Some Contentious Issues in the

Earth Grid Design in Australia

Presented by:
Dr Zoran Božić & Mr Steve Hughes
 ABOUT THE PRESENTATION
 The objective is to:
• Provide an overview of contentious issues
• Serve as a catalyst to resolve the issues
 It is organized in two parts:
• Top down view: broader perspective and
considerations
• Bottom-up view: critical review of individual
building blocks

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
 The authors would like to acknowledge the
contribution given by Dr Hoohman
Dehbonei and Mr Sandeep Magan and for
the stimulation discussion
 Dr Dehbonei and Mr Magan are members
of the ENA EG-0 working group

we_n7071236_v1.ppt 3
 BACKGROUND (1)
 July 2009, a new issue of AS 2067-2008:
Substations and High Voltage Installations
exceeding 1kV a.c.
 Aug 2009, draft EG-0 Guide on Power
System Earthing – Part 1: Management
Principles
 Feb 2010, 2nd draft EG-0

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 BACKGROUND (2)
 Standing obligation:
• Under the Western Australian (Supply and
System Safety) Regulations 2001, Western
Power and other licensed power system
network operators in WA have an obligation to
comply with the requirements laid down in
Australian Standard AS 2067.

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 CONTENTIOUS ISSUES (1)
 Change in the Australian approach and
inconsistency between AS2067 and EG-0
• Probability of fatality calculation
• Permissible voltage thresholds – shall they exist or
not
 Application of the IEC60479 I vs t curves
• Pfibrillation and AS2067
• Pfibrillation and EG-0
 Aggregate risk to business
 Risk assessment data and role for regular
auditing
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 CONTENTIOUS ISSUES (2)
 Application of the probabilistic concepts
• Probability of coincidence calculation
• Probability of fatality calculation
• Assessment of risk due to step voltages
• Electric shock duration:
credible contingencies and autoreclosing
• Table of permissible risk limits

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 PART 1

Broader perspective and considerations

by
Steve Hughes

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 Change in the Australian approach and
inconsistency between AS2067 & EG-0 (1)
 In the soon to be issued ENA EG-0 Power System
Earthing Guide the probability of a fatality resulting from
the heart of a person entering ventricular fibrillation due to
contact with an external transient voltage is stated to be:
Pfatality = Pcoincidence x Pfibrillation

 Pcoincidence can be considered to represent the ‘likelihood’

probability that a person will be exposed to an external
voltage with sufficient potential to cause death.
 Pfibrillation to represent the ‘consequence’ probability that
death will result from exposure to the same external
voltage.
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 Change in the Australian approach and
inconsistency between AS2067 & EG-0 (2)
 EG-0 states: ‘If the coincidence probability is
less that the allowable societal risk limits the
hazard is of an acceptable level independent of
the fibrillation probability’.
 This implies if a value of 1 in 10-6 or less is
determined for Pcoincidence no further consideration
needs to be given to Pfibrillation.
 This, presumably, is based on the fact that if the
value for Pfibrillation will be < 1 (which is usually the
case) the overall risk probability for Pfatality will not
be any greater than that calculated for Pcoincidence.

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 Change in the Australian approach and
inconsistency between AS2067 & EG-0 (3)
 No disagreement with this line of reasoning if the
total level of exposure was restricted to just one
potential hazard.
 However this will not be the case in practice and
a responsible organisation will want a clear
understanding and assessment of its total level
risk exposure.
 Consequently each study necessitates an
assessment of Pfibrillation , irrespective of the value
determined for Pcoincidence, so all relevant
information is available for risk assessment and
auditing needs etc.
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APPLICATION OF THE IEC60479
I vs t (I/t) CURVES (IEC)
 Pfibrillation and AS2067
 Pfibrillation and EG-0

