The Role of UN in World

Politics: Theoretical
Perspectives
 UN in World Politics
Today, after almost 70 years, UN preserves to occupy a
“unique position” in world politics compared to other
IOs.

Its status as an organization approximating

universality makes it unique.

Its decisions and resolutions has been a frequent

reference point for states’ uses of force in international
affairs especially after the Cold War.
 UN in World Politics

UN’s role and influence has varied over

time, but no other regional or international
organization has ever seriously emerged
to rival it, even when it was at its lowest
ebb.

WHY?
 Questioning the role of UN in
World Politics
What makes UN “so central” to world
politics?
What are its sources of power and how it
exercises its power?
Which toll or tolls it uses to produce
outcomes in world politics?
What kind of an actor UN is and how it
influences world politics?
 Questioning the role of UN in
World Politics

Power-based approach(Realist-Neorealist)
Interest-based approach (Neoliberals)
Knowledge-based approach
(Constructivists and Critical Theories)
The role of UN in World Politics
Claude, from a “power-based” realist
perspective:

“UN’s role in world politics is highly

dependent upon its “legitimacy” and
“collective legitimization” function given by
states.”
(Claude, 1966)

Collective Legitimization?
UN and Collective Legitimization
When states act multilaterally and comply
with the UN norms, their policies acquire
“legitimacy” which in turn support their
positions and foreign policy choices in
international relations.

“collective legitimization”
UN and Collective Legitimization

“Politics is not merely a struggle for

power, but also a contest over legitimacy.
A competition in which the conferment or
denial, the confirmation or revocation, of
legitimacy is an important stake.”

(Claude,
1966)
 UN and Collective Legitimization

Legitimacy Power

Rulers seek “legitimacy” to strengthen their positions

in world politics.

Legitimacy ??
 UN and Collective Legitimization
Legitimacy

Institution Actor Rule

“the prestige of being considered binding”

(Weber)
Justified Authority
(What legitimacy does in IR?)
Why important?
 UN and Collective Legitimization
Legitimacy makes rulers more “effective” and
“secure” in the possession of power while
realizing their goals compared to “naked
power”.

successful in its exercise.

(Remember Morgenthau- “legitimate power”

Carr: “power over opinion”)
UN and Collective Legitimization
“Legitimate power, which can evoke a
moral or legal justification for its
exercise, is likely to be more effective
than equivalent illegitimate power, which
cannot be so justified”

(Morgenthau, Politics Among

Nations)
 UN and Collective Legitimization
“what is the ‘standard’ of “legitimacy”, then?’

“who decides”?
UN and Collective Legitimization
According to Claude, while different
principles of legitimacy and agents of
legitimization may be operative in global
politics, there is usually a tendency for a
single concept of legitimacy to become
dominant in a particular era.
UN and Collective Legitimization
Since 1945, especially after the cold war, UN
arena has become the “center” of this
“legitimacy” talk and debate in world
politics.

UN?
LEGITIMACY?

States turn to “UN norms and decisions” to

legitimize and strengthen their positions
UN and Collective Legitimization
Ex. The “admission” of Israel to UN in
1949 was regarded by both friends and foes
as a major contribution to its capacity to
survive in a hostile neighborhood.
A major campaign was waged in the UN to
delegitimize colonialism and many states
“utilized” the UNGA resolutions on “self-
determination” to get support for their
policy choices.
 UN and Collective Legitimization

Ex. Cyprus Issue in the UN

In 1950’s
Greece brought the issue before UN in
1954, arguing for the “self-determination
principle.
Turkey “domestic affair of Britain.”
(sovereignty principle)
UN and Collective Legitimization
In 1960’s
This time Makarios tried to “legitimize”
its policies regarding the Constitution, by
arguing for the “sovereignty” principle in
the UN.
Turkey, on the other hand, argued that
these policies violated the 1960
agreements and the basic rights of Turkish
Cypriots.
 UN and Collective Legitimization

Post-Cold War Increased

“legitimacy debate”

During 1990 Persian Gulf War, “the

legitimacy of Iraq’s move into Kuwait”
was the center of debates in world
politics. (The Times, 28 August 1990).
UN and Collective Legitimization

In the course of 1992-1995 Bosnian War ,

when the humanitarian tragedy reached at
its peak, Turkey’s Permanent
Representative at the UN, Inal Batu,
argued that “ignoring Bosnian war would
mean the death of international
legitimacy principle for international
society” (Milliyet, July 1993)
 UN and Collective Legitimization
 During the first anniversary of September 11 attacks, in
his speech at UN General Assembly, Kofi Annan,
argued that “only UN has the ability to legitimize the
“war on terror”, (BBC News, September 2002)

 In 2003 Iraq War Russian Foreign Minister, Igor

Ivanov, had earlier warned the United States of its war
in Iraq that ‘we will not, of course, give legitimacy to
this action in the Security Council’ (Moscow Times,
March 2003).
UN and Collective Legitimization
According to Claude, “collective
legitimization” through UN is not an
answer to what UN can do,
but to the question of how it can be used.
So “utilization of UN” for power
purposes.

