Session 11: Transition II: Transitions to

Democracy as a model for reconciliation

► Politics in Spain: Processes and

Institutions

► IES
Barcelona
► FALL 2007 PROGRAM

► Instructor:Andrew Davis
► e-mail: ad374@iesbarcelona.org
1
Democratization in Multinational
Polities
► Democratization is considered
inherently more difficult in
multinational states.
► John Stuart Mill – ‘Free institutions are
next to impossible in a country made
up of different nationalities’.
► Historically, this was taken to be a
given.
2
 Primordialists
► This was ‘proven’ by a group later
called ‘primordialists’.
► In plural societies there are always
political entrepreneurs who wish to
take advantage of the ‘natural
divisions’.
► So you might have political parties
who wish to construct a state-wide
identity but this is not stable because
the identity issue will eventually bring
it down. 3
 Primordialists
► Primordialism – assumes that people
are born into particular cultural
identities and that their most strongly
held values are determined by the
inherited identities.
► In other words, while social mobility is
possible, cultural mobility is not.

4
 Counter-argument
► Others counter this argument:
► Common cultural roots are neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for
ethnic or national membership.
► Nations are not direct descendents of
ancient families, rather they are
modern political movements that rely
on myths of common ancestry in order
to legitimate their domination over
society via the state.
5
 Counter-argument
► The theory that multinational
democracies are inherently unstable is
less convincing than it might seem.
► Belgium, Canada, Spain and
Switzerland.
► Good examples of democratic failures
were Germany, Japan, Italy in 1930s,
all culturally homogenous.
6
 Counter-argument
► Authoruses the example of Somalia to
show how ‘homogenous’ states can
get broken up.

► Country is ethnically, culturally and

linguistically homogenous. Opposition
to the dictator in 1991 began divide
between inter and even intra clan civil
war.
7
 Counter-argument
► Primordialism re-appeared during the
breakup of Yugoslavia.
► Croats, Slovenes, Serbs and Bosnians
had lived together peacefully since
WWII.
► With the breakup – they suddenly
began to tear each other apart.
► How to explain this?

8
 Explaining ‘instability’
► Institutionalfailure – the failure of
Yugoslavia meant that one of its main
raisons d’etre – a successful union of
the Slavic people - was a failure.
► This gave way to entrepreneurs like
Slobodan Milosovic the opportunity to
take advantage of the pre-existing
historical narratives regarding the
differences between Serb, Croat, etc.
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 Institutional failure
► When institutional failure happens
when a peripheral territory has a
successful economy, there are
incentives to mobilize for separation or
autonomy.
► This is easier if there is a ‘historical
narrative’ to base this project on.
► From what you know about Spain –
how much does this apply?
10
 Institutional failure can be part
of dictatorship or democracy
► Andrejection of the state has taken
place during dictatorships: Spain and
Czechoslovakia and in full-fledged
democracy: Quebec and Flanders.

► Soclearly this type of peripheral

nationalism is a reaction to something
specific, and is not just applied to
democracy.
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 Multinational Democracy is not
inherently unstable
► Overall point: regionally based
nationalisms do not cause institutional
failure at the center; rather,
institutional failure at the center
provides a context in which regionally
based nationalists can effectively
mobilize to promote an autonomy
movement.

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 How to solve the multinational
question
► Lijphart – suggests ‘consociational
democracy’.
► First, you recognize different groups
► Second, you empower them, but
together.
► In other words, you create institutions
which force agreement (such as, no
policy moves forward unless all groups
agree).
► This forces ‘consociationalism’ and 13

compromise.
 Criticizing Lijphart
► Itsounds good in theory, but it is
difficult to implement in extremely
divided societies. His case study was
the Netherlands.
► So when it becomes negative it
creates complete gridlock, stalemate,
frustration and at times, return to
conflict (Lebanon).

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 Criticizing Lijphart
► 2.
Also, is consociationalism
democratic?

► Imagine, if one group has twice the

population than the other, why should
the smaller group have a veto?
Shouldn’t the person who wins the
elections simply govern?
15
 Criticizing Lijphart
► 3.
What do you do when the
population changes?

