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Chapter 4 - Banking Crises - Part II
Chapter 4 - Banking Crises - Part II
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IX- Origins and Causes of Banking Crises
• Empirical work in the area of origins and causes of banking crises has focused on a combination
of:
• microeconomic causes (bank specific),
• structural causes (structure of the banking system), and
• macroeconomic causes
for which emphasis has varied from one research to another.
• Much of the research relates to a single country experience while others involve a panel of
country.
• Studies on the possible causes of banking system problems and the conditions under which
banking crises are likely to occur identified a list of potential determinants of crisis and these are
interrelated or induce one another and could commonly be responsible for amplifying the severity
of the problem or crisis.
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Potential Determinants of Banking Crises
Domestic
macroeconomic
instability
Poor and
inadequate External
bank macroeconomic
management, volatility
regulation and
supervision
Banking
Problems/Crises
Improper Unfavorable
Structure of economic
the banking policy changes
system and reforms
Inadequate
government
safety net
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1-Domestic Macroeconomic Instability
Affects the activity and profitability of Lower real value of capital and force
businesses and causes them to incur losses, portfolio adjustments from high income
implying high ratio of non performing loans at activities to lower ones
banks and rising losses
Demotivate borrowing and lending
Leads to a drop in the demand for loans, thus activities thus less business and lower
reducing the income and profitability of banks Sharp profitability for banks
contraction in
High inflation
economic
rates
activity and
output
Can reduce banks’ profitability or cause losses if Can impact negatively the value of the
interest paid on deposits increase faster than collateral underlying the loan and weaken
interest charged on loans the solvency of banks
High interest Collapse in asset
Make loan repayments more difficult for rates prices
borrowers and increase the share of loan losses May raise fears about the safety and
at banks soundness of banks and encourage bank
Exacerbate the moral hazard and adverse runs
selection problems and lower the quality of
loan portfolios
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2-External Macroeconomic Volatility
Large capital inflows and credit booms The fixed exchange rate regime and currency crises
induced by low international interest rates, financial A fixed exchange rate decreases the exchange rate risk ,
liberalization or government guarantees of the exchange rate encourages banks to rely on external funding, and promotes
or FX deposits, tend if not sterilized to increase fast bank capital inflows and subsequent lending booms, excessive risk
deposits and loans most of which low quality. taking at banks, and low asset quality .
(given the limited number of creditworthy projects and Unexpected currency devaluation in the presence of currency
limited capacity to assess and monitor projects and banks) mismatch make domestic currency denominated earnings
Problems arise when the credit boom bubble collapses or finance less foreign currency denominated debt. This could
under capital inflow reversal causing output contraction and be problematic to individuals, firms, and banks
liquidity problem for banks
4 main factors
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3-Unfavorable Economic Policy Changes and Reforms
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Financial Repression vs. Financial Liberalization
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Mechanisms through which financial liberalization increase banking
sector problems and drive banks to assume more risk
• Financial liberalization grants easier access of local • The competition coming in with the lifting of
banks to new domestic and foreign markets and barriers to entry and the removal of ceilings on
sectors, where banks can over-lend to a given deposit interest rates. Increased bank competition
sector, firm, individual and risky borrower as contributes to moral hazard and increased risk
interest rates are now market-determined. taking.
Previously banks could not charge a high or
market determined risk premium to high risk customers
and that would have affected their risk/ return trade off • The lack of necessary skills and experience of non-
and probably induced banks to better diversify their trained bank staff to evaluate and monitor the risk
portfolios and/or reduced the extension of such risky of a bank loan portfolio and manage interest rate
loans. risk in this new environment of less regulated
financial system.
• The involvement of domestic banks in new risky
activities such as derivatives’ contracts.
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4-Inadequate Government Safety Net
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5-Improper Structure of the Banking System and Government
Ownership of Banks
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6-Poor and Inadequate Bank Management, Regulation and
Supervision
Poor management and internal governance
Poor management and internal governance Poor internal controls such as poor credit valuation and follow up
Over-extension of lending relative to the bank equity or deposit systems, internal audit mechanisms and management information
base, domestically and abroad, systems,
Dealing with sophisticated risky instruments and contracts Poor disclosure comprising hiding the truth from the public and the
supervisors by the means of inadequate provisioning and reporting
Aggressive lending with less stringent criteria or through aggressive on loan losses and other practices,
deposits collecting highly remunerated,
Diverse fraudulent activity
Poor lending manifested by loan concentration in a small number of
borrowers or a given segment of the economy, in addition to The inability or unwillingness to set appropriate rules, procedures
connected lending and term /currency mismatching, and policies for controlling risk and minimizing the organizational
hazards, …
Banking system fragility and crises can slow economic growth and contribute to a sharp
fall in output.
