Atatürk’s Principles and History of Turkish

Revolution II
(Course IV)
Lecturer: Dr. Merve Doğan Kader
Biruni University

Course IV: Atatürk’s Foreign Policy

ATATÜRK’S FOREIGN POLICY
The Ottoman Empire, based on the balance policy for international relations during the nineteenth
century, had lost her real authority on her country by signing the Armistice of Mudros on October
30, 1918. After the Armistice of Mudros, the Ottoman state and its authority continued only
theoretically. The Ottoman Government and the resistant resistance movements had hoped that the
principle of self-determination would be applied first. Many staff officers in the Ottoman Army were
seeking suitable conditions for military resistance. Just after the Armistice, a resistance movement in
Kars, although it was loyal to the Ottoman Empire, was already establishing an independent political
unit as well as the occupation of İzmir by Greek forces, showed everybody in Turkey that the
resistance could only be military. The Clergymen who took into account that the Caliph were
enslaved by the entente states, also began to invite people into a religious independence war. Mustafa
Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) landed in Samsun on 19th of May and united all the resistance movements in
the country in one center This movement forced the Ottoman government to open the last Ottoman
Assembly and made Ankara the centre of a new era.
The acceptance of the national oath that determined the principles of resistance and conditions of an
honourable peace, incited the entente states’ official occupation of the capital of the Ottoman Empire
, then the Sultan/Caliph closed the Assembly. The opening of the National Assembly with the
invitation of Mustafa Kemal became the turning point of the Turkish National Struggle and this
Assembly prepared the foundations of the Turkish Republic. The national Oath, the main guide of
Mustafa Kemal and the Assembly for National Struggle were based on the self-determination
principle and indivisible integrity of the Country. The Treaty of Lausanne, finished the Turkish
National Struggle, and had shown that the men whose professions were in the military could make
diplomatic policies. Moreover, their realistic policies had gained successful results on the
international ground as well. The Turkish side had removed the possibility of a new war by making
small compromises in the field of Law, foreign trade and the National Oath in Lausanne. Mustafa
Kemal became the main character of the peace process and as the head of the National Assembly
kept a balance policy between the Turkish delegation in Lausanne and the Government in Ankara.
Ataturk defined his foreign policy activities as ‘Peace at home, peace in the World’. According to
Ataturk, the foreign policy should be supported by the internal policy. After long years of war, the
first goal was to reconstruct the ruined country. In order to achieve this, he tried to avoid war as
much as possible. However, avoiding war did not mean abandoning national rights. He implemented
a realistic foreign policy, knowing his country’s military and economic limits. By closely monitoring
international developments in the World, he joined the multilateral pacts while he respected the
status quo. He used all kinds of peaceful elements in bilateral relations in line with the world and
regional developments. He used all forms of diplomacy to defend rights without bringing the country
into war. He correctly assessed that the British began to see Turkey as a very valuable ally against
the Germans and Italians for Mediterranean domination and tried to attract it to their ranks. Atatürk,
who always tried to bring the nation to the most civilized level, was a leader who believed in
peaceful development and modernization. He saw war as the last solution that could be used to fulfill
the wishes of the nation. He has always set his main goal as the readiness to protect the interests of
the nation against volatile international developments.
When we looked at the areas that Ataturk cared about in his foreign policy, it is seen that he followed
up protecting peacefulness and stability in the Mediterranean Sea, attributing special importance to
the Black Sea and Near East.
The Principles of Atatürk’s Understanding of Foreign Policy Strong Foreign Policy Should
Lean on and are Compatible with the Internal Policy. Ataturk thought that, foreign policy
should certainly lean on the internal policy.
In foreign policy, domestic policy should be taken into account. The priority of the Republic of
Turkey in the domestic policy, was to be strong and foreign policy should also emerge based on this
strength inside. At the end of the long years of war, urbanization of the country, which was burned
and destroyed during the Entente occupation, was the first goal of the state. These efforts began just
after the Armistice of Mudros. In order to achieve these goals, the new Turkish state had to try to
keep away from war as much as possible. But keeping away from war did not mean forgetting
national rights. The abolishing of some privileges given in the Treaty of Lausanne and reaching the
goals mentioned in the National Oath had become the main agenda for the foreign policy of the
Republic during the Ataturk era. While the governments of the Republic were working to strengthen
the inner body of the state, strictly following the worldwide developments and waited for the
occurrence of suitable conditions for the country patiently. They did not take action unless the
conditions were sufficiently favorable. Based on this, the straits problem was first solved in 1936.
Later, they raised the question of Sandzak (Hatay) in international politics.
Foreign Policy Should Strictly Follow Worldwide Developments and Contain Joining
International Pacts
Turkey joined the Kellogg pact, which was founded under the leadership of the USA and France in
1928, and accepted the main principle of solving international conflicts with multi-sided agreements
in the same year. Turkey was invited to join the League of Nations in 1932, realized the Balkan Pact
in 1934 and Sadabad Pact in 1937 as her own policy success.
Foreign Policy Understanding Should be Convenient with Regional and Global Developments
Atatürk’s view of foreign policy is of naturally global policy on the ground of logic and information.
“We cannot imagine that we live alone in the world”. He thought that it is inevitable that nations go
under the rule of other nations that understand the world differently and more realistic than others.
According to him, if there are no elements such as peace, openness and good relations between
nations and in the world, a nation is deprived of peace no matter what it does for itself. In this case,
naturally, we should think and do everything we need, and then we will take care of the whole world.
Foreign Policy Should Know Its Place and Its Power and be Realistic
Atatürk, in contrary to the Ottoman Empire, said that the new Turkey will spend her sources just for
the Turkish nation, not for inapplicable positions, loyalties and values. He said that “I warned the
nation not to imagine her as if commanding the whole World, this heedlessness must not go on.” The
heedlessness of not knowing our place in the world and the heedlessness of not knowing the
developments in the world should not continue. It is enough to haul the nation to the catastrophes.
We should not maintain the same disaster consciously.
Foreign Policy Should Use Every Peaceful Instrument for Bilateral Relations
Atatürk’s understanding of foreign policy was essentially peaceful, not expansionist. Atatürk said:
“The gun is the last factor consisting the result extracting from power” His main goal was to be
strong in terms of scientific, moral and technical aspects. Neither friendship nor enmity is eternal in
international relations. The important thing is the benefits of the nation and the country. The best
example of this understanding of Ataturk was the relationship with Greece that occupied western
Anatolia and Thrace from 15th of May 1919 to November 1922.
Foreign Policy Must be Coherent with The World Perspective of The Executors’
Ataturk believed that policy executors should generate policies around their sincere thoughts and
must be realistic. He sincerely supported the foundation of the Balkan Pact with this view, “it must
not be forgotten that no matter what state they’re in right now, Balkan nations have common
ancestors that came from the same blood, same ancestry from Central Asia”
The Essentials of Application in Atatürk’s Foreign Policy Understanding
The above-mentioned essentials were successfully replicated during the process of
the accession of Hatay to Turkey. All forms of diplomacy have been used in order to
defend national rights without being in a war. It was obvious that the British Empire
had begun to see Turkey as an important ally corresponding with Germany and Italy
and tried to win Turkey for the sovereignty of the Mediterranean Sea. This
development firstly gave the possibility that the straits went under Turkish
sovereignty. The British support also had brought the opportunity of acting more
confident against France. At this stage, President Ataturk used the columns of the
Mehmet Asım Us, the owner and the lead writer of a daily newspaper, and very
close to him. He expressed his sincere ideas and did not let the Turkish Republic be
an interlocutor against France. When he used the press, he criticized governments
and diplomats but cared about the national sensitivity of France. By declaring his
priority as peace, he got the national benefits with diplomacy and reconciliation that
could only be earned by war.
In Foreign Policy, Problems Should also be of Interest to The Nation and Act
Together with The Nation
With the Hatay issue, Atatürk ensured that the entire nation dealt with this problem
and learned about it. In the end, he menaced the French diplomats with waging war.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had carried out the national struggle and the modernization
of Turkey with his nation. When the Ottoman Empire had collapsed at the end of the
First World War, more than twenty new states emerged in her lands. Almost all of
them had to live under the Mandate of Entente Powers until the mid, 1900’s. Only
the Turkish Nation under the leadership of Ataturk could form an independent state
and become modernized in a very short time. In fifteen years’, Turkey became an
active regional power that gave direction to its region with pacts. This result is
indisputable evidence of the success of foreign and internal policies. Ataturk
succeeded in creating a regional power from a collapsed state and a nation on the
edge of oppression in fifteen years’ which is a very short time for a nation’s life.
 When the Ottomans were defeated in the war, what Europe particularly wanted to see was the end of
the existence of the Turks in the continent. As also indicated elsewhere, Atatürk was very well aware
of the fact. But he "acted with the belief that giving a Western image to Turkey was a prerequisite
[condition] for its security. Europe would agree to co-exist with Turkey, only if the latter were
similar to itself. Therefore, he never had anti-western thoughts including foreign policy, even though
Mustafa Kemal was an anti imperialist leader.
After the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey began to develop friendly relations with Western countries. In this
sense, there were great similarities between the aspirations of Mustafa Kemal and those of the
nineteenth century’s westernists. Like the westernists, he wanted to finish centuries old hatreds, wars
and antagonisms between Turkey and the Western countries. Of course, Turkey's aspiration of
becoming a western country certainly affected foreign policy as well. Modernisation/westernisation
was a basic foreign policy goal of Atatürk's Turkey.
 ATATÜRK’S FOREIGN POLICY
THE PERIOD NECESSARY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THAT THE TREATY OF
LAUSANNE LEFT UNRESOLVED: 1923-1932
1) The Question of the Etabli and Turkish Greek Relations :After the signing of the Treaty of
Lausanne, the Allied forces left Istanbul. This caused the emigration of Christians from Istanbul to
Greece. The problem started when the Greek minority wanted to stay in Istanbul. The two countries
decided to clarify the situation with an agreement. The Convention between Greece and Turkey
conceding the exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities was signed on January 30, 1923. With thıs
agreement the future of the Greek community in Istanbul, as well as the Muslim minority in Western
Thrace, was officially guarantied. On the other hand, the implementation of this treaty was more
difficult than its preparation. It caused same problems between the two countries due to different
interpretations. We can say the most important problem was "the question of the etabli". Article 2 of
the exchange convention stipulated that: The following persons shall not be included in the exchange
provided for in Article 1: The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople and the Moslem inhabitants of
Western Thrace .
There was a different interpretation concerning the status of the Greek residents settled in the city
before 30 October 1918.From the Turkish point of view, the status of these Greek residents had to be
determined by Turkish Law. According to the Greeks , the term etabli had to be interpreted by the
treaty of 1923. A mixed-commission was established to find a solution. Wishing to reduce to a
minimum the number of non-exchangeable Greeks, the Turkish government reopened the problem as
soon as the mixed-commission was convened in October 1923. By September 1924 negotiations at
the mixed commission had failed. The question of the etabli was referred to the judicial sub-
committee but it could not break the deadlock either. The impasse was then presented LO the League
of Nations.6 The Council of the League of Nations therefore suggested the possibility of an appeal to
the Permanent Court of International Justice. On February 21, 1925,the-Permanent Court of
International Justice announced its opinion regarding this issue. According to the Courts opinion if
the Greek minority of Istanbul wished to be non-exchangeable:
i) they have to have been in Istanbul before November 30,1918,
(ii) they have to have intended settling in Istanbul penitently. However, after this resolution there
were some unresolved problems relating to personal property possessions in the two countries.
The other problem was the position of the ecumenical Patriarch at Istanbul in 1924. Patriarch
Gregory expressed his anxiety about the status of the archbishops. He had come to the city after
1918 and was therefore exchangeable under the terms of the exchange convention. For this reason,
the Turks refused to recognize the new patriarch. Turkish goverment stated:
(1) that mixed-commission decided that Patriarch was subject to exchange,
(2) that Turkish goverment had no objection to election as Patriarch of person properly qualified by
Treaty of Lausanne,
(3) that foreign intervention on could not be admitted in domestic affair Resignation of patriarch
assisted negotiations between Greece and Turkey.