► Thisis particularly thorny when the

‘minority’ group is growing faster than
the majority group. This has been
problematic in Northern Ireland, Israel,
and in other territories.
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 But there are lessons from
Consociational School
► Often, these lessons need to be
applied on a case by case basis.
► You can build electoral systems to
encourage groups and political parties
to mix.
► If you give incentives (usually in the
form of power) for parties to build
inter-ethnic coalitions, you de-
emphasize the ethnic and emphasize
state-wide answers.
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 Electoral Systems
► As I mentioned from a previous lecture. The
timing of state-wide versus regional
elections during transitions is also a key
variable in peaceful democratic transitions.
► What happened in Spain?
 Statewide votes first
 Constitution written before statutes of autonomy
► Bycontrast – in the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, regional elections mobilized
regional sentiment.
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 Strategic Problems with
Transition in Multinational
States
► 1. Center must show regional interests
that it will not cave in lightly to
demands for secession.
► 2. Center must make credible
promises that if regional interests
compromise regarding the transition,
they will not take advantage of the
situation later, and recentralize.

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 Strategic Problems with
Transition in Multinational
States
► 3. Regional activists want to make
sure that it is understood that there
will be strong consequences if
autonomy is not granted.
► 4. Regional leaders need to make
credible promises that if they are
given autonomy, they will not escalate
demands later, nor maltreat minorities
within their own regions.
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 Lessons for transition in
multinational states
► Ifwe deny primordiality, we are left
with four options
► 1. Do not acknowledge groups based
on a ‘historic identity’. This means that
any minority group – Turks in
Germany, Russians in Estonia,
Algerians in France, have no political
rights because they are not part of the
autochthonous group.
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 Lessons for transition in
multinational states
► 2. This also means that that you
should not give specified regional
groups enumerated constitutional
rights.
► The Spanish Constitution provides for
the creation of autonomies but does
not create them itself.
► This provides for changing realities on
the ground.
22
 Lessons for transition in
multinational states
► 3. Recognize that people have multiple
identities. Poll after poll, for example,
shows that most people in Catalonia
feel both Spanish and Catalan.
► The system can therefore be ‘normal’.
In other words, system can be
‘conflictual’ without revolutionary
implications.

23
 Lessons for transition in
multinational states
► Most important – The return of violent
nationalist movements in the former
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and in Africa,
was never ‘pre-ordained’ and requires
political explanations.
► Most often, it is the failure of the
project at the center which causes or
allows nationalist movements to be
created.
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 The late transition and the
Socialist years
► THEFOLLOWING SLIDES ARE FOR USE
AS BACKGROUND REGARDING THE
POST-TRANSITION YEARS OF THE
1980s AND EARLY 1990s.

► THESLIDES THAT FOLLOW FROM HERE

ON IN WILL NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE ON
THE MIDTERM EXAM.
25
 Success of the Transition
► In the short time from November 1975
to October 1982, Spain had managed
to do what nobody thought it capable
of doing: it had transformed itself from
a Fascist dictatorship into a stable,
modern democracy.
► The world breathed a sigh of relief,
applauded, and invested heavily in
Spain's future.
26
 Socialist Spain
► Elections were called for October 1982, and
the Socialist Party, lead by Felipe González,
was given an overwhelming mandate.
► Ten million Spaniards voted to let the once-
illegal Socialist party lead them into the
1980's and 90's.
► At the time of the election, he was 40 years
old, represented the NEW Spain: he was
modern, youthful, charismatic, and
intelligent.
27
 The bright side - La movida
► Spain was suddenly perceived as modern,
with it, exciting, expensive, chic, and exotic.
► "La movida"— was a complex array of
cultural and social ferment stimulated by,
among others, the film director Pedro
Almodóvar, began to capture the attention
of the world press, the jet set, and the
culture mavens.
► Money flowed freely, clothes were shed, and
all rules seemingly suspended in an orgy of
creativity and excitement as Spain liberated
itself from its repressive past. 28
 The dark side - Political
Disillusion
► Even as the 1980's crescendo of
prosperity and spending kept up, many
Spaniards were already becoming
disillusioned with what they perceived
to be:
 the growing indifference of their political
leaders
 rising incidence of corruption at high
levels
 and an increasing threat to their daily 29

security.
 Political Corruption
► The PSOE began to be referred to as corruPSOE—
and statements such as "We lived better with
Franco," - the streets of Madrid were impressively
crime- and drug-free during the Franco years.
► In May 1983, RUMASA, a huge holding company
which controlled 700 banks, construction
companies, corporations, and other major industrial
concerns in Spain, collapsed after it was revealed
the level of corruption within its organization.
► This was the most serious banking crisis in post-
World War II Europe, and it was only the beginning
of what would become the tidal wave of corruption
with which Spain is dealing today.
30
 ETA violence increases after
democracy, why?

