TFP2 Lecture Notes All

Turkish Foreign Policy II
Lecture Note 1
Foreign Policy Change
●
What is change?
●
What changes in foreign policy?
●
How to understand the change in foreign
policy?
●
What are the driving factors behind change in
foreign policy?
2
Types/Levels of Change
●
Change in foreign policy can occur at four
different levels
●
1) adjustment changes
●
2) program changes
●
3) problem/goal changes
●
4) international orientation changes
3
How to understand change in
foreign policy?
●
What factors do we need to pay attention to
explain change?
●
Internal vs. External factors?
●
Systemic vs. Individualistic/System vs. Agent
●
Is it man-made or system-induced?
4
Drivers of Change
●
Hermann explains that change in a country’s
foreign policy derives from four different
sources.
●
1) leader-driven change
●
2) bureaucratic advocacy
●
3) domestic restructuring/pressure
●
4) external shocks
5
Turkish foreign policy
in the 1980s
●
International Context:
●
Islamic Revolution in Iran in March 1979.
●
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in December
1979.
●
Reagan's presidency between 1981 and
1989.
6
●
Domestic Context:
●
Economic liberalization started with the
economic reforms put into force by 24
January 1980 economic reform package.
●
The military coup of September 1980 in
Turkey.
●
A new constitution was adopted in 1982.
●
A single party government led by Turgut Özal
was formed after the 1983 general elections.
7
●
Regional Context:
●
Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.
●
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988.
●
Bulgaria's hostile policy towards the Turkish
community in Bulgaria.
●
Greek-Turkish rivalry and Greek membership
to the EU.
8
Hasan Kosebalaban (2011), Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization,
Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, England, p.135.
9
The Özal Era
●
“They believed that if we raise our heads, they will decisively
shoot us. Therefore, let’s keep our noses clean. . . . According
to the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], at first, we should
observe the surroundings while determining policy. . . . Getting
the average of what everyone is doing is considered to be the
most successful. Going after everyone is assumed to be
rational. . . . However, that bureaucracy is based on Inonu with
its whole aspects. . . . It is never based on Ataturk. . . . Ismet
Inonu, in some way,was the last Ottoman Pasha. . . . However,
Ataturk was always a reformer trying to change the status quo”
(Quoted in Ertosun 2016:54).
10
●
“The existing ties with the Western world and the ongoing
relations with the Islamic world are two complementary
elements of our foreign policy. On one hand, the geographical
location, which acts as a natural bridge between the West and
the Middle East, and the common history and cultural heritage,
on the other hand, requires that Turkey should show great
importance to the Islamic world” (quoted in Ertosun 2016:58).
●
“I personally believe that it is possible to establish closer
economic relations with the Eastern bloc, because there are
more than 300 million people within that bloc and we can sell so
many goods to them” (quoted in Ertosun 2016:61).
11
The Özal Era
●
Turgut Özal became the first civilian prime
minister after the coup as a result of the general
election held in 1983. He reinforced his
authority by winning the 1987 elections.
●
Özal first of all provided consistent leadership
which was lacking since the 1960s.
12
13
Economic Liberalization
●
Özal was also committed to economic liberalization
model championed by Reagan and Thatcher in the
1980s.
– Small state, minimum involvement of state in the
economy
– The idea of free market was privileged over state
intervention
– Economic growth based on free-trade and
export-based industrialization
– Keynesian type of welfare state was replaced by
a night-watchman state. 14
Economic Liberalization
●
Ozal’s aim was to reduce the country’s debt and
decrease the trade deficits and balance of payments
deficits.
●
By boosting the level of exports Ozal wanted to
increase foreign currency reserves.
15
Main Characteristics of Özal’s Era
●
1)Innovation in foreign policy was needed in order to bring
about change in a defunct domestic regime.
●
Foreign policy was seen as a means of further developing
economic relations.
●
2) Ozal was a firm believer that Turkey’s democratic,
economic, and technological development could be
accomplished through Westernization. In fact, his main problem
with traditional Turkish foreign policy was not its Western
orientation, but its adherence to the status quo and
guardedness.
16
●
3) Ozal visited many countries to help improve Turkey’s foreign
relations, and he was able to form his own diplomatic network
by establishing close relations with the leaders of many
countries.
●
4) Ozal followed a pragmatic policy by identifying his foreign
policy approach with Ataturk’s, thus wisely challenging the
Kemalists’ pro – status quo foreign policy by identifying it with
former Prime Minister Inonu and attributing his own active
policy to that of Ataturk.
17
●
5) Ozal intended to remove issues from the security agenda
and he tried to desecuritized most of the issues in order to
curtail the influence of the military on foreign affairs. Only
security issues were left to generals to discuss and decide.
●
6) Ozal highlighted Turkey’s multidimensional identity as
Muslim, Turkic and modern.
●
Turkey as a secular European state coexists with a Muslim
society and Islamic practices. (Types of secularisms?)
●
7) Ozal was the first Turkish prime minister to visit the
following Muslim countries, which had either Muslim majorities
or large minorities: Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, India,
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
and Yemen. 18
●
8) Ozal sought to be the determinant actor in both
the decision making and implementation of foreign
policy. In his understanding, “elected politicians”
should be positioned at the forefront, with “appointed
diplomats” following them. Ozal travelled with large
groups of businessmen during his official trips.
●
9) In addition, Ozal paid great attention to
establishing personal relationships with global and
regional leaders, preferring to solve critical political
issues directly in face-to-face meetings.
19
Neo-Ottomanism
●
In an interview given in 1992 Turgut Özal, the
president of Turkey at the time, expressed his
views on the new characteristics of TFP.
●
He believed that the new era brought new
opportunities for Turkey. “Türkiye’nin Önünde
Hacet Kapıları Açıldı,” (a title which can be
translated roughly as “Turkey’s Wishes are
Granted”), This is considered the official
proclamation of neo-Ottomanism
20
●
In addition to its nostalgic imagination of an
imperial past, neo-Ottomanism is essentially
about projecting Turkey’s “soft power”—a
bridge between East and West, a Muslim
nation, a secular state, a democratic political
system, and a capitalistic economic force. Like
French Gaullism, it seeks Turkish “grandeur”
and influence around Turkey’s neighbourhood.
21
Neo-Ottomanism
●
the “Ottoman hinterland” is Turkey’s “natural
cultural legacy” and that Turkey’s actions
should be restricted to the cultural aspects,
having no more than cultural solidarity.
●
neo-Ottomanism is an exercise of
understanding “how the Ottomans did it.” In that
regard, neo-Ottomanism—adopting similar
approaches to the Ottoman Empire—can help
to maintain domestic stability and solve foreign
policy problems.
22
Özal's Foreign Policy
●
The First Phase:
●
New Relationship with the West, especially with the
US.
●
Developing economic relations with the Middle East
●
The Second Phase:
●
The end of the Cold War and the rise of Turkey's
grandeur.
●
Turkey’s political-military involvement in regional
conflicts.
23
Re-engagement with the West
●
During the first half of the 1980s, Turkey entered a
phase of re-engagement with the West.
●
With the invasion of Afghanistan, hostility returned
to Turkish-Soviet relations.
●
Global developments heightened tensions btw. two
superpowers and re-established the importance of
Turkey as a reliable ally of the West.
●
The Iranian revolution meant that Turkey was now
the West's only ally in the Middle East against the
SU.
24
Re-engagement with the West
(cont'd)
●
Moreover, the invasion of Afghanistan weakened the
case for leaving NATO in domestic debates.
●
At the domestic level, as a result of the military coup in
1980, social order, political stability and economic
reforms were enforced and Turkey transformed from a
problematic ally to a stable one.
●
The military coup suppressed rightist, leftist and
Islamist parties, put into force economic reforms and
codified a new constitution that was more restrictive
than its predecessor.
25
Turkish-American Relations in the
1980s
●
A new Defence and Economic Cooperation agreement
was signed in March 1980 after the lifting of arms
embargo in 1978.
●
Under the new DECA the US retained the use of 12
most vital military bases on Turkish soil.
●
Furthermore, economic and military aid to Turkey were
increased in the 1980s.
●
Turkey received military equipment from the US as
part of arms reduction process in the US started in the
second half of the 1980s.
26
Turkish-American Relations in the
1980s(cont'd)
●
A factory to manufacture the F-16 fighters was
established in Turkey in collaboration with the USA.
●
The main problems btw. Turkey and the USA were the
consequences of the hostile approaches of pro-Greek
and pro-Armenian lobbies against Turkey in the US
Congress.
●
Congress cut the military aid to Turkey in 1987.
●
Reagan gave support for Armenian claims on the
issue of historical events in 1915.
27
Turkish-Soviet Relations in the
1980s
●
Suspicions about the Soviets’ intentions as a result of
●
The invasion of Afghanistan
●
Soviet military build-up in the Caucasus in the
1980s
●
The Soviet re-arming of Syria after the Lebanon war
in 1982.
28
Turkish-Soviet Relations in the
1980s
●
The tension continued until 1985 when Gorbachev
became the leader of the SU.
●
During the second half of the 1980s, Turkey
developed better relations with the SU
●
Bilateral trade quadrupled.
●
Turkey sold manufactured goods and purchased
Russian natural gas via Bulgaria.
●
Moreover, Turkish contractors won important
construction contracts in the USSR.
29
Turkey and Greece
●
The bilateral conflict between Turkey and Greecce
over Agean Sea and Cyprus remained unchanged in
the 1980s.
●
Greek return to NATO was accepted by the military
junta in Turkey in 1980.
●
The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was
declared in 1983 just before the general elections in
Turkey.
●
Turkish Cypriots accepted a constitutional package
establishing a federal republic on the island. However,
Greek Cypriots' leader Kyprianou rejected the deal.
30
Turkey and Greece
●
The tension between Turkey and Greece resurfaced
when the Greek government gave permission for a
Canadian company to search for oil outside Greek
territorial waters in 1987.
●
Turkey also sent its own survey ship.
●
Via confidential talks and as a result of face-to-face
meeting between Özal and Papandreou in Davos in
1988 the tension was overcome.
●
Yet, the problems btw the two remained unsolved.
31
Turkey and the Turkish Community
in Bulgaria
●
Beginning in 1984, the Bulgarian government led by
Todor Zhivkov launched a campaign of forced
assimilation and oppression against Bulgarian Turks.
●
Turks were forced to adopt Bulgarian names and
prevented from performing religious practices.
●
During June-August 1989 more than 300000 Turks
fled to Turkey.
●
The crisis was ended when Zhivkov was overthrown in
November 1989.
32
Turkey and the Middle East in the
1980s
Mutual distrust/dislike between Turks and Arabs
1) On the Arab side because of former imperial
domination
2) On Turkey’s side because of Arab “betrayal” during
WWI.
33
Turkey and the Middle East in the
1980s
●
What were the main incentives in the 1960s and
1970s that pushed Turkey to develop relations with
Arab countries?
●
Political incentives
– Winning the support of Arab countries in the case
of Cyprus.
●
Economic incentives
– Turkish dependency on Arab oil
– Starting from the 1980s Turkey aimed to develop
trade relations with the Middle Eastern countries.
34
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis
●
Those in power since the 1980 coup have tried to use
religion as an instrument of conservative social
control.
●
Their conclusion from the experience of the 1970s was
that the neglect of Islamic upbringing was an important
element in creating a “rebellious youth” and therefore
an unstable political situation.
●
A depoliticised and controlled youth would enhance
social conformity and solidarity.
35
Turkish strategy towards the Middle
East
●
Turkey tried to uncouple its regional policy from its
alliance with the West
●
Any use of NATO bases in Turkey must be the part
of NATO mission or must have an humanitarian
purpose.
●
Turkey tried to build bilateral relations with the Middle
Eastern countries rather than multilateral relations.
●
Turkey avoided taking sides with the main states in the
region.
●
Lastly, Turkey aimed to enhance bilateral economic
relations with the Middle Eastern countries. 36
Economic Relations with the Middle
East
●
In the period from 1980 to 1985, exports to the ME
increased fivefold.
●
For the first time trade volume with the ME reached
and surpassed that of trade with the EC.
●
Why do you think Ozal preferred ME?
●
The relations with the EC were strained as a result of military
coup in Turkey.
●
The US, on the other hand, continued to restrict Turkish
exports especially textiles.
●
There was a huge sum of oil money in Arab countries.
37
Turkey and Iran-Iraq War
●
There was no political dispute between Turkey and
Iraq. Both countries also cooperated against the
Kurdish rebels.
●
In 1984 Turkey signed an agreement with Iraq and
gained the right to carry out hot pursuits into Iraqi
territory against the PKK.
●
Turkey's initial reaction to the Iranian revolution was
soft and balanced. Turkey did not impose any trade
embargo on Iran in spite of the American pressure on
Turkey.
38
●
During the Iran-Iraq war Turkey supplied non-
military imports and a transit route to the
outside world for both countries.
●
Turkey's main concern was the empowerment
of Iraqi Kurds and PKK in the north of Iraq with
the help of Iran.
●
However, Iranians were careful enough not to
alienate Turkey and lose a source of imports by
giving support to the Kurds in Iraq.
39
●
Turkey pursued an active neutrality policy during the
war. Turkey was also lucky that neither countries won
the war at the end of a decade long fighting.
●
Despite the initial gains in trade, Turkey wanted the
war to end because it posed a threat to its security.
The Kurds in Iran and Iraq realised that the war was a
major opportunity for them.
●
The only problem Turkey had to deal with was the
60000 Kurdish refugees fled from the Iraqi forces
taking over the control of Halabjah from Iran in 1988.
●
The Kurdish issue was internationalized after the
Halabjah massacre.
40
Turkey and Israel
●
Turkey did not support Israel during the Yom Kippur
War of 1973.
●
Turkey recognized PLO in 1976 and gave permission
for the opening of a PLO office in Ankara in 1979.
●
There had been a growing public support for the
Palestinian cause in Turkey in the 1970s and 1980s.
●
Turkey criticized Israeli annexation of east Jerusalem
in 1980.
41
Turkey and Israel
●
Israeli forces handed Turkey some members of ASALA
they captured in Lebanon during the İsraeli invasion of
Lebanon in 1982.
●
Turkish politicians sought to gain support of İsraeli
lobby in the US against Greek and Armenian lobbies.
●
Turkey upgraded its relations with Israel by sending a
senior diplomat to Tel-Aviv in 1986.
42
Regional Cooperation
●
Economic Cooperation Organization
●
Founded in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.
●
Established as Regional Cooperation for Development
(RCD) in 1964 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, the
Organization was renamed as “ECO” in 1985.
●
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation
●
Founded in 1992.
●
Founding members are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia,
Turkey and Ukraine.
43
Lecture Note 2
44
Francis Fukuyama(1989-1992)
45
Samuel L. Huntington(1993-1996)
46
Bruce M. Russett (1993)
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1990)
George Bush’s New World Order Speech
• Speech given at the US Congress on 11 September
1990.
• Main Points:
– US would continue to lead.
– US would continue to defend international law.
– US would act like global policemen while the UN would be
global judge.
– US would support democracies and democracy promotion
– US would commit to reduce nuclear and conventional arms
– Future cleavages would be economic not ideological.
– USSR had to be integrated to the international system.
49
Turkish foreign policy
after the Cold War
●
What were the mainstream academic debates about the
future of the World after the Cold War in Western
academia?
●
Francis Fukuyama vs. Samuel Huntington
●
The end of history thesis vs. Clash of Civilizations
●
International Context:
●
What was the good news for Turkey and what was the
bad news for Turkey?
50
Turkey’s neighbourhood after the Cold War
●
Turkey was surrounded by small neighbours that were
economically and militarily weaker than Turkey.
●
The collapse of the SU created a power vacuum in
the Balkans and the Central Asia which for Turkish
politicians could be filled by Turkey.
●
Turkey's soul-searching period and its seeking for a
new role in the new world order
51
Debates on Turkey's
new international role
Turkey as barrier/buffer zone:
●
For some commentators, Turkey's international
importance was diminished with the end of the Soviet
threat
●
Turkey might be seen as a burden and liability in the
Western alliance as it was geographically closer to
problematic regions. Moreover, Turkey did not
economically and political resemble the Western
democracies.
52
53
●
Turkey as bridge:
●
On the other hand, some other authors wrote that Turkey could
benefit from its Middle Eastern and Turkic identity without
contradicting its Western credentials. Turkey should enhance its
relations in the East in order to maintain its importance in the
West. (Turkey as bridge)
●
Turkey's importance did not diminish rather increased in the
eyes of the West in the post-Cold War environment. The West
needed Turkey more than ever before if they wanted to establish
good relations with Turkic states and the Middle Eastern
countries.
54
Turkish View
●
On Turkey's relations with the West:
●
Turkey should remain in the Western institutions and
maintain its bid to join the EU.
– Historical objective remained intact.
– Turkey still needed the Western economic and military aid.
– To be proud of being a member of the winning side
●
Turkey should end its relations with the West and walk on its
own path with its own goals.
– Growing self-confidence resulted in the divergence of
national interests from the interests of the Western
countries.
– Increasing suspicion about Western plans in the ME. (The
emergence of Sevres Syndrome)
55
●
Axis Shift in TFP:
●
For some others, Turkey could initiate a Eurasian alliance with
Turkic Republics in Central Asia or an İslamic alliance with the
Muslim countries that would contradict Turkey's Western
credentials and cut Turkey's ties with the West.
●
For instance, Erbakan when he came to power and became
prime minister championed closer relations with Muslim
countries. Another example is Tuncer Kılınç, a general in the
army and secretary general of National Security Council who
suggested that Turkey had to develop further relations with
Russia and China in early 2000s.
56
Relations with Neighbours
●
Security-first approach:
– Turkey surrounded by enemies and weak states
embroiled with conflicts and crisis.
– Turkey was considered as sieged by enemies
– Turkey had to modernize its army in order to enable its
to fight at two and a half front.
●
Active\peaceful engagement with neighbours:
– Turkey aimed at diversifying its trade partners, Turkey
aimed at solving problems with its neighbours
– Turkey aspired to become a leader and act as
modernizer and developer in its neighbourhood.
– High politics were replaced with low politics.
57
●
With the end of the Cold War, the Kurdish problem and the
terrorist attacks of the PKK became Turkey's most important
and immediate security concern.
●
Its effects on Turkish foreign policy:
●
The way Turkey dealt with the Kurdish question presented
an undemocratic image of Turkey to the world.
●
Turkey spent its economic sources for fighting against
terrorism.
●
Turkish military and security bureaucracy became more
influential in internal and external affairs.
●
Turkey had to confront its neighbour as well as its allies on
the matter of the Kurdish issue and PKK terrorism.
58
Domestic Context in the 1990s
●
During the 1990s, no single party won an overall majority
in the general elections.
●
Governmental instability created a power vacuum in the
making of foreign policy which was filled by bureaucracy
and the military throughout the 1990s.
●
The flaws of economic liberalization advocated by Özal
resulted in severe economic crises in the 1990s. The
economic problems of Turkey became an hurdle before
Turkish politicians to realize their grand vision about
Turkey's regional role.
59
The rise of a security-first approach in TFP
• The Re-emergence of Sevres Syndrome
– The Gulf War and its aftermath challenged Turkish-American relations as the
old suspicions about the objectives of the Western countries in the region
resurfaced in the mentality of Turkish elite. (Sevres Syndrome)
– With the help of the Operation provide comfort Western countries were
believed to implement their plan to promote the establishment of an
independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.
– Turkish policy-makers believed that Turkey could never win the support of the
west, however hard it tried to democratize its internal political system.
• The Re-emergence of Security Dilemma
– Two states caught in a vicious circle. State A increases its military spending or
makes alliances with third countries and state B also increases its military
spendings.
– The result of anarchic int. system and its main characteristics: self-help
• New Threat Perceptions
60
Turkish-American Relations in the 1990s
●
For both sides the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 was a critical
turning point. This crisis reinforced Turkey's importance in
the Middle East.
●
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 Turkey did not
react severely up until the UN imposed an economic
embargo on Iraq. Turkey followed suit and closed
Yumurtalik pipeline.
●
Turkey had three options:
1) Whether Turkey would joining the Coalition forces
2) Whether Turkey would open a second front in the north
3) Whether Turkey would allow the US to use İncirlik.
61
●
During the crisis Turkish elite was divided into two groups:
●
On the one hand, Turgut Özal tried to act single-
handedly in leading Turkish foreign policy.
– Özal would give full support to the Coalition powers and
insisted that Turkey should open a new front in order to
take control of the Northern Iraq.
●
On the other hand, the military, foreign ministry and the
opposition in Turkish parliament were against hasty
decisions and adventures.
●
As a result Turkish foreign minister Ali Bozer, the
Defence minister Safa Giray and the Chief of the
General Staff Necip Torumtay resigned.
●
Turkey gave permission for Coalition forces to use
İncirlik but it did not send troops to Iraq.
62
●
Why did Özal support the coalition in the Gulf
War?
●
To re-establish Turkey's strategic importance
in the eyes of the West.
●
To replace Saddam Hussein with a
democratic regime in Iraq which would be
more predictable for Turkey.
●
To prevent Northern Iraq to be used by the
PKK.
63
Consequences of the First Gulf War
●
Anti-Iraq policy and embargo affected Turkish Economy considerably.
●
Turkey couldn’t buy the Iraq’s cheap and easy-obtainable petrol so Turkey’s cost of
energy output significantly increased.
●
The rupture of trade relations with Iraq to whom Turkey exported merchandise
substantially reduced the exportation potential of Turkey.
●
After the Gulf War, authority gap was occurred in Northern Iraq and this means a
very serious security threat.
●
Separatist Terror Organization who benefited from this authority gap, carried their
camps to Northern Iraq.
●
At the end of the Gulf War, hundred of thousands Kurd who were escaping from
Saddam Huseyin’s oppression took refuge in Turkey.
●
Turkey’s tourism revenues was decreased who was neighbouring on the Gulf War.
●
Economic assistances promised for covering the economic loss caused by embargo
to Turkey fell short.
64
Consequences of the First Gulf War
●
Around 500000 Kurds fled to the border with Turkey.
●
Turkey was reluctant to accept them thus Özal proposed
a safe haven in northern Iraq under the control of
international forces.
●
Operation Provide Comfort conducted in May 1991 and
continued until 1997 when a no fly zone was imposed
above the 36 parallel in Iraq.
●
Operation Provide Comfort became a hot debate within
the domestic politics as it was believed that via
Operation Provide Comfort Northern Iraq turned into an
autonomous region of Iraqi Kurds.
65
66
●
After the war Saddam retained his power and no
settlement was achieved for the Kurds.
●
In 1992, after the failure of negotiations between
Saddam's government and the two main Kurdish
groups in Iraq led by Mesud Barzani and Celal
Talabani, elections were held in northern Iraq
and two Kurdish leaders shared power in order
to form a federated state.
●
Turkey had to put into force economic embargo
towards Iraq and lost economic benefits.
67
Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s
• Why did the Middle East become so important
for Turkey in the early 1990s?
– The ME was one of the most insecure regions of the
world.
– The ME posed a constant threat to Turkey.
– There was no dominant regional power, there was a
power vacuum in the region.
– For Turkey the ME was also crucial because of oil
and because the ME was considered as a valuable
market for Turkish exporters.
68
Turkey and Iraq after the Gulf War
• Problematic areas:
– Northern Iraq and Iraqi Kurds
– Water issue
– Economic embargoes imposed upon Iraq under Saddam’s
rule.
• Between the eruption of the Kuwait crisis in 1990 and
the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkey’s policies
towards Iraq and Iraqi Kurds were part of
– Turkey’s domestic politics i.e. oscillation between security
concerns and democratization
– Turkey’s problematic relationship with the US.
69
Turkey and Iran in the 1990s
• Problems:
– Mutual suspicion
• Great suspicion among two countries about their policies towards each other
• Iranian revolution and Iran’s policy to spread its Islamic regime across the region.
• Iranians regarded Turkey as American’s main ally in the ME, which had established
closer ties with Israel.
• Turkish officials believed that militant sections of the Iranian regime were aiding
fundamentalists in Turkey and organizing assassinations against secular journalists
and writers
– Kurdish problem
• In November 1993, two governments signed a security protocol stipulating that
neither would allow any terrorist organization hostile to other to operate from its
territory.
• Suleyman Demirel paid a visit to Tehran in 1994.
• Turkey’s links with Israel and Turkey’s policy towards Iraqi Kurds caused serious
tension between two countries which culminated at a meeting of OIC held in Tehran
in 1997 when Demirel walked out of the meeting.
70
Turkey and Iran
– Economic relations and pipelines
• Erbakan also gave importance to Turkish-Iranian relations and
visited Tehran in 1996.
• An agreement for the construction of a natural gas pipeline from
Tabriz to Erzurum was signed during Erbakan’s visit to Iran.
• Erbakan aimed to sign a defence cooperation agreement with Iran
but it was rejected by the Turkish military.
– Regional rivalry
• Starting with the early 2000s, the main cause of conflict was Iran’s
nuclear proliferation and its advanced missile programme.
• After the American withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 Iran turned out
to be the most powerful external actor in Iraqi politics due to the
large Shiite population in Iraq.
71
Turkey and Syria in the 1990s
• Disputes between the two countries:
– Hatay issue
– Water dispute
– Turkey’s entente with Israel in the 1990s
– Syria’s support for the PKK
72
Tensions
• Turgut Ozal and Hafiz al-Assad reached an agreement over the
water dispute and the fight against the PKK in 1987.
• This agreement was never put into force as Syria failed to take
any measure to prevent the activities of the PKK on its
territory.
• Water became increasing scarce in the ME and for both Syria
and Iraq Tigris and Euphrates became more vital as they faced
with rising populations and increasing demand for agricultural
and non-agricultural uses of both rivers.
• After the completion of the Ataturk Dam in 1990, both Syria
and Iraq demanded more water from Turkey and tried to
prevent unlimited Turkish use of the waters of Euphrates.
73
1998 Crisis with Syria
• During September 1998, Turkey mounted a strong
campaign against Syria, backed up by military force, in
order to force Assad to end his support for PKK and
deport Ocalan from his country.
• Turkish officials threatened Syria with use of force if their
demands were not fulfilled by Syria.
• The crisis was solved with the mediation of Egypt and
Iran between two countries.
• At the end of the crisis, Ocalan left Syria and fled to
Russia and negotiations were held in Adana between
Turkey and Syria.
74
Adana Accords
• Signed on 20 October 1998.
– Confirmed that Ocalan left Syria and Syrian government
would not support the PKK.
– A direct hot-line to prevent future clashes would be
established
– Beginning of an entente between two countries.
– When Assad died the then Turkish president visited Damascus
for the funeral.
– Rapprochement further continued with the signature of
bilateral agreements on trade, tourism, visa regimes and
military training until the beginning of a civil war in Syria in
2011.
75
Turkey and Israel
• What was Turkish policy towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict over Palestine?
– During the 1990s it appeared that Turkey was
abandoning its traditional policy of strict neutrality
in the Arab-Israeli dispute.
• Why did Turkey and Israel become closer in
the 1990s?
– International and Regional Context
– Domestic Issues
76
International and Regional Context
• With the collapse of the USSR, pro-Soviet Arab
states such as Syria became more isolated and
Turkey and Israel became more powerful vis-à-
vis Arab countries.
• The beginning of the Arab-Israeli peace
process in 1991 followed by the signing of the
Declaration of Principles by Yitzhak Rabin and
Yasser Arafat in 1993 made it possible for
Turkey to develop closer relations with Israel.
77
• Yet, Turkey had to cope with terrorism which
was supported by Turkey’s neighbours in the
ME.
• In addition, Turkey had conflicts with Syria and
Iraq over Tigris and Euphrates.
• Israel had conflicts with Syria over Golan
Heights and problems with Iraq and Iran due
to nuclear proliferation plans of both
countries.
78
Domestic Issues
• The expectation that by securing the support
of the pro-Israel lobby in the US congress,
Turkey could increase its influence in
Washington.
• Turkey needed technical and military support
of Israel and it also considers Israel as an
important economic partner.
• Cooperation in the area of intelligence sharing
was also vital for both countries.
79
Turkish-Israeli Cooperation
• Turkish-Israeli agreement on Military Training
and Cooperation was signed in February 1996.
– Acquisition of military know-how
– Joint military exercises
– Cooperation in the manufacture of surface to air
missiles
– Exchange of intelligence.
• A free trade agreement between the countries
signed in March 1996.
80
Erbakan and his Islamic foreign policy
• When Erbakan became prime minister in a coalition
government with Tansu Ciller he was forced to accept the
military cooperation and free trade agreements with Israel.
• Erbakan paid visits to Iran, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria between August 1996
and October 1996 in order to develop bilateral relations.
• Erbakan also initiated a multilateral cooperation among
Muslim countries which was called D-8.
• Erbakan’s foreign policy initiatives were abruptly ended
with his resignation in June 1997 after 28 February military
memorandum.
81
Weaknesses of Turkish-Israeli relations
• Turkey was far more dependent on trade with Arab countries
due to its rising consumption of oil and natural gas.
• The entente between Israel and Turkey was heavily dependent
on the progress of peace talks between Israel and the PLO.
• Turkish politicians under the public pressure generally opted
for supporting Palestinians against Israel.
• With the collapse of the Camp David II negotiations and start
of second intifada, a new tension emerged in Turkish-Israeli
relations.
• As Prime Minister in April 2002 Bulent Ecevit described Israeli
attacks on the PLO in the West Bank as “genocide against the
Palestinian people”.
82
Lecture Note 3
83
Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the
Former Soviet Republics in the 1990s
End of the Cold War
• According to Kenneth Waltz, the Cold war as “the
longest peace yet known rested on two pillars:
bipolarity and nuclear weapons”.
• With the dissolution of the USSR:
– Bipolar world order turned into a unipolar world order
with one hyper-power, aka USA.
– Yet, the dissolution of the USSR gave birth to two major
problems for regional and international security:
• What would happen to nuclear and conventional weapons of
the USSR?
• How would the ex-Soviet Republics in Eastern Europe, Central
Asia and Transcaucasia be integrated into the international
politics as independent and sovereign states?
85
Turkish-Russian Relations
• How can we describe Turkish-Russian relations
towards the end of the Cold War?
• What has changed in Turkish-Russian relations
after the end of the Cold War?
86
• Tensions between the countries had declined
after Gorbachev came to power in the USSR in
1985.
• In 1991, Gorbachev and Özal signed a Treaty of
Friendship and Good Neighbourliness.
• Why did Turkey and Russia fail to cooperate in
regional politics in the aftermath of the Cold
War?
87
• The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 opened up a Pandora’s box
of regional conflicts over which Turkey and Russia fell apart.
• For Turkey, there were two concerns:
– First, filling the power vacuum emerged due the demise of the
Soviets and develop relations with Turkic and Muslim
communities in ex-Soviet republics. (Political and geostrategic
rivalry)
• Concerns about newly born Turkic Republics
• Concerns about nuclear and conventional arsenal of the SU
– Second, preventing Moscow from regaining its power in its near
abroad without damaging economic relations and energy trade
with the Russian Federation. (Economic dependency and
partnership)
• Concerns about trade relations
• Concerns about energy supplies
88
• It is accepted that the diplomatic relations between the two
countries began with the formal request by Czar Ivan the 3rd to
send a diplomatic delegation to İstanbul in 1492.
• Turkey’s relations with the Russian Federation started with Hikmet
Cetin’s visit to Moscow in January 1992.
• The "Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Republic of
Turkey and the Russian Federation" was signed on May 25, 1992.
• Principles introduced by the Treaty:
– respect for political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,
– non-interference in internal affairs,
– equality of rights and mutual interests,
– refraining from using force and threat to use force in solving problems.
89
Turkish-Russian
Economic Relations
• The Turkish-Russian Joint Economic Commission was
founded in May 1992.
• Two dimensions of relations:
– Suitcase trade
– Gas trade
• Suitcase trade: Individuals from Russia and Ukraine
travelled to Istanbul and Trabzon in order to buy Turkish-
made goods, usually textiles and home appliances.
– In 1996, Turkey’s suitcase trade with Russia was more than 8
billion dollars. Suitcase trade fell to 600 million dolars towards
the end of 1999.
90
Gas trade
• The first ever agreement on energy policy was signed
in 1984 between Turkey and the Soviet Union.
• Turkey received natural gas from the SU via a
Bulgarian pipeline in 1987.
• Moscow agreed to accept payment for natural gas in
the form of Turkish manufactured goods, contracting
services and in cash.
• The increase usage of natural gas as domestic energy
source plus electricity production by power plants
using natural gas.
91
Energy Consumption
• Between 1980 and 1996 net per capita
consumption of electricity rose 150% while
net population growth of 40 % over the same
period. The reasons are:
– High increase in the industrial usage of electricity
due to mechanization
– Rapid urbanization(street lighting, residential
usage and commercial usage)
– Electric power brought to countryside
92
Why did Turkish politicians want to
purchase natural gas from the SU?
1) Increase in demand for natural gas
2) Strategic aim to diversify energy supplies away
from the Arab world (due to oil shocks of 1970s)
and Iran (due to the regime change)
3) Political aim to foster stable relations with
Moscow through economic relations.
93
• 1- Turkey as a consumer
– Turkey is a net importer of hydrocarbons which
are named as fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas)
– Turkey relies on external sources for 70 percent of
its energy needs.
• 2-Turkey as a transportation corridor
– Turkey benefits from its geostrategic position
between major producers and consumers
– Russia, on the other hand, has the world’s biggest
natural gas reserves and second biggest coal
reserves
94
Pipeline Policy
• First pipeline opened in 1987.
• The deal for Blue Stream (Mavi Akım) pipeline was
signed in December 1997, started operation in 2003.
– According to the deal Russia promised to supply Turkey with
as much as 16 billion cu.m. of gas a year over a 25-year
period via a new 1200 km long pipeline to be mainly
financed and built by Russia.
– Because of the Take or pay clause Turkey was obliged to pay
for a given amount of gas per year whether or not it actually
used it.
• Besides the questions of whether the Blue Stream
pipeline was viable, it had been criticized that the
pipeline extended dependence on Russia.
95
Blue Stream Pipeline
Turkey and Russia agreed to
build a direct natural gas
pipeline from Russia to Turkey
through the Black Sea.
The most important