By early April 1925, negotiations had been resumed after these problems had been solved. The
Ankara Accord was signed on June 21,1925. The aim of this agreement was to solve the financial
and legal questions arising from the exchange. lt was about Greek property in Turkey and Turkish
property in Greece. The second part was deal with the interpretation of articles 2 and 16 of the
exchange convention.
They exchanged ambassador in the following month, and established normal relations for the first
time since the Balkan Wars. But General Pangalos, 'who was a Greek dictator came to power on 25
June 1925. He refused to take any positive action regarding to situation and practically ignored
Turkey. However, Pangalos soon fall and the Athens agreement was signed on December 1, 1926 .

Despite the agreement, meaningful relations did not start between the two governments until 1930. A
strong wish for an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations was developed by Venizelos and Atatürk.
These two Ieaders came to symbolize the idea of peaceful Greek-Turkish co-existence. The
negotiations were resumed in 1928 and an agreement was first signed on 10 June 1930. It dealt with
the questions arising from the application of the Lausanne treaty and with the agreement on the
exchange of population's. Consequently, they decided that the Greek and Turkish claims as-
balancing. Properties were be restored to their rightful owners within two months. In summary, the
minorities issue was solved and a treaty was signed which covered the following: nneutrality,
conciliation and arbitration, a protocol of parity and naval armament and a commercial convention.
2) Turkish British Relations and the Mosul Question
"The Turkish Question" for Britain centered around the Mosul Question. According to Turkey,
Mosul was within the National Pact boundaries. on the other hand the Treaty of Lausanne left the
undetermined frontier with Iraq to be settled directly with Britain as trustee for Iraq. In accordance
with article three of the Treaty of Lausanne the problem was to be solved by mutual negotiations
within nine moths. Talks opened in Istanbul on May 19, 1924, but reached no definite conclusion.
The Treaty of Lausanne envisaged that if the parties failed to find a solution within nine months, the
issue would be referred to the League of Nations.
By 6 August 1924 Britain had decided to make a unilateral application to the League of Nations and
had the item 'Iraqi Frontier' put on the agenda of the Council of the League. Turkey proposed a
referendum in the region. During the discussions which began on 24 September, the British countered
the Turkish request for a plebiscite by arguing that the matter was a boundary dispute.
Finally on September 30,1924, the Council of the League of Nations decided that a commission of
neutral members be set up to . investigate the matter. At the same time the British issued a 48 hour
ultimatum to the Turks to move from the area by October 9,1924. The Turks appealed to the League of
Nations against the ultimatum. The League called a special session to meet in Brussels to discuss the
matter. They decided upon a line to divide the two territories. This became known as the Brussels line.
This provisional frontier approximated to the boundaries of the Ottoman provinces of Mosul and
Hakkari.
Two days later, the Enquiry Commission was appointed and the commission gave its report to the
League on 16 July 1925. The Brussels Line was accepted as a geographical border. Turkey refused to
recognize the decision and questioned the Commission's findings. The Secretary-General sent a letter to
the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 2, 1925. It was explaining that the Committee of
the Council had special duty to investigate the question of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq. The
problem was then referred to the Permanent Court of International justice in the Hague for an advisory
opinion. The P.C.IJ. was only asked its opinion on procedural matters. The Turkish government
declared that the matter was a political one which could not be decided by judicial means, and that for
this reason Turkey would not participate in the activities of the Court. However, the Council decided
that the Brussels Line become the permanent border, thereby awarding Mosul to Iraq on December 16,
1925. Despite official and popular reactions in Turkey, the government decided to abide this decision.
There was reason for accepting this decision: The reason to seek a quick end for the Mosul Question
was the Şeyh Sait rebellion. The revolt was led by Shaikh (Şeyh) Said in the Dersim region in
February 1925. Shaikh Said and the other cooperating sheikhs blamed the secular Turkey as a
godless government. In the name of the restoration of the Holy Law, the shaikh forces marched
through the country and sized government offices.
Because of these reasons Turkey accepted the decision of the League of Nations and the Turks
formulated three proposals to put the British:
1) Britain would sign a neutrality treaty with Turkey.
2) The sovereignty of Mosul would be transferred to Iraq as a 'fully self-governing state'.
3) A request for shares in Mosul oil.

The British-Turkish Treaty was signed on June 6, 1926. An important clause was that the Treaty
gave Turkey 10% of all the oil royalties for 25 years from the Mosul oil fields. However. within a
year Turkey had accepted a one-off payment of £500.000. Furthermore, the British promised not to
interfere in internal affairs of Turkey about minorities.
3) Turkish-Soviet Relations
The Mosul Question served as the motivation for Turkey to return to the foreign
policy which it had follwed during the War of National Liberation. Turkey felt the
need for the support of a major power. At that time the only major power which
wished to maintain friendly relations with Turkey was the Soviet Union. Also the
USSR had itself not yet normalized its relations with the West. Turkey and the
Soviet Union signed a Pact of Non-Aggressıon and Security on December 17, 1925-
onc day after the League's decision on the Mosul Question. Article 1 of this Pact
reads: Both sides agree to observe neutrality towards the other on case a military
action should be carried out by one or more powers against one signatory party. In
some ways the treaty was an extension of the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of 1921, which
enshrined the principle of non-intervention by adding non-aggression and
neutrality".
Thrace On March 11, 1927, a commercial treaty was also signed. However, although the volume of
trade between the two countries increased between 1927 and 1930, relations were not always
amicable. Some friction had arisen as a result of Soviet insistence on establishing "branches of the
commercial delegation" in many Turkish cities. The Turks rejected the establishment of such offices
in Kars and Artvin. On the other hand, they continued to have good relations in the international
arena. For example, they clearly demonstrated their allegiance to the rule of law and to world peace,
by signing the KelIog-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. This pact was perhaps the first agreement
signed by Turkey after Lausanne. Also, it was another proof to the world of Turkey's desire for
general peace and goodwill.
Turkey and the Soviet Union had good and strong relations between 1933 and 1936. The Soviets'
offered Turkey credit for the purpose of buying Soviet made machinery . In addition, the Soviets
made free gifts of military vehicles and loaned the services of experts to set up industrial plants
during this period. Although the Soviet Union supported the Turkish proposals for the Montreux
Revision, relations had begun to deteriorate since i936. From the Soviet point of view, Turkey
steered a course towards closer relations with the Western World. According to Turkey, the Soviets
might be harbouring imperialistic claims towards the' Strait's and Istanbul. In 1936, the deterioration
of Turkish Soviet relations was caused by the initiation of Turkish-British relations. The real reversal
in the Turkish-Soviet relationship was to come after Atatürk's death in 1938. Although the Mosul
incident brought Turkey and Russia closer together for a time, there was a rapprochement with the
West.
Turkish Rapprochement with the West:
Italy and France Though Atatürk had never admired Mussolini, Turkish-ltalian relations had been
extraordinarily good untiI 1938. They had reached an agreement in 1921 and Turkish - Italian trade
relations from that time on had continued to flourish. Relation's improved after the solution of the
Mosul Question, and in May 1928 a bilateral Turkish-ltalian agreement was signed. it was a treaty of
friendship, conciliation and neutrality. It was the first political pact which the Turks had signed with
a Western European Great Power after the war. According to this treaty in the event of one of the
contracting parties being attacked by one or more other power; the other party would remain neutral.
Actually in 1928 ltaly was striving for a tripartite pact in the eastern Mediterranean among Turkey,
Italy and Greece. After Turkish-ltalian pact, a Greco-Italian pact was signed on September 24, 1928.
Also, Italian "conciliation" played an important part in the Greco-Turkish accord of 1930.
France has always been a source of inspiration for the arts and general culture of Turkish
intellectuals. The subsequent recognition of the National Pact by France seemed
to usher in a new era of Turkish-French relations. On October 20, 1921, the Ankara Agreement was
signed between Turkey and France. The Turkish-Syrian border was
determined by this agreement as well as by a special administrative regime for İskenderun. Also they
agreed that a border-commission would decide the fixed frontier
within one month. However, the commission was not founded until 1925 and it did not find any
solutions. After that Turkey and France resumed negotiations on the border
question in 1926. On February in 1926, the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness was
signed, which was the first agreement between Turkey and France since the Treaty of Lausanne. The
Treaty established relations of good neighborliness and friendship between Turkey and France.
There had been no important modification of
frontiers, but only adaptations to practical necessities. As a matter of fact the whole of this agreement
was based on the Treaty of Ankara of 1921. The Grand National
Assembly ratified this treaty on the same day as the British-Turkish Agreement on the Mosul
Question on June 8, 1926.
There were two important questions between Turkey and France: the question of the capitulations
and the question of Hatay after 1930's. The system of the capitulations was the privileges granted by
Sultans to foreigners in the Ottoman Empire since 1535. Under the system of capitulations,
foreigners were not subject to Ottoman law. The Capitulations were to be totally abolished by the
Treaty of Lausanne. After the abolition of the capitulations, Turkey accepted to pay the debts of the
Ottoman Empire to the Western States, especially to France since it had more privileges than the
others. On June 13,1928, the convention deal with this issue was signed by Turkey and France.
Turkey continued to pay the installment until the World Recession of 1930.
Atatürk’s Principles and History of Turkish
Revolution II
(Course V)
Lecturer: Dr. Merve Doğan Kader
Biruni University

Course V: Atatürk’s Foreign Policy

Turkey’s Foreign Policy 1939-1980.
THE PERIOD OF TURKISH ACHIEVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: 1932-1938

The progress of Turkish foreign policy was paralalled by success and peace in the international field
in this period. The world economy was affected by the great recession between 1929 and 1930.
Almost every state tried to find a solution and they all applied different policies. Two big groupings
emerged as a result of the situation: The Revisionists (Germany, Italy) and the Anti-revisionists
(France, Britain). Turkey was in the Anti-revisionist Camp. As a result in 1932 Turkey was admitted
to ,membership of the League of Nations. Joining the League of Nations was a milestone in Turkey's
rapprochement with the West. After becoming a member of the League, Turkey remained faithful to
the articles of the Convention.
The Balkan Entente of 1934 against the Revisionist States
Ataturk wanted to start good relationships with Turkey's neighbours. He concluded two regional
pacts to reinforce the defense policy: one in the Balkans and one with Turkey's eastern neighbours.
"The difficult problems have concerned relations between Turkey and the Balkan countries, a legacy
of the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. Specified problems have arisen from Turkish minorities,
their cultural freedom and property compensation. The minority problem was solved by Turkish-
Greek Agreement on June 10,1930. On October 30 a treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation and
Arbitration was signed. A Cordial Friendship Pact of 1923 was to lead to the foundation of the
Balkan Entente.
In the 1930s, Bulgaria and ltaly were two aggressive states in the Balkans. Moreover, their designs
on southern Anatolia during the First World War had not been forgiven by Turkish statesmen. At that
time Atatürk decided that a Balkan federation was the ultimate aim of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey
had signed treaties with all the Balkan States separately: with Yogoslavia in 1925 and 1933; Bulgaria
in 1929; Rumania in 1933; Hungary in 1927. However the Balkan situation outside the sphere of
Turkish-Greek reIations appeared Iess optimistic. The Balkan States organized many conferenees for
Balkan Unity between 1930 and 1933. Finally in February 1934, (the Balkan Entente was signed
between Turkey, Grecee, Yugoslavia and Romania), guaranteeing all frontiers and pledging
collective security for the Balkans. In fact the Entente was against a possible attack by Bulgaria.
Yugoslavia Bulgaria and Albania refused to join, the Balkan Union would never become a genuine
regional organization. Actually, without Bulgaria and Albania the agreement cannot be called a
Balkan Agreement.
This agreement was an important step towards international peace. Instead of solving any problem it
caused furher friction. For example, Bulgaria increased its diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union. Apart from Bulgaria, Turkey feared of Italian aggression in the region. In spite of the Treaty
of Neutrality and Conciliation, relations between Turkey and ltaly did not proceed in a peaceful
manner. There was not any problem between 1928 and 1932. However, Mussolini's speeches in 1934
brought Turkish suspicions to the surface. According to Mussolini, the historical aim of Italy has two
names: Asia and Africa. Although Mussolini stated that he had never included Turkey in his plans,
ltaly's attack on Ethiopia further increased Turkey's suspicions. On the other hand, the Italians
objected to the Montreux Convenlion. From 1937 until 1939, relations between the two countries
remained cool.
In addition, peace in the Balkans was seen by Atatürk as a defensive measure against the growing
imperialism of Germany. In reviewing Turkish-German relations between the two world wars, a
somewhat paradoxical atitude of Turkish statesmen and people towards Germany could be detected.
Atatürk himself had bitter memories of German highhandedness during the First World War. it
appeared that at any rate Atatürk was alive he would never again allow Turkey to be dragged in the
political wake of Germany. By 1933, Turkey had started to implement its five-year economic
improvement program. Turkey accepted a loan and technical advice from Russia to apply its five-
year plan. "There is no doubt that Ataturk's goal in international economic relations were diversity
and balance. Also Turkey, and Atatürk in particular, did not desire an exclusive German monopoly
over the Turkish economy. For example, Turkey contracted for the construction of Karabuk steel and
iron mills with a British company. Although Germany wanted to lake Turkey to the 'revisionists'
camp, it did not join. Germany's close collaboration with Italy and its negative attitude toward the
Montreux Convention created further Turkish suspicions. In 1937, Turkey fell the necessity of
countering German-ltaIian pressure.
Montreux Convention or 1936 and Turkish British Relations by the Mediterranean Pact
After the resolution of the Mosul dispute, relations between Turkey and Britain entered a period of
stagnation. Although the elimination of the fundamental problem formed the foundation for a close
relationship, it was neither easy nor rapid. The Locarno Agreement, which is called a golden age of
inter-war history, created a climate of relative peace. It was in this period that Turco-British relations
became closer. The visit of the British Mediterranean Fleet in 1929 was received positively on both
sides. A British-Turkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed in 1930. When ltaly
attacked Ethiopia in 1935 Turkey felt the fear of ltalian imperialism in the Mediterranean region. Not
only Turkey but also Greece felt the necessity of protecting the Eastern Mediterranean region against
the danger of Italian aggression. Therefore Turkey and Greece proposed for a Mediterranean Pact
was suggested by the French as a means of Franco-Italian detente. The British government never
encouraged this proposal before the Abyssinian trouble, because:
(a) Britain did not wish to undertake further commitments beyond the Locarno .Agreement and the
Covenant of the League of Nations,
(b) lt was difficult to see how the guarantee could be limited to defence against naval attack in the
region.
(c) lt would be difficult to exclude Egypt, Russia and Romania from partication in the Pact, but their
involvement would cause the most difficult problems.
In 1936, the situation was completely different. Hence Great Britain accepted the proposal of
Turkey. The Mediterranean Pact was signed in July 1936 by Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Great
Britain. The British government declared that if Turkey, Greece or Yugoslavia should be the victim
of an act of unprovoked aggression committed in violation of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, Britain would at once assist these countries. In the final analysis, it was clear that it could
not be any real Mediterranean securely if France and ltaly did not participate. Still, this pact was
regarded as evidence of Anglo- Turco-Greek alliance for peace in Eastern Mediterranean. The
Turkish fleet visited Greece and Malta as a sign of this rapprochement in November 1936.
if we look at the international arena in 1936, Germany began re-armament of the Rhine area; Japan,
which was a signatory of the Treaty 0f Lausanne, invaded Manchuria and subsequently withdrew
from the League of Nations. Additionally, there was another possibility. Turkey feared that should
ltaly succeed in conquering Ethiopia it might tum its attention to the Straits' with a view to ensuring
oil supplies from the Black Sea. This could been definitely ensured if ltaly hold the Straits. After
these actions of the Revisionists states Turkey entered into diplomatic action for changing the
demilitarized status of the Turkish Straits. The Turkish Government presented a formal note to the
Lausanne signatories. Bulgaria, France, Britain, Japan, Romania, Turkey and the Soviet Union met at
Montreux and signed a convention on July 20,1936. ltaly refused to sign the convention until 1938.
According to the Straits Convention of the Lausanne Treaty, there was to be a demilitarized zone
while at' the same time recognizing Turkish sovereignty. This convention delegated their defense to a
straits commission operating under the auspices of the Assembly of the League of Nations in
conjunction with the great powers. As has been mentioned, the security system of the League was
lacking in any real deterrent force against revisionists states. The British Government took a sensible
attitude toward Turkish claims and also the Balkan Entente supp0rlcd Turkey in this matter. As a
result of the conference, Turkish sovereignty and its right to remilitarize the zone was re-established.
From the Turkish point of view, the most important result was that the International Commission
ceased functioning after October 1,1936. "Like the Lausanne Convention, the Montreux Convention
recognized and affirmed 'the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits.
which was to 'continue without limit of time'.
Briefly, the most important point of the convention was that the passage of warships
must be Ieft to the discretion and judgment of the Turkish Government if Turkey
considered itself in danger of imminent war. However, this convention was Turkey's
biggest diplomatic victory between the two World Wars. With respect to the
