Global Tank Storage Summit

Amsterdam Jan 2012

Process Safety
In Tank Storage
Ivan Vince
ASK Consultants
The Coach House, 14 Scotts Avenue, Bromley BR2 0LQ, UK
Tel: +44 (0) 20 8460 9923 Web: www.askconsultants.com
Nothing new under the sun

(not even Buncefield)

Vapour cloud explosion (VCE)

“Buncefield was an
unprecedented event”

- HSE, Dec 2005

Vapour cloud explosion (VCE)

“…petrol…should not have been

capable of generating such a
massive explosion”

- Vince, Dec 2005

 Flash fire

considered to be worst case

Drifting vapour cloud from spill
Cloud ignited at a distance
Flash-back to the source
No explosion (no blast)
if in the open
 Modelling the cloud
• Evaporation
– Temperature
– Wind speed
• Dispersion
– Wind speed
– Atmospheric stability
 Modelling the cloud
Worst case for spill:

Possibly ground-level inversion

- Clear sky
- Low wind speed
- Early or late in the day
 Modelling the cloud
Worst case for spill:

Possibly ground-level inversion

- Furthest extent of cloud
- But least rise
 Modelling the cloud
Worst case for venting:

Harder to predict.

Location of ignition sources?

 Modelling the cloud

Dense vapour can

move upwind
Wind 
Uncertainties in dispersion

Set cloud boundary at contour

of ½Lower Flammability Limit
½LFL
LFL
Basics of vapour cloud explosion

and
why the Buncefield VCE was a shock
 Ignition in the open

Up to ~7-fold increase in volume

 Ignition in confined space

Up to ~7-fold increase in pressure

 Ignition in confined space
• Blast
• Missiles
• Ejection of hot material

• Detonation in ducts & pipework

 Partial confinement

increases pressure directly

& also generates turbulence
Ignition in congested area
Ignition in congested area
 Congestion  Turbulence
• Flame stretched & torn
• Flame surface area 
• Heat release rate 
• Flame speed 
• Flame STRETCHED, TORN…
 Low flame speed

Flame Unburned mixture

 High flame speed

Flame Unburned mixture

Pressure wave (blast)

Flame Unburned mixture

But where was the
congestion
(or confinement)
at Buncefield?
No question there was a VCE
Excess pressure < 6kPa
Excess pressure
~ 10kPa
Xs pressure > 200kPa…detonation!?
Excess P = ??!
Vapour cloud explosion (VCE)

“Buncefield was an
unprecedented event”

- HSE, Dec 2005

 Buncefield
precedents

HSE – Jul 2006

Texaco, Newark NJ, Jan 1983
Texaco, Newark NJ, Jan 1983
Vapour cloud explosion at Texaco
Newark NJ, Jan 1983

• Gasoline tank overfilled

• Massive spill
• Cold night
• Near calm
• Delayed ignition
…sound familiar?
Vapour cloud explosion at Texaco
Newark NJ, Jan 1983

• Reported in 4th Int Symp Loss Prev

Safety Prom Proc Ind, 1983.
• cf article by NFPA in Chemical
Engineering Progress, Aug 1985
• and Trevor Kletz “Will cold petrol
explode in the open air?” in The
Chemical Engineer, Jun 1986
Vapour cloud explosion at Texaco
Newark NJ, Jan 1983
“Such explosions are rare but it
seems they can occur if enough
liquid is spilt. Obviously formation
of a vapour cloud is helped if the
liquid is discharged at high level
and spills down the side of a tank.”

- Trevor Kletz, 1986

Vapour
cloud
formation

(MIIB, 2007)
Buncefield CCTV
 But a VCE?…

without congestion?…
Buncefield aerial view

Source tank
Buncefield
tree line
(outside area
of worst
damage)
 !!

Answer: quite possibly, yes.

 “Do tree belts increase risk of
explosion…”

• This paper not mentioned by MIIB

even in final report (2008).
• Earliest citation I’ve found: 2010.
• HSE now considers it highly likely
that the tree line was important.
 “Do tree belts increase risk of
explosion…”

Footnote:

In 1966, tree planting was a planning

condition – to screen the site.
Texaco, Newark
Texaco, Newark - detail
Environmental aspects
 Extinguish or controlled burn?

