Pengenalan Kepada

Keterangan
Sokongan
DR JAL ZABDI MOHD YUSOFF
Keterangan Sokongan

Seksyen 134. Bilangan saksi.

Tiada bilangan tertentu bagi saksi dikehendaki dalam mana-mana kes untuk membuktikan
sesuatu fakta.

Berdasarkan kepada s. 134 AK ini bermakna, hanya seorang saksi adalah memadai untuk
membuktikan sesuatu fakta.

Pada amnya, undang-undang tidak memfokuskan kepada jumlah saksi yang memberi
keterangan untuk menentukan sama ada sesuatu fakta yang ditegaskan itu telah dibuktikan.
Sebaliknya, undang-undang lebih mementingkan kualiti keterangan yang diberikan. Ini
adalah kerana sekiranya terdapat keterangan daripada seorang saksi yang boleh dipercayai,
maka ia adalah lebih baik daripada 10 orang saksi yang kualiti keterangan mereka diragui.
Kes: Aziz bin Muhamad Din v Public
Prosecutor [1997] 1 CLJ 523
Section 134 of the Evidence Act 1950 (‘the Act’) states that ‘no particular number
of witness shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact.’ The section
enshrines the well-recognised maxim that ‘evidence has to be weighed and not
counted’.

Kualiti keterangan vs Kuantiti Keterangan

Balachandran v Public Prosecutor [2005] 1
CLJ 85 (FC)
 Where the evidence of a witness does not require to be corroborated in law there
is no obligation to tender corroborative evidence to support his testimony.
 Thus if the case for the prosecution rests solely on the evidence of one witness in
such a category there is no requirement in law for his evidence to be corroborated.
 Any such requirement will conflict with s. 134 of the Evidence Act 1950 which
provides that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for
the proof of any fact. This means that the testimony of a single witness, if
believed, is sufficient to establish any fact
AGBU GOODLUCK UGOCHUKWU
lwn. PP [2018] 2 CLJ 30 (CA)
 Mahkamah ini menerima hujahan peguam perayu tersebut. Steven Owusu bukanlah suatu
watak yang 'fictitious' yang direka-reka oleh perayu. Keterangan SP6 iaitu pemilik rumah
adalah jelas bahawa rumah tersebut disewakan kepada Steven Owusu. SP6 mengesahkan
ada berjumpa Steven Owusu dan menyerahkan satu set kunci rumah termasuk kunci
mangga gril serta kad akses kepada Steven Owusu. SP6 berjumpa Steven Owusu
sebanyak dua kali. Butiran Steven Owusu seperti nombor passport H2536859 warga
Ghana dan nombor telefon 012-3446164 ada tercatit dalam perjanjian sewaan (P62).
 Seseorang yang tahu nombor akaun bank SP6 tentunya telah membuat bayaran bulanan
tersebut tanpa gagal. Bayaran dibuat secara memasukkan tunai melalui mesin CDM. Tiada
keterangan oleh pihak pendakwaan yang menunjukkan perayu tahu nombor akaun bank
SP6 bagi mengatakan bayaran bulanan dibuat oleh perayu atau rumah tersebut diduduki
secara tunggal oleh perayu dengan mengambil alih sewaan daripada Steven Owusu. Tiada
apa-apa rampasan dokumen atau resit bayaran sewa rumah tersebut dijumpai daripada
milikan perayu. Dengan yang demikian, Steven Owusu adalah saksi material kes.
 Justeru, usaha yang berkesan dan memadai hendaklah dilakukan bagi mengesan Steven
Owusu tetapi gagal dilakukan oleh SP8. Mahkamah menerima hujahan oleh peguam
perayu bahawa hakim bicara telah gagal menimbangkan dengan betul usaha pihak
pendakwaan yang jelas tidak memadai tersebut apabila menerima keterangan SP8
sebagai telah berusaha sebaik mungkin.
 Justeru, peruntukan anggapan yang tidak memihak di bawah s. 114(g) Akta Keterangan
1950 jika Steven Owusu dikemukakan akan memudaratkan kes pendakwaan adalah
terpakai ke atas pihak pendakwaan kerana kegagalan memanggil Steven Owusu sebagai
saksi bagi menutup lompangan kes pendakwaan atau menawarkannya kepada pihak
pembelaan (Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1987] 1 CLJ 250; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221;
[1987] 1 MLJ 492, [1986] 1 MLRA 292). Walaupun s. 134 Akta Keterangan 1950 tidak
meletakkan bilangan saksi tertentu bagi pembuktian sesuatu fakta, tetapi dalam kes
perayu ini, kes pihak pendakwaan mengalami kesenjangan atau 'gap' dengan ketiadaan
Steven Owusu dipanggil bagi memberi keterangan.
COLLINS CHIGBO CHIMA v. PP [2019]
1 LNS 107 (CA)
 Ground (i) - sole reliance upon the evidence of SP-2, the raiding officer
 [40] Learned counsel submitted that the learned JC erred when he relied solely
upon the evidence of SP-2 in convicting the appellant. It was contended that SP-
2's evidence had been challenged by the defence in terms that when the appellant
was apprehended, Nabuuma Lucky was with him and Nabuuma Lucky was in fact
holding the white coloured plastic bag containing the impugned drugs. The only
person who could confirm the prosecution's version is Nabuuma Lucky. Hence,
Nabuuma Lucky should be called to corroborate SP-2's testimony that at the time
of the appellant's arrest, the appellant was holding the white coloured plastic bag
containing the drugs.
 Likewise, in the present appeal before us, the learned JC believed the testimony of
the raiding officer, SP-2. As the trier of fact, that was his primary role. We further
opined that the nature of the case herein does not fall within that category of cases
where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires that
corroboration should be insisted upon as a rule of prudence. Hence, the singular
testimony of SP-2 was credible enough and was sufficient to establish the case for
the prosecution.
 In our view, it falls squarely within the ruling in Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ
85, adverted to by the Federal Court in the case referred to above: that any
requirement for SP-2's evidence to be corroborated will conflict with s. 134 of the
Evidence Act 1950 which provides that no particular number of witnesses shall in
any case be required to establish or prove any fact. As such we found no merit in the
submission canvassed by the appellant on the issue of the need of SP-2's testimony to
be corroborated.
Keterangan Sokongan