acquisition of rights by legal means, Turkish policy had a unique place in
international relations during this period. The sojourn of King Edward VIII in
Istanbul in 1936 and Inonu's visit to London in 1937 symbolized the climax of the
rapprochement between Turkey and Britain. On May 27, 1938, the Credit
Agreement was signed. For a time a silent struggle was waged between Britain,
Germany and Russia to win Turkey's confidence and friendship. However, in 1936,
Turkey was definitely on England's side. Furthermore, Turkish-English relations has
been facilitated by the Montreux Convention.
The Saadabad Pact of 1937 with the Eastern Neighbours
The other notable achievements in international affairs followed. In 1937 Turkey participated to the
Saadabad Pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. It was Turkey's attempt to be a bridge between Asia
and Europe. Establishing an Eastern Entente was similar to the Balkan understanding of 1934.
Actually Ataturk's westernization policies separated Arabs and Turks. Arab nationalism, anti-
westernism and socialism grown up since the First World War, when Turkey felt the Russian
pressure. Surprisingly, the fırst sign bf Turkey's good relations with the Eastern neighbours was
initiated by the Soviet Union. The pact of brotherhood between Turkey and Afghanistan was signed
during the War of Liberation. After seven years, Treaty of friendship and economic co-operation was
signed at Ankara on 25th May, 1928 between Turkey and Afghanistan. Object of the treaty was to
consolidate further relations established by treaty of 1921. There was no indication of its being
intended to serve as an instrument towards the creation of a Ieague of Eastern Nations, "which
Russia has been suspected of desiring to establish. After this agreement Turkey started to lead an
Eastern Pact Turkey signed two agreements with Iran and lraq. In addition to the pact of friendship
with Iran, the visit of shah Pehlavi served to open a new era in Turca-Iranian relations. Turkey and
Iraq solved the border problem with the Mosul Agreement. The Saadabad Pact was not a military
alliance, but a pact of friendship and solidarity. "The pact called for non-aggression, consultation
among the signatory state in case of a threat, and cooperation in stopping subversive activity. Turkey
was now the stable link between East and West as the pivotal number of both the Balkan and Eastern
agreements." But this Pact never got beyond the 1937 stage.
The Question of Hatay and Turkish-Franco Relations
As has been mentioned, the important problems between the two countries were the Question of
Capitulations and the Debts of the Ottoman Empire. The world depression made Turkey tighten
currency controls. Turkey declared that it could not pay the instalments of Ottoman Debts. This
declaration caused major problems between Turkey and France. After several negotiations the Paris
Agreement of 1933 was signed. This agreement led to a rapid improvement in the Turkish-Franco
relations. Turkey's most troublesome frontier was to the south with Syria. The Sanjak of Hatay, were
more than 90 000 Turks resided, was within the National Pact frontiers. On the other hand, Turkey
accepted the trusteeship of France for the Sanjak with the Ankara Agreement in 1921. According to
this agreement, a special administrative regime was to be established for Hatay. It never occurred to
Turkey that the Sanjak would be considered a part of Syria, because the region was very important to
Turkey strategically and for security reasons. There was not any problem until 1925. The Turkish-
Syrian border became a source of irritation because of Syrian agitation. When the Franco-Syria
accord, (which was about Syrian interdependence), was signed in 1926 , the Syrians interpreted its
articles as incorporation of the Hatay in Syria. Turkey was concerned about the future of the Sanjak.
Turkey objected to the Sanjak's incorporation in to Syria From the Turkish point of view, the future
of the Sanjak should be decided by bilateral treaties between Turkey and France.
After several deliberalions, the separate political entity of the Sanjak was accepted in 1937 but there
was a dispute over the new electoral system. On July 4, 1937, a Turkish-Franco Treaty of friendship
was signed. The Following year, a Turco-French condominium for Hatay was established. "In
September 1938,eleclions were held and the Turks gained a majority in the assembly which
promptly proclaimed autonomy under the name of Hatay." The new government was independent for
one yeat and then decided part of Turkey. France was forced to keep silent because German and
ltalian foreign policies increased the importance of Turkish-Franco co-opcralion. Hatay was annexed
to Turkey in June 1939. The negotiations over the Hatay was essentially Ataturk's last public act. He
had been ill since Iate in 1937. He did not see the annexation of Hatay to Turkey because he died on
November 10,1938. This territorial acquisition was the only exception to a general Turkish policy of
preserving the statuesque and peace with its neighbours.
In the final analysis, Turkey achieved its foreign policy goals during ,this era:
a) The Republic of Turkey was accepted as a part of the Europen state system
b) Turkey had good relationships with its neighbours and preserved the peace both in the Balkans
and the Middle East
c) lt was not in the revisionist camp; it chose to protect the statues quo between the two world wars
lt was a faithful adherent of international law.
"By her peaceful methods of negotiations, as compare to ltaly's belligerence, Turkey gained
considerable international stature. Turkey's good foreign relations were a consequence of Ataturk's
unyielding resistance. The national state in ıts national frontiers was not revisionist.
As a consequence, it is fair to say that all of the international problem s which remained unsolved at
Lausanne, were solved by peacefull means during this period in Turkish foreign policy.
Atatürk's Final Years and Death
Atatürk followed a heavy schedule of work, traveling regularly around the country by train to spread
the ideals of the Republic among the masses . Heavy work, however, drove him to an increasingly ill
which finally caught up with him in 1938. On March 11 the public first was made aware of the fact
that the president was ill, as it turned out with cirrhosis of the liver. On March 24 the Turkish
government purchased the yacht Savarona in England for his personal use, and thereafter he spent
most of his time resting on it, even holding cabinet meetings next to his bed. On September 5
Atatiirk was transferred to the Dolmabahqe Palace as his condition became worse. He wrote his final
will and left his entire fortune to the nation. On October 17 he fell into a deep coma from which he
emerged only with difficulty two days later. The seriousness of his illness became apparent to the
public for the first time. A literal "death watch" now began, with medical bulletins being issued twice
a day. On October 29, the 15th anniversary of the Republic, the students of the Kuleli Army Lycee
sailed past the palace on the Bosporus, serenading the president with the strains of the national
anthem. Two days later Celal Bayar read the president's speech to the new session of the Grand
National Assembly, the first time Kemal was unable to do so himself. On November 8, 1938, he fell
into his final coma, and two days later he succumbed to his illness at the relatively young age of 57.
His death precipitated a wave of mass sorrow unequaled in Turkish history, with mourning crowds
observing the funeral train as it brought the president back to Ankara and as he was interred at the
Ethnographic Museum (November 30, 1938). his body remained there until he was transferred to the
Anıtkabir (The Mausoleum-Monument), the permanent tomb especially built for him, on November
10, 1953. The "Father of the Turkish nation" had found his final resting place.
İsmet İnönü’s Foreign Policy
After Atatürk's death, İsmet İnönü, his closest assistant and the uncompromising implementer of
the decisions taken, was elected president. The atmosphere created by the Second World War in the
world also affected Turkey negatively in this period. Turkey, which did not participate in the war,
approached the West again after the end of the war and in this context, a multi-party system was
started.
The fact that Turkey did not participate in the war caused the deterioration of relations with the
Soviets. At the Potsdam Conference held between 17 July and 2 August 1945, the issue of
internationalization of the Straits was discussed. However, this was abandoned when the imperialist
aims of the Soviets were understood.
The Truman Doctrine
In this period, known as the Cold War, the influence of the United States in Turkey has increased.
President Truman's speech to Congress on March 12, 1947 was like an official declaration of the Cold War. In
this speech, known as the Truman Doctrine, Truman asked that Greece and Turkey be supported in the face of
Soviet expansionism. Truman, who devotes the majority of the speech to Greece due to its participation in the
Second World War, said, “If Greece and Turkey fall into the clutches of communism today, Western Europe,
North Africa, Iran and the Middle East will not be able to escape this end.
At the end of the speech, his request for aid to Turkey and Greece was approved by the Congress. Accordingly,
Turkey would receive 100 million dollars, Greece 300 million dollars, and military equipment almost all of
which was used in the war.
Marshall Plan
