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Ethics Three Mile (Org)
Ethics Three Mile (Org)
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LOCATION
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INTRODUCTION
It is an US based commercial nuclear power station started on September 2, 1974 Named so as it is three miles down river from Middletown, Pennsylvania. It has two separate units, known as TMI-1 and TMI-2. After the crisis on March 1979 only TMI-1 unit operates today
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The construction began on 1968 and was completed in 1970 Unit 1 commenced its operations on April 19, 1974 with an power output of 802MWe Unit 2 began its operations on December 30, 1978 with an power output of 906MWe
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THE ACCIDENT
The Three Mile Island accident of 1979 was a partial core meltdown in Unit 2, near Harrisburg PA. It was the most significant accident in the history of the American commercial
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TMI II REACTOR
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Series of pumps feeding water to the steam generators at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant stopped functioning. When the flow of the water stopped the temperature inside the reactor core increased. This caused the water inside the reactