Did you issue a post-dated check for the amount of
P1,000,000.00?
• (d) Is it not a fact that you were previously convicted
of violation of BP Blg. 22?
A. Incriminating Questions
A question is incriminating when the
answer tends to expose you to an
accusation of a crime or punishment, or it
would furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute you.
[Are you a marijuana user? Did you pay
your income tax? Do you have aids?
• B. The right in various proceedings
• 1. Criminal (Chavez v. CA –theft of motor vehicle – accused was
called by the prosecution to the witness stand - PROHIBITION OF
INQUIRY – Witness may altogether refuse to take the witness stand
• 2. Administrative case (Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners) “In
an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, he may not be compelled to take the witness stand
without his consent. He can suffer revocation of license. Penal
aspect? Cabal v. Kapunan
• 3. Civil (Bagadiong v. Gonzales – plaintiff called the defendant as
his first witness) – IN PROCEEDINGS OTHR THAN CRIMINAL,
THE RIGHT IS AN OPTION TO REFUSE TO ANSWER AND
INCRIMINATING QUESTION. One cannot refuse to take the
witness stand
• 4. Legislative investigation [In re: Sabio, 504 SCRA 704 (2006)]
 Bar questions:

• 1990, No. 4: The privilege against self-incrimination must be timely

invoked, otherwise it is deemed waived:
• 1. In a civil case, the plaintiff called the defendant a hostile witness
and announced that the defendant would be asked incriminating
questions. When should the defendant invoke the right?
• 2. In a criminal case, the prosecution called the accused t the witness
stand as the first witness. When should the accused invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination?
• 3. In an administrative case for malpractice and the cancellation of a
license to practice medicine filed against C, the complainant called C
to the witness stand. When should C invoke the privilege against self
incrimination? [1988, No. 3. Board of Dentistry]
3. Scope of the Right
It covers only testimonial self incrimination, not
mechanical and physical acts. But according to
Cruz, it exempts the witness from being compelled
to bring to court documents that might incriminate
him.Thus: 1) it exempts the witness from
testifying against himself (2) it exempts him from
producing documents and articles demanded of
him (but see Office v. Yu, 820 SCRA 256
(2017))
• Office v. Yu, 820 SCRA 256 (2017)
• Judge Yu was administratively charged for conduct unbecoming of a member of the
judiciary by another female judge for sending her numerous messages with sexual
insinuations through their Facebook accounts. Since the messages themselves were the
evidence offered by complainant, can the right be invoked in cases of non-testimonial
incrimination?
• Held: No. The constitutional guarantee simply secures to a witness - whether a party or
not - the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question? The privilege
did not prohibit legitimate inquiry in non-criminal matters. At any rate, the rule only
finds application in case of oral testimony and does not apply to object evidence. As the
Court has pointed out in People v. Malimit: [The right against self-incrimination], as put
by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, "x x x is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him x x x" It is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his
will, admission of his guilt. It docs not apply to the instant case where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.
• Exceptions as to compelled production of documents:
• a) Baseco –
1.Corporation – creatures of the State subject to
government regulations. They are not entitled to all the
rights possessed by private persons. It cannot apply to their
records which the law requires them to keep
2.Officers – The corporation has a distinct personally. If
the documents are incriminating, it was the corporation
that incriminated you.
• b) Almonte v. Vasquez, (subpoena issued by OMB) –
Public officers cannot claim the right of they are required
to produce public documents.
Testimonial v. Non-Testimonial
1. US v. Tan Teng (gonorrhea which he transmitted to his victim)
2. Villaflor v. Summers (charged with adultery to determine pregnancy – “ocular inspection”)
3. People v. Gamboa (paraffin test)
4. People v. Tranca (ultra violet radiation to determine if he held flourescent powder
5. People v. Rodero (charged with rape and hair strands were pulled out from his head )
6. People v. Codilla/People v. Gallardo (ordered to strip their clothes so that the victim can
look at their body marks, asked to pull down his shorts and he was photographed)
7. People v. Yatar (DNA samples)
Exceptions:
1. Handwriting –Beltran v. Samson (requires the use of intelligence and attention)
2. Reenactment-Olvis (communicative in nature) YES. Reenactment is communicative in
nature.
Others: police line-up – not incriminating; not asked to answer any question, polygraph – lie
detector test – not violative purely mechanical; not judged by the way you answer but when
the needle jumps, voice print – not incriminating because use the type of voice that you are
having, sperm test - might not be allowed; if give up sperm requires the use of imagination.
Not yet decided by the SC.
New Development: Drug Testing
1. SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board, GR No. 157870, Nov. 3, 2008
Students, workers, - “random and suspicionless” right to enroll
not absolute  yes because it is just random and suspicion
less.
2. Laserna v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410 (2008) -
charged before the Prosecution  allow only drug testing if
you’re caught with a drug-related offense (must be random and
suspicion less – applicable only in drug cases)
De la Cruz v. People, 730 SCRA 655 (2014) – only for drug
offenses.
 Bar Questions

