CAUSES

Proximate Cause

Is that cause, which, in natural and

continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred (Ramos v. C.O.L. Realty,
G.R. No. 184905, August 28, 2009).

NOTE: Proximate cause is not necessarily the immediate

cause; it’s not necessarily the nearest time, distance or
space (People v. Elizalde, 59 Off. Gaz. 1241).
 Concept of Proximate Cause

Negligence Civil Liability Act/Omission Damage

Direct Causal Connection

Reasonable
Foreseeability
Application of Proximate Cause

The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict,

not in actions involving breach of contract.

The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person

where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created (Calalas v. CA, G.R. No.
122039. May 31, 2000).
Tests in Determining Proximate Cause
1. “But For” /Sine Qua Non Test
Whether such negligent conduct is a cause without which the injury would not
have occurred or is the efficient cause which set in motion the chain of
circumstances leading to the injury.
[Bataclan v. Medina, supra]
Tests in Determining Proximate Cause

2. Sufficient link
The Supreme Court has adopted a
relaxation of the “but for” test in Dy
Teban v. Jose Ching [G.R. No. 161803
(2008)]. Plaintiff, however, must
establish a sufficient link between the act
or omission and the damage or injury.

That link must not be remote or far-

fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach.
The damage or injury must be a natural
and probable result of the act or
omission.
Tests in Determining Proximate Cause
(3) Substantial factor

If the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the
fact that the actor neither foresees nor should have foreseen the harm or the
manner in which it occurred, does not prevent him from being liable.
[Philippine Rabbit v. IAC, G.R. No. L-66102-04 (1990)]

(4) Mixed considerations

There is no exact formula to determine probable cause. It is based

upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent
[Dy Teban v. Jose Ching, supra]
Tests in Determining Proximate Cause
(5) Cause v. condition
The distinction between cause and condition has already been almost entirely
discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case
where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position
of apparent safety, and some new force intervense. But even in such cases, it is not
the distinction between “cause” and “condition” which is important, but the
nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause
[Phoenix Construction v. IAC, supra].

(6) Last clear chance

Also known as: "doctrine of discovered peril” or “doctrine of supervening negligence” or
“humanitarian doctrine”. The antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude
him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant,
who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence [PNR v. Brunty, supra].

If both parties are found to be negligent; but, their negligence are not
contemporaneous, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party [Picart v Smith, supra].
Types of Proximate Causes
 Principle of concurrent causes
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts
or omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination with
the direct and proximate cause of a single injury
to a third person, and it is impossible to
determine what proportion each contributed to
the injury, either of them is responsible for the
whole injury, even though his act alone might not
have caused the entire injury (Sabido v.
Custodio, G.R. No. L- 21512, August 31, 1966).