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 IEC - Pfibrillation and AS2067 (1)
AS 2067 – 2008 states:
 ‘As a guide, the representative touch voltage (Vt)
limits that may be applied to accessible metal
work for the two typical cases are shown in
Appendix A (Figure A2 and Table A1). These
two cases are described as follows:
 C1 = Special locations: High public contact
likelihood assuming bare hands and feet and
thus negligible series impedance
 C2 = Normal locations: Normal public contact
likelihood with typical mix footwear and thus
additional series impedance
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IEC - Pfibrillation and AS2067 (2)

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 IEC - Pfibrillation and AS2067 (3)
 The material presented in AS2067-2008 raises
ambiguity as to exactly how the two curves
presented in AS2067 Figure A2 were derived?
 Were they produced by selecting IEC60479
curve c1 (or c2) and using two different values
for an equivalent human body impedance, or,
were they based on the two separate curves (i.e.
c1 and c2) bounding the AC-4.1 zone
(Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing
up to about 5%) and a single equivalent human
body impedance (of approximately 700 ohms)?
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 IEC - Pfibrillation and AS2067 (4)
 The correct answer is believed to be by using
IEC/TS 60479-1 curve c1 and two different
equivalent series impedances, which would imply
AS2067 – 2008 requires that the body current
versus time curve not exceed the limits defined
by curve c1.
 This would result in Pfibrillation being equal to 0 and,
based on the current safety policy in WA,
precludes using the range of Pfibrillation being
suggested by EG-0.
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 IEC - Pfibrillation and AS2067 (5)
 One possible way of reconciling the two
documents is for AS2067 to reference
limits based on the body current versus
the duration of current flow, as described
in IEC/TS 60479-1, rather than Vt curves.

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IEC - Pfibrillation and AS2067 (6)

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 IEC - Pfibrillation and EG-0 (1)
 In appendix B of EG-0 the probability assessment of
Pfibrillation is based on the body current curves contained in
IEC 60479-1 and a much broader range of equivalent
touch and step impendence, which in turn, produce a
wider range of representative touch voltage (Vt) limits to
that presented in AS2067-2008.
 A wider difference is expected to pose acceptable risk
when a business can impose strict access and personal
protection equipment requirements but greater
consideration needs to be given to situations that involve
the involuntary exposure of people to direct or
transferred voltage transients.

we_n7071236_v1.ppt 19
 IEC - Pfibrillation and EG-0 (2)
 One also needs to consider whether the
approach taken by EG-0 to the type and
percentage use of footwear for societal
risk – which is a principle determinant
affecting the magnitude of body current
flow – is a reasonable one?

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 IEC - Pfibrillation and EG-0 (3)
 While it is generally agreed the likelihood of a
fatality occurring due to the involuntary exposure
to direct or transfer voltage transients is
extremely small, any organisation with a
significant number of assets sited in the public
domain will invariably find that its level of overall
risk will likely fall in a ‘very low’ rather than
‘negligible’ category.
 Hence, those accountable for the duty of care of
the business need to seriously considered just
how pliable they want this limit to be?
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 IEC - Pfibrillation and EG-0 (4)
 While under EG-0 the assessment of risk is
based on probabilistic principles the
understanding and quantifying of the
deterministic values for such parameters as:
the value of earth grid impedance; the fault
current magnitude; the fault clearance time; the
rise of earth potential, etc; still applies.
 As described in IEEE Std. 80, for example, these
deterministic parameters will form the basis for
where to start in assessing and quantifying
Pfibrillation
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 IEC - Pfibrillation and EG-0 (5)
 The determination of the magnitude of these parameters
is general practice for system and plant designers and
the results can be used to produce anticipated worse
case I/t curve for the situation(s) under study.
 By superimposing the resulting current/time zone curves
on those presented in IEC 60479 the probability for
Pfibrillation. can be clearly assessed and decisions made,
using cost benefit analysis methods etc, to determine
what, if any, design changes or remedial measures
should be taken.
 The benefit of this approach is the values presented for
Pfibrillation are always transparent.

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 IEC - Pfibrillation and EG-0 (6)
 The foot to foot current path should not be
automatically ruled as an ‘insignificant risk’
for this current path is the one most
commonly encountered in practice and
invariably experiences the maximum
exposure time, meaning that under some
circumstances, the level of risk posed by
this mechanism could prove statistically
significant.
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AGGREGATE RISK TO BUSINESS (1)

 Licensed electricity operators need to constantly

verify the meeting of all legislative and moral
obligations.
 That the earthing risk safety management
framework transparently demonstrates that
relevant elements, including all of the
substantive supporting data needed to assess
the level individual and aggregate risks posed to
the business, are recorded and effectively
maintained.
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AGGREGATE RISK TO BUSINESS (2)
 EG-0, in Section 7, gives a good initial outline as
what substantive elements should be included
with the possible exception of aspects of the
actual system performance. For example
information resulting from the operation of
protection relaying schemes and associated fault
recording equipment.
 The inclusion and integration of this type of
information is fundamental for it will serve to
verify the assumptions made as to number, type
and duration of faults predicted to be
experienced by the system.

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AGGREGATE RISK TO BUSINESS (3)
 Embedded processes and procedures must also
clearly demonstrate that all of the initial and
ongoing safety coordination needs that involve
other licensed operators, and large industrial
enterprises that are dependent on the reliable
supply of electric power, are adequately applied.
 This requirement is not trivial and will be
particularly challenging when large industrial
entities are involved, such as the Kwinana
Industrial corridor in WA, for the holistic
assessment and apportionment of the safety
risks posed is expected to be complex.

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AGGREGATE RISK TO BUSINESS (4)

 It is unclear what the role of a Regulator(s)

is in ensuring these requirements for
public safety are being adequately met.
 What is clear is that any major adverse
incident would highlight the part played by
the Regulator(s) in coordinating the
effectiveness of the design solutions etc.
set in place by the various parties
involved.

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 RISK ASSESSMENT DATA AND
ROLE FOR REGULAR AUDITING (1)
 The recorded material needs to be logically
structured, regularly updated and made as
transparent as possible in order to meet the
need of regular internal and periodic external
auditing.
 The material should be securely controlled and
managed in order to respond to other (e.g. legal
or coronial) enquiry purposes. Most important is
that there is no ambiguity within the business as
to what the accountabilities are for the upkeep
and maintenance of these aspects.
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 RISK ASSESSMENT DATA AND
ROLE FOR REGULAR AUDITING (2)
 It is recommended that annual internal audits be
undertaken with summary reporting made a
standing order to those sectors of management
holding the accountability for duty of care.
 It is anticipated that relevant regulating bodies
will want to conduct periodic independent audits,
at the end of an access agreement period for
example, to verify the safety performance etc of
the licensed utility is to an acceptable standard,
as well as to ensure that the Regulator(s) own
due diligence responsibilities are being
adequately met.

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 PART 2

Critical review of individual building blocks

by
Dr Zoran Božić

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 PART 2
Critical review of individual building blocks:
• Probability of coincidence calculation
• Probability of fatality calculation
• Assessment of risk due to step voltages
• Electric shock duration - autoreclosing &
credible contingencies
• Table of permissible risk limits

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 PROBABILITY OF COINCIDENDE
CALCULATION (POCC) (1)
 Unexpected outcomes of draft EG-0
 Origin of unexpected outcomes
 Link between Eq.(A-13) and the
“Probability That Two Trains Meet at the
Station” problem
 “Two Trains…” inappropriate model
 What should be done instead
 The magnitude of error
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 POCC – Equation (A-13) (2)

 Eq.(A-13) of Draft EG-0, Feb 2010:

Pcoincidence = constant x (fd + pd)
where: fd – fault duration
pd – presence duration
 Qualifier: “This derivation [of Eq.(A-13)] is
valid for short duration contacts and fault
events. It is not appropriate to be used for
continuous exposure of fault conditions.”
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 POCC – Unexpected Outcomes (3)

1. Gives probabilities greater than one!

The qualifier only partially addresses this issue
as no maximum time for the application of Eq.
(A-13) is given
2. How to assess the risk associated with long
exposure durations? Not stated. This is
important for ‘step voltages’, see IEC60479-
1:2005, Table 12, heart-current factor for the
current path foot-to-foot (the value of 0.04)

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 POCC – Unexpected Outcomes (4)

3. Eq.(A-13) gives unrealistically high

values of probabilities for short fault and
exposure durations, sometimes in the
order of seven orders of magnitude.
So does Eq.(A-16).
4. The reduction of protection clearing
times to near zero will not reduce the
probability of coincidence to near zero.

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 POCC – Origin of Unexpected
Outcomes (5)
 Partly originate from approximations made
in deriving Eq.(A-13) in section A.1.1
 The main cause is use of the inappropriate
mathematical model of the “Probability
That Two Trains Meet at the Station”
problem for the intended electrocution
application.
 Moreover, two different solutions to that
problem are given in EG-0
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 POCC – Origin of Unexpected
Outcomes (6)
 One is the approximate analytical solution
of section A.1.1, ending with Eq.(A-13)
 The second is the graphical derivation of
section A.1.2(A), ending with Eq.(A-16)
 Their comparison reveals that Eq.(A-13) is
essentially the first term of Eq.(A-16)
 The 2nd term, truncated, ensures that the
probability does not exceed the value of 1
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 POCC – Link Between Eq.(A-13)
and “Two Trains …” (7)
 Definition of events A and B in section
A.1.1:
“Event A – a person in contact with an
earthed asset when a fault occurs”,
“Event B – a person contacts an earthed
asset during a fault”
 The ‘Two Trains” are the ‘fault coming’
train and the ‘person coming’ train
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POCC – Link Between Eq.(A-13)
and “Two Trains …” (8)

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 POCC – “Two Trains …”
Inappropriate Model (9)
 The value calculated by Eqs.(A-13 & 16) is the
‘cumulative’ probability – the summation of
probabilities of a number of events
 Note that all but one of these events represent
electrocutions of shorter durations than the
protection clearance time
 Consequently, the solution to the “Two Trains…”
problem does not represent any single real
event of specific duration

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 POCC – “Two Trains …”
Inappropriate Model (10)

 So, no probability of fibrillation from

Figure 20, IEC60479-1 can be derived
using this ‘mathematical abstraction’

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 POCC – What Should be done
Instead (11)
 The electrocution event of duration equal
to the protection clearance time should be
used for the earth grid design
 The probability of a single event i is given
in Eq.(A-14) as:
Pcoincidence_i = (fd_i x pd_i) / T2
 and also illustrated in Figure A-1(c) of
Draft EG-0, Feb 2010
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 POCC – The Magnitude of the
Error (12)

Visual comparison of the area AB in (a) (the coincidence,

Eq.(A-14)), and vertically shaded area D in (c), which is the
exact solution to the “Two Trains…” problem (Eq.(A-16)),
shows significant difference which represents the error.
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 POCC – The Magnitude of the
Error (13)
 For example, for the fault and exposure
duration of 1 second over one year period:
 Eq.(A-14) gives the probability of 1x10-15
 Eq.(A-16) gives the probability of 3x10-8
 Eq.(A-13) gives the probability of 6x10-8
 Eq.(A-14) is correct one, the true probability
of coincidence, whereas Eqs.(A-13 &16) are
the respective approximate and exact
solutions to the “Two Trains …” problem

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 POCC – The Magnitude of the
Error (14)

 Final assessment of the magnitude of

error of Eq.(A-13) would be possible
after the requested clarification on what
is the maximum time (fault and/or
exposure) for the application of this
equation

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 PROBABILITY OF FATALITY
CALCULATION (1)
Pfatality = Pcoincidence x Pfibrillation
Rewritten for a single event i becomes:
Pfatality_i = Pcoincidence_i x Pfibrillation_i

