1. Deceit involves intentionally making a false statement of fact that causes another to act detrimentally. The statement need not be made directly to the plaintiff. Statements of intention or law may also constitute deceit. Negligence alone is not enough.
2. Malicious falsehood involves intentionally making a false statement that damages another's business. It is similar to defamation but applies to statements that damage business reputation rather than personal reputation. The plaintiff must prove falsity, malice, and financial loss.
3. Passing off occurs when one deceives the public into believing one's goods are another's, such as using a similar name or packaging. The test is whether the representation would
1. Deceit involves intentionally making a false statement of fact that causes another to act detrimentally. The statement need not be made directly to the plaintiff. Statements of intention or law may also constitute deceit. Negligence alone is not enough.
2. Malicious falsehood involves intentionally making a false statement that damages another's business. It is similar to defamation but applies to statements that damage business reputation rather than personal reputation. The plaintiff must prove falsity, malice, and financial loss.
3. Passing off occurs when one deceives the public into believing one's goods are another's, such as using a similar name or packaging. The test is whether the representation would
1. Deceit involves intentionally making a false statement of fact that causes another to act detrimentally. The statement need not be made directly to the plaintiff. Statements of intention or law may also constitute deceit. Negligence alone is not enough.
2. Malicious falsehood involves intentionally making a false statement that damages another's business. It is similar to defamation but applies to statements that damage business reputation rather than personal reputation. The plaintiff must prove falsity, malice, and financial loss.
3. Passing off occurs when one deceives the public into believing one's goods are another's, such as using a similar name or packaging. The test is whether the representation would
1. Deceit involves intentionally making a false statement of fact that causes another to act detrimentally. The statement need not be made directly to the plaintiff. Statements of intention or law may also constitute deceit. Negligence alone is not enough.
2. Malicious falsehood involves intentionally making a false statement that damages another's business. It is similar to defamation but applies to statements that damage business reputation rather than personal reputation. The plaintiff must prove falsity, malice, and financial loss.
3. Passing off occurs when one deceives the public into believing one's goods are another's, such as using a similar name or packaging. The test is whether the representation would
(Turin), AHCZ DECEIT • Deceit: Where a person makes a)A statement of fact; b)Which he knows to be false, or on the truth of which he has no genuine belief; c)Intending that another shall act upon it; d)Which he does; e)To his detriment The person making it will be liable to that other in an action for deceit! DECEIT CONTINUED • POINTS TO NOTE IN THE DEFINITION: • The statement need not have been made to the Plaintiff himself. See the case of LANGRIDGE V. LEVY 91837] 2 M. & W. 519. The Defendant had falsely represented to the Plaintiff’s father when selling him a gun that it was of good make and safe. It burst in the Plaintiff’s hand. It was held that the Defendant was liable for deceit. DECEIT CONTINUED • Statements of intention and opinion and promises may be statements of fact for this purpose- ‘the statement of man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion- as echoed in the case of EDINGTON V. FITZMAURICE [1885] 29 CHD. 459….per Lord Bowen L.J. In this case company directors were held liable for deceit because in a prospectus for debentures they stated that the money was required for capital purposes whereas in fact they intended to use it to pay off pressing creditors. ….. • And so might a statement of law, e.g. if a Lawyer fraudulently told a lay client “such is the law” well knowing it not to be so! DECEIT CONTINUED • Mere negligence in finding out the true facts is not deceit: the case of DERRY V. PEEK [1889] 14 APP. CASE. 337. It was stated in a prospectus that the company had the right to use steam for trams. In fact, the Board of Trade consent was required and this was quiet unexpectedly refused. It was held that an action for fraud could not be maintained against the directors since they believed the statement, though they may have been negligent. DECEIT CONTINUED • An intention to injure or defraud is not essential. • Persons who are