► Between 1968 and 1977, ETA killed on

average 7 people a year.
► Between 1978 and 1980 it was 81
► Between 1981 and 1990 it was 34
► 1991 to 2000 it was 16
► Overall, between 1977 and 1987 some 475
people were assassinated by ETA terrorists,
a figure that had risen to 600 by 1988, and
to more than 750 by 1996.
31
 Nature of Spanish Transition
► Spanish transition to democracy was
‘pacted’.
► It was peaceful, negotiated between elites.
► For the most part, the fear of another civil
war or increased violence meant that
Spanish populace supported this
► In BC, however, the nature of transition
meant that many reforms took place too
slowly, meaning that continued
indiscriminate repression and misapplication
of new legislation by police forces was
taking place under ‘democracy’. 32
Nature of Spanish Transition
II
► This gave ETA measure of legitimacy.
Half of all Basques considered ETA
patriots or idealists in 1978, only 7
percent considered them terrorists.
► 2004, that had changed – 69%
considered them terrorists, 17%
criminals and murderers and 13%
fanatics.

33
 The end result of ETA’s
actions
► This created an
action/repression/action cycle which
never allowed normalization of political
life in the BC.
► This does NOT mean that violence is
an innate characteristic of the
Basques. It emerged due to specific
circumstances.

34
 The ETA dilemma
► Felipe had just been elected by 10 million
votes in October 1982 and Spain seemed to
be entering a period of hope and renewed
stability.
► But ETA continued waging its bloody war
against the government, the police, and, at
times, the innocent population itself:
between 1980 and 1982 it was killing a
person per week.
► Something obviously needed to be done.
Felipe's mandate that violence needed to be
combatted "by all possible means" was
interpreted by a small group of ultra-
rightwing cops, to mean "by all possible 35
 What did PSOE do about
ETA?
► Asit turns out, the Civil Guard's quasi-fascist
organization, the Grupo Antiterrorista de
Liberation, known as GAL, had been created
in 1983 with the goal of using the techniques
employed by ETA (assassination, kidnapping,
bombings) against ETA itself.

► Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL,

Antiterrorist Liberation Groups) - were death
squads illegally set up by officials within the
Spanish (then Socialist) government to fight
ETA. They were active from 1983 until 1987, 36