Turkish-Russian ventures were
signed on December 15, 1997
between Mesut Yılmaz
government and the Russian
Federation and between
Gazexport and Botaş for 25
years.
Map of Pipelines
97
Natural Gas Pipelines
98
99
100
101
Alternative Pipelines
• Alternative Pipeline Projects:
– A US-backed project for a Trans-Caspian pipeline to bring gas from
Turkmenistan
– Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline has been operational since
2006.
– Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline opened in 2006.
– Nabucco Project: A 3300 km pipeline across Turkey to Europe. Financed
by the EU in order to reduce European dependence on Russia. It has
been on halt due to supply side concerns and the construction of Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline.
– Trans-Adriatic Pipeline: Carrying Azeri gas via Turkey to Greece with a
small-scale connector between Turkey and Greece which was opened in
2007.
– Turkish Stream: Proposed by Russia when South Stream was cancelled in
order to by-pass Ukraine. It was cancelled in November 2015 due to the
Turkish-Russian tension over Syria.
102
Turkish-Russian Political Relations
• Age-old suspicion between two countries in
the early 1990s.
• Geostrategic rivalry and political tensions re-
emerged due to the opposing policies of two
countries in Caucasus, the Balkans and Central
Asia.
– Russian objection to the Turkish Model which had
been promoted by Turkish and Western leaders
for the new Turkic Republics.
103
Turkish Model v. Near Abroad
• In October 1992, Summit of the Heads of Turkic Speaking
States was held in Ankara.
• Russian Federation declared its “Near Abroad” strategy in
1993 after Boris Yeltsin consolidated his power as the first
president of the RF.
• Conflicting areas:
1) The spread of Turkish nationalism in ex-Soviet Republics
• Armenian-Azeri War over Nagorno-Karabagh
2) Energy Policy and Pipeline Wars
3) Turkish support for Chechnians and Russian support for the PKK.
4) Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe signed in 1990 and
Russian objection to troop ceilings in Caucasus region.
104
Terrorism
• In February 1994, a conference on Kurdish History was organized
in Moscow with the support of the Russian Government and a
Kurdish House was opened in Moscow after the conference.
• The Russian Parliament allowed the Kurdish Parliament in exile to
hold meetings in Moscow.
• The two countries signed a Protocol for Preventing Terrorism in
January 1995. With the signature of this protocol both countries
declared their willingness to cooperate against terrorism.
• The Caucasian Chechen Solidarity Committee was allowed to
launch a nation-wide campaign for the Chechen cause in Turkey.
• In January 1996, a group of Chechens kidnapped a ferry which
was sailing from Trabzon to Sochi, Russia.
105
Conventional Forces in Europe
• Signed in Paris in November 1990. Based on the principle that
two blocs would have similar amount of conventional
weapons in different categories.
• The treaty placed limits on five types of conventional
armaments deployed between the Atlantic Ocean and the
Ural Mountains: tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles
(such as armored personnel carriers), aircraft, and helicopters.
• It divided the area covered by the agreement into subzones,
each having its own equipment limits. The agreement limited
NATO and the Warsaw Pact each to 20,000 tanks, 30,000
armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800
combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters.
• The treaty did not address naval forces.
106
CFE and Turkey
• For Ankara, the CFE was a formal guarantee against the
Russian military presence in the Caucasus.
• Turkey’s south eastern region was held exempt from
the CFE Treaty. (Approximately 1/3 of Turkish territory)
• In line with cascading programme, Turkey received
1050 M-60 and Leopard Tanks, 700 Armoured Vehicles,
40 F-4 fighter jets, Cobra Helicopters, Roland surface-
to-air missile systems from NATO members.
• Cascading programme modernized Turkish army and
helped Turkey in its fight against the PKK.
107
108
• After the dissolution of the SU in December 1991 as a result of secessionist
movements in the Caucasus, civil war and inter-state tensions within and
among Georgia, Armenia and Azerbajian, the Russian Federation demanded a
revision of the treaty.
• In 1993, Russia asked to deploy more troops in Caucasus. (According to the
CFE, Russia would only have 250 tanks on its 1000 km long north Caucasus
border.)
• Debates on NATO’s enlargement in the aftermath of the Cold War also
exacerbated Russian concerns about its security.
• The RF demanded exemption for its flank regions (the region starting from the
Azov Sea and reaching to Abkhazia and Volvograd to the Caspian Sea.)
• The Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty is a post–Cold War
adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed
on November 19, 1999 during the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe's (OSCE) 1999 Istanbul summit. The main difference with the earlier
treaty is that the troop ceilings on a bloc-to-bloc basis (NATO vs. the Warsaw
Pact) would be replaced with a system of national and territorial ceilings.
• With the enhancement of trade relations between Russia and Turkey, concerns
of both countries shifted from militaristic to economic and thus, the issue
became less important for the two countries. 109
Turkey and the former Soviet Republics in
Central Asia
• Before the end of the Cold War, Turkey was
disinterested towards the Turkic communities
living under the Soviet rule.
• All political communication were conducted
with Moscow and no political links were
established until the collapse of the SU.
• Before Özal visited Alma Ata in March 1991, he
first went to Moscow.
110
Map of Central Asia
111
• After the coup d’etat against Gorbachev in August 1991, Kazakh
President Nazarbayev became the first of the Central Asian
heads of state to visit Turkey in September 1991.
• In September 1991, Turgut Özal declared the 21st century
would be a century of the Turkic world with Turkey becoming
the strongest country in the region.
• In February 1992, Demirel stated that ‘a gigantic Turkish world
strecthing from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China had
appeared with the collapse of the SU.’
• In March 1992, Hikmet Çetin talked of Turkish model for Central
Asian countries.
• Turkey was the first country to recognise the independence of
the former Soviet republics in December 1991.
• Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TİKA) was
established in August 1992. TIKA is responsible for coordinating
Turkey’s development cooperation with other countries. 112
After the End of the Cold War
• Turkey’s initial reaction was characterised by a
mixture of sentiment and superiority.
• Turkish public suddenly believed that they had
found natural friends or long-lost relatives.
• Furthermore, Ankara believed that Turkey
could be a good model for the newly
independent Turkic states.
113
Turkey’s Strategy
• Aimed to treat all of these republics equally in order
not to alienate any of them.
• Aimed to establish political and socio-cultural ties as
well as economic relations.
• Aimed to give economic and technological assistance.
• Aimed to act as an example of democratic, modern,
secular and economically liberal country with a
predominantly Muslim population.
• Aimed to act as a facilitator for the Turkic countries to
develop their relations with the Western world.
114
• After the initial excitement and euphoria, Turkish politicians
strategy was shattered during the Turkic Summit in October
1992.
• It was the first multilateral meeting of the Turkic republics.
• Özal put forth a blueprint of political, economic and cultural
cooperation. However, the newly independent states were
not eager for such a full-scale cooperation as they were
struggling to maintain their civil order and consolidate
political power.
• On the other hand, for instance Nazarbayev objected to a
grouping of states based on religion or ethnicity.
• Nazarbayev argued that any commitment to the Turkic world
should not damage his country’s relations with Russia.
• At the end of the summit, participant countries did not
promise for any binding commitment.
115
• The loans given to the countries in the region through Eximbank
have reached the level of around 1 billion USD.
• Turkey has also provided around 1 billion UDS in foreign aid to four
Central Asian Countries over the last 20 years.
• The International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) was
established in 1993 for the purpose of protecting the Turkic culture,
art, language and historical heritage.
• Turkey has been carrying out a broad scholarship program “Great
Student Project” for students in the Central Asian countries.
• The Turkish-Kazakh International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University
operates in the city of Turkestan, (Kazakhstan) and the Turkish-
Kyrgyz Manas University is located in Bishkek (capital of Kyrgyzstan).
116
• Turkish policy shifted from a pan-Turkist ultra-
nationalist approach to a more balanced policy
when it was appeared that
– Abkhazians won against Georgians,
– Armenians invaded Nagorno-Karabagh,
– Russians signed military agreements with Central
Asian countries and
– Elcibey was replaced by Haydar Aliyev in
Azerbaijan.
– Turkey’s energy needs prevailed over Turkey’s
political objective to be the leader of the Turkic
World.
117
Why do you think Turkey’s strategy towards
the Turkic World failed?
• 1) The strategy ignored the limited nature of Turkey’s resources.
– Limited state aid to the Turkic World
– Unfulfilled promises of investments by Turkish firms
– Turkish private sector’s desire to quickly make profit in Central Asian countries
• 2) Russian Federation developed a new policy called Near Abroad and re-
established its ties with former Soviet Republics.
• 3) The new republics developed independent strategies and policies which would
balance Russian and Western interests.
– They aimed to establish direct links with the West.
– They also believed that Turkey acting as a big brother imposing certain policies to the new
republics. (E.g. Turkey’s reaction to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan’s policy to develop relations
with Iran)
• 4) The new elite in Turkic republics did not consider the Turkish model of
democracy and liberalisation as a solution for their needs at the time.
– Democracy meant sharing power, yet the new elite in Turkic republics wanted to
consolidate their power.
118
Lecture Note 4
119
Turkey and the Caucasus in the
1990s
121
Turkey and Azerbaijan
• Azerbaijan has been important for Turkey
since its independence because of three
reasons:
– Azeris are fellow-Muslims of Turkic ethnicity
– Azerbaijan has rich oil and natural gas deposits
– Azerbaijan acts as a geographical link between
the Central Asian countries and Turkey.
122
The Nagorno-Karabakh Issue
• The violent conflict between Azeris and Armenians began in
January 1990 after autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh region
voted to unify with Armenia in February 1988.
• Turkey was cautious about the issue when it first emerged.
When the conflict first occurred Turkey considered it an
internal problem of the USSR.
• Turkish politicians refrained from being seen as part of a
Christian-Muslim conflict in it neighbourhood.
• Turgut Ozal thought that Turkey should scare the Armenians
into abandoning their fight for Karabakh.
• Ozal argued that Turkey must be prepared to take “calculated
risks”.
123
• Turkey recognized Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s
independence in November 1991 and
December 1991, respectively.
• Initially, Turkey tried to broker a peaceful
settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia
but by February 1992 conflict turned into a full
scale fighting between the two countries.
• On 26 February 1992 Armenians forces
captured the Azeri-inhabited of Hocali.
124
• In May 1992 Armenians captured the whole of
Nagorno-Karabakh and attacked Nakhichevan.
• For Turkey, Nakhichevan was strategically as
well as politically crucial. Because
– an Armenian invasion of Nakhichevan would bring
war to Turkish borders,
– it would also be a clear infringement of the
Turkish-Soviet Treaty of 1921, which declared that
Nakhichevan was part of Azerbaijan and could not
be given to any other state.
125
• On 25-26 May 1992, Demirel and Yeltsin issued a declaration
condemning the occupation of Lachin and fighting in Nakhichevan.
Armenians ended their attacks on Nakhichevan two days laters.
• In June 1992, Abulfez Elcibey was elected as the president of
Azerbaijan.
• In March 1993, an agreement on the BTC pipeline project was
signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
• In April 1993, Turkey imposed a blockade on Armenia.