Sungguhpun, keterangan oleh seorang saksi adalah memadai terdapat keadaan

yang mana lebih daripada seorang saksi adalah diperlukan. Keadaan ini berlaku
apabila terdapat keperluan sama ada dari segi undang-undang atau
amalan/kebijaksanaan

Keterangan sokongan – apabila seseorang saksi itu memberi keterangan terdapat

keperluan sama ada dari segi undang-undang atau amalan/kebijaksanaan untuk
keterangan saksi berkenaan di sokong oleh keterangan lain.
Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras AIR
[1957] SC 614
Sinha J said in :
On the consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, the
following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established:
(1) As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness
though uncorroborated.One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other
witnesses of indifferent character.
(2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on
corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself
requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for
example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an
accomplice or of an analogous character.
(3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary
must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid
down in a manner like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge
before whom the case comes.
Rule of Law and Rule of Prudence

Rule of Law
1. Kanak-Kanak (Seksyen 133A Akta Keterangan)

Rule of Prudence
1. Mangsa Kesalahan Seksual
2. Rakan Sejenayah
3. Saksi Berkepentingan
Apa itu Keterangan Sokongan?

 Director of Public Prosecution v. Hester [1973] AC 296).

Corroboration is not a technical term. It simply means
“confirmation”

Attan Abdul Ghani v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 143, keterangan sokongan
adalah keterangan yang boleh menyokong atau dapat menunjukkan bahawa
keterangan yang diberikan oleh saksi yang keterangannya perlu disokong itu
benar.

Kes : Aziz Mohamad Din [1997] 1 CLJ SUPP 523

Keterangan yang mengesahkan keterangan yang diberikan oleh saksi yang
keterangannya perlu disokong.
R v Baskerville [1916]2 KB 658

The nature of the corroboration will necessarily vary according to the

particular circumstances of the offence charged. It would be in high degree
dangerous to attempt to formulate the kind of evidence which would be
regarded as corroboration, except to say that corroborative evidence is
evidence which shows or tends to show that the story of the accomplice that
the accused committed the crime is true, not merely that the crime has been
committed, but that it was committed by the accused.
R v Baskerville [1916]2 KB 658

evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the

accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In other words, it
must be evidence which implicate him, that is, which confirms in some material
particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed but also that
the prisoner committed it.

(keterangan sokongan dalam undang-undang keterangan hendaklah bebas,

melibatkan tertuduh dan juga mengaitkan tertuduh dengan kesalahan yang
dipertuduh)
 Dalam kes Brabakar v PP [1966] 1 MLJ 64 :
Corroborative evidence is not necessarily restricted to the oral evidence of
an independent witness. Corroboration can equally well be afforded by established
facts and the logic of established facts sometimes speaks more eloquently than
words.

Dalam Kes Attan Abdul Ghani v PP [1970] 2 MLJ 143.