under PSOE.
But Socialists maintain power
► Ironically,
however, Felipe and the Socialist
Party made impressive gains in popularity
during the mid-1980's because of their:
 obvious dedication to social welfare concerns
 their notable improvement in areas as diverse as
education, health care, and the infrastructure.
► Spain entered the NATO alliance in 1985
(thereby breaking a PSOE campaign
promise)
► In 1986 it was admitted as a full member
into the European Economic Community. 37
 The Monarchy
► In February 1986, on his 18th birthday,
Prince Felipe was sworn in officially as
the heir to the throne, insuring the
continuity of Spain's constitutional
monarchy.
► And in the June 1986 elections, the
Socialist Party once again gained an
absolute majority (44.3 percent) and
continued to rule triumphantly.
38
 Back to the dark side…
► Still, one heard more talk about "Felipe's
blunders" and "Felipe's deceits," and, for the
first time in a decade, an opposition party
began to achieve some coherence.
► There had been underground opposition
parties during the Franco regime and
legitimate opposition parties since the 1977
elections, of course, but neither the rightist
Alianza Popular nor the leftist Izquierda
Unida had posed any real threat to the rule
of the Socialists for most of the 1980's.
39
 The Right wing reorganizes
► Slowly,however, the Alianza Popular
transformed itself into the newly
constituted Partido Popular, a right-
wing coalition of technocrats,
conservative businessmen, and
disenchanted military and religious
leaders, and began to position itself as
a legitimate and stable alternative to
the Socialist government.
40
 2 Cracks in the Wall - 1988
► Several commissions were formed to
investigate influence peddling and
misappropriation of funds by high
government officials and members of
Congress.
► In July 1988, two policemen were
arrested and charged with establishing
a secret police hit squad whose sole
mission was the elimination of Basque
terrorists.
41
 Cracks in the Wall
► These arrests, while widely publicized, were
not at the time seen to be a major threat to
Spanish democracy. In hindsight, they
appear to be defining moments - time
bombs waiting to explode across the
political face of Spain, as they would indeed
do in 1994.
► The suspicion that government funds from
the Ministry of the Interior had been used to
finance this secret police organization
remained at the time only that—a suspicion. 42
 Positive Side
► Felipe still could rightfully claim great
strides in the improvement of the
standard of living for most Spaniards.
► Spain was Western Europe's fastest
growing economy.
► Industries had been modernized and
the steel and shipbuilding sectors,
which had fallen onto hard times a
decade earlier, were once again
prospering.
43
 Positive Side
► People seemed to live well, to spend money
freely, to enjoy themselves with abandon.
► One-month summer vacations were not only
possible, they were an absolute and
immutable right of workers.
► Working hours shortened as mattress
lengths lengthened (proving the real
benefits of improved nutrition), corporate
and banking profits tripled and quadrupled.
► Tourism set new records.

44
 1992
► Ironically,
exactly 500 years after
Columbus:
► Olympic Games (Barcelona)
► the International World's Fair (Seville)
► the Cultural Capital of Europe (Madrid).
► Whereas in 1982 only 23 percent of
Spaniards defined themselves as
belonging to the middle class, by 1992
more than 52 percent did so. 45
 Modernity
► AsWilliam Finnegan wrote in The New
Yorker in 1992, "for all the medieval
images that still cling to the country,
"the real Spain" is a thoroughly
modern land, increasingly sexy and
shockproof and rich."

46
 Price for success high
► Spanish prosperity benefited the rich
much more than the poor, or even the
middle class, and inflation began to
run rampant.
► Unemployment, which in the U.S.
hovered between 3 percent and 5
percent at the time, reached a
catastrophic 20 percent in Spain by
1988, and has stayed there (or moved
even higher) ever since. 47
 Price for success high II
► The country reacted by staging the largest
national strike ever witnessed on Spanish
soil in December 1988, a strike which in
effect closed the country down.
► Even the king, in his traditional Christmas
message, called for some serious talks
among the competing sectors of a society
he feared would unravel if left unattended.
► Public confidence in the leadership and the
morality of the Socialist party was eroding.

48
 Scandal starting to drown out
positives
► In March 1991 his long-time ally Alfonso
Guerra (now openly called "henchman" by
his enemies) was forced to resign as vice
president, caused in part by a major scandal
provoked by his brother Juan, who was
accused of influence peddling and enriching
himself illegally.
► The government of Felipe lost the people's
confidence. As The New York Times put it in
a not very subtle headline in July 1994
referring to Felipe: "Spaniards Grow
Disenchanted With a Once-Charismatic 49
Leader."
 Summary of PSOE years
► Spain has undergone monumental changes
in the past 20 years.
► It must be kept in mind that in one
generation Spain went from a predominantly
rural to a predominantly urban society, from
a predominantly agricultural to a
predominantly industrial/service society (50
years ago Spain was 70 percent agricultural;
now it is only 6 percent agricultural);
► Spain has moved, in one generation, from
the 19th century to the 20th century.
50
 Summary of PSOE years
► 1975 to 1995 have been the most
important years in Spanish history in
the past several centuries.
► This has been the longest democratic
period Spain has ever witnessed.
► The changes have been dramatic and
lasting, and Spain can never return to
its agricultural, rural, 19th-century
roots.
51
 Summary of PSOE years
► With all its problems accumulated by
1995, Spain remained a dynamic,
tolerant, and exciting country which
looked to the future as much as it did
to the past.
► The party of the go-go 80's may have
ended, but Spain’s democracy, most
importantly, was consolidated during
this time.
52