The document summarizes the background and issues surrounding the Punatsangchu-I hydroelectric dam project in Bhutan. It describes how the original dam site was changed in 2008 without thorough geological studies, which revealed weaknesses in the right river bank. Despite major landslides, comprehensive solutions were not implemented until 2019. Independent reviews ultimately recommended abandoning the current dam site and building a smaller barrage upstream due to unsafe geological conditions and stability factors below international standards. The project is now progressing with the barrage option to generate power while minimizing risks.
The document summarizes the background and issues surrounding the Punatsangchu-I hydroelectric dam project in Bhutan. It describes how the original dam site was changed in 2008 without thorough geological studies, which revealed weaknesses in the right river bank. Despite major landslides, comprehensive solutions were not implemented until 2019. Independent reviews ultimately recommended abandoning the current dam site and building a smaller barrage upstream due to unsafe geological conditions and stability factors below international standards. The project is now progressing with the barrage option to generate power while minimizing risks.
The document summarizes the background and issues surrounding the Punatsangchu-I hydroelectric dam project in Bhutan. It describes how the original dam site was changed in 2008 without thorough geological studies, which revealed weaknesses in the right river bank. Despite major landslides, comprehensive solutions were not implemented until 2019. Independent reviews ultimately recommended abandoning the current dam site and building a smaller barrage upstream due to unsafe geological conditions and stability factors below international standards. The project is now progressing with the barrage option to generate power while minimizing risks.
05190014 BE4PE OUTLI NE • Background • Causes • Recommendations • Pictures • Current progress BACKGRO UND 2008: The then PHPA MD (R.N Khazanchi) proposed to change the dam site – to generate more power June 2008: The then cabinet agreed to the proposal 2012-13: The Joint Audit Report of: 1. Royal Audit Authority (RAA) – Bhutan 2. Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) – India PHPA, its main consultant WAPCOS (Water and Power Consultancy Services), and CWC (Central Water Commission) Knew about geological weaknesses at the right bank area 2009: Still went ahead with tendering of dam on above site BACKGRO UND 16th Feb 2009: Project dam bids opened – clearance issued by WAPCOS, on behalf of GSI (without further investigations) July 2013: Major slide on right bank - could be fixed with Nu 3.5B of mitigation measures (WAPCOS and CWC) August 2016: Another major slide – additional mitigation measures 22nd Jan 2019: Repetition of slide 21st PHPA Authority Meeting: Govt. insisted Indian consultants for comprehensive solution CWC: Tasked to strengthen right bank (stability) 1st Oct 2019: CWC report Dec 2019: Detailed drawings BACKGRO UND PHPA officials confident enough – concreting from stable left bank Total dam width: 241 m Starting work area in left side: 51 m Proposal of CWC: Right bank constructed over 288 concrete piles driven into ground – to avoid excavating shear zone below right bank Bhutanese side not very convinced (long term) – overall review NHPC (National Hydro Power Corporation) – 3rd party review of WAPCOS and CWC proposal BACKGRO UND NHPC recommendation – abandon dam site Minimum factor of safety: International standard: >=1 European standard: 1.5 to 1.8 CWC’s factor of safety: 1.2 to 1.4 NHPC disagreed – factor of safety below 1 (unsafe) Instead recommended to build a smaller structure (barrage) – 820 m upstream of the current dam site A dam significantly raises the water level and has storage capacity while a barrage is a less tall structure that focuses more on diverting water flow. BACKGRO UND NHPC’s criticism was not only restricted to right bank but also the Stilling Basin - to reduce the velocity and flow of the water coming out of the Dam’s sluice gates - not adequate. Normally a stilling basin has hard rock under it but given its absence, the proposal was to build a 7-meter concrete raft to take the impact. A foreign 3rd party expert – After its own study & review of reports of CWC and NHPC – concluded as too risky (weakness of right bank) Similar recommendation – barrage upstream BACKGRO UND Barrage option was found to be: Much less risky 1200 MW generation – not expected to be significantly affected Save costs Highway passing over dam will not have to be relocated Still utilize HRT and power house which are almost complete. Current HRT can be elongated to reach the barrage. The project’s original completion date: Nov 2016 Repeated delays (right bank area) - several new deadlines with the last one being in 2025. BACKGRO UND Budget 2020 document: P-I hydroelectric is expected to be commissioned in March, 2025 Revised estimated cost: Nu 93.755B Initial budget allocation (2008): 35B As of March, 2020, Nu 79.453B has been disbursed and 86.65% of the works had been completed with the main uncompleted works being the dam. CHANGE OF LOCATION The original dam site, studied under DPR was located 1.5 km d/s of present dam site. Location was shifted in 2008 with an understanding that dam foundation grade rock will be available under river bed at 45 m depth (original depth – 78 m) However at the new location also, it was still 78 m CAUSE S Geological weakness: The right bank threatened stability of dam. This was known but not thoroughly addressed. Inadequate safety factor: Below international standards, making it risky. The initial recommendations and strengthening measures were insufficient. Insufficient stilling basin: Inadequate design of stilling basin Change in dam site: Without conducting comprehensive geological investigations. Lack of comprehensive solution: Despite major slides, no comprehensive solution until 2019 (insistence of Govt.) RECOMMENDA TIONS Through geological surveys: Conduct comprehensive geological surveys and studies before initiating any hydropower project to identify potential weaknesses or risks. Adherence to safety hazards: Ensure that all dam construction projects meet or exceed international safety standards (factor of safety) to minimize risks. Independent reviews: Engage independent and third-party experts to review project proposals and designs to ensure objectivity and prevent conflicts of interest. RECOMMENDA TIONS Consult local and international experts: Seek expertise from both local and international experts in dam construction and geology to benefit from a wide range of perspectives and experiences. Rigorous project planning: Ensure that all phases of the project are thoroughly planned, including contingency plans for potential issues that may arise. CURRENT PROGRESS Overall progress: 87.73% (Aug 31, 2023) MC-1 Dam: 69.87% MC-2 HRT: 100% MC-3 Underground Power House: 100% Electro-mechanical works: 98.58% Transmission line: 99.94% PICTUR ES PICTUR ES REFERENC ES Lamsang, “Current Punatsangchu I dam likely to be abandoned for a barrage upstream,” The Bhutanese, Feb. 09, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://thebhutanese.bt/current-punatsangchu-i-dam-likely-to-be-abandoned- for-a-barrage-upstream/ Wikipedia contributors, “Comptroller and Auditor General of India,” Wikipedia, Aug. 24, 2023. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comptroller_and_Auditor_General_of_India REFERENC ES “WAPCOS.” https://www.wapcos.co.in/ Dr Dhawan Academy of Geologists, “‘Punatsangchhu-I, Bhutan: What Went Wrong?’ Academy Open House.09, 12 Dec 2020,” YouTube. Dec. 15, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hqDDLiDqHA0 ChatGPT 3.5 “Punatshangchhu-I Hydroelectric Project Authority.” https://www.phpa1.gov.bt/home-2/ THANK YOU
Handbook on Construction Techniques: A Practical Field Review of Environmental Impacts in Power Transmission/Distribution, Run-of-River Hydropower and Solar Photovoltaic Power Generation Projects