CSCE

CSCE 815
815 Network
Network Security
Security
Lecture
Lecture 10
10

Kerberos
X.509

February 13, 2003

Version 4 Authentication Dialogue
Authentication Service Exchange, To obtain Ticket-
Granting Ticket
(1) C  AS: IDc || IDtgs ||TS1
(2) AS  C: EKc [Kc,tgs|| IDtgs || TS2 || Lifetime2 ||
Tickettgs]

Ticket-Granting Service Exchange: To obtain Service-

Granting Ticket
(3) C  TGS: IDv ||Tickettgs ||Authenticatorc
(4) TGS  C: EKc [Kc,¨v|| IDv || TS4 || Ticketv]
Client/Server Authentication Exchange: To Obtain Service
(5) C  V: Ticketv || Authenticatorc
(6) V  C: EKc,v[TS5 +1]
–2– CSCE 815 Sp 03
 Kerberos 4 Overview Fig 4.1

–3– CSCE 815 Sp 03

Kerberos Realms
a Kerberos environment consists of:
 a Kerberos server
 a number of clients, all registered with server
 application servers, sharing keys with server

this is termed a realm

 typically a single administrative domain

if have multiple realms, their Kerberos servers

must share keys and trust

–4– CSCE 815 Sp 03

 Request for Service in
Another Realm

–5– CSCE 815 Sp 03

Kerberos Version 5
developed in mid 1990’s
provides improvements over v4
 addresses environmental shortcomings
 encryption algorithm – v4 DES based, v5 tags ciphertext by
type of encryption
 IP dependence – v4 requires internet Protocol (IP), v5 general
 byte order - v5 message defined using Abstract Syntax
Notation(ASN.1) and encoded with Basic Encoding Rules (BER)
 ticket lifetime – 8 bits (255)x five minutes = 21+ hours; v5
start/stop times
 authentication forwarding: In v5 one server can forward
credentials to another e.g., a print server can forward
credentials to file server so that a file can be printed
 interrealm authorization – In v4 n realms  n(n-1)/2
relationships
 and technical deficiencies
specified as Internet standard RFC 1510
–6– CSCE 815 Sp 03
Kerberos Version 5
V5 solves technical deficiencies of v4
 double encryption: tickets provided to clients are
encrypted twice (fig 4.1)
 PCBC encryption: v4 uses propagating block
chaining (PCBC) - non-std and vulnerable to
ciphertext block interchange attack
 session keys – a key used by the client to encrypt
the AS to the service; however it may be reused to
gain access to the service again. V5 allows
subsession keys to prevent replays.
 password attacks – both versions are susceptible to
attacks on the password. The message from the AS
to the client is encrypted with a key based on the
client’s password. This can be captured and then
attempts to decrypt and figure out the password.
–7– CSCE 815 Sp 03
Kerberos Version 5 Message
Exchanges
Table 4.3
Authentication Service Exchange: to obtain the
ticket-granting ticket
New additions
 Realm of the user
 Options
 Times: from, till, renewTime
 Nonce – random value to be repeated in response to
insure freshness

–8– CSCE 815 Sp 03

Ticket-Granting Service
Exchange
To obtain a service-granting ticket
Both versions include
 Authenticator
 a ticket
 Name of the requested service

In addition v5 includes
 Requested times for the ticket
 Options for the ticket
 And a nonce

–9– CSCE 815 Sp 03

 Client/Server Authentication
Exchange
To obtain service
Both versions include
 Authenticator
 Ticket
 Name of the requested service

In addition v5 includes
 Options for mutual authentication
 Subkey – client’s choice of encryption key (default is
Kc,v)
 Sequence number – used to detect replays

Ticket Flags table 4.4

– 10 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 X.509 Authentication Service
part of CCITT X.500 directory service standards
 distributed servers maintaining some user info database
defines framework for authentication services
 directory may store public-key certificates
 with public key of user
 signed with private key by certification authority
also defines authentication protocols
uses public-key cryptogrraphy & digital signatures
 algorithms not standardised, but RSA recommended
Used in a variety of contexts
 S/MIME chapter 5
 IP secuirty chapter 6
 SSL/TLS, SET chapter 7

– 11 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 X.509 Certificates
issued by a Certification Authority (CA), containing (fig 4.3):
 version (1, 2, or 3)
 serial number (unique within CA) identifying certificate
 signature algorithm identifier and parameters
 issuer X.500 name (CA)
 period of validity (from - to dates)
 subject X.500 name (name of owner)
 subject public-key info (algorithm, parameters, key)
 issuer unique identifier (v2+)
 subject unique identifier (v2+)
 extension fields (v3)
 signature (of hash of all fields in certificate)
notation CA<<A>> denotes certificate for A signed by CA

– 12 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 X.509 Certificates

– 13 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 Obtaining a Certificate
any user with access to CA can get any
certificate from it
only the CA can modify a certificate
because cannot be forged, certificates can be
placed in a public directory

– 14 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 CA Hierarchy
if both users share a common CA then they are assumed
to know its public key
otherwise CA's must form a hierarchy
use certificates linking members of hierarchy to validate
other CA's
 each CA has certificates for clients (forward) and parent
(backward)
each client trusts parents certificates
enable verification of any certificate from one CA by users
of all other CAs in hierarchy

– 15 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 CA Hierarchy Use

– 16 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 Certificate Revocation
certificates have a period of validity
may need to revoke before expiry, eg:
1. user's private key is compromised
2. user is no longer certified by this CA
3. CA's certificate is compromised

CA’s maintain list of revoked certificates

 the Certificate Revocation List (CRL)

users should check certs with CA’s CRL

– 17 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 Authentication Procedures
X.509 includes three alternative authentication
procedures:
One-Way Authentication
Two-Way Authentication
Three-Way Authentication
all use public-key signatures

– 18 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 One-Way Authentication
1 message ( A->B) used to establish
 the identity of A and that message is from A
 message was intended for B
 integrity & originality of message

message must include timestamp, nonce, B's

identity and is signed by A

– 19 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 Two-Way Authentication
2 messages (A->B, B->A) which also establishes
in addition:
 the identity of B and that reply is from B
 that reply is intended for A
 integrity & originality of reply

reply includes original nonce from A, also

timestamp and nonce from B

– 20 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 Three-Way Authentication
3 messages (A->B, B->A, A->B) which enables
above authentication without synchronized
clocks
has reply from A back to B containing signed
copy of nonce from B
means that timestamps need not be checked or
relied upon

– 21 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 X.509 Version 3
has been recognised that additional information
is needed in a certificate
 email/URL, policy details, usage constraints

rather than explicitly naming new fields defined

a general extension method
extensions consist of:
 extension identifier
 criticality indicator
 extension value

– 22 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 Certificate Extensions
key and policy information
 convey info about subject & issuer keys, plus
indicators of certificate policy

certificate subject and issuer attributes

 support alternative names, in alternative formats for
certificate subject and/or issuer

certificate path constraints

 allow constraints on use of certificates by other
CA’s

– 23 – CSCE 815 Sp 03
 Summary
have considered:
 Kerberos trusted key server system
 X.509 authentication and certificates

– 24 – CSCE 815 Sp 03