Process Safety Moment

Richmond Refinery Fire Incident

PSM Team
BBG

#Link:
CBS_Fire_at_Chevron's_Richmond_Refinery,_August_6,_2012_Video

© 2010 Chevron (Reference from OE Moment by Phil Rosen)

 Process Safety Moment: Richmond Refinery Incident
Asset Integrity / Management of Change (MOC)

Incident Description:
 A section of number #4-sidecut line from the distillation column
showed leakage.
 Operation team and Emergency team responded the leak from
the piping at operating condition at 640 F, 55 psig, around 19
employee investigated on site.
 Hydrocarbon released and auto-ignited approx. 2 min. after
ruptured, causing an explosion and fire.
What went wrong?
Improper MOC Process
 Improper MOC conducted to analyze an impact of removing What went wrong? How could this have been prevented?
H2S Removal Equipment for the piping section and study
changing in feeding crude components in 1991. Background Knowledge in an industry:
 Sulfidation corrosion is damage mechanism which normally
Insufficient Inspection Testing Preventive Maintenance is well
(ITPM) Program understood and known in the refinery industry.
 Sulfur compound frequently found in crude oil such as H2S.
 7 times of recommendation to take action for #4-sidecut line  API provide guidance on sulfidation corrosion in carbon
from 7 different team were partially followed. The rest piping steels piping & equipment in 1800s.
sections, the site manager decided that the line still thick Consequences:
enough to stay in service and the overall replacement could  6 employee suffered minor injuries and 5,000 people have
wait up to 5 more years. breathing problem.
 The refinery was shut down 8 months for maintenance

© 2010 Chevron 2
 Process Safety Moment: Richmond Refinery Incident
Asset Integrity / Management of Change (MOC)

What went wrong?

 High operating temperature at 640 F, 55 psig with a low
remaining thickness of piping at 1.89 mm (original
thickness was 8.178 mm in 1976) before the rupture
condition.
 No proper MOC conducted to analyze an impact from a
significantly increases in sulfur composition from new
feeding crude in high temperature operation.
 Sulfidation corrosion was a damage mechanism of the
piping section number 4-sidecut line.
 No shut off valve between the pipe and the distillation
tower and no way to isolate the leak.
 No intention to shutdown unit when discovered leakage. What went Right?
 7 times of recommendation to take action for #4-sidecut  Operator Response
line from 7 different team were partially followed. The
rest piping sections, the site manager decided that the  Emergency Response
line still thick enough to stay in service and the overall
replacement could wait up to 5 more years.

© 2010 Chevron 3
 Process Safety Moment: Richmond Refinery Incident
Asset Integrity / Management of Change (MOC)

Prevention Safeguards Mitigation Safeguards Emergency Response

Fatality
Hazard

Im
- Hydrocarbon p ro Ins No No
pe Ins In Em
- Auto Ignition r u ffic u F &G uf ef
MO ps f ic fe erg
i en t re de ct en
Temperature C t IT am ien ive cy
pr tec t F
oc PM iso tio dr i re Ma
es Initial event lat ns a ina na
s fig ge
ion ys ge ht me
tem i
Corrosion in n g Fire nt
MOC AIM ar
ea
Consequence

Failures in Preventive Safeguards: Failures in Mitigation Safeguards: Effective Safeguard:

1. Improper MOC process to analyze risk 1. No isolation was performed at upstream 1. Emergency response: Shelter in
of removing equipment upstream of the equipment after leak /No decision to SD unit Place, Evacuation on site.
piping section after change operation right after the leak was found.
condition. 2. Inactivate/Not in function for F&G
2. Insufficient ITPM program for detection system.
Sulfidation Corrosion Inspection and 3. Insufficient bund or drainage system to isolate
liquid hydrocarbon from ignition source.
Mitigation. 
4. Ineffective Fire fighting implementation.
© 2010 Chevron 4
 Process Safety Moment: Richmond Refinery Incident
Sulfidation Issue within Chevron U.S. Refineries

© 2010 Chevron 5
 Process Safety Moment: Richmond Refinery Incident
Chronology - Richmond 4 Side Cut Sulfur/Temperature