Receiving assistance from the USA within the framework of the Truman Doctrine, Turkey wanted to be
included in the Marshall Plan program announced by the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, on 5
June 1947.
This plan envisaged the rehabilitation of Europe, whose economic structure collapsed after the war.
Thinking that Europe would be under the influence of communism if economic aid was not given
urgently, Marshall asked European countries to offer them a request package on this issue. Thus,
European states would be able to maintain their independence against communism. However, the
Soviets, who evaluated the plan as creating a front against itself, reacted and prevented Eastern
European countries from benefiting from this plan. In order for the Marshall Plan to be used effectively,
some European countries, including Turkey, met in Paris on 12 July 1947 and established the European
Economic Cooperation Conference. In fact, the Marshall Plan did not initially envisage aid to Turkey.
According to the Americans, the Truman Doctrine was sufficient to meet Turkey's urgent needs.
Moreover, Turkey, which did not enter the war, was in a better position compared to Europe, as it
was not destroyed during the war. In fact, let alone getting help from the Marshall Plan, Turkey could
have contributed to the development of Europe by meeting its agricultural product and mineral needs.
Therefore, it was said that Turkey can be helped if it organizes its economy to meet these needs of
Europe. In other words, Turkey would become the food warehouse of industrialized Europe. Upon
Turkey's acceptance of this condition, it was included in the scope of aid on July 4, 1948. As a result,
Turkey received approximately 300 million dollars in aid between 1948 and 1952. It was mostly used
for the development of agriculture. As with the Truman Doctrine, the Turkish government perceived
being included in the Marshall Plan as a sign of integrating with the West and not being alone in the
face of the Soviet threat.
Relations with the Middle East (1915-1950)
Turkey tried to develop relations with Lebanon and Syria, which gained independence right
after the war. Turkey sympathized with these newly independent countries and recognized the
independence of these two countries in March 1946. However, relations with Syria became
problematic because of the Hatay issue.
After the visit of King Regent Abdulillah to Turkey on September 15, 1945, relations with Iraq
improved and the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborhood was signed between the two
countries on March 29, 1946. Afterwards, King Abdullah of Jordan also visited Turkey. When the
issue of Palestine came to the fore in 1947, Turkey, together with the Arabs, voted against the
partition of Palestine. This was received very positively in the Arab world. However, the official
recognition of Israel on March 28, 1949, as a result of Turkey's approach to the West, was met with
reaction in the Arab world.
Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1950-1960 Period:
In this period, Turkey appears to be a country that seeks alliances in its region and strives to be a
leader in the Middle East. The reason that pushed the Democratic Party to active foreign policy was
its search for security due to the anxiety created by the Soviet threat.
The Menderes government made an effort for the countries of the region to follow a Western-
oriented policy.
Under these conditions, Turkey officially applied to be included in the North Atlantic Defense
Pact (NATO) on 3 August 1950. On February 18, 1952, Turkey joined NATO with Greece on an
equal footing with other countries.
While the Democratic Party devoted its time in foreign policy to creating security against the
Soviets in its first years, the Cyprus problem began to come to the fore in the second half of its rule.
Turkish Foreign Policy Between 1960-1980
In this period, the bipolar system continued in the world. However, as a result of some new
developments that emerged at the beginning of the period, the tension between the two countries was
gradually replaced by a détente. These developments led to the "Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction" talks between the two countries, then to the "Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe" (CSCE) and finally to the formation of the "Helsinki Final (Final) Act" in 1975. In this
period, the USA, which was the leader of the Western Bloc, lost its power in the international arena
to a great extent. First of all, the Vietnam War, which Amerika started, depressed the country in
many respects.
This situation led to the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 and the collapse of the international
financial system, thereby undermining international confidence in the United States. On the other
hand, Germany and Japan, which started to gradually gather their strength after the Second World
War, started to create a competition against the economic dominance of the USA.
The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets in 1979, and more importantly, the revolution in Iran in
the same year caused some public reactions against the state in the USA.
As a result, the United States has lost a lot of power in this period. During this period, the Soviet
Union (especially in the 1970s) made important breakthroughs. First of all, the foreign aid, which
was under the monopoly of the USA until then, was not as effective as the USA, but it was used as a
method of influencing the underdeveloped countries.
 The Soviets obtained military bases in the Middle East and landed in the Mediterranean by
building aircraft carriers. In addition, the Non-Aligned Movement, which was formed by third world
countries and benefited from the situation both within and among the blocs in this period, took place
in international politics almost like a third power.
While this new situation strengthened the Eastern Bloc, it also weakened the Western Bloc. This
period is the years when the economic and social development in the world increased. Countries
started to slowly recover themselves after the war. In Europe, especially Germany, has achieved a
high growth rate and has entered into such an intense growth that it needs to bring workers from
abroad. Parallel to this, an atmosphere of social freedom emerged in the world. Different music
groups and social movements emerged, and the student revolution that emerged in May 1968 caused
the atmosphere of freedom to spread all over the world by overturning all authoritarian values.
These changes in the international environment, which we briefly mentioned above, created an
atmosphere that creates a serious "relative autonomy" for countries like Turkey. The international
balance that has emerged since the 1960s, the oil crisis that concerns the West, the strengthening of
the Non-Aligned, the developments in Afghanistan and Iran, the improvement and strengthening of
relations with the Soviet Union, all these developments created new opportunities for Turkey.
Therefore, the period of 1960-1980 was a period of real “relative autonomy” for a nation-state like
Turkey in terms of making and implementing foreign policy decisions.
In this period, Turkey was regarded as a kind of antithesis of the foreign policy followed during the
Democratic Party period.
- Turkey supported the recognition of the right of self-determination to Algeria at the United Nations General
Assembly for the first time.
- Turkey took a determined stance against the Johnson letter in 1964.
- In September 1965, at the United Nations, Turkey opposed the US's Vietnam policy and in 1965 refused to
join the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), which the US wanted.
-Turkey supported the Arabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and kept a distance from Israel after that.
- Turkey took control of the bilateral agreements it made with the United States in 1969 and also controlled
the use of the bases.
During the 1970s, Turkey struggled with Greece in the Aegean Sea, despite the USA, and started a program
of aid to the Third World countries in 1971.
- In July 1974, Turkey re-released the cultivation of opium, which was banned under the pressure of the USA
during the 12 March period, and made a successful landing in Cyprus in the same month, July 1974.
- Just as Turkey resisted the embargo imposed by the USA on Cyprus in September 1974, it abolished the
Joint Defense and Cooperation Agreement (OSIA) in July 1975, since the embargo was not lifted, and banned
the use of the bases in the same month.
- Turkey suspended relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) with a unilateral decision in
1976, and lifted the embargo imposed by the USA in September 1978, although there was no change in
Cyprus.
-In 1978-79, she pursued a policy of serious rapprochement with the Non-Aligned, and again in 1979, despite
pressure from the United States, she refused the return of Greece to the military wing of NATO.
- Turkey did not participate in the sanctions initiated by the USA in 1980 due to the American hostages in
Iran. it established the domestic defense industry with the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
(SEIA) dated March 29, 1980.
The above are decisions that are not easy to take for a nation-state like Turkey. These foreign policy
decisions taken at a time when the country was facing a real economic bankruptcy and again in a
civil war, are an indication of how independent Turkey was in the field of foreign policy at that time.