• In June 1993, Turkey joined ten other nations in the so-called
“Minsk Group” to resolve the conflict.
• On 4 June 1993, Elcibey was overthrown by ex-Colonel Suret
Husseinov with the covert Russian support. However, Heydar
Aliyev became the next president of Azerbaijan on 3 October
1993.
• In May 1994, Russia induced Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-
Karabakh to sign a ceasefire.
126
Ankara’s Strategy
• Ankara’s strategy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict:
1) Responsible and cautious rhetoric
2) Repeated statements in favour of a ceasefire
3) Maintenance of the territorial integrity and borders of
both parties
4) Advocated a process of reconciliation
5) Close cooperation with interested multilateral institutions
6) Repeated attempts to persuade allies in the West to
engage with the issue
7) Provide humanitarian aid.
127
Turkey and Armenia
• Turkey recognized Armenian independence in December
1991.
• Armenia was subject to a complete blockade by Turkey in
response to Armenian invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh.
• The imposition of a blockade represented a more measured
response than the military intervention advocated by some
Turkish politicians.
• Yet, Turkey’s restriction on all but food supplies to Armenia
has helped to foster Yerevan’s dependence on Moscow.
• A bilateral agreement in 1995 allowed the presence of Russian
forces in Armenia with their military bases in Gyumri and
Yerevan.
• In August 1997, Armenia and Russia signed a mutual
assistance agreement in case of external attack. 128
Turkey and Georgia
• The Abkhazia conflict:
– The case of Abkhazia posed a problem of secessionist
movement’s activities in a neighbouring country.
– Security concerns related to the future of Georgian
territory for trade routes and pipelines from the
Caspian Sea to Turkey.
– The RF would exploit the conflict in Georgia to re-
establish its influence in the South Caucasus.
– Turkey was home to a substantial Abkhazians( 39000-
500000 Abkhazians)
129
130
Turkey’s reaction
• Initially, the Demirel Government developed
bilateral relations with Tbilisi and Eduard
Shevardnadze.
• Turkey supported the territorial integrity of
Georgia.
• Turkey sent wheat and relief aid to Georgia.
• A friendship and Co-operation Agreement was
signed between Georgia and Turkey.
131
The Chechen Issue
• In November 1990, political and economical problems raised
in Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic and they decided
to establish Chechen National Congress as an independence
movement. The congress came together in Grozny.
• Chechen leader Dudayev declared independence in 1991.
• Russia didn’t recognize the newly founded Chechen Republic
and said it was a danger for Russia’s territorial integrity.
• The president of Russian Federation, Yeltsin, announced
extraordinary situation to protect constitutional order and
give order to arrest Dudayev. As a response, Yeltsin sent
troops to Grozny.
132
133
• Dudayev and his associates frequently visited Turkey
and had contacts with nationalist politicians.
• Whereas the public mood in Turkey displayed
hostility towards Russian military operations against
the Chechens, Turkey, officially, remained distant to
the Chechen issue and supported the status quo in
the region.
• Russians, on the other hand, believed that Turkey
was clandestinely supporting the Chechens in order
to gain a stronghold in the backyard of the RF.
134
Turkey’s official approach
• Turkey wanted the Chechen issue
– to be resolved peacefully through negotiations
– Protection of the territorial integrity of the RF (no recognition
of Chechnya)
– Restoration of regional peace and security.
• Demirel wrote to Yeltsin urging an immediate cease-fire
and peaceful resolution of the conflict.
• Turkey sent humanitarian supplies to the Chechens in
January 1995. Humanitarian aid distributed through the
Russians as Turkey initially saw the issue an internal
affairs of the RF.
135
• Turkey’s measured and mild reaction to the Russian
operations in Chechnya altered in the early 1995 when Turkish
politicians declared they had family relations with Chechnya
and they could not see this problem as the internal problem of
another country.
• Turkey reverted to protestations of Russian operations after
the fall of Grozny and Dudayev’s death in April 1996.
• In November 1999, Bulent Ecevit paid an official visit to
Moscow just as the Russians were intensifying their attacks
during their second campaign in Chechnya. Ecevit stuck to the
line that war was Russia’s internal problem yet it was causing
serious humanitarian worries.
136
• Avrasya ferry-boat hijacking
137
Similarities betw. the Chechen and
Abkhazian Issue
• Similarities betw. the Chechen and Abkhazian
Issue:
– An ethnic group (Chechens and Abkhazians)
struggling for independence
– A military response from the central government
(Russian and Georgian)
– A strong expatriate interest inside Turkey
138
Differences betw. the Chechen and
Abkhazian Issues
• A former superpower Russia rather than a small state
Georgia was the dominant power involved in the
Chechen case.
• Russian-Turkish relations in the 1990s were tense
due to several problems.
• The outcome of the Chechen-Russian struggle would
provide a model for other people in the north
Caucasus.
• Lastly, in the Chechen case there was no ethnic lobby
to campaign in favour of the Russians in Turkey.
139
The History of the Chechen Issue
• 1893 While industrialization was sweeping over Russia, oil was discovered in
Chechnya (which was at this time a part of Russia)—the area became increasingly
important to Russia.
• 1914 By this time, Chechen oil comprised 14 percent of Russia’s oil production.
• 1917 Beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution—Tsar Nicholas II and then the
Provisional Government were both ousted by the Bolshevik Party.
• 1918 The Mountain Republic was established, only to be taken back by Lenin in
1921.
• 1922 The Mountain Republic was officially dissolved into the Chechen Autonomous
oblast on November 30.
• 1923 Lenin’s Congress officially adopts the policy of korenizatsiya (indigenization),
encouraging different nations to use their languages and celebrate their cultures:
instilling a sense of ethnic and national awareness in minority groups.
• 1936 The combined oblast rises to the status of Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic (ASSR).
• 1944 Stalin begins deporting Chechen and Ingush people to Siberia and Central
Asia, accusing them of conspiring with Nazis.
• 1957 January—Nikita Khrushchev re-establishes the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. 140
• 1991 The collapse of the Soviet Union.
– November 1—Dzhokhar Dudayev, after winning a
presidential poll, proclaims Chechnya independent of
Russia.
– Russian President Yeltsin declares Martial Law in Chechnya
and Ingushia, sending 1,000 Internal Affairs Ministry
troops—but they leave without ever disembarking from
their aircrafts as crowds block the airport.
– Chechnya begins to develop its army. It is to consist of
11,000–12,000 troops with approximately 40 tanks and 50
units of various armored equipment.
141
• 1992 Chechnya adopts a Constitution.
• 1994 Russian troops invade Chechnya to end the independence movement.
– During the 20-month war that follows, approximately 100,000 people, many of
them civilians, are killed.
• 1995 Chechen rebels seize hundreds of hostages at a hospital in Budennovsk,
southern Russia. Over 100 are killed in the initial raid and the subsequent
unsuccessful Russian commando operation.
• 1996 April—President of Chechnya, Dudayev, is killed by a Russian missile
attack. Succeeded by Zemlikhan Yandarbiyev.
– May—Yeltsin signs short-lived peace agreement with Yandarbiyev.
– August—Chechen rebels attack Grozny (rebel chief of staff Aslan Maskhadov and
Yeltsin’s security chief Alexander Lebed sign the Khasavyurt Accords—ceasefire).
– November—agreement of Russian troops’ withdrawals.
– December -- kidnapping of 22 Russian Interior Ministry troops in Chechnya, two
days later the kidnapping of a government delegation on its way to Chechnya for
talks with Chechen officials. The same night six medical personnel from the Red
Cross were shot and killed south of Grozny. The following day six Russian civilians,
living in Grozny, were killed.
• 1997 January—Aslan Maskhadov wins Chechen presidential elections. His
presidency is recognized by Russia.
142
• 1999 January—Maskhadov announces his three-year plan to phase in Islamic Shariah Law.
– March—Moscow’s top envoy to Chechnya is declared missing (his body is found in Chechnya one year later).
– July/August—Chechen insurgents begin crossing the border into Dagestan to assist the overthrow of the Russian
government and the establishment of a separate state. Maskhadov tried to maintain friendly relations with Russia
and appealed to Chechens to leave Dagestan.
– September—a series of apartment bombings targeting Russian civilians, attributed to Chechen rebels, provoked
the Russian government to take action. Approximately 300 Russian civilians killed. (aka 9/11 of Russia)
– October—Russian government launches assault into Chechnya and recaptures the breakaway regions of Dagestan.
It is estimated that approximately 200,000 refugees flee Chechnya for neighboring Russian republics. (Second
Chechen War)
• 2000 Russian troops capture Grozny. Russia declares rule of Chechnya. War continues in mountainous
areas.
– June—Akhmat Kadyrov is named the head of administration in Chechnya by the Russian government.
• 2001 January—rumors of human rights atrocities begin to circulate in the Chechen village of Dachny.
• 2002 October—Chechens seize an 800-person theater in Moscow.
– One man shot and killed by the hostage-takers. 118 civilians (along with 50 hostage-takers) die as a result of gas
used by the Russian government to flush out the terrorists.
• 2003 March—Chechens vote in referendum that makes Chechnya a separatist republic within Russia.
Multiple suicide bombings occur following the referendum.
– Akhmat Kadyrov becomes the official president (many groups question the legitimacy of the elections).
• 2004 February—former Chechen president, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, is murdered in a car bombing in
Qatar.
– Two Russian intelligence officers are sentenced to life in prison after admitting that the attack was ordered by the
Russian government.
– May 9—Akmat Kadyrov and five others are killed in a bombing in a stadium in Grozny. Some 56 people are
wounded in the attack. Warlord, Shamil Basayev, declares responsibility for the attack.
– September – Nearly 400 people were killed during a siege at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia.
• 2005 March – Aslan Maskhadov was killed by Russians in a special operation in Chechnya.
• 2006 – Ramzan Kadyrov, became Chechen prime minister. 143
Lecture Note 5
144
Turkey and the Balkans in the
1990s
New Wars after the Cold War
• New Wars:
– Inter-state conflict between weak states
– Intra-state conflict within a weak state
• Ethnic and religious differences
• Conflicts over a territory
• Conflicts over natural resources
– The purpose of war is not gaining the control of whole
country.
• Gaining the control of a region within a country
• Gaining the control of natural resources
• Gaining independence
• Secessionist and Irredentist movements
146
Turkey and Greece
• Historical Legacy:
– The histories of modern Greece and modern
Turkey were each born in war against the other.
• Greek independence movement began in 1830s.
• Greek invasion of Anatolia between 1919-1922.
• The Cyprus problem since the 1950s.
• For Greeks, Turks had been invaders and
colonizers.
• For Turks, Greeks had been invaders and
collaborators.
147
Reasons behind the Turkish-Greek enmity
• Psychological problems
– Greek fixation with Turkey’s size, proximity and superior
overall power (Asymmetrical military power of Turkey)
– A Turkish perception that Greek foreign policy has been
systematically aimed at undermining Turkish national
interests. (Asymmetrical diplomatic power of Greece)
• Pro-Greek lobbies in the US Congress
• Greece veto power in the EU since 1981.
– For both countries, relations are a zero-sum game.
– Both countries have the feeling that they are under siege
by the other country.
148
Problematic Issues
• Bilateral problems
– Aegean Islands
• Continental Shelf
• Disputed Islands, Isles and rocks
• Control of air space (Dog fights btw. two countries air forces)
• The militarisation of the Dodecanese Islands
– Cyprus Issue
• For Turkey, the Turkish community has been under attack by the
Greek community in the island.
• For Greece, Cyprus has been under the threat and occupation of
Turkey since 1974.
– Minorities
149
Good Relations between Turkey and Greece
• Alongside historical conflicts and tension between the two