Credit contraction can arise from the supply side in response to an increased regulatory
tightening or oversight and deterioration in bank assets or profitability.
Credit contraction can also stem from weak demand for credit.
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Supply of vs. Demand for Credit
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
On the issue of credit misallocation, illiquid and poor performing banks tend to behave
differently than their sound counterparts. As their capital position is weakened and
depositors are inclined to avoid dealing with these “weak institutions”, illiquid and poor
performing banks often recourse to the following:
They first lend high risk profile borrowers and projects at high lending rates to raise
badly needed liquidity and
Second widen their interest spreads to cover their mounting operating costs,
particularly, non-performing loans.
Their behaviour could encompass also continued lending to insolvent debtors to prevent
their defaults.
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
Second, the cost of intermediation will rise and eventually the cost of investment.
This is to say that the behaviour of troubled or weak banks could penalize some
creditworthy borrowers and productive economic activities from receiving adequate
funds at the usual market rates.
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Banking crisis
leads to:
• Lower number of
operating banks
• Large losses
• Less resources to Credit Contraction
extend loans
• Lower capital level • Higher cost of financial
to support loans intermediation and
• High uncertainty investment
• Fall in economic activity
and output
• Slow economic growth
• Risky lending and
high interest Credit
spreads by poor misallocation
performing banks
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
A fragile banking system can compound fiscal problems through reducing government
revenues and rising government expenditures, thus increasing budget deficits.
Depending on the scale and intensity of this fragility, large budget deficits could pose
a threat to any undertaken stabilization policies and programs.
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
Lower revenues are mainly attributed to a drop in the overall economic activity (less
aggregate tax and non-tax revenues), banks’ rising expenses (less net profit and less
corporate tax income), and central bank’ declining profits (lower profit transfers to the
treasury) all caused by banking system distress.
On the other hand, cost on the public sector can be incurred when the government has to
bail out insolvent banks, particularly state owned, or honour their obligations towards
deposit/credit guarantee institutions or schemes for these latter to perform adequately
their duties when crises occur.
Another fiscal cost is rising cost of deficit financing and debt servicing. This is the case
when the amount of finance to the government i.e. subscriptions in the treasury securities
is substantially altered by the presence and performance of systemic bank weakness.
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
To sum up, government assistance of banks in distress can take different forms depending
also on the different stages of this distress.
Assistance could be through short to medium term liquidity and credit support, re-
capitalization programs or schemes, government acquisition of bad loans and assisted
mergers.
Related costs could add up and increase the public deficit and public debt.
Estimated fiscal costs due to banking crises have ranged worldwide from 2 to 30 percent
of GDP.
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Banking crisis may result in :
Macroeconomic instability
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
Banking system problems are capable of exercising or inducing undesirable effects on the
exchange rate and the balance of payments, as banks are major importers and exporters of
capital.
These effects could be manifested by speculative attack on the currency, exchange rate
deterioration and capital outflows.
However, it is not always clear whether these implications are a direct response to
banking sector problems and the associated inefficient cross border banking and loss of
confidence in this sector or to macroeconomic imbalances in general.
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
There are many channels through which banking system fragility contributes to the
depreciation/ devaluation of the exchange rate and to capital outflows.
Pessimistic expectations about the solvency and soundness of the banking system drive
locals and overseas depositors and investors to shift resources at banks to cross border
markets. In this respect, large outflows could have a major impact on the value of the
domestic currency.
The shift in confidence of foreign investors in the domestic currency can also lead to the
same result of capital outflows or drive investors to sell domestic assets or equity and
exchange domestic for foreign assets, thus pressuring the exchange rate.
The adverse effects of banking sector weakness on the exchange rate and balance of
payments could come therefore from the loss of confidence.
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
There are other ways banking system fragility plays a role also in initiating currency
attacks and accelerating the depreciation of the currency.
Banking problems may signal potential future large government bailouts that would be
inconsistent with defending the currency under a pegged exchange rate mechanism,
initiating speculative attacks on the currency.
Large scale banking problems can even accelerate the devaluation of the currency. This is
the case when the currency within a fixed exchange rate regime gets under attack and the
central bank finds itself constrained in defending the currency by raising interest rates
fearing of the potential negative effects on the weak banks balance sheets.
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Banking crisis
may lead to:
• Pessimistic expectations
about banks and the
economy
• Shift in confidence of Large capital • Pressure and attacks on the
local and foreign outflows exchange rate
investors • Exchange rate
deterioration
• Balance of payments
problems
• Expectations of large
government bailouts
and expansionary
policies inconsistent
with maintaining the
fixed exchange rate
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
Banking fragility influences the supply of and demand for money and credit and
complicates the task of the monetary authority in regulating monetary aggregates for
policy goals of price and economic stability.
