This document discusses the concept of anarcho-capitalism. It describes anarcho-capitalism as a form of anarchism that rejects the idea of a single legal system and envisions competing private firms offering police, judicial, and other services. However, the document also outlines several criticisms of the anarcho-capitalist model, including that private firms would not provide truly impartial adjudication and their primary goal would be profit rather than justice, which could lead to problems like cartels or violence between firms. It also argues anarcho-capitalism would lack a final authority and be detrimental to the poor.
This document discusses the concept of anarcho-capitalism. It describes anarcho-capitalism as a form of anarchism that rejects the idea of a single legal system and envisions competing private firms offering police, judicial, and other services. However, the document also outlines several criticisms of the anarcho-capitalist model, including that private firms would not provide truly impartial adjudication and their primary goal would be profit rather than justice, which could lead to problems like cartels or violence between firms. It also argues anarcho-capitalism would lack a final authority and be detrimental to the poor.
This document discusses the concept of anarcho-capitalism. It describes anarcho-capitalism as a form of anarchism that rejects the idea of a single legal system and envisions competing private firms offering police, judicial, and other services. However, the document also outlines several criticisms of the anarcho-capitalist model, including that private firms would not provide truly impartial adjudication and their primary goal would be profit rather than justice, which could lead to problems like cartels or violence between firms. It also argues anarcho-capitalism would lack a final authority and be detrimental to the poor.
The main objection to anarchy consists in the claim that
in the absence of government (i.e. in a “state of nature”), the quality of life will be intolerably bad.
Anarchists of all kinds reject this empirical claim.
This slide show examines a particular type of anarchism, namely, Anarcho-Capitalism (“ancap” for short). Anarcho-capitalism is sometimes known as “right-wing anarchism” or “libertarianism.” (Note, though, that anarcho-capitalism is an extreme form of libertarianism; less extreme forms of libertarians accept the existence of a very minimal state. Thus, these less extreme libertarians are not anarchists.) Anarcho-capitalism is distinct from socialist anarchism and communist anarchism (both of which are types of “left-wing anarchism”). Anarcho-capitalists like Murray Rothbard believe in a “voluntary society.” They claim that in their system, only aggressors (i.e. only rights-violators) are subject to coercion. If you are not an aggressor, you will not be coerced to do anything, ever. For example, anarcho-capitalists reject all taxation as a form of illegitimate coercion against peaceful people. They reject the idea of a single legal system (legislature, police, courts). In their eyes, a single legal system is a coercive, and therefore an illegitimate, monopoly. Imagine an entrepreneur, say, who wishes to form a private company offering judicial services or police services. “My dream is to be founder and CEO of a company that I will call Prudential Judicial Services, Inc.,” says our entrepreneur. “I will run a tight ship and deliver judgments efficiently and effectively.” In our society, this would-be entrepreneur will be forcibly prevented by the state from starting such a company. The state does not allow competitors in its domain of police operations and legal operations. Anarcho-capitalists: This entrepreneur is not a rights-violator. And yet she is being aggressed against (i. e. she is being stopped in her entrepreneurial actions by coercive interference from the state). That is wrongful aggression, say anarcho-capitalists. What is more, consumers are wrongly and forcibly denied the option of getting their judicial services from this entrepreneur. In our society, if (say) you get sued, then you are forced to use the one-and-only judicial service in our society, i.e. the court system. Instead, anarcho-capitalists envision a world of competing firms offering judicial and police services. Just as there are now competing firms selling cars, groceries, electronics, etc., in our society, in an ancap society there will also be competing firms selling police services and judicial services. Entrepreneurs will be free to start such firms, and consumers will have a free choice between such firms. Competition between firms will ensure that firms deliver their services efficiently, in cost-effective ways that satisfy those who use the firms. At least, so claim anarcho-capitalists like Rothbard! A criticism of anarcho-capitalist justice: •A private security / judicial firm is hired by a customer to represent his or her interests. So, the firms are NOT impartial. (Instead: “The customer is always right.”) A firm’s interest does not ultimately lie in doing justice, but rather lies in satisfying its customers and thereby generating profits for its owners and shareholders. Customers are satisfied to the extent that they get what they want – and what they want will often NOT be identical with a truly just outcome. Thus, firms will have strong financial incentives to frequently depart from genuinely just outcomes. In other words, private