Largely political – outside our scope

Failure of 2 ary containment
nd

Sealant lost
in fire
Failure of 2 ary containment
nd

Sealant lost
in fire
Failure of 2 ary containment
nd

Similar bund failure in 1990

caused extensive fish kill in
Thames tributary.

reported in J CIWEM, 1996.

 Summarising:

three nasty surprises

 Three nasty surprises
• Overfilling a gasoline tank has led
to VCEs before Buncefield.
• Trees can provide the congestion
required for a VCE.
• Sub-standard bunds fail in a fire.
 Three Four nasty surprises
• Overfilling a gasoline tank has led to
VCEs before Buncefield.
• Trees can provide the congestion
required for a VCE.
• Sub-standard bunds fail in a fire.

• All the above information was readily

available in 2005.
Memory vs Forgettory*

* © Prof Trevor Kletz

 Memory vs Forgettory
• See info sources in my notes.
• Share your info, e.g. with LPB.
• Record & review near-misses.
• Use ‘Sneak’ analysis* with HAZOP.

* ref: ility Engineering

The fire triangle:
 Ignition source

Fuel Oxidant
The true situation:
 Ignition so

urce
gnItI on sour ce
r c e
so u
i on
ni t
Ig
Fuel Oxidant
 Ignition sources
• Are many and varied.
• Cannot be eliminated with any
confidence.
• Often cannot be identified after
an incident – see ref in notes.
 Ignition puzzle

Ref: Kletz T (1988) Learning from

accidents in industry (London:
Butterworths) ISBN 0-408-02696-0.
 Ignition puzzle
• High flashpoint liquid
• Low flashpoint contaminant
• Vitiated nitrogen blanketing
• Splash filling

• Ignition source?
 Beware of ‘nothing’

Some hazards of empty tanks

 Empty tanks
• What’s in the vapour space?
• Heat can volatilise residues
• Rust + sour crudes .. FeS
– Pyrophoric
– Evolves H2S (toxic, flammable)
• Rusting  O2 deficiency
• Pipe connections etc empty?
 Hot burr from friction

ref ‘Ignition handbook’, Babrauskas

 Dirty water puzzle

Explosion kills three workers

above tank holding recycled water
and fibre waste.
LFL

Temperature
Flash point

Vessel diameter
Maximum experimental safe gap
(MESG)
• Surfaces kill heat and free radicals
• No ignition across MESG
• MESG varies with
– Fuel
– Temperature
– Length of gap etc
How to burn beer
Flash point of mixtures
 ‘Ideal’, e.g.
pentane/octane or MeOH/BuOH

% low-flash component
 ‘Ideal’, e.g.
pentane/octane or MeOH/BuOH

NB sample evaporation

falsely high flash point
‘Non-ideal’, e.g. methanol/octane

!!
% low-flash component
 ‘Non-ideal’: aqueous

0 % alcohol 100
 ‘Non-ideal’: aqueous
% Ethanol Flash point (°C)

100 13

40 25

10 50
Ignition sources
Naked flame
 Arcs, sparks, static discharge

Minimum ignition energy (MIE)

Arcs, sparks, static discharge

Ignition energy

MIE

Fuel-air ratio
 Arcs, sparks, static discharge

MIE affected by

• Source duration
• Source size & shape
• Environment of flame kernel
 Hot surfaces

Autoignition temperature (AIT)

 Hot surfaces

AIT affected by

• Source size & shape

• Source orientation
• Flow conditions
 Hot surfaces

Friction, Impact – special cases:

Small surface area, but high T

Chemical reaction hazards

A+BC
Chemical reaction hazards

A+BC

D ···
 Chemical reaction hazards

e.g. HNO3  + Organics  

Unstable nitro or nitrate derivatives
 Chemical reaction hazards

Finish with brainstorm:

another unsolved incident