UN is not an independent power!

 UNSC: Ability to Legitimize
Eric Voeten, taking an “Institutionalist”
perspective, argued that UN’s importance
and ‘actorness’ lies mainly in its ability to
provide benefits and avoid costs to states.
Given its lack of enforcement capabilities,
the SC’s leverage resides almost entirely
in the perceived legitimacy its decisions
grant to forceful actions.
The role of the Security Council
The SC provides a focal solution that has
the characteristics of an “elite pact”:

Elite Pact?
The role of the Security Council
How this “elite pact” works?

◦ (1) SC approval provides a green light

for states to cooperate.
◦ (2) Its absence triggers a coordinated
response that imposes costs on
violators.
The role of the Security Council
SC’s ability to legitimize uses of force
depends not on the perceived normative
qualities of the institution,

but, because norm compliance produces

favorable outcomes and violation costs.
The role of the Security Council

What about 2003 Iraq War?

An exception?

Benefits and costs of unilateralism?

The role of the Security Council
NO! (?), Because;
During 2003 Iraq War, the US went to
considerable length to persuade the SC
to authorize the Iraq intervention, argued
repeatedly that it was implementing past
SC resolutions, and returned to the SC in
the immediate aftermath of the
intervention.
The role of the Security Council
At the end US did choose to intervene
without a SC resolution and it becomes
“costly”

Couldn’t get the support of its allies like

Turkey
“Reputational effects”-anti-Americanism
 Loss of soldiers, time, money..etc.
The role of the Security Council

Hence, obtaining legitimacy for proposed

interventions is valuable and beneficial.

Violatingthis social norm is costly,

undesirable, or inappropriate.
 The SC and Information
Transmission

Alexander Thomson

Why big powers “willingly” spend time and

money to limit themselves although they
have the “means” to act unilaterally?
 The SC and Information
Transmission

The United States has tried to achieve

approval from the UN Security Council
for most of its interventions since 1990,
including those in 1990 Iraq, 1992
Somalia, 1993 Rwanda, 1999 Kosovo,
and Afghanistan.

WHY?
 The SC and Information
Transmission

Because doing so lowers the political

costs of exercising power.

HOW?
 The SC and Information
Transmission
Alexander Thomson uses the term
“strategic information transmission”
(Thomson, 2006)

Strategic Information Transmission?

 The SC and Information
Transmission
The basic idea is this:

Coercing states face the problem of

minimizing the international political
costs of an intervention…
 The SC and Information
Transmission
“UN involvement sends information
about the coercer’s intentions and the
consequences of the coercive policy..

 Information that determines the level of

international support offered to the
coercing state.”
HOW?
 The SC and Information
Transmission
There are two types of information
towards two intended audiences:
(1) the costs of channeling a policy through
an IO, like UN allow the coercer to signal
benign intentions directed primarily at
foreign leaders.
 (2) the support of an IO, like UN sends
policy-relevant information to foreign
publics.
 The SC and Information
Transmission

Why care Foreign Publics?

 The SC and Information
Transmission

This second audience (foreign publics)

can be as important as the first because
leaders are often constrained by domestic
politics from supporting another state’s
use of force, especially in changing world
politics.
 The SC and Information
Transmission

Increased international support from

these two audiences is desirable for a
coercing state because it determines the
political costs of a given policy and may
affect its long-term success.

Any Examples?
 The SC and Information
Transmission
Comparing and contrasting 1990 Persian Gulf
War with 2003 Iraq War.
In 1990 Gulf War, Arab leaders reacted with fear
and suspicion towards a war against Iraq
(a desire to exploit local resources and establish
political dominance in the region ??)
European governments viewed initial US
reactions to Iraq’s invasion as hasty and
aggressive.
The US thus faced the problem of signaling its
intentions
 The SC and Information
Transmission
In the 1990–91 case, many governments,
having concluded that it might be in their
interest to support US action, initially felt
constrained by their publics from doing
so…
Ex. Turkey
Turgut Ozal
Northern Iraq.
 The SC and Information
Transmission
Many governments faced tough domestic
political questions in deciding whether to
support a US-led invasion.
Potential coalition governments knew that
IO approval would help them “sell”
support of the war to their domestic
audience.
 The SC and Information
Transmission
Ex. UN cover allowed Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak to argue to his citizens
that Saddam “is one man against the
world,” and his pro-intervention stance
was ultimately supported by a clear
majority of the population…
 The SC and Information
Transmission