 An important characteristic of each

electrocution is its duration and that this
duration determines the probability of
ventricular fibrillation (as per Figure 20 of
IEC60479-1: 2005)
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 PROBABILITY OF FATALITY
CALCULATION (2)
 Consequently, the equation
Pfatality_i = Pcoincidence_i x Pfibrillation_i

 Should not be used when solution to the

“Two Trains …” problem is used as a
proxy for the probability of coincidence,
because that proxy does not represent
any single event of specific duration
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 PROBABILITY OF FATALITY
CALCULATION (3)

 In principle, electric shocks of shorter

duration than the protection clearance
times (“partial overlaps”) could be used,
however, these should be individually
combined with the appropriate
probability of fibrillation from IEC 60479

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ASSESSMENT OF RISK DUE TO
STEP VOLTAGES

 EG-0 is silent on how to assess the risk

associated with long exposure durations,
which are typical for exposures to step
voltages in densely populated areas, as no
alternative to Eq.(A-13) is given

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ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION (1)

 A key design input for safety assessment

and equipment rating
 Related to the protection clearance times
 Shall we use the time that is:
• Shorter than the primary clearance time?
• Equal to the primary clearance time?
• Equal to the backup clearance time?
• What to do in case of autoreclosing?
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ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION (2)

 Apparent consensus to use the backup

clearance time for equipment rating
 Not so for safety assessment
 Times shorter than the primary protection
clearance time used only in EG-0
Justification not clearly stated
 We reviewed the practice of others …

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 ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION –
USA (3)

 IEEE Std. 80 considers as a design input

decision on whether to use the primary or
backup protection clearance time

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 ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION –
CREDIBLE CONTINGENCIES (4)
 Some argue that safety and other
assessments should be done consistently
as per the list of credible contingencies
 Earth faults cleared in the backup
protection clearance time can be a
credible contingency
 This also implies that the same time
should be used for safety and equipment
rating, and other power system studies
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 ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION -
AUTORECLOSING (5)
 Autoreclosing, particularly high-speed,
result in longer clearing times increasing
the level of risk to public and personnel
 Can this additional risk be ignored?
 ……
 The proposed thresholds in EG-0 originate
from IEC 60479 – I/t curves
 They relate to ventricular fibrillation
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ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION -
AUTORECLOSING (6)

 Unlike IEEE Std. 80, IEC 60479-1 is not a

design standard and is understandably
silent on what to do in case of
autoreclosing
 However, IEC 60479-1 clarifies the
thresholds of Figure 20 as follows …

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 ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION -
AUTORECLOSING (7)
 “It is important that the thresholds as order
of magnitude are valid for all persons
(men, women and children) independent
of their state of health. Often concerns are
expressed in that respect but if the
background of such objections is
examined it is found that such objections
represent just opinions without
experimental evidence….”
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 ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION -
AUTORECLOSING (8)
 “For fault durations below 200 ms,
ventricular fibrillation is only initiated within
the vulnerable period if the relevant
thresholds are surpassed.….”
 Autoreclosing causes, as a minimum, two
successive electric shocks of the
aggregate duration of twice the primary
protection time, which is generally longer
than 200ms
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ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION -
AUTORECLOSING (9)

 The fundamental question to ask is are

we sure that no autoreclosing attempt
can cause a death and would it be
appropriate to disregard it for safety?
 No, in our opinion.

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ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION -
AUTORECLOSING (10)
 It is important to note that the total duration
of electrocution is (implicitly) considered in
Figure 20, regardless if it is ‘administrated’
as a ‘single large dose’ (one electrocution
of longer duration, say due to a circuit
breaker fail time) or in ‘two consecutive
smaller doses’ (the sum of two primary
protection clearing times, which is typical
for high speed autoreclosing, with only one
autoreclosing attempt).
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ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION -
AUTORECLOSING (11)

 This opinion is one that is shared by others

in the USA and Europe, as follows …

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 ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION –
USA (12)
 IEEE Std. 80 states that the cumulative
effect of two or more closely spaced
shocks is assessed by using the sum of
individual shock durations as the time of a
single exposure:
“The fault duration and shock duration are
normally equal, unless the fault duration is
the sum of successive shocks, such as
from reclosures.”