This determination in foreign policy was realized in a period when Turkey was in economic and
social chaos and in total need of the IMF. In addition, in this period, Turkey also made foreign policy
initiatives to reduce its economic and political dependence on the West. For example, when it could
not find loans from the USA and Europe for some important industrial investment facilities, it turned
to the Soviet Union after 1967.
The very low interest and long-term loans provided by the Soviet Union in areas with high added
value such as the mining industry both contributed to Turkey's economic situation and increased its
autonomy against the West.
In this period, Turkey's foreign policy became relatively autonomous in the face of the West, but did
not fundamentally change.
Therefore, in this case, Turkey did not leave NATO, did not turn to the Soviet Union, did not cut
relations with Israel, continued to support the USA in the Middle East. In short, she did not change
her basic principles in foreign policy. However, compared to the past, Turkey became a little more
autonomous from the West, especially in Cyprus and the Middle East. The most autonomous and
most important example of this determined foreign policy period was the 1974 Cyprus Peace
Operation.
Although the relative autonomy of the post-1960 period in foreign policy was not as precise as the
intense relative autonomy of the 1930-39 period, it was experienced in parallel with international
developments.
When the international environment changed in the early 1980s, this relative autonomy was lost and
the basis of foreign policy shifted with the abandonment of domestic democracy.
CYPRUS PEACE OPERATION

The Island of Cyprus, which is geographically an extension of the Anatolian peninsula, has been a
land of many conquests due to its proximity to the Middle Eastern countries and its strategic location
at the cross-road of East and West. Cyprus has seen a succession of rulers, namely Assyrians,
Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders and Turks who ruled the Island as part of the
Ottoman Empire, from 1571 until 1878. Cyprus has never been a Greek Island.

It is both useful and important to keep in mind that there has never been in Cyprus a "Cypriot nation"
due to the distinct national, religious and cultural characteristics of each ethnic people who, in
addition, speak different languages. It is also interesting to note that although the two peoples (Turks
and Greeks) had lived together in the Island for centuries there were practically no inter-marriages
and not even a single commercial partnership was set up.

The Turkish Cypriots are mainly Moslems and the Greek Cypriots are mainly adherents of the
Greek Orthodox Church. Cyprus lies 40 miles from the coast of Turkey, and Turkish people have
inhabited the island since the 12th century. The Island is 250 miles from the nearest Greek island
(Rhodes), and Athens is 460 miles away.
 The Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived relatively peacefully until Greece gained its
independence from the Ottomans in 1821. The Greek Cypriot agitation for “Enosis” (the
union of Cyprus with Greece), perpetrated by the Greeks, was further intensified with the
change of administration in Cyprus (from Turkish to British) in 1878. The ultimate aim of
the Greeks and Greek Cypriots was to oust the British and annex Cyprus to Greece and in
order to Hellenize the entire population of the Island.
The period following the formal annexation of Cyprus by Britain in 1914 can be
characterized as the high tide of Greek nationalistic ambitions in Cyprus.
The Greek Cypriots, in conspiracy with Greece, launched a violent campaign for
annexing the Island to Greece in 1955. The terrorist organization EOKA, under the guidance
of Archbishop Makarios, indiscriminately murdered everyone in their way, the British (the
then colonial rulers), the Turkish Cypriots and even some of their kinsman, who were
opposed to the idea of “Enosis”.
Today, the Cyprus question can perhaps be summarized as follows: The partnership
Republic formed in 1960 between the two peoples of Cyprus broke down in 1963. For the
time being, Greek and Turkish Cypriots live apart.
THE 1960 PARTNERSHIP REPUBLIC
In 1960, the two peoples brought about the bi-national state of Cyprus in line with the Zurich and
London Agreements of 1959. They together, under agreed terms of cooperation and partnership,
shared the legislative, executive, judicial and other functions. Matters which the two peoples had
managed on a "Communal" basis over the centuries - like education, religion, family law, etc.- were
left to the autonomy of the "Communal" administrations which had legislative, executive, and
judicial authority over such matters. In effect, a "functional federative system" had been established
by the two co-founder peoples of the Republic.
CONSTITUTION IGNORED
It became clear very soon after the independence that the Greek Cypriots did not intend to abide by
the Constitution, and that their entry into that solemn legal obligation with the Turkish Cypriots and
the Guarantor Powers in 1960 had been a deception. On 28th July 1960 the Greek Cypriot President
Makarios said "the agreements do not form the goal -they are the present and not the future. The
Greek Cypriot people will continue their national cause and shape their future in accordance with
their will.”
In a speech on 4th September 1962, at Panayia, Makarios also said: "Until this Turkish community
forming part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty
of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered terminated."
 The 1960 Constitution provided that separate municipalities be established for Turkish Cypriots and
Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots refused to obey this mandatory provision and in order to encourage them
to do so the Turkish Cypriots said they would not vote for the Government's taxation proposals. The Greek
Cypriots remained intransigent, so the Turkish Cypriots took the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court
of Cyprus. The court comprised one Greek Cypriot judge, one Turkish Cypriot judge, and a neutral President.
In February 1963 (Cyprus Mail 12.2.63) Archbishop Makarios declared on behalf of the Greek Cypriots that
if the Court ruled against them they would ignore it. On 25th April 1963 the Court did rule against them and
they did ignore it. The President of the Court (a German citizen) resigned and the rule of law in Cyprus
collapsed. Even Greece was embarrassed by this Greek Cypriot behaviour. On 19th April 1963, Greek
Foreign Minister Averoff had written to Makarios "It is not permissible for Greece in any circumstances to
accept the creation of a precedent by which one of the contracting parties can unilaterally abrogate or ignore
provisions that are irksome to it in international acts which this same party has undertaken to respect."
However, in November 1963 the Greek Cypriots went further, and demanded the abolition of no less
than eight of the basic articles which had been included in the 1960 Agreement for the protection of the
Turkish Cypriots, to which abolition the Turkish Cypriots naturally refused to agree. The aim was to reduce
the Turkish Cypriot people to the status of a mere minority, wholly subject to the control of the Greek
Cypriots, pending their ultimate destruction or expulsion from the island.
In so far as the Constitution became unworkable, it was because the Greek Cypriot leadership refused to
fulfil the obligations to which they had agreed. The doctrine of necessity in international law applies to
supervening impossibility due to extraneous and unforseen causes. It does not apply to self-induced causes.
There is in particular no doctrine of necessity known to international law which could justify the slaughter of
innocent men, women, and children.
At Christmas 1963 the Greek Cypriot militia attacked Turkish Cypriots across the island, and many
men, women, and children were killed. 270 of their mosques, shrines and other places of worship
were desecrated. On 2nd January 1964 the Daily Telegraph wrote "The Greek Cypriot community
should not assume that the British military presence can or should secure them against Turkish
intervention if they persecute the Turkish Cypriots. We must not be a shelter for double-crossers."

