COUNTER INSURGENCY

OPERATIONS

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 INTRODUCTION
“ The mass of the population of nations
is generally poorly educated and
indifferent to problems outside its
daily environment. The individual
doesn’t always realize the main
reason for his misery or poverty and
is thus easy prey for a well trained
subversive organization”

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 INTRODUCTION Cont’d...
 Understand the insurgency dynamics
including the environment within
which he operates
Ability to manipulate the environment.
The population will tend to give
allegiance to the side that best
protects it.

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 SCOPE
Definitions
Insurgency and causes
Counter Insurgency Strategy
Counter Insurgency Operations
Framework For COIN
Conduct
Principles
Challenges
Q & A
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 Causes of insurgency
 The causes may include:
 Nationalist, ethnic, tribal and cultural separatist movements based on strong
feelings of identity which are antipathetic to the dominant majority in a state
 Religion, either as a manifestation of a separate identity or motivated by
religious fundamentalism
 Neo-colonialism; the control of key sectors of the economy by foreign business
interests, or the presence of allied troops and their bases under the terms of an
unpopular treaty which offends national sentiment
 Misadministration, corruption, discrimination and repression
 Economic failure. Extremes of wealth and poverty, especially in countries
where the upper and lower classes are of different ethnic origins
 Unfulfilled expectations, particularly amongst the middle class and the
intelligentsia of the population. It is here that expectations of an improved way
of life are usually greatest
 Characteristics of insurgency
 Anarchist. Sets out to eliminate all political structures and the
social fabric associated with them. There are normally no plans
to replace any form of government with any other system
 Egalitarian. An egalitarian insurgency seeks to impose a new
system based on centrally controlled structures and institutions
to provide equality in the distribution of all state resources
 Traditionalist. Here the insurgency would seek to displace or
overthrow the established system but revert back to
national/original values that are rooted in the previous history of
the region
 Pluralist. The goal of such insurgencies would be to establish a
system in which the values of personal freedom, liberty,
moderation and compromise are emphasized
 Separatist. The separatists would seek to remove themselves,
and the area they live, completely from the control of the
remainder of the state
 Reformist. Fighting for political, economic or social reforms and
possibly some form of autonomy for themselves, without altering
the overall political status quo
 Preservationist. Orientated towards maintaining the political
status quo in that nation because of the relative political, social
and economic advantages that can be gained from it
 INSURGENTS STRATEGIES

• PROTRACTED POPULAR WAR

The strategy is based upon the assumption that the cause
will attract ever increasing numbers of supporters. It will
involve a mix of political activity, terrorism and guerrilla
tactics, but with the former always predominating.
• Most applicable in rural, peasant-based environments in
situations where government control is weak or non existent,
and where the insurgent can establish his base areas, build a
parallel political and military structure and gradually expand
the area of influence to challenge government authority.

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 INSURGENTS STRATEGIES

• URBAN INSURGENCY
In its pure form this strategy involves the application
of organised crime and terrorism in a systematic and
ruthless manner.
• The intention is to force a repressive military
response that in turn will alienate the volatile mass of
the urban poor and move them to revolt.
• The media will be used to generate an air of panic.
Violence is therefore a catalyst for political change.

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 INSURGENTS STRATEGIES

• ISOLATED TERRORISM
No less dangerous or destabilising for the government is the
potential for isolated terrorism often committed by small
groups of militant insurgents. Modern society is vulnerable to
terrorist tactics not only because of its complexity, but also
because of its high technology. Thus, while on the one hand
whole modern cities can be reduced to chaos by lack of
electrical power or the health hazards of untended sewers, on
the other hand the terrorist can exploit the vulnerability of jet
aircraft, fast trains and crowded motorways to make
extravagant demands linked to the threat of causing
spectacular disasters.
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 DEFINITION OF COIN

‘the actions of an existing state

authority to combat insurgency and
prevent its recurrence’.

“Counter insurgency is not strategy,

but [operational] techniques to deal
with the environment … it does not
represent a policy.”
Dr David Kilcullen
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 DEFINITION OF COIN Cont’d...

• COIN ops are those military, political,

social, and economic activities
directed containing insurgencies with
the ultimate aim of restoring
government control by defeating the
insurgents.

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 COUNTER INSURGENCY STRATEGY
 The fundamental goal for the state must
be to identify and eventually eliminate
the conditions that give rise to violence.

 Seek to integrate civilian activities and

military operations (comprehensive
approach)

 Understand that the strength of the

insurgents’ popular support and not in
their military power

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 COUNTER INSURGENCY STRATEGY
Must heed to the political claims
and demands

Acknowledge the critical nexus

between the political and the
military dimensions

There is unlikely to be a purely

military solution to insurgency
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 COUNTER INSURGENCY STRATEGY
Setting time frame for
ops?.......maybe counter-
productive!!! Why?
 Take cognisance of the cause and
must endeavour to address the
genuine grievances
Strategic and operational centre
of gravity must be identified and
understood by everyone down to
the lowest level.
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COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS
“Military operations carried out to
complement those political,
economic, psychological and civic
actions necessary to defeat an armed
insurgency and thereby sustain an
existing state authority”
They must be supported by political,
psychological and socio-economic
means within the overall campaign
framework.
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 CONDUCT
Seize the initiative in the ‘hearts
and minds’ battle
Seek to exploit insurgents inherent
weaknesses
Maintain a visible presence
COIN can be grouped into, defensive
and offensive operations.

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 DEFENSIVE OPS
 Ops designed to prevent the insurgents
from disrupting the governments
programme
 Tasks;
• Guarding and protection
• Dispersal of illegal assemblies
• Operations to prevent the insurgents from
gaining an influence over the population.

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 DEFENSIVE OPS cont
Tasks;
Civil/Military Relations thro’;
Interface with Government
Coordination with Relief and
International Agencies
Communication with Local
Communities
Use of the available skilled labour
from the local community
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 DEFENSIVE OPS cont
 Control of Movement
 The civil authorities are responsible for
imposing collective measures and the
security forces for enforcing them.
 Why control mov of civilians?
 To make it easier for the security forces
to enforce the law
 To disrupt insurgent groups and plans by
making movement difficult.

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 DEFENSIVE OPS cont
 Why control mov of civilians?
 To dominate an area to prevent crowds
from gathering and to deter hostile action
 To prevent their reinforcement
 To discourage the illegal movement of
arms, explosives, medical supplies and
food
 To seal off an area to prevent the
introduction of weapons, explosives and
subversive propaganda material
 To arrest wanted persons.
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 DEFENSIVE OPS cont
 Public information Ops
 Create and maintain a positive public
image of the Army
 Search Operations
 Purpose?
 Capture wanted persons, arms, radio
transmitters, supplies, explosives or
documents
 Disrupt enemy activities
 Eliminate insurgent activity
 Gain evidence
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 OFFENSIVE OPS

Identify and neutralise the members

of the insurgent organisations
Dependent on the established
security organisation might not
have the ability to provide
intelligence
The tactical commander should be
responsible for the collection of
pinpoint intelligence he requires
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 OFFENSIVE OPS cont
 What do we do with those captured in the course
of conducting this campaign?
 The captured should be prevented from doing
further damage to the government cause
 Should be given every encouragement to change
sides.

 Maximum advantage should be taken of his

ability to help the government either through
giving information or in other ways.

 His treatment should be in such a way as to

influence others to return to their proper
allegiance.
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 FRAMEWORK FOR COIN
 Understand this is a different kind of
war and knowing and adapt to the new
nature of such operations is important.
 Considerations for the framework are;
Coordination
No such thing as a purely military
solution because insurgency is not
primarily a military activity.
Neither there is no such a thing as a
wholly political solution either short
of surrender.
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 COORDINATION Cont’d...
 The military is not going to operate
independent of other government agencies or
operating in isolation except at the lowest
tactical level.

 Coordination should not only be seen at the

higher level but also through the chain of
command to the lower level
.
 Govt actions should be complimentary not
undermining each other

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 COORDINATION Cont’d..
Two types of command orgs have
been identified for effective coord;
Single commander method.
Committee method.