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 ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION -
UK (13)
 In UK, a time about twice the primary
protection clearance time is used
 200ms (as a minimum), where the fastest
clearing times are 80ms at 400kV, 100ms
at 275kV and 120ms at 132kV; the longest
operating time to clear a transmission fault
is 140ms (including 3 ended lines)
 500ms in the distribution system

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 ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION -
Europe (14)
 In a number of other European countries
in which high speed autoreclosing is
routinely used, as it is in WA, it is also
required that the two (primary) protection
clearing times (before and during
autoreclosing) be added and their sum
used for safety assessment.
 For example, 2x150 = 300 ms

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 ELECTRIC SHOCK DURATION –
AS2067 (15)
 The earlier version of AS2067, which was
referencing to IEEE Standard 80, also
required to add up the (two) protection
clearance times and use the sum for
safety assessment (where autoreclosing
applies).
 This fact and the associated change may
have been overlooked in the development
of the AS2067-2008 version?

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 TABLE OF PERMISSIBLE RISK
LIMITS (1)
 An important characteristic of the
approach proposed in Draft EG-0 is that
the calculated probability of fatality is
compared against the thresholds which
are expressed as absolute values.
 Central for success of this new approach
is that the probability is calculated
accurately and that the appropriate
thresholds are selected.

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 TABLE OF PERMISSIBLE RISK
LIMITS (2)
 This section examines the thresholds and
challenges their suitability` in the present
form by raising the following issues:
• Absolute values do not apply universally
• Impact of the neighboring land use on the
“Low or Tolerable Risk” threshold
• The impact of apportion of the aggregate risk

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TABLE OF PERMISSIBLE RISK
LIMITS (TOPRL) (3)

• Source for the “≤ 10-6” value for “Low or

Tolerable Risk” = ?
• Source for the “≤ 10-4” value for “High or
Intolerable Risk” = ?
• No stakeholders’ Involvement in Selecting the
Threshold for “High or Intolerable Risk”

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TOPRL – Absolute values do not
apply universally (4)
• Largely originate from the Environmental
Protection or similar agency documents
• The maximum aggregate risk permissible to
be exported to outside of the installation
• The values vary for different land uses
• Apportion to individual industries = ?
• Allocation of a fraction of that aggregate risk
would require more stringent earth grid design

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 CONCLUSION (1)
 Some short comings have been explained
in the approach used to assess and
quantify the risk exposure probability and
an alternative approach was presented
 It is recommended that the calculation of
Pfatality be fully completed for all situations
that require an in-depth analysis and not
be truncated on the basis that Pcoincidence is
shown to be “≤ 10-6”
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 CONCLUSION (2)
 All relevant system performance statistics
and fault clearing times, etc should be
included as a matter of routine as part of
the risk management data base

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 CONCLUSION (3)
 Under Western Australian (Supply and System
Safety) Regulations 2001 there is the potential
for serious conflict between AS2067–2008 and
EG-0 over the interpretation and use of V/t
curves and in this context AS2067–2008 is seen
to be ambiguous.
 Greater clarity and consistency would be
achieved if AS2067–2008 were to reference the
current/time zone curves presented in IEC
60479-1 rather than the V/t curves currently
shown in this standard.
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 CONCLUSION (4)
 Little consideration is presented on the matter of
how to deal with the aggregate risk associated
with large industrial complexes and the complex
interrelationships that can affect the level of
societal risk.
 While this is seen to be primarily a responsibility
for WA, and possibly National, regulators to
clarify and coordinate, some comments to this
effect in EG-0, assuming this to be so, would
beneficial.
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Questions = ?

we_n7071236_v1.ppt 74