injured by false statement but were not within the contemplation of the defendant cannot recover. • See the respective cases below for each pint above: • See EDGINGTON V. FITZMAURICE ; and • PEEK V. GURNEY [1873] L.R. 6 HL 377- In this case, the Plaintiff purchased shares in the market in reliance on false statement in the prospectus. It was held he had no action since the Prospectus was addressed to possible applicants for new shares. DECEIT CONTINUED • The Plaintiff must have substantially relied on the misrepresentation, and must have sustained damage by so doing! • “Detriment” includes personal injuries. The fact that the Defendant had nothing to gain by making the statement is irrelevant. • See the respective case: • BURROWS V. RHODES [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. The Defendants induced the Plaintiff to take part in the Jameson Raid by the false statements that British women and children needed protection. He recovered damages for loss of property and personal injuries (loss of leg) MALICIOUS FALSEHOOD Intentionally a false statement made to cause damage to another. In contrast to defamation, malicious falsehood is confined to damage to a person's business reputation. Also called injurious falsehood or trade libel. •Malicious falsehood or injurious falsehood is a tort. It is a lie that was uttered with malice, that is, the utterer knew it was false or would cause damage or harm. •Malicious falsehood is a false statement made maliciously that causes damage to the claimant. Malicious in this case means the defendant either knew the statement was not true or did not take proper care to check. It is often covered under laws regarding defamation. MALICIOUS FALSEHOOD • Malicious falsehood is a similar type of claim to defamation. A malicious falsehood is a false statement published maliciously by the defendant which either causes or is likely to cause financial loss to the claimant. "Malicious" means, essentially, that the defendant either knew that the statement was false or did not care as to its truth. Malicious falsehood therefore has a number of disadvantages over defamation for a claimant. Unlike defamation, a claimant must prove malice, falsehood and actual or likely financial loss. • The only advantage of malicious falsehood is that it can apply to any statement whereas in defamation the statement must be defamatory in nature. This is the one area in which it would be advisable to consider a malicious falsehood action in place of defamation. There may be many statements which can cause financial loss but which are not defamatory. For example, to falsely say of a solicitor that he has retired, cannot be defamatory but could be very damaging, resulting in loss of earnings. If the solicitor could show that the statement was made maliciously, he could bring an action for malicious falsehood MALICIOUS FALSEHOOD • Malicious Falsehood
To be successful in a claim for malicious
falsehood the claimant must prove that:
1.The defendant published words about the
claimant which were false; 2. They were published maliciously; and 3. The publication has caused special damage PASSING OFF • To deceive the public into believing that one’s goods or services are those of another is actionable at the instance of the latter. Examples are: using a similar trading name, wrapping, identification mark, or description of goods. See the case of WHITE HUDSON & CO. LIMITED V. ASIAN ORGANISATION LIMITED [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1466- The Plaintiffs sold cough sweets in Singapore in red wrappers. The Defendants began to sell cough sweets in similar wrappers under a different name. the majority of purchasers could not read and asked for “red paper cough sweets”. An injunction was granted. PASSING OFF CONTINUED • The test is whether the representation by the Defendant of his goods is calculated to deceive the public. The fact that he is innocent of any intent to deceive is immaterial. • In the case of common words the Plaintiff has a heavy burden of proof in showing that the word has become associated with his goods. But it may not be necessary to show that the word is exclusively associated with them. See the case of BOLLINGER V. COSTA BRAVA WINE CO. LIMITED [1960] CH 262. The Defendants, producers of sparkling wine made in Spain, sold it as “Spanish Champagne.” it was held that the description of ‘Champagne” referred exclusively to wines grown in the Champagne districts of France and the Defendants were consequently guilty of Passing Off. INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE: CONSPIRACY, INTIMIDATION, INDUCING A BREACH OF CONTRACT • INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE IN THE LIGHT OF INDUCING A BREACH OF CONTRACT: If a third party (A) internationally and without lawful justification induces B to break his contract with C, C has a right of action against A for the damage which he suffers thereby. The third party must either intend to bring about a breach or be recklessly indifferent as to whether there will be a breach or not see the case of EMERALD CONSTRUCTION CO. LIMITED V. LOWTHIAN [1966] 1 W.L.R 691: Union officials took action to hamper the work of sub-contractors and thus induce the main contractors to terminate their contract. They did not know the terms of the contract but were indifferent as to whether such termination would be lawful or unlawful. An injunction was granted to restrain them. INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE IN THE LIGHT OF INDUCING A BREACH OF CONTRACT • FORM OF INTEFERENCE: • (i) Direct Persuasion: LUMLEY V. GYE [1853] 2 E. & BL. 216: The Plaintiff, an opera-house manager, entered into a contract with a singer for her exclusive services over a period. The Defendant induced her to break it and was held liable. • (ii) Direct intervention whereby it becomes impossible for the contract to be performed. See the case of G.W.K. LIMITED V. DUNLOP RUBBER CO. LIMITED [1926] T.L.R. 376: Before a motor show the Defendants secretly substituted there tyres for the tyres of another company whose tyres were, by contract with a motor manufacturer, always to be exhibited on the latter’s car. It was held they were liable for interference with the contract. INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE IN THE LIGHT OF INDUCING A BREACH OF CONTRACT • Note also that the intentional use of unlawful means by A against B which precludes him from entering into a contract with C will give C a right of action against A. See: TARLETON V. MCGAWLEY: In order to prevent the Plaintiff trading with natives in Africa, the Defendant, a rival trader, fired a cannon at a native canoe. It was held that the Defendant was liable for the damage thereby suffered by the Plaintiff INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE IN THE LIGHT OF INDUCING A BREACH OF CONTRACT • DEFENCE: • There will be lawful justification if, e.g., the Defendant acts in the interests of public morality or is under a moral duty to give advice. But the mere absence of malice or furtherance of the Defendant’s own interests is not a defence. See: CAMDEN NOMINEES V. FORCEY [1940] CH. 352: A Tenant Committee in a block of flats induced other tenants to refrain from paying their rent in order to bring pressure to bear on the Landlords to remedy grievances. It was held that its members were liable to the Landlords. Neither common interest nor the tenants weakness vis-à-vis the Landlords was sufficient justification! INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE IN THE LIGHT OF INTIMIDATION: • The tort of intimidation is committed if A threatens to act unlawfully against B with the intention of causing B to act to the detriment of C: to understanding the foregoing at this stage, let’ consider the case of ROOKES V. BARNARD [1964] A.C. 1129: The Plaintiff was employed in the design office of B.O.A.C. He had ceased to be a member of the A. Union. In order to preserve 100 per cent. Union membership in the design office of the defendants, officials of the union, threatened to strike in breach of the their contracts of employment unless the Plaintiff was dismissed. As a result the Plaintiff's contract was lawfully terminated. It was held that the Defendant’s had committed the tort of intimidation and the Plaintiff could recover. INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE IN THE LIGHT OF INTIMIDATION: • Therefore, if C suffers damage thereby, he will have a right of action against A. it does not matter whether B’s action in relation to C is lawful or unlawful. • Note that it is not a tort to threaten a lawful act, however, malicious the intention. INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE IN THE LIGHT OF CONSPIRACY: • When two or more persons, without lawful justification, combine for the purpose of willfully causing damage to the Plaintiff, and actual damage results therefrom, they commit the tort of conspiracy. • CROFTER HAND WOVEN HARRIS TWEED CO. LIMITED V. VEITCH [1942] A.C. 435: Trade union officials, for the purpose of raising wages on the island of Lewis, persuaded the Dockers not to handle mainland wool which, it was alleged, was undercutting that spun on the island. The Dockers (without breaking any contract) complied. It was held that the union officials were not liable in conspiracy for the damage caused to the mills using mainland wool, since their purpose was to benefit members of their union. END! • QUESTIONS/Additions/ clarifications • arthsike@yahoo.com/ sikea@zra.org.zm