Qn. What method of command

organisation was used in the Mt Elgon
Operations and how effective was it?
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 WORKABLE CAMPAIGN PLAN

“A revolutionary war is 20% military

and 80% political”. David Gagula,
Counter Insurgency, Theory and
Practice.

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WORKABLE CAMPAIGN PLAN cont
 Multi-dimensional approach

 Must recognise that, as the problem is

essentially political, so must be the
solution..

 The military must understand the

background of the conflict and need to
identify the actual tasks that may be
undertaken by the military.
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WORKABLE CAMPAIGN PLAN
The campaign must focus on the ‘the
hearts and minds’
Possible lines of operations that they
have identified as;
Economic. Reconstruction of
state/affected area infrastructure –
transport, water etc.
Security. DDR
Justice. Anti crime activities.
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 WORKABLE CAMPAIGN PLAN
Governance.
Diplomatic. Regional and international.
Influence Operations. Secure the C of G.
('hearts and minds'), psychological
operations.

“You can kill 1,000 Taliban a day and in

isolation it will make no difference to the
campaign”. Lt Gen David Barno, US Army

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 INTELLIGENCE.
 Intelligence has to come from the
population
 Intelligence is more about the population
than the enemy – Pop is the CoG
 Understand the human terrain and the
networks that underpin the insurgency
 Need to differentiate between political and
operational intelligence
 The influx of security officers may also raise
other security concerns
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 INTELLIGENCE cont
Two main ways of gathering int are;
Use the existing sources or
injecting military personnel to the
existing intelligence networks
Setting up own intelligence org in
the field.
What are the inherent dangers of
such organisations and which is
best for the military?
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 INTELLIGENCE cont
• “Any government that cannot find
enough trustworthy people to run a
single intelligence service will not
last long, but in practice rulers or
ruling bodies often like running
several intelligent organisations”
Sir Robert Thomson ‘Defeating
Communist insurgency’
• #
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 THE LAW
Legitimacy and minimum necessary force

Estb a legal framework

 Lack of legal framework may derail

operations due to loopholes existing in
the law

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 PRINCIPLES OF COIN
 Political primacy and a clear political aim.
 Gain and secure the consent of the people
 Coordinated government machinery – the
Comprehensive Approach
 Effective communication with the people
 Focussed intelligence
 Neutralise the insurgent
 Plan for longer term post-insurgency
conditions.

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 PRINCIPLES OF COIN cont
 However in the application of these
principles one should be guided by the
following questions;
 What motivates the insurgents?
 What is the Root cause?
 How do insurgents appeal to population?
 What Internal/external support do they
have?
 What are their weapons/tactics?
 Do they have majority/minority support?
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What does not work for COIN?
Focus on enemy rather than engaging
population.
Conduct large scale ops as the norm.
Build and train host-nation security
forces in your own image.
Ignore peacetime govt processes.
Allow open borders, airspace and
coastlines.
•
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 CHALLENGES
 Based on the Russian operations in
Chechnya in 1994 and in 1999.
Environment
Capability and design of the military
Training
Media
Force org
Protracted ops

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 CONCLUSION
 There is always a temptation to delay the use
of the force of law against subversive elements
because of the danger that will drive
uncommitted civs into supporting them.
 We need to understand that COIN involves
asymmetric warfare and the dynamics of COIN
and the Insurgent come to play
 The guerrillas do not have to defeat their
opponents militarily; they just have to avoid
losing
 Comprehensive approach
 Legitimacy and minimum force

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 To beat the guerrilla on his own ground,
the first essential is knowledge. Knowledge
about the enemy himself, his methods, strengths
weaknesses, tactics and techniques. More than
that to beat the guerrilla means not to fight in
the sharp black and white of formal combat, but
in the gray fuzzy obscurity where politics affects
tactics and economics influence strategy. The
soldier must fuse with the statesman, the private
turn politician. To win, the soldier must think
and understand, and his odds will improve to the
extent that he has done his homework before he
arrives on the battlefield.

LTC T. N. Greene, USMC, 1962

The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him

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 Qns

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