• 1992, No. 3: Congress: Congress is considering a law agaisnt drunken

driving. Under the legislation, police authorities may ask an driver to
take a “breathalyzer test” wherein the driver exhales several times into
a device which can determine whether he has been driving under the
influence of alcohol. The result of the tst will be used in any legal
proceeding against him. Does it violate the right?
• 2000, No. 11: Borja was arrested as a suspect in a killing. After his
arrest, he was brought to the police precinct where his pants, shirt and
boots were forcibly taken and he was weighed, measured,
photographed, fingerprinted and subjected to paraffin testing. At his
trial, Borja objected to the admission of the above items on the ground
that his right against self –incrimination was violated. Rule on the
objection.
• 2006, No. VII: Select the best answer and explain. An accused right
against self-incrimination is violated in the following cases:
• A. When he is ordered by the trial court to undergo a paraffin test to
prove he is guilty of murder;
• B. When he is compelled to produce his bankbooks to be used as
evidence against his father charged with plunder.
• C. When he is ordered to produce a sample of his handwriting to be
used as evidence that he is the author of a letter wherein he agreed to
kill the victim;
• D. When the president of a corporation is subpoenaed to produce
certain documents as proof he is guilty of illegal recruitment.
2008, 5: Having received tips that the accused was selling narcotics, two police
officers forced open the door of his room. Finding him sitting partly dressed
on the side of the bed, the officers spied two capsules on the night stand beside
the bed. When asked, "Are these yours?", the accused seized the capsules and
put them in his mouth. A struggle ensued, in the course of which the officers
pounced on the accused but failed to extract the capsules. The officers
handcuffed the accused, took him to a hospital where at their direction, a
doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube into accused's stomach against
his will. This process induced vomiting. In the vomited matter were found two
capsules which proved to contain heroin. In the criminal case, the chief
evidence against the accused was the two capsules.
a) As counsel for the accused, what constitutional rights will you invoke in his
defense? (4%)
b) How should the court decide the case? (3%)
 Is the right against self-incrimination an absolute right?
Use immunity v. Transactional immunity:

1. Use- prohibits the use of the witness compelled

testimony in connection with the criminal
prosecution of the witness.
2. Transactional –immunity to the witness from
prosecution for any offense to which his
compelled testimony relates. (broader type of
immunity).
Bar Question, 2011
• 4. When a witness is granted transactional immunity in
exchange for his testimony on how his immediate superior
induced him to destroy public records to cover up the
latter's act of malversation of public funds, the witness
may NOT be prosecuted for
• A. direct contempt.
• B. infidelity in the custody of public records.
• C. falsification of public documents.
• D. false testimony.
• Bar Question, 1998, V: Summary: Suppose
Congress passes a law requiring that an employee
can be compelled to testify even if it tends to
incriminate him, provided his testimony cannot be
used in evidence against him.
• Supposed further that A, a member of the PRC
Board was required to answer questions
pertainingg to a leakage in the medical
examination. Can he refuse to answer on the
ground of self-incrimination?
2014, XXIV. Alienmae is a foreign tourist. She was asked
certain questions in regard to a complaint that was filed
against her by someone who claimed to have been
defrauded by her. Alienmae answered all the questions
asked, except in regard to some matters in which she
invoked her right against self-incrimination. When she was
pressed to elucidate, she said that the questions being
asked might tend to elicit incriminating answers insofar as
her home state is concerned. Could Alienmae invoke the
right against self-incrimination if the fear of incrimination
is in regard to her foreign law? (4%)
• 2016, -XII. Paragraphs c, d and f of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
9165 provide:
• "Sec. 36. Authorized drug testing. xx x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing: xx x
c. Students of secondary and tertiary schools x x x;
d. Officers and employees of public and private offices x x x;
f. All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal
offense having an imposable imprisonment of not less than 6 years
and 1 day;"
Petitioners contend that the assailed portions of Sec. 36 are
unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures and the equal protection clause.
Decide if the assailed provisions are unconstitutional. (5%)
• 2018, XIII. PO1 Adrian Andal is known to have taken bribes from
apprehended motorists who have violated traffic rules. The National
Bureau of Investigation conducted an entrapment operation where P01
Adrian was caught red-handed demanding and taking PhP500.00 from
a motorist who supposedly beat a red light.
After he was apprehended, PO1 Adrian was required to submit a
sample of his urine. The drug test showed that he was positive for
dangerous drugs. Hence, PO1 Adrian was charged with violation of
Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
PO1 Adrian argues against the admissibility of the urine test results
and seeks its exclusion. He claims that the mandatory drug test under
R.A. No. 9165 is a violation of the accused's right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination.
Are PO1 Adrian's contentions correct? (2.5%)