security / justice firms will not offer the sort of impartial adjudication needed to avoid the harms of individual vigilante justice identified by John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government. For example, suppose that Jack and Jill get in a dispute. A tree from Jack’s yard was blown down, smashing Jill’s fence. Jill says Jack has to pay for the fence. Jack says it was an act of nature, so he is not to blame and thus, he owes Jill no payment. Suppose that Jack subscribes to Acme Justice Inc.; Jill subscribes to Equitas Services LLC. Acme will have financial incentive to get the result that Jack wants. By contrast, Equitas will have financial incentive to get the result that Jill wants. Each firm wants a satisfied customer, after all. Thus, the problems of partiality that characterize vigilante justice will reappear at the level of the firms. As such, the existence of private security / justice firms does not eliminate these problems, and may even intensify them. Violence between firms is a possibility. Possible reply by an anarcho-capitalist: In an impasse (such as the one just described between Acme and Equitas), firms will be reluctant to use violence against other firms. After all, violence is costly and will cut into each firm’s profits. Instead, firms will find it more cost-effective to submit to an outside arbitration agency that exists to settle disputes between firms. So, a non-violent, impartial judgment accepted by all parties will occur after all in anarcho-capitalism. Possible counter-replies against the anarcho-capitalist: Main criticism = the anarcho-capitalist takes a wildly optimistic view of things: 1.For starters, a business-minded arbitration agency will be attentive to the relative financial clout of the judicial agencies that are using its services. For instance, suppose that judicial agency Acme represents a larger share than Equitas does of the annual revenue of Handshake, Inc. (an arbitration agency). Then there will significant financial incentive for Handshake, Inc. to side with Acme. Thus, the partiality problem arises yet again. A possible anarcho-capitalist rebuttal: Giving in to these financial incentives will hurt Handshake, Inc.’s reputation for integrity, which will be bad for an arbitration agency’s business in the long run. Critic’s reply: Handshake will hire arbiters who are good at crafting plausible-sounding rationales to justify the most profitable course of action, and thereby give the appearance of integrity. Handshake will also hire good PR agents to burnish its reputation (by using ad campaigns, etc.). Another counter-reply against the anarcho-capitalist’s claim that “violence is bad for business”: 2. A wealthy individual may be willing to pay a premium for security / justice firms that serve his/her interests “by any means necessary.” (Imagine a firm’s advertising pitch: “Sign on with us, and we will NEVER compromise your interests, EVER!”) If there are a significant number of such wealthy individuals willing to pay such a premium, then violence may well be profitable for a firm, with warlordism and/or organized crime the result. 3. Also, violence might pay if one security firm can use violence to destroy a rival firm.
4. Even if warlordism does not arise, what is to stop
security cartels from forming, and charging exorbitant prices for basic protection? • The basic problem, summarized: Anarcho-capitalism would be a case of rule by private corporations, who are in the final analysis accountable only to their owners and their shareholders.
That is to say, the ruling private corporations are
NOT accountable to the public at large. • Another fundamental objection:
Many philosophers (e. g. John Locke) argue that the
purpose of law is to provide authoritative settlement of disputes.
It is unclear how multiple and competing private
court companies could provide the finality that is characteristic of authoritative settlement.
Thus, if Locke is right, “law” made by various
competing private judicial companies would be ineffective law. For instance, there will be private adjudication firms well known to offer adjudication rules that are more favorable, say, to property owners than to renters. Other private adjudication firms, seeking to tap into a niche market, will offer rules more favorable to renters. Predictably, property owners will have incentive subscribe to the former sort of adjudication firm; renters will have incentive to subscribe to the latter sort. So there will be confusion as to what your “rights” are as property owner or as a renter. There will only be your-rights-according-to-firm-X, and your-rights- according-to-firm-Y, and so on. In short, in anarcho-capitalism there is a destabilizing lack of finality. Note that the existence of private higher-level arbitration firms, which offer services for settling disputes between lower-level adjudication firms, won’t dispel this confusion and lack-of-finality. After all, there will be a market of competing higher- level arbitration firms, each with somewhat different rules and procedures for arbitrating disputes. So, there will be no finality at this higher-level then, either. To understand this problem of a lack-of-finality, consider Locke’s understanding of law as an impartial umpire to settle citizens’ disputes. Analogy: Imagine that there were competing private umpire services in baseball, so that the Yankees and Red Sox bring their own private umpires to a game between them.