countries there had been some short periods of
reconciliation and good neighbourly relations too.
– Good relations between Ataturk and Venizelos in the 1930s.
– Another attempt during Menderes’s first government in the
early 1950s.
– Davos settlement in 1988 between Ozal and Andreas
Papandreou
– Good relations between Ismail Cem and George Papandreou
began in 1999.
150
Greek Strategy
• Gain the support of Western countries
– Greece and USA signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement in June 1990.
– Americans guaranteed the military balance between Greece and Turkey
and ensured that they would contribute to the peaceful solutions of
problems between Greece and Turkey.
• Use pro-Greek lobbies against Turkey
– In the US Congress by blocking American aid to Turkey
• By uploading Greek interests to the EU
– Greek veto against Turkey
• Making alliances with enemies of Turkey
– Armenia, Syria and Iran and Iraq
– Clandestine Supporting the PKK
151
Military Spending percentage of GDP
• Year Greece Turkey
• 1990 3.8%3.5%
• 1991 3.5%3.8%
• 1992 3.6%3.9%
• 1993 3.6%3.9%
• 1994 3.6%4.1%
• 1995 3.2%3.9%
• 1996 3.3%4.1%
• 1997 3.4%4.1%
• 1998 3.5%3.3%
• 1999 3.6%4.0%
• 2000 3.6%3.7%
• Source: Military Balance dataset.
152
Aegean Sea
153
Turkey’s Perception of the Aegean Sea
Turkey believes that the Turkish-Greek relationship in the Aegean has to be
based on the following principles:
• a. The Aegean is a common sea between Turkey and Greece.
• b. Both countries should respect each others legitimate rights and vital
interests.
• c. These freedoms at the high seas and the air space above it, which at
present both coastal states as well as third countries enjoy, should not be
impaired.
• d. Any acquisition of new maritime areas should be based on mutual

