Cinema & Philosophy

Pictures & Perception

 Goodman’s Pictorial
“Language”
Goodman accounts for depiction in purely
formal features of pictorial symbol
systems.
This leaves the perceptual nature nature
of pictorial interpretation completely
unaccounted for; pictures somehow seem
to display the looks of things, but
nothing in Goodman’s account implies
(or explains) this fact.
 A new start: Pictures &
Perception
Richard Wollheim (1923–2003):
Pictorial Representation is
perceptual.
At least, there seems to be
links between pictures and
(visual) perception. Which
links?
Here are a few:
 Pictures & Perception
Alberti: pictures are always of what
is visible (in contrast to words)
Pictures have a fairly rich content,
as does vision (words don’t always
have a rich content; think of a
name)
Pictures are always perspectival, as
is vision (in contrast to words)
Pictures & Perception
 Pictures & Perception
Granted that pictures and perception
display links, (in a way that words and
perception do not,) perhaps one can try
to explain depiction by somehow
relating it to perception?
(This is precisely Wollheim’s strategy,
but first a note on perception, which
will be relevant also later in
connection to photography)
 Pictures & Perception
What is it to visually perceive
something?
In a minimal sense, (and very
roughly,) to have a visual
experience, which is caused
(in the right kind of way) by
what that experience is of.
 Pictures & Perception
A fuller sense of seeing:
“seeing-as”
The minimal sense + some kind
of “thought” (perhaps a
concept)
Pictures & Perception
Pictures & Perception
Pictures & Perception
 Pictures & Perception
Two kinds of seeing-as:
Seeing x as y and believing x to be
y
Seeing x as y and not believing x
to be y but instead merely
imagining x to be y (or in some
other way letting the thought of
y “permeate” one’s visual
experience)
 Pictures & Perception
Could pictorial experience be explained
in terms of seeing-as?
Wollheim initially thought so, but later
changed his mind
Instead, depiction should be explained in
terms of “seeing-in”
This is not merely a change of
terminology, seeing-in is (on
Wollheim’s view) a special kind of
experience. What’s special about it?
And how does it explain depiction?
 Seeing-in
Seeing-in is a visual
experience (as) of the
picture’s content(s), which
one undergoes in looking at
pictures
The idea is not that pictures
prompt experiences, which are
indistinguishable from seeing
the content face-to-face
Seeing-in
 Seeing-in
Instead, seeing-in is characterised by a
certain non-illusionistic phenomenology
(a sense of what it’s like to
experience the picture): twofoldness
“Seeing-in permits an unlimited
simultaneous attention to what is seen
[i.e. the picture’s content] and to
features of the medium”
 Seeing-in
Put differently:
We see the marks (as marks) and
are somehow visually aware of
the content
Seeing-in
 Seeing-in
Further characterisations:
Content: particulars and states
of affairs
Seeing-in
Different kinds of
content: The
couple
(objects); the
wedding (an
event); the fact
that they are
being/about to
be/have been
married
 Seeing-in
Further characterisations
Seeing-in is not “localized”:
there isn’t always an answer
to the question where one
sees a certain “thing” in a
picture
(According to Wollheim seeing-
as displays none of the
above)
Seeing-in
Non-
localisation:
Where do you
see the wedding
(or the fact
that they are
married)?
 Depiction
Wollheim: A depicts B only if B
can be seen in A
Note that this is only a
necessary condition
Depiction
Depiction
Depiction
Depiction
 Depiction
What else is needed?
Pictures come with a standard
of correctness, guiding the
correct seeing-in
The standard either derives
from intentions (handmade
images) or is set in causal
terms (photography)
Looking at a piece of burnt
toast doesn’t come with a
standard of correctness; so
it doesn’t depict anything
A painting, however, does come with a
standard of correctness regarding what
is correct to see in the picture.
Although it might be possible to see
Reggie Kray in a painting of Ronnie,
it’s correct to see Ronnie and not
Reggie.
Why? Because the picture-maker intended
Ronnie to be seen in the picture.
Note, however, that this doesn’t amount
to “brute” intentionalism: If nothing
can be seen in the picture, then, no
matter how much the painter intends
something to be seen there, the picture
doesn’t depict what the painter
intends.
Rather, the intentions of a picture-maker
selects the right perception out of
possibly many experiences of seeing-in.