That would simply push disputes up a level rather
than resolving them. Yet another fundamental criticism of ancap: •Anarcho-capitalism would be horrible for the poor. The poor would be unable to afford police services, legal services, health services, etc. The poor would have less mobility: in an ancap society, there is no public transportation, and there are no public roads (all roads charge tolls or subscription fees for their use). Children of poor parents would go uneducated (since there are no public schools). In short, many people in an ancap society will be subject to an unfair inequality of opportunity. An anarcho-capitalist reply: Private charities will help the poor. The wealthy in an ancap society, after all, will have much more disposable income to donate to charities, since there are NO taxes.
Counter-replies by critics of anarcho-capitalists:
•Requiring the poor to depend on private charity for their security makes them… insecure. Counter-replies by critics, cont’d:
•Also, private charity will not likely be given in
sufficient amounts to eliminate unfairness / misery.
Instead, it is more realistic to suppose that the
well-off will self-segregate into gated communities, leaving large slums in which violence is rampant. Since the residents in the slums are poor and since crime rates are high, no police firm can make a profit offering affordable security services. So, there will be no police in these areas.
Leading very separate lives from the non-rich, the rich
will likely have little sympathy for the plight of those in poor areas.
Why think, then, that in an ancap society the rich will
shower the poor with charitable donations, so that the poor can afford even basic security, health care, education, etc.? Another criticism of anarcho-capitalism: •Its lack of gun control of any kind will lead to a “Wild West” culture in which people walk around with automatic weapons.
Paranoia and “me and my kind” thinking will replace
fellow-feeling and a sense of community. And remember, in ancap you will be free to buy not only guns, but also grenade launchers, explosives, etc.! A final criticism: •Would an ancap society really be a freer society than our current one? The poor would have less security and less opportunity in ancap than they now have. Even the middle class would lack important protections. No workplace safety laws, no overtime laws, complete freedom for bosses to fire at will. Arguably, this creates the potential for economic forms of coercion.
(Boss: “Mow my lawn this weekend or you lose your
job!”) Another way to put this same final criticism = Anarcho-capitalists focus exclusively on the dangers of government power (i. e. the dangers of government agents having power over individuals). But anarcho-capitalists are blind to the existence of economic power (economic agents having power over individuals). Both forms of power (government and economic power) can constrain freedom, though. The goal of critics of ancap = use democracy to make government power accountable to the people, and then use reasonable government regulations to prevent private abuses of economic power. If successful, then in fact there is more freedom in a society under democratic government than in an ancap society. And so far, the democratic experiment has been reasonably successful. Should we really take the steep risks inherent in dismantling all of our institutions of democratic government, merely in the hope that untested ancap social arrangements will fare better? A summary of major criticisms of anarcho-capitalism: •Privately supplied, competing judicial services will lack impartiality and finality, and hence, will be deficient. •Some private security agencies will likely fight each other with violence. Those that don’t fight may collude to form cartels and charge extortionate rates. •Ancap is blind to forms of economic-power-over-others which are inimical to freedom. •Many non-rich people in an ancap society will lead insecure lives and lack a fair level of opportunity. •A critical mass of highly weaponized citizens will create mistrust / paranoia, at odds with the value of community. In short, I find ancap to be a very flawed doctrine. (But if you think otherwise, I’d be interested in hearing your responses to the criticisms described in this set of slides!) For purposes of our course on the philosophy of law, the key points I want you to take away from our look at ancap are these. Our look at ancap shows that to be well-ordered, a society must offer dispute adjudication that is… •Impartial and •Authoritative (i.e. possessing “finality”) Thus, our investigation of ancap reveals that an important purpose of law (and of legal institutions generally) is to offer adjudicative judgments that are impartial and final. To be sure, perfect impartiality and finality are impossible ideals. But this investigation suggests that impartiality and finality are important yardsticks we can use to measure the health and effectiveness of a given country’s legal system.
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