consent and should be fair and equitable
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-
perception-of-the-aegean-sea.en.mfa
Territorial Waters
155
• In the Treaty of Lausanne, the territorial
waters of the Aegean was accepted as 3
nautical miles.
• On September 17, 1936, Greece adopted a
territorial sea of 6 nautical miles by law.
Greece’s proportion in the Aegean Sea rose to
35%. On the other hand Turkey began 6
nautical miles applications in 1964, and
reached a proportion of 8.8%.
156
Tensions in the 1990s
• Territorial Waters Problem:
• The Çiller Government declared in 1994 that if
Greece implemented the Law of the Sea
Convention on a 12 mile territorial limit it
would be taken as a casus belli by Turkey.
– If Greece were to implement 12 miles rule, around
71.5 % of the Aegean Sea would become Greek
territorial waters with just 8.8 % remaining in the
hands of Turkey.
157
• The Imia/Kardak Crisis in 1996:
– A combination of media irresponsibility, populist
political figures and public opinion socialised into
a mutual antipathy had brought both sides close
to war.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nFEKCEeKYZ4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RUszoXOqd3A
158
The Imia/Kardak Crisis
• The Turkish ship, Figen Akat, ran aground on
the Kardak Rocks on the Aegean Sea on
December 25, 1995, 3.8 miles from Bodrum.
After this incident, Greece claimed that the
marine accident was in own territorial waters.
Turkey stated that the island belonged to
Turkey.
159
The Cyprus Question in the 1990s
• In 1992, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General
Butrous Ghali a “Set of Ideas” was put forward.
– Turkish Cypriots were pleased with the idea that two
communities would share the sovereignty in the Island.
– Greek Cypriots were pleased with the idea that there would
be one sovereignty and one citizenship.
– Turkish Cypriots did not like the idea that they would not
have their own sovereignty and right of self-determination.
Turks also believed that the UN proposal was in favour of
Greek interests.
– Greek Cypriots did not like the idea that one sovereignty
emanates equally from the Greek and Turkish communities.
160
Turkey’s Position in Cyprus
• Support for a bicommunal and bizonal solution
(confederation)
• Peace talks must be held between two
communities and Rauf Denktash was given full
political support as the only negotiator on
behalf of the Turkish community.
• No withdrawal of Turkish troops in the island.
• No waiver of Turkey’s rights as a guarantor.
161
The Cyprus Question
• S-300 Missiles:
– The Cyprus Government attempted to acquire S-300 surface-to-air
missiles from Russia in January 1997. (Target range 120-150 km)
– Cyprus is located 70 km away from Turkish mainland. Thus, such
missiles are capable of hitting southern or even central Turkey.
– These missiles altered the military balance between Greece and
Turkey.
– Turkish officials declared that Turkey would not allow the
deployment of such missiles in the island. (why?)
– The Clerides government abandoned the plan under cocnerted
Western pressure in December 1998. Missiles were installed in
Crete rather than Cyprus.
162
The Cyprus Question
• Cyprus and the EU Membership:
– In 1990, the government of the Republic of Cyprus
applied for EU-membership in the name of the
whole island.
– In December 1996 the EU decided to begin
accession talks with the Nicosia government on
behalf of Cyprus.
– The accession negotiations were opened in 1998
and completed in 2002.
163
• Greek clandestine support for the PKK
– Abdullah Ocalan was hosted in the Greek Embassy in
Nairobi after a three month stay in Rome.
– Greece was severely embarrassed within the EU and the
wider Western world once it was revealed that Ocalan
was in Kenya under Greek protection.
– Athens shifted its policy against Turkey and embarked
upon a path of determined reconciliation with Turkey.
– The tragedy of August 1999 earthquake provided a
favourable context in which both countries would help
each other.
164
The Reconciliation Period
• Greece accepted Turkey’s candidacy status at
Helsinki Summit in 1999.
• Cem and Papandreou exchanged letters and
subsequently confidence building measures
were adopted in order to find a solution for
Aegean sea disputes and the Cyprus problem.
165
The Balkans
• The Dissolution of Yugoslavia
– Yugoslavia was governed by the Consociational
form of government.
• which gives the preservation of the ethnic balance
higher priority than the majority rule.
• When Tito became the president of Yugoslavia in 1945
he created a system of ethnic balance among Croats,
Slovens and Serbs.
• With the 1974 Constitution Yugoslavia adopted a
decentralized government by giving autonomous status
to Kosovo.
166
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
167
168
• The reasons behind the collapse of Yugoslavia
– The rise of ethnic nationalism in the 1980s
(Serbian Nationalism)
– Decentralized government was replaced by a
centralized and unitary state after the death of
Tito
– Economic problems (Corruption and the
emergence of mafia economy)
169
The rise of Serbian Nationalism
Historical roots of Serbian nationalism:
1) Kosovar War in 1389 (Serbs were defeated by the
Ottomans)
2) The Serbian nationalist movement was the first
ever secessionist movement in the Ottoman Empire.
3) Serbs believed that they were the protectors of
Christianity against the Muslim invasion.
4) Serbs also believed that they had been repressed
during Tito’s reign. (Tito was Sloven originally.)
170
The rise of Serbian Nationalism
• Ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo had to leave their
homes in Kosovo after Kosovo became
autonomous.
• Serbs began to think that under the Tito’s rule they
were oppressed.
• Serbs also thought that they were the real owners
of Yugoslavia. They loathed sharing sovereignty by
other ethnic groups.
• Milosevic became the next president of Yugoslavia
after Tito.
171
The Rise of Serbian Nationalism
• Orthodox Church’s support for Serbian
nationalism.
• Serbian intellectuals gave their support for
Milosevic’s policies.
– Radovan Karadzic was a psychiatrist and a poet.
– Nikola Koljevic was an expert on Shakespeare.
– Milosevic was a banker.
172
• In 1989, Milosevic limited Kosovo’s and Vojvodina’s
autonomous status.
• Milosevic’s purpose was to gather ethnic Serbs living in
different parts of Yugoslavia. To transform Yugoslavia into a
Serbian state.
• In 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence.
Yugoslavian National Army moved into Slovenia in June 1991 in
order to prevent its secessionist movement.
• In November 1991, Bosnia declared its independence.
• The EC recognized Croatia and Slovenia in January 1992, yet the
EC recognized Bosnia in April 1992.
• Turkey recognized all four republics in February 1992.
173
Turkey and the Bosnian Crisis
• Turkey tried to develop relations with Romania,
Bulgaria and Albania in the early 1990s.
• The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian
Crisis did not pose direct threats to Turkey’s
borders.
• The Bosnian crisis was important for Turkey
owing to identity and public opinion as the
Bosnian crisis turned out to be a human tragedy.
174
Early Reaction of Turkey
• The policy of non-interference
• Reasons are:
– Domestic issues of Yugoslavia
– Friendly relations with Yugoslavia in the 1980s
– Yugoslavia supported Turkey against Bulgaria
– Yugoslavia was vital for Turkey’s trade with Europe
– Yugoslavia was a geostrategically important country in the Balkans
– A destabilized Yugoslavia could bring a flood of Bosnians and
Albanians to Turkey
– Relations with Greece, Bulgaria and Russia would be damaged
– Turkey would be seen as pursuing Neo-Ottomanist strategy in the
Balkans
175
Turkish Strategy
• First, the Turkish government rigorously followed the issue and raised it on
every occasion in every international organization.
– Turkey supported the status quo in the Balkans as it had nothing to win but much to
lose.
– Turkish policy-makers tried to mobilise the major powers and international
organizations.
• Second, the government organized a domestic aid effort for Bosnia.
– Provided Humanitarian assistance
– Secretly sent weapons to anti-Serb forces
• Third, Ankara indicated that it would be willing to contemplate active Turkish
participation in the use of force in Bosnia but only in multilateral context. Why?
– Unilateral action would create tensions with Greece and Russia
– Unilateral action would be seen as illegitimate.
– Turkey did not have military capabilities to conduct a military operation due to the
lack of refuelling capability for Turkish aircrafts.
176
• Ankara was pleased to give support to the Bosnian
government as it is made up of Muslims.
• Yet, Turkish politicians were cautious not to use the
Bosnian Muslims but the Bosniaks.
• Turkish officials worried about the fall of the secular
administration in Sarajevo and the Islamisation of
Bosnian politics.
• Turkish politicians also worried about the enhancing
influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Bosnia.
177
• Ankara held Serbia responsible for the ethnic cleansing
in Bosnia.
• According to Ankara, the Bosnian conflict was not a civil
war. Without the support of Serbia, the Bosnian Serbs
would not be able to pursue such a hostile approach
towards the Bosnians.
• At first, Turkey supported a unitary Yugoslavia. But when
it appeared that a unitary Yugoslavia was not a viable
solution Turkey recognized the independence of Croatia,
Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia at the same time in
February 1992.
178
• Turkish politicians tried to convince the great
powers and international community to stop
the atrocities of Serbs in Bosnia.
• When the international community imposed
sanctions on all warring sides rather than
Serbs, Turkey began to consider finding ways
to help Bosniaks.
• Turkey also received around 500000 Bosnians
as refugees escaping from the war.
179
Lecture Note 6
180
Turkey-EU Relations
Relations in the post-1980 Coup era
• Military Coup and its consequences on Turkey-
EC relations
• Democracy and liberal values were considered
a sine qua non for the EC membership.
• Difference of opinions between the two sides
182
Turkish Application for full membership
• On April 14, 1987, during Ozal’s premiership Turkey
applied to the EC for full membership.
• The reasons for application were:
– Need for foreign capital
– Need to develop trade relations with EC
– To ensure the transfer of technology from Europe
– To find European partners and to cooperate with European
companies in order to penetrate new markets
– However, there was a disagreement between Anatolian-
based Turkish industrialists and Istanbul-based Turkish
industrialist. Why?
183
• On December 14, 1989, the European Commission
sent its opinion (avis) on Turkey’s membership to the
European Council.
• The Commission confirmed that Turkey was eligible
for full membership but?
• On regional issues Turkish politicians were closer to
the US than Europe.
184
Relations in the post-Cold War era
• Being Western had two meanings for Turkish
politicians
– joining every European institutions
– cooperating with the US.
• With the end of the Cold War the attitude of the
United States and the EU towards Turkey have
changed significantly.
185
• Matutes Package
• In 1992, the EU-Turkey Association Council (a
board consisting of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs) convened after long break started in
1978.
• State Planning Organization were responsible
for the adaptation of EC legislatives in Turkey.
186
Copenhagen Criteria
• These criteria (known as the Copenhagen criteria) were established
by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by
the Madrid European Council in 1995.
• They are:
1. stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
2. a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;
3. ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the
capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies
that make up the body of EU law (the 'acquis'), and adherence to the
aims of political, economic and monetary union.
4. Absorption capacity of the EU
187
• A customs union is a type of trade bloc which is composed of
a free trade area with a common external tariff. The
participant countries set up common external trade policy.
188
Aims of the Customs Union
• Protecting the financial interests of the Community and its
Member States;
• Protecting the Community from unfair and illegal trade while
supporting legitimate business activity;
• Ensuring the security and safety of the Community and its
residents, and the protection of the environment , where
appropriate in close cooperation with other authorities;
• Maintaining a proper balance between customs controls and
facilitation of legitimate trade.
189
What is Free Trade Agreement?
• A free-trade area is the region covering a trade bloc whose member
countries have signed a free trade agreement (FTA). Such
agreements involve cooperation between at least two countries to
reduce trade barriers
• Free Trade Agreements are designed to create opportunities by:
– Opening new markets for goods and services
– Increasing investment opportunities
– Making trade cheaper - by eliminating substantially all customs duties
– Making trade faster - by facilitating goods' transit through customs and
setting common rules on technical and sanitary standards
– Making the policy environment more predictable - by taking joint
commitments on areas that affect trade such as intellectual property
rights, competition rules and the framework for public purchasing
decisions
190
The Customs Union
• In December 1994, Greece vetoed the establishment of the CU.
• After difficult negotiations, The Association Council on 6 March
1995 unanimously decided to establish the Customs Union. The
EP approved the decision in December 1995 and the CU came to
life on January 1 ,1996.
• What did the CU mean to Turkey? What did it mean to
Europeans?
– For Turkey, the CU would open the doors for full membership. The CU
was a means of anchoring Turkish economy to the EU.
– For Europeans, on the other hand, the CU was a way of delaying
Turkish membership without upsetting Turks while the EU were more
concentrated on the future of the Eastern countries.
191
192
Criticisms of the CU
• The opposition parties in Turkey (the
Motherland Party) criticized the CU decision of
the DYP-SHP coalition government because
the CU decision lacked a membership
perspective.
• On the other hand, some Turkish politicians
saw the Customs Union as a step that would
pave the way for full membership in a couple
of years.
193
Luxembourg Summit (1997)
• In the Luxembourg Summit the EU member states did not include
Turkey to the next enlargement phase
• Turkish government decided to freeze political relations with the
EU, yet this decision did not have any negative impact on the CU.
• At the end of the Luxembourg Summit Turkey was invited to the
European Conference but the EU asked Turkey
– To improve relations with Greece
– To solve bilateral conflicts through peaceful means
– To enhance human and minority rights in Turkey
– To support the negotiations on the Cyprus problem under the supervision
of the UN.
• Turkey rejected this invitation and did not attend the European
Conference.
194
Helsinki Summit (1999)
195
Helsinki Summit (1999)
• Turkey was given candidate status in the Helsinki Summit.
• The reasons were:
– the coalition formed by Social Democrats in Germany supported
Turkish membership
– Shift in Greek strategy towards Turkey due to the
• disclosure of Greece support the PKK
• earthquakes occurred in Turkey and Greece
• Cem and Papandreou's friendship
• US pressure on two countries
– The European politicians believed that in order to have stability in the
Balkans there has to be amicable relations between Greece and Turkey.
– Turkey’s support for the development of the ESDP was needed by the
EU.
196
Council Decisions
• 4. The candidate States are participating in the accession process on an
equal footing. They must share the values and objectives of the
European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European
Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in
accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to
make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other
related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the
dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will
review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular
concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to
promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the
latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that
compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen
European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession
negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the
basis for accession to the Union.
197
• 9. (a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive
settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong
support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the process to a successful
conclusion.
• (b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the
accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the
completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made
without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all
relevant factors.
• 12. The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in
the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards
complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the
Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.
Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit
from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include
enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political
criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on
the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will also have the opportunity to
participate in Community programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate
States and the Union in the context of the accession process.
198
Copenhagen Summit (2002)
• According to the Council Conclusions, "the
EU would open negotiations with Turkey
'without delay' if the European Council in
December 2004, on the basis of a report
and a recommendation from the
Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the
Copenhagen political criteria."
199
Brussels Summit 2004
• The EU leaders agreed on 16 December 2004 to
start accession negotiations with Turkey from 3
October 2005.
• While Austria and Germany initially wanted to
leave open the possibility that negotiations with
Turkey would lead to a privileged partnership,
less than full membership, accession
negotiations were ultimately launched with the
"shared objective" of membership.
200
201
Ankara Agreement
• Turkey signed the additional protocol on July 29, but Turkey also
declared that the signing of the additional protocol would not be
interpreted as the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.
• On September 21, the EU announced its opinion on the issue and
declared that Turkey’s declaration was illegal and had no legal
consequences.
• On October 3, 2005 negotiations framework was published and
accession negotiations began with the screening process.
• However, progress in negotiations was linked to following criteria:
– implementation of the Copenhagen criteria
– fulfillment of the responsibilities arising from the Ankara Agreement
– ratification of the additional protocol by the TGNA
– giving support to the solution of the Cyprus problem
– normalization of relations with the Republic of Cyprus
202
Accession Negotiations
• Negotiations take place in intergovernmental
conferences between the governments of the
EU countries and that of the candidate country.
• Starts with a screening process
• 35 chapters are negotiated
• What is negotiated?
• Negotiations ends with the signature and
ratification of the Accession Treaty
203
2006 EU Summit
• Until Turkey agrees to apply the Additional Protocol of the
Ankara Association Agreement to Cyprus, eight negotiation
chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be
provisionally closed.
• The Chapters prevented from being opened by the Republic of
France:
• Chapter 11: Agriculture and Rural Development (This chapter is also
among the 8 chapters suspended by the Council in December 2006)
• Chapter 17: Economic and Monetary Policy
• Chapter 22: Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments
• Chapter 33: Financial and Budgetary Provisions
• Chapter 34: Institutions
204
Negotiation chapters
Open Provisionally closed
Free Movement of Capital

Company Law
Intellectual Property Law
Information Society and Media
Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy
Taxation
Statistics
Science and Research
Enterprise & Industrial Policy
Trans-European Networks
Environment
Consumer & Health Protection
Financial Control
Regional policy & coordination of structural instruments
Economic and Monetary Policy
205
Frozen Chapters
• Free Movement of Goods
• Freedom of Movement For Workers
• Right of Establishment For Companies & Freedom To Provide Services
• Financial Services
• Agriculture & Rural Development
• Fisheries
• Transport Policy
• Energy
• Judiciary and Fundamental Rights
• Justice, Freedom and Security
• Education and Culture
• Customs Union
• External Relations
• Foreign, Security and Defence Policy
206
Problems in the relations between Turkey and
EU
Economical; External Affairs; Cultural and

Growth rate Cyprus question historical identity of
Population Greece question Turkey;
growth Armenian Religious problems
question Geographical
problems
EU Public Opinion on Turkish Membership
208
209
Source: http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/11/02/chapter-9-rating-the-eu-and-nato/
Turkish Public Opinion on EU membership
• According to a Eurobarometer Survey conducted in

2015
• Participants were asked whether Turkey's EU
membership would be "a good thing", a "bad thing"
or "neither good nor bad" thing.
Good thing Bad Thing Neither Good nor

Bad
33 % 40 % 27 %
210
• Is the EU membership beneficial for your
country?
EU membership beneficial EU membership is not

beneficial
55 % 36 %
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
Readmission Agreement and Visa Dialogue
• Readmission agreements aim to realize the return

of irregular migrants to country of origin or transit
by establishing obligations and procedures
between the contracting parties.
• The objective is to eliminate the visa obligation
currently imposed on Turkish citizens travelling to
the Schengen area for a short term visit
Discussions will also include other aspects related
to migration and mobility for Turkish citizens and
third country nationals residing or crossing Turkey.
The EU and Turkey agreed that:
• All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March
2016 will be returned to Turkey;
• Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for
irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU;
• Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or have been
substantially reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be
activated;
• The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated with a view to
lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June
2016. Turkey will take all the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements;
• The EU will, in close cooperation with Turkey, further speed up the disbursement
of the initially allocated €3 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey.
• The accession process will be re-energised, with Chapter 33 to be opened during
the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the European Union and preparatory work
on the opening of other chapters to continue at an accelerated pace;
• The EU and Turkey will work to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria.
CFSP and Turkey
• December 1999 Helsinki summit

• The EU made new framework about the
participation of 3rd parties:
• -NATO members without membership in
the EU
• -EU candidate states
• - Other partnerships
CFSP and Turkey
• EU-NATO permanent arrangements for consultation in January
2001
• Satisfying for Turkey

• -Non-member EU countries but NATO allies will be in touch
with the Political and Security Committee both peace and crisis
times.
• -The authorization of Participants Committee has been
extended.
• -EU military forces gave a guarantee about the non intervention
that political agreement which is party of NATO allies.
CFSP and Turkey
Turkish Armed forces gave an information note on 4 th June
2001 in about the access:
• -It has to be given more roles Participants Committee

• -NATO allies have to be more access about the
operations.
• -Turkey has to be invited the military operations where
take place in its near environment.
• -EU allies have not to be used in order to fix the
problems which take place in the NATO allies.
CFSP and Turkey
• December 2001 Ankara Document
• In spite of Turkey’s security guarantees, Turkey accepted
discrimination as a result of the EU’s decision making
autonomy.
• Automatic invitation-> near environment
•
• IN 2002 Turkey-> gave up its automatic invitation provision
• Turkey gave support European Security Defense Policy but

Turkey excluded the European Defense Agency cooperation
process which other non-EU NATO members take a part.
Summary
• April 1999 Washington Summit-> when WEU started an operation
other European NATO members would join the operation
• Köln, Helsinki, Feira and Nice Summits-> Turkey would join the
operations when NATO assets are used.
• Turkey's participation in the EU missions
• -ALTHEA, 225 personnel
• -EUPM, 10 personnel
• -EULEX KOSOVO, 35 polices
• -CONCORDIA, 10 personnel
• -PROXIMA, 4 Gendarmes
• -EUPOL Kinshasa 1 Gendarme
The Union for the Mediterranean
• The Union for the Mediterranean,previously

known as the "Mediterranean Union", is a
community established on the 13 July 2008 by
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, as a
development of the Euromediterranean
Partnership
• The idea was originally proposed as an alternative to
Turkish membership in the European Union, whereby
Turkey would instead form the backbone of the new
Mediterranean Union. However, with modifications to
the plan in March 2008, membership was no longer seen
as an alternative to joining the European Union, and
instead considered more as a stepping stone into the EU.
• Once Turkey was given a guarantee in March 2008 that

the project would not be an alternative to Turkish EU
membership, it accepted the invitation to participate.
• At the start of 2008 Sarkozy began to modify
his plans for the Mediterranean Union due to
widespread opposition from other states in
the EU and the Commission. At the end of
February of that year France's minister for
European affairs, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, stated
that "there is no Mediterranean Union" but
rather a "Union for the Mediterranean" which
would only be "completing and enriching" to
existing EU structures and policy in the region.
Members of the Union
• The Union consists of all the EU states and those countries on
the Mediterranean rim or those which are participating in the
Euromediterranean Partnership. The idea is to form a connection
between Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.
• The original proposals would have excluded the EU states not
bordering the Mediterranean. All other EU states apart from
France, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, Malta, Greece, and Cyprus, would
have been silent observers which angered those countries who
would not be involved, such as Germany, as it did not approve of
EU funds being used in a project over which it had no influence.
France's President Nicolas Sarkozy (left) and summit co-chairman Hosni
Mubarak (right) welcome Syria's President Bashar Al Assad as he arrives to
attend the Paris' Union for the Mediterranean founding summit. Europe is
Syria’s main trading partner.

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Turkish Foreign Policy II

The most important

• Alongside historical conflicts and tension between the two

• a. The Aegean is a common sea between Turkey and Greece.

• d. Any acquisition of new maritime areas should be based on mutual

Free Movement of Capital

Economical; External Affairs; Cultural and

• According to a Eurobarometer Survey conducted in

Good thing Bad Thing Neither Good nor

EU membership beneficial EU membership is not

• Readmission agreements aim to realize the return

• December 1999 Helsinki summit

• Satisfying for Turkey

• -It has to be given more roles Participants Committee

• Turkey gave support European Security Defense Policy but

• The Union for the Mediterranean,previously

• Once Turkey was given a guarantee in March 2008 that

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