Thus, corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused
committed the crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of
his connection with the crime. Corroboration must be in material particulars
and it is not necessary that the whole prosecution story or all material
particulars should be corroborated:
Tang Kin Seng v. Public Prosecutor
[1997] 1 SLR 46
This is but common sense. The only surprise is that it took so long for it to be
recognised. If a conviction for an offence can be secured solely on circumstantial
evidence, there is no reason at all why corroboration cannot also be based purely
on circumstantial evidence.

Prinsip
Mahkamah tidak menetapkan apakah fakta yang terjumlah kepada
keterangan sokongan. Sebaliknya ia bergantung pada fakta kes
untuk menentukan jenis keterangan sokongan yang diperlukan.
PP v. LIM KIANG CHAI [2016] 4 CLJ
173
Thus, corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the
crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the
crime. Corroboration must be in material particulars and it is not necessary that the
whole prosecution story or all material particulars should be corroborated.

Surrounding circumstances leading to commission of offence - Whether events

preceding offence to be considered?
 In our judgment the shooting incident on 18 February 2005 should not be considered in isolation from with the
events that preceded the murder. It must be considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances leading to
the murder. The case for the prosecution was that the murder was committed pursuant to a prearranged plan.
 The target was Fabian Lim.
 His office address was identified but no one had his photograph. Evidence was adduced that on 22 January
2005 the deceased's law firm was burgled.
 The prosecution called PW16 and PW20 who gave evidence that on 1 February 2005 the deceased's car was
trailed by a Proton Wira car No. BFJ 9275 driven by PW23 with PW26 as a passenger. PW23 and PW26 were
arrested by the police on the same day, acting on information given by PW20.
 Hilman bin Sutt (PW18), who was a clerk at the deceased's law firm testified that a few days before the break
in he saw a male Chinese with another person, sitting on a motorcycle parked next to the law firm. This
Chinese male later walked up the staircase to the said law firm. He later identified him, at an identification
parade, as Sim Eng Huat (PW26).
 On 22 January 2005 the deceased's office was broken into. The deceased lodged a police report of the break in.
Several items, including some bags, a one million ringgit cheque and photographs containing the deceased's
picture were stolen. This evidence came from PW16, the deceased's wife and PW20.
 PW26 admitted in evidence that he had trailed the deceased about a month before
the deceased was murdered.
 He admitted that he was arrested together with PW23, while trailing the deceased
in the Proton Wira car and pleaded guilty to a charge under s. 118 of the Penal
Code.
 He admitted that on 18 February 2005 he trailed the deceased's car to the
restaurant and saw the pillion rider open fire at the car when it was reversing out
of the parking lot.
 He saw the pillion rider flee on a motorcycle ridden by another person. He said he
knew the pillion rider and the rider of the motorcycle.
 However, we find that there are ample independent evidence to corroborate PW26's
evidence in material particulars.
 PW16's evidence that the deceased's car had been trailed by a golden coloured Proton Wira
corroborated PW26's evidence that he had been trailing the deceased's car before the
deceased was shot.
 PW20 could even see the Proton Wira car from his office and took down the car's
registration number before passing the information to the police who arrested PW26.
PW18 who identified PW26 as the person who walked up the staircase leading to the
deceased's office supported PW26's evidence that he had been observing the deceased
going into and leaving his office.
 ASP Wong Chee Keong (PW21) gave evidence that PW26 brought him to the place where
the badly burnt motorcycle which was allegedly ridden by the respondent on the day of the
shooting was found. There is no ground for us to interfere with the assessment of PW26's
evidence by the learned trial judge.
Public Prosecutor v Hashim bin Hanafi [2002] 4 MLJ
146 (Tujuan Keterangan Sokongan)

 Augustine Paul J (as he then was) said :

 The purpose of corroboration is not to give validity or credence to evidence which
is deficient or suspect or incredible but only to confirm and support that which as
evidence is sufficient and satisfactory and credible (see DPP v Hester [1972] 3 All
ER 1056).
 Its role is to confirm other evidence in the sense that it renders that other evidence
more probable (see Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207; DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC
729). It cannot therefore amount to that other evidence itself. Thus the record of
an information will only enhance the credibility of the witness and the absence of
it cannot render the oral evidence of it inadmissible; nor can it be a substitute for
the evidence that it is meant to corroborate.”
Director of Public Prosecutions v
Kilbourne [1973] 1 All ER 440
 There is nothing technical in the idea of corroboration. When in the ordinary
affairs of life one is doubtful whether or not to believe a particular statement one
naturally looks to see whether it fits in with other statements or circumstances
relating to the particular matter; the better it fits in, the more one is inclined to
believe it. The doubted statement is corroborated to a greater or lesser extent by
the other statements or circumstances with which it fits in.