“ Article 51 doesn’t mind public opinion…

Fifty five million French people are not
international lawyers …We need that
resolution to authorize the use of force to
ensure the consequences it will entail”

(French President François Mitterrand, 1990

Persian Gulf War )
 The SC and Information
Transmission
Mitterrand insisted on a clear UN
resolution to legitimize use of force..

WHY?
Though felt that Article 51 was sufficient
from a legal perspective, he knew it could
not justify military intervention to his
domestic audience…
 The SC and Information
Transmission
In the end, the US “chose” to wait for
Resolution 678 which clearly authorize the
use of force, although it has the “legal
ground” in terms of “collective self-
defense”.
In 1990 Persian Gulf War, almost forty
countries contributed personnel to the
coalition, and more than twenty provided
military hardware.
 The SC and Information
Transmission
Similarly, 2003 Iraq War, absent a UN approval,
publics around the world were skeptical and
most saw selfish goals involving oil, Israel, and
political influence.
However, in contrast to 1990, in 2003 Iraq War,
US acted unilaterally-with a small “coalition of
the willing”.
Following the 2003 Iraq war, the United States
has had considerable difficulty garnering
cooperation for peacekeeping and
reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
 The SC and Information
Transmission
Therefore “Security Council” is not an
“legitimizing” actor, but “valuable”
because of its “information transmission”
role…
Since SC decision making procedures are
not transparent, procedural legitimacy is in
question.
Its structural legitimacy is also in
question: Only P5 decides..so.. “it is not
legitimacy” that explains best.
 The Security Council and
“Authority”
In sum, all these approaches argue that
states “utilize” UN “strategically” for the
purposes of power and/or interest.
At this point, Constructivists like Ian
Hurd, argue that IOs like UN are taken
“SO” for granted…
This means the UN is in a position of
power in world politics, even if states
sometimes choose not to comply.
The Security Council and Authority
Ex. US effort to gain UN Security Council
approval in 2003 Iraq war

US spend considerable time and effort to gain

approval before SC..

The Counsel was thereby placed in a position of

power relative to the United States since it
controlled something that the latter wanted.
The Security Council and Authority
Through “legitimization” process before
SC two kinds of power are on display
(1) the power states get from associating
themselves with the SC (well-covered in
literature)
(2) the power the Council gets from
controlling the terms of that association.
The Security Council and Authority

Far from replacing power politics the

legitimacy of the Counsel changes the
context of power politics by
“institutionalizing” it.

It brings “IOs” and “norms” to the

equation.
The Security Council and Authority

Through this “legitimization” process, UN

begins to occupy a position of
“authority” in world politics.
The Security Council and Authority
The existence of UN resolutions increases the
amount of available policy alternatives to
states.

IN OTHER WORDS

The range of options for leaders is constrained

by the availability of normative justifications.”
The Security Council and Authority

Normative environment and IOs both

“enables” and “constraints” the strategic
calculations of states.

Therefore they are in a position of

“power”,
not coercive power but, power of
“legitimacy” = “Authority”
The Security Council and Authority

“UN’s power derives primarily from its

ability to persuade, rather than its ability
to coerce”
(Barnett, 1995)
 Soft Power and UN
Similarly Joseph Nye used the concept of
‘soft-power’ to explain the role of UN in
world politics.
The UN has considerable soft power, Nye
argues, that arises from its “ability to
legitimize” the actions of states, particularly
regarding the use of force.
UN is “attractive”, as Nye use the term,
since it has a “soft power” coming from its
“legitimacy”.
Concluding….
LEGITIMACY AND UN
All different approaches agree that the role
and “actorness” of UN in world politics is
highly dependent upon “legitimacy”.
(except Thomson)
However they differ on “how” this
legitimacy create outcomes.
Legitimacy-power
Legitimacy-costs and benefits, cooperation.
Legitimacy-authority
Concluding….
Is UN’s legitimacy “in crises”, today?

How can we “locate” UN in today’s changing world

politics?

What kind of challenges its system faces in

contemporary world politics?

What are its “successes” and “failures”?

 ANY QUESTIONS?

HAVE A NICE HOLIDAY!!