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Subprime Final
Subprime Final
Mehul Jain
Nimish Singhatwadia
Jharna Tinani
SUBPRIME CONTAGION
What are Subprime mortgages? What
are the mediums involved?
SUBPRIME LOANS: TECHNICALLY
SPEAKING
According to Fair Isaac Corporation FICO
score, loans with score below 620 are
subprime loans.
These scores are calculated by factoring
weightage to:
Payment history
How much is owed
Length of credit history
New credit
Types of credit in use
MEDIUM: COLLATERAL DEBT
OBLIGATIONS
Bankers pool together many risky loans to
borrowers with highly suspect credit-
worthiness
They make bundles of these securities and
market to investors with different appetites
of risk
Underwriter pulls together thousands of
loans to serve as collateral; slices it into
tranches with varying levels of risk and
return
Investors get hit in different ways in case of
default
High risk slightly below investment
grade safe paper
MEDIUM: CREDIT DEFAULT
SWAPS
Creation of CDO only the first step
Other banks offered protection against
probability of default on CDOs
Second order derivatives; new income
stream
Could again be bundled and sold as third
order derivatives
SUBPRIME CONTAGION
HOW SUB PRIME MIGHT END UP IN
YOUR INVESTMENTS
CHAIN REACTION OF
DEFAULTS
People began acting as if risk had
disappeared
Allowed people without financial health to
buy houses
No buyers for financial instruments backed
by mortgages
Housing bubble popped Subprime
meltdown decrease in investor
confidence about junk bonds
Financial institution A can’t sell its
mortgage-backed securities, so it can’t
raise enough cash to make the payment it
owes to institution B, which then doesn’t
have the cash to pay institution C, and
HOW MARKETS GOT INTO A BEAR
HUG
Overnight interest rates shot up above the
central banks’ targets
CP was used to finance Ninja mortgages given
to people with no income, no jobs, no assets;
CP market out of buyers
Selling off a delinquent’s home might not yield
enough collateral to pay back the loan
Uncertainty regarding who holds the toxic
paper
SUBPRIME CONTAGION
THE CULPRITS
Lenders who made lenient loans: Lenders began
proposing these structures as a way to make
homes affordable; no documentation of
borrowers’ income, only interest payment option,
piggybacks
Home buyers who sought easy mortgages:
Buyers putting less than 20% have little incentive
to avoid default, piggyback mortgages free them
from private insurance to protect the lender
Wall Street underwriters who turned them into
securities: Purchase piggybacks to turn them into
high-yield securities; shop around for higher
ratings
Investors who wanted higher yields: Interest
rates were low; their search ended here
Banks who are wary of counterparty risks:
Accentuating the situation by sitting on cash,
BEHIND THE SCENE CULPRITS: THE
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
S&P believed a ‘piggyback’, where borrowers
simultaneously take out a second loan for down
payment was no more likely to default than a
standard loan
Assign top ratings to questionable securities- making
them seem as safe as a treasury bond
Lucrative market- twice as high a fees for securities
backed by home loans
Collaboration with underwriters- influence creation of
such securities
Had the securities received the risky ratings as
present, many mutual funds and pension funds would
have been barred from buying them
Money managers lacked the resources to analyze
pools of assets and relied on rating companies
Piggyback loans 43% more likely to default than
others; still majority share of pool value are these
(52%-Washington Mutual Inc)
SUBPRIME CONTAGION
TRIGGERS IN ACTION
TRIGGER 1: BEAR STEARNS
(US)
Sponsored two hedge funds invested in subprime
paper
Most cash came from outside investors
Leveraged by borrowing from other banks
Investors tried to take out cash when subprime
hit; Bear closed funds
Lenders demanded more collateral (margin call)
After initial refusal, the I-Bank had to provide a
$1.6 bn. Credit line to least risky fund
Creditors seized the assets of the other fund
Suggested Bear had liquidity problems
How AAA ratings can’t be relied upon
Undermined confidence in mark-to-market model
MARK TO MARKET MODEL
For a frequently traded asset, financial
institutions value it by looking it at market
price
Mortgage security tranches (‘Equity’ AAA)
are not frequently traded
Valued by reference to mathematical models
Ignores liquidity: selling in a hurry say on a
margin call will only fetch what somebody is
willing to pay
<-BACK
TRIGGER 2: IKB (GERMANY)
Virus crosses the Atlantic
Focused attention on the CP market, till now a
risk-free investment
IKB set up an off-balance sheet ‘conduit’ –
Rhineland Funding
Back-up loans and ‘credit enhancement’ used
to proclaim loans as risk-free
Funded itself with $19 bn. CP for securities,
including subprime
Banks providing back-up credit lines worried
that CP market would seize up when investors
realize how exposed Rhineland was to <-BACK
dodgy
TRIGGER 3: Leveraged Buy Out
BUBBLE
Banks initially provide debt, then syndicate
loans to others in market, taking a fee
The banks got stuck up with a variety of loans
they wanted to syndicate
Two big deals: Chrysler and Alliance Boots
$50 bn. Of LBO loans now stuck on their
balance sheets with another $200+ bn. in the
pipeline
Reluctant to make any more financing
Knock-out effect on share market
<-BACK
TRIGGER 4:TROUBLE AT BNP
PARIBAS
3 money market funds (even less riskier than
conduits)with assets of $1.5 bn.
35% invested in instruments exposed to
subprime market
“The complete evaporation of liquidity in
certain market segments of the US
securitization market has made it impossible
to value certain assets fairly regardless of
their credit rating.”
Some parts of credit market had shut down
No buyers for “certain assets” regardless of
quality
Credit ratings weren’t worth the paper they
were written on
SUBPRIME CONTAGION
THE IMPACT
Bank Corporations
Mortgage lenders and Real Estate Investment
Trusts
Special purpose entities (SPE)
Investors
Impact on the neighbourhood.
Impact on corporations and other business
entities
Top funds (Goldman Sachs, Highbridge, AQR,
Renaissance) lose up to a third of investors
money
Business filling for bankruptcy
Business Type Date
New Century Subprime Lender April 2, 2007
Financial
American Home Mortgage Lender August 6, 2007
Mortgage
Ameriquest Subprime Lender August 31, 2007
NetBank on-line bank September 30, 2007
Loss due to Subprime Crisis
Business Type Loss
Citigroup Investment Bank $11,000,000,000
Merrill Lynch Investment Bank $8,400,000,000
Barclays Capital Investment Bank £1,300,000,000
HSBC Bank $3,400,000,000
Swiss Re Re-insurance $ 1,070,000,000
UBS AG Investment Bank $3,600,000,000
Deutsche Bank Bank €2,200,000,000
Bear Stearns Investment Bank $1,200,000,00
Morgan Stanley Investment Bank $3,700,000,000
Lehman Brothers Investment Bank $700,000,000
Freddie Mac Mortgage GSE $3,600,000,000
BLOOD IN WORLD STOCK
MARKETS
NSE SENSEX
QUESTIONS?