1991
H2S Removal Equipment
for 4SC taken out of
1984 service. No MoC
85% Alaskan North
Slope Crude Oil 2006 MOC for piping
(1%S) replacement during 2007
turnaround. Piping replaced
with 9Cr downstream of
1992 pump only
4SC 625˚F
2002
4SC 680˚F

© 2010 Chevron 6
 Process Safety Moment: Richmond Refinery Incident
Asset Integrity / Management of Change (MOC)
Historical Timeline:
Date Study By Findings Recommendations Action Taken
Increased operating temperature would Increase inspection of 4SC piping
August Richmond Refinery Proactive action by Crude Unit Inspector
cause more H2S to evolve leading to Piping may need to be upgraded from
2002 Employee increased sulfidation corrosion CS to 5Cr
in 2002

Piping not upgraded during 2007

Additional inspection of 52” 4SC piping.
2002 turnaround
Crude Unit Inspector Found accelerated corrosion in 52” 4SC Upgrade piping during 2007 turnaround.
Turnaround piping section (lost 1/3 of its thickness)
CML not added to 52” 4SC piping. 52”
4SC piping was not inspected after 2002

Continuous monitoring probes installed

100% inspection using continuous
Corrosion Mitigation Identified 4SC piping to be at risk from during 2007 turnaround but not on 52”
Feb 2006 monitoring technology
Plan Team sulfidation corrosion. 4SC piping section
100% inspection was not performed

Upgrade the entire 4SC piping with 5Cr. Piping downstream of pump (higher
Recommendation based on 2002 Recommendation not accepted by pressure) upgraded to 9Cr during 2007
2007
Crude Unit Inspector turnaround inspection results for 52” 4SC turnaround planning team. Concluded turnaround.
Turnaround piping that piping has sufficient thickness to last No action for thinned 52” 4SC piping
until 2011 turnaround section

Chevron ETC Neither line replacement or 100%

ETC - Prioritize piping circuits susceptible ETC - 100% thickness testing to be
inspection performed . Based on
Corrosion Experts/ to sulfidation corrosion. Perform 100% performed on all high priority lines
Sept 2009 limited inspection data , considered that
Richmond Refinery thickness testing on all high priority lines RRMG - Replace 4SC line with 9Cr
pipe would last until the next (2011)
Materials Group RRMG - 4SC line identified as high risk
turnaround

Prior to Indentify key issues that should be

Intensive Process Upgrade 4SC piping to 5Cr due to 4SC piping not upgraded during 2011
2011 addressed and repaired during upcoming
Review Team shutdown
sulfidation corrosion turnaround
Turnaround

4SC piping not upgraded during 2011

Prior to Crude Unit Upgrade 4SC piping in line with Chevron turnaround.
2011 Inspector/ CES for high temperature, high sulfur Upgrade 4SC piping to 9Cr Turnaround management team
Turnaround Metallurgist service concluded that inspection data did not
© 2010 Chevron support upgrade . 7
 BACK UP

© 2010 Chevron 8
 Auto-ignition Temperatures

© 2010 Chevron
 Auto-ignition and Operating Temperatures
Upstream Facilities
600

500

400
Temperature (°C)

300

200

100

0
Methane Ethane Propane C4s Gasoline Kerosine Diesel Gas Oils Turbine Fuel Oil Asphalt
Oils (Bunker)

© 2010 Chevron 10
 Auto-ignition and Operating Temperatures
Oil Refinery
600

500

400
Richmond Fire
640˚F/338˚C
Temperature (°C)

300

200 1. Crude Oil Distillation

2. Vacuum Distillation
3. Naphtha HDS
4. Naphtha Stabilization
5. Kerosine HDS
6. Kerosine Stabilization
7. Gas Oil HDS
8. Catalytic Reformer
100 9. Fluid Catalytic Cracking
10. Hydrocracker
11. Alkylation
12. Coker
13. Bitumen Plant

0
Methane Ethane Propane C4s Gasoline Kerosine Diesel Gas Oils Turbine Fuel Oil Asphalt
Oils (Bunker)

© 2010 Chevron 11