Thereafter Turkish Cypriot members of Parliament, judges, and other officials were intimidated or
prevented by force from carrying out their duties.

A UN peace-keeping force was stationed in the Island in March 1964, which was not able to improve
the situation since political power was usurped by the Greek Cypriots.

The United Nations not only failed to condemn the usurpation of the legal order in Cyprus by force,
but actually rewarded it by treating the by then wholly Greek Cypriot administration as if it were the
Government of Cyprus (Security Council Res. 186 of 1964). This acceptance has continued to the
present day, and reflects no credit upon the United Nations, nor upon Britain and the other countries
who have acquiesced in it.
MASSACRES OF TURKISH CYPRIOT CIVILIANS

The civilian massacres of 1963, 1964, 1967 and 1974 are of extreme importance to understand the
Turkish Cypriot negotiating position to this day.
"When the Turkish Cypriots objected to the amendment of the constitution Makarios put his plan into effect,
and the Greek Cypriot attack began in December 1963" said Lt.Gen. George Karayiannis of the Greek
Cypriot militia in June 1965 ("Ethnikos Kiryx" 15.6.65). The General was of course referring to the
notorious "Akritas" plan, which was the blueprint for the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots and the
annexation of the island to Greece.
On 28th December 1963 the Daily Express carried the following report from Cyprus: "We went tonight
into the sealed-off Turkish Cypriot Quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in
the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be
described in print. Horror so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears."
On 14th January 1964 the Daily Telegraph reported that the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of Ayios
Vassilious had been massacred on 26th December 1963, and reported their exhumation from a mass grave in
the presence of the Red Cross. A further massacre of Turkish-Cypriots, at Limassol, was reported by The
Observer on 16th February 1964, and there were many more. On 17th February 1964 the Washington Post
reported that Greek Cypriot fanatics appear bent on a policy of genocide.
On 1st January 1964 the Daily Herald reported: "When I came across the Turkish Cypriot homes they were
an appalling sight. Apart from the walls they just did not exist. I doubt if a napalm attack could have created
more devastation. Under roofs which had caved in I found a twisted mass of bed springs, children's cots, and
grey ashes of what had once been tables, chairs and wardrobes. In the neighbouring village of Ayios
Vassilios I counted 16 wrecked and burned out homes. They were all Turkish Cypriot. In neither village did
I find a scrap of damage to any Greek Cypriot house."
British troops in Cyprus at the time did what they could to protect the Turkish Cypriots, and their
efforts are remembered to this day, but the scale and ferocity of the Greek Cypriot attacks made their
task impossible. On 6th February 1964 a British patrol found armed Greek Cypriot police attacking
the Turkish Cypriot of Ayios Sozomenos. They were unable to stop the attack.
THE EVENTS OF 1974
In 1971 General Grivas returned to Cyprus to form EOKA-B, which was again committed to
making Cyprus a wholly Greek island and annexing it to Greece. In a speech to the Greek Cypriot
armed forces (Quoted in "New Cyprus" May 1987), Grivas said. "The Greek forces from Greece
have come to Cyprus in order to impose the will of the Greeks of Cyprus upon the Turks. We want
ENOSIS but the Turks are against it. We shall impose our will. We are strong and we shall do so."
Greek Invasion and coup d’etat
By 15th July 1974 a powerful force of mainland Greek troops had assembled in Cyprus and with
their backing the Greek Cypriot National Guard, in a coup d’etat, overthrew Makarios and installed
Nicos Sampson as "President." On 22nd July Washington Star News reported: "Bodies littered the
streets and there were mass burials... People told by Makarios to lay down their guns, were shot by
the National Guard.« Turkish Cypriots appealed to the Guarantor powers for help, but only Turkey
was willing to give any effective response. Even Greek Cypriots sought Turkey's help.
Cyprus Peace Operation:
Stating that the guarantee was violated after the Greeks coup, Turkey took action. Turkey first
offered to intervene with the UK together, but when she received a negative response, she launched
the Cyprus Peace Operation on 20 July 1974. (Ecevit-Erbakan coalition) On July 22, with the UN's
call, the Turkish forces stopped.
After the talks in Geneva were inconclusive, Turkey launched the 2nd Operation on 14 August. In
the operation that lasted until August 16, Turkey captured approximately 40% of the island. While
the 1st Operation was deemed justified by the international public opinion, the 2nd Operation was
described as an occupation and received a great reaction. The USA cut off economic aid and
imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. The embargo continued until 1978. On February 13, 1975, the
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was established under the leadership of Rauf Denktaş. The UN
declared on 13 May 1983 that it recognized the Greek Cypriots as the Government of Cyprus.
Against this, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established on November 15, 1983.
Bibliography
1) Ayla Göl, «A Short Summary Of Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1939»
2) Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi
3) Cezmi Eraslan, Turkish Foreign Policy During Ataturk’s Era 1920-1938.
4) https://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-_historical-overview_.en.mfa