In fact systemic vulnerability constrains the capacity of the monetary authority to devise,
control and implement adequate policies as input from the banking market may become
less reliable and the fear that certain policies may hurt banks.
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
The reliability and accuracy of financial banking data, on which part of the policy
formulation and control is based, become increasingly questionable as there is a tendency
from the part of unsound banks ( more than the others) to incorrectly provision and
misclassify non performing loans, capitalize unpaid interest ( to consider them new loans)
,or inflate assets.
Illiquid and insolvent banks have in general interest in doing that to prevent information
driven loss of confidence and associated costs for banks.
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
These practices of improper accounting bewilder the accurate assessment of the true
credit volume and growth in the economy and provide misleading indicator variables and
low usefulness policy guide contributing to potential error making at policy levels (of
concern targeted growth rate in monetary aggregates).
Because fragile banks are inclined to get involved also in lending high risk projects and
widening their spread to cover the cost of their operations, any interest rate rise may not
reflect anymore the overall market stance and changes in the supply of and demand for
funds, thus adding to the complication in controlling policies.
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
What could happen also is the witnessing of segmented interest markets in the economy
depending mainly on depositors’ behaviour and the presence investment opportunities for
banks.
For it has been reported ( Venezuela 1994) that depositors were transferring their assets in
huge amounts from unsound banks to sound ones. In reaction to this massive inflow of
funds that could not be deployed by sound banks, these latter had to reduce the interest
rate to avoid attracting further deposits or place the excess liquidity in the central bank or
in government securities, leading again to a drop in interest rates.
Thus, interest market segmentation also complicates the task of the monetary authority.
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• Improper accounting
practices Complicating the task of
the monetary authority in
Distort the actual money
• Less reliable and controlling the monetary
and credit volume and
accurate banking data aggregates or the interest
growth
rate and in devising
• Higher spreads and appropriate policies to
Send misleading signals
rates not truly achieve its objectives of
for policy makers
reflecting supply of and price and economic
demand for funds stability
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
It has been observed that the Central Bank may be no more at ease in raising the interest
rates, for example, to defend the currency for the adverse short term negative
consequences of high rates on banks’ balance sheet (a larger portfolio of non performing
loans).
The central bank may not be able even to pursue properly its stabilization policy through
a monetary tightening, especially in two situations.
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
First, if it is committed to support ailing and illiquid banks through extending them
overdrafts on their accounts at it premises, reducing the discount rate, accommodating
any shortfalls in reserves and purchasing short term treasury bills from banks in the
secondary market.
Second, if it has concerns about the effects of money tightening, mainly high interest
rates and reduced liquidity, on the asset portfolio of banks and the cost of raising
money (case of Mexico and Venezuela).
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
Large-scale banking problems affect also the efficiency of monetary policy instruments in
stimulating the anticipated response. Conventional monetary relationships, even if they
hold, could no more be perceived as efficient and predictable.
A deliberate interest rate change by the Central Bank through its open market operations
may not translate into credit expansion or contraction for reasons related to the
performance and behaviour of unsound banks as well as the public preferences and
expectations.
Given the erratic performance of banks in distress, the quality and structure of their
portfolios (high volume of risky loans) and their increasing insensitivity to market interest
rates (increase in the cost of funds), it becomes difficult for these depository institutions
to quickly adjust their balance sheet items (specifically loans and reserves) in response to
policy action.
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
This difficulty or even inability to respond, delays the on-time achievement of intermediate
targets such as contraction or expansion in monetary growth, or simply impairs specific
policy signals transmission to the market carried either through the interest rate or credit
channel (reserve money – money multiplier mechanism).
The public’s choice on how much money to hold and in what financial instrument to invest
in panic times influences also the efficiency of the monetary policy. The demand for money
could rise or fall substantially and large portfolio shifts would become a reality with
systematic banking fragility.
In fact, banks in distress can generate an environment characterized by high uncertainty and
asset liquidations which drives people to adjust their demand for money and/or turn into
other perceived safer instruments such as foreign currency assets, government securities
and others.
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X- The Economic Effects of Banking Sector Weaknesses and Crises
That is the interest elasticity of demand for currency and deposits would be altered in
these situations, where fears of suffering losses on deposits, should banks collapse, or
paying a high premium on currency, in the event of suspension of payments, are there.
Structural changes in currency to deposit ratio, bank reserve holdings and currency in
circulation influence in turn the monetary base, the money multiplier process and
ultimately the overall money creation in the economic system. Where people want to hold
more currency relative to deposits, the rise in this ratio would then imply implicitly a fall
in the broadly defined money supply.
Deposits are “destroyed” also when banks reduce their loans and increase their reserves-
deposit ratio to improve their liquidity position. A reduction in the money stock is
determined as well by bank failures of themselves.
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