 The other statements or circumstances are only of value if, having regard to what
is in issue, they come from a source or sources independent of the accomplice and
go some part of the way towards proving guilt, by tending to show that the
offence was committed and that the accused committed it.
 It is therefore always important to consider: (1) what are the real issues in the
case; (2) what the evidence being put forward as corroboration does in fact prove.
The proof may of course come from several sources, and in that sense
corroboration may be cumulative as already illustrated; (3) whether that evidence:
(a) comes from a source or sources independent of the accomplice; (b) goes some
significant part of the way towards showing that the offence was committed and
that the accused committed it.
 Corroboration Warning
(Aziz bin Muhamad Din v PP [1997] 1 CLJ supp. 523)

 Generally in Malaysia there is no specific rule of law that requires the evidence of
a witness to be corroborated except in the case of the evidence of a child of tender
years under s 133A of the Act. However, in certain types of cases there is a rule of
practice which requires evidence to be corroborated. This includes the evidence of
a complainant in a case involving a sexual offence.
 Even in such cases a conviction based on uncorroborated evidence is not illegal.
But the rule of practice regulates the manner in which uncorroborated evidence is
to be treated, that is to say, the judge must warn himself of the dangers of
convicting on such evidence. In saying that the warning must appear in the
judgment or grounds of decision of the trial court though no particular form of
words need be used.
Ng Yau Thai v PP [1987] 2 MLJ 214

 The warning as to the danger of convicting on uncorroborated evidence if the

prosecution is relying on the testimony of an accomplice does not involve some
legalistic ritual to be automatically recited by the trial magistrate, or that some
particular form of words or incantation be used and if not used, the judgment is
deemed to be faulty and the conviction set aside. There is no magic formula and
no set words which must be adopted to express the warning.
Attan Abdul Ghani v PP [1970] 2 MLJ
143b
 The law as to corroboration as enunciated by the various authorities may be summarised
thus:–
 "It would be impossible, indeed it would be dangerous, to formulate the kind of evidence
which should, or would, be regarded as corroboration. Its nature and extent must
necessarily vary with the circumstances of each case and also according to the particular
circumstances of the offence charged. But to this extent the rules are clear:–
 (1) It is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every material
circumstance in the sense that the independent evidence in the case, apart from the
testimony of the complainant or the accomplice, should in itself be sufficient to sustain
conviction. All that is required is that there must be some additional evidence rendering it
probable that the story of the accomplice (or complainant) is true and that it is reasonably
safe to act upon it.
 (2) The independent evidence must not only make it safe to believe that the crime
was committed but must in some way reasonably connect or tend to connect the
accused with it by confirming in some material particular the testimony of the
accomplice or complainant that the accused committed the crime.
 (3) The corroboration must come from independent sources and thus ordinarily
the testimony of one accomplice would not be sufficient to corroborate that of
another.
 (4) The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the
crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with
the crime.
 (5) Corroboration must be in material particulars but it is not necessary that the
whole prosecution story or all material particulars should be corroborated.
 (6) Corroborative evidence required for accepting the testimony of an accomplice need
not by itself conclusively establish the guilt of the accused. It is sufficient if it is a piece
of circumstantial evidence which tends to connect the accused with the crime with
which he is charged.
 (7) Though a trap-witness is not an approver, he is certainly an interested witness in the
sense that he is interested to see that the trap laid by him succeeded. He could at least be
equated with a partisan witness and it would not be admissible to rely upon his evidence
without corroboration. His evidence is not a tainted one; it would only make a difference
in the degree of corroboration required rather than the necessity for it.
 (8) Corroboration need not be by direct evidence. It may be by circumstantial evidence
in which case the rule relating to proof from circumstantial evidence would apply and
the circumstance must be consistent with the innocence of the accused against whom the
circumstance is offered as evidence.
 (9) There must be corroboration in one or more material particulars but that does
not mean in every particular or detail. Corroboration, as the grammatical meaning
of the word itself implies, means only support, or in other words, an assurance of
truth which is lent to the evidence of the accomplice or the complainant by other
evidence. It does not mean that the whole evidence given by the accomplice (or
complainant) must be repeated wholly or in parts by witnesses other than the
accomplice (or the complainant).
 (10) The minimum corroboration which the law ordinarily requires of the
evidence of an accomplice is evidence of at least one material fact pointing to the
guilt of the accused person. The weight of such corroborative evidence which is
necessary depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case."