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06 Parliamentary Sovereignty (2023-24)
06 Parliamentary Sovereignty (2023-24)
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Consider how to Explore the origins Examine Dicey’s Have regard to the
define the elements of parliamentary approach to complexities and
of parliamentary sovereignty parliamentary problems associated
sovereignty sovereignty in detail with the doctrine of
parliamentary
sovereignty
REQUIRED
READING
Doherty & McGuirk, Public Law (Routledge, 2022,
3e), Access via Library, Chs. 7-8
OR
Stanton & Prescott, Public Law (OUP, 2022, 3e),
Access via Library; Chs. 4-5
What is Parliament?
SOVEREIGNTY? (2000)
b. Legal sovereignty
i. The power to determine what counts as a law, and from there the power to
make laws, and provide consequences for their breach.
ii. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832); HLA Hart, The
Concept of Law (1961); Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (1967)
WHAT IS
PARLIAMENTARY
SOVEREIGNTY?
The classic answer to this question is that given by
AV Dicey.
“The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means
neither more nor less than this, namely that
Parliament thus defined has, under the English
constitution, the right to make or unmake any law
whatever: and, further, that no person or body is
recognised by the law of England as having a right to
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”
Introduction to the Study of
the Law of the Constitution (1885)
BONHAM’S Had HVIII (and later, Mary I) been told of this, they would not
have assented to the law
CASE In such circumstances…
SOVEREIGNTY?
This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA
PART 3: WHAT WILL WE
CONSIDER?
Who was AV Dicey?
Diceyan Legal Sovereignty
Parliament has a legally unlimited power to un/make
law (legislative sovereignty) through statute.
The courts cannot strike down Acts of Parliament /
Parliament may overturn the decisions of courts.
Parliament cannot bind future parliaments
Diceyan Political Sovereignty
External and internal limits to sovereignty
Now let’s consider the possibility of changing this rule, and binding future Parliaments.
PARLIAMENT CANNOT
BIND ITS SUCCESSORS:
A PARADOX
H.R. Gray, ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament Today’
(1953) 10 University of Toronto Law Journal 54
‘Can God create for Himself an impossible task?” If He
can do so, so it is reasoned, then the impossibility of
that task must mean that God is not therefore
omnipotent; if He cannot create such a task, there is
something which He is unable to do and He is not
therefore omnipotent. Therefore God is not
omnipotent. Likewise if Parliament is sovereign, there
is nothing it cannot do by legislation; if there is
nothing Parliament cannot do by legislation, it may
bind itself hand and foot by legislation; if Parliament
so binds itself by legislation there are things which it
cannot do by legislation; and if there are such things
Parliament is not sovereign.’
Office 365 Stock Image
BINDING BY MANNER
AND FORM - JENNINGS
W. Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London:
UoLP, 5e 1959)
‘… legal sovereignty is not sovereignty at all. It is not
supreme power. It is a legal concept, a form of expression
which lawyers use to express the relations between
Parliament and the courts. It means that the courts will
always recognise as law the rules which Parliament makes
by legislation; that is, rules made in the customary manner
and expressed in the customary form.’ p.149
‘… If Parliament adheres to the procedure presently
required by the law to produce a valid statute, this will be
recognised by the courts, including a rule which alters this
law itself.’ p. 153
See also, note on AG for New South Wales v Trethowan
[1932] AC 526 in Essential Cases: Public Law. Image © Public Domain Sri Lanka, 1950 yearbook of Ceylon Muslim Scholarship
BINDING BY MANNER
AND FORM – JACKSON V
AG [2005] UKHL 56
‘This statute created a new method of ascertaining
the declared will of Parliament. It restated the
manner and form in which laws may be made in
respect of what I will call “delayed Bills”, i.e. Public
Bills passed three times by the House of Commons
and rejected on each occasion by the House of
Lords.’ 75
‘In any event, in manner and form the 1911 Act
simply provides for an alternative mode by which
Parliament, as reconstituted for specific purposes,
may make laws.’ 94
See also, note on Jackson v Attorney General in
Essential Cases: Public Law
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Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002]
EWHC 195 (Admin), Laws LJ
(EC: PL note)
[on binding future parliaments …] ‘The
British Parliament has not the authority to
authorise any such thing. Being sovereign,
it cannot abandon its sovereignty.’, [59]
Modified by the common law, the concept
of a ‘constitutional statute’ [59]
‘(a) conditions the legal relationship
between citizen and State in some
general, overarching manner, or (b)
enlarges or diminishes the scope of
what we would now regard as
This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA fundamental constitutional rights’ (at
[62]).
What about when two constitutional
OTHER MANNER & FORM statutes meet?
OTHER CONSTRAINTS
ON SOVEREIGNTY –
PRACTICALITY
Office 365 Stock Image
Mark Elliott, quoted by the
Select Committee on the Constitution United Kingd
om Internal Market Bill
(17th Report of Session 2019-21, HL 151), Ch 7, para.
228
“… Parliament has, as a matter of orthodox
constitutional theory, limitless power to enact and
change domestic law, [but] restraint is exercised in
order to ensure adherence to relevant
constitutional standards. This both requires and
ought to give rise to a culture of mutual respect,
whereby (for example) Parliament respects the
courts’ constitutional role, including that which is
entailed in judicial review, just as courts respect
Parliament’s constitutional right to make the law.”
R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor
[2017] UKSC 51, at [68]
OTHER CONSTRAINTS ON
SOVEREIGNTY –
CONSTITUTIONALITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
TRS Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal
Foundations of British Constitutionalism (OUP, 1993)
‘...it [the legislature] could not usurp the executive or
judicial functions... It is hard to believe that, as a body
of principle (reason), the common law could take a
different view. It follows that a statute which violates
the constitutional scheme fundamentally could derive
no legal authority from the doctrine of sovereignty,
properly understood.’ 77
Mark Elliott, quoted by the
Select Committee on the Constitution United Kingdo
m Internal Market Bill
(17th Report of Session 2019-21, HL 151), Ch 7, para.
229
We do not doubt that Parliament has the legal
authority to enact violations of the UK’s international
OTHER CONSTRAINTS legal obligations. However, it does not follow that
ON SOVEREIGNTY – such action is consistent with the rule of law. Clauses
44, 45 and 47 explicitly authorise ministers to breach
CONSTITUTIONALITY: the UK’s obligations in international law and attempt
to place significant limits on judicial review of certain
RULE OF LAW regulations made under it. Those clauses represent a
disregard for the rule of law.
Office 365 Stock Image
R v HM Treasury, ex parte Smedley [1985] QB
657 Per Sir John Donaldson at p.593
‘Although the UK has no written constitution, it
is a constitutional convention of the highest
importance that the legislature and the
judicature are separate and independent of
one another, subject to certain ultimate rights
of Parliament over the judicature which are
immaterial for present purposes.
It therefore behooves the courts to be ever
sensitive to the paramount need to refrain
from trespassing on the province of
Parliament, or so far as this can be avoided,
even appearing to do so. Although it is not a
OTHER CONSTRAINTS matter for me, I would hope and expect that
ON SOVEREIGNTY – Parliament would be similarly sensitive to the
need to refrain from trespassing on the
CONSTITUTIONALITY: province of the courts.’
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Office 365 Stock Image
SOVEREIGNTY TODAY?
Jackson v AG [2005] UKHL 56, Lord Steyn at [56]
[102] … We do not in the United Kingdom have an uncontrolled constitution as the Attorney General implausibly asserts. …
The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen
to be out of place in the modern United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of our
constitution. It is a construct of the common law. The judges created this principle. If that is so, it is not unthinkable that
circumstances could arise where the courts may have to qualify a principle established on a different hypothesis of
constitutionalism. In exceptional circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts,
… [the courts] may have to consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting at the
behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish.’
R (oao Miller) v SSEEU [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin), per Thomas LCJ, Etherton MR, Sales LJ, at [20]
‘… the most fundamental rule of UK constitutional law is that the Crown in Parliament is sovereign and that legislation enacted
by the Crown with the consent of both Houses of Parliament is supreme… . Parliament can, by enactment of primary legislation,
change the law of the land in any way it chooses. There is no superior form of law than primary legislation, save only where
SOVEREIGNTY TOMORROW…
CAN THE VIEW – OF PARLIAMENT’S
SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE NATURE OF
THE SOVEREIGNTY – CHANGE?
HWR Wade Constitutional Fundamentals (The Hamlyn Lectures,
32nd series)(London: Stevens & Sons, 1980), pp.29-30
‘I have never suggested that no shift in judicial loyalty is possible.
One only has to look at the shifts which took place [in history] …
These shifts are revolutions, breaks in continuity and in the legal
pedigree of legislative power. Even without [30] such
discontinuity there might be a shift of judicial loyalty if we take
into account the dimension of time.
Suppose Parliament were to enact a Bill of Rights entrenched by
a clause saying that it was to be amended or repealed only by
Acts certified to be passed by two-thirds majorities in both
Houses. Suppose also that Parliament scrupulously observed
this rule for 50 or 100 years, so that no conflicting legislation
came before the courts. Meanwhile new generations of judges
might come to accept that there had been a new constitutional
settlement based on common consent and long usage, and that
the old doctrine of sovereignty was ancient history …
The judges would then be adjusting their doctrine to the facts of
constitutional life, as they have done throughout history.’ Office 365 Stock Image
SUMMARY
Definitions
Origins
Dicey’s account of parliamentary sovereignty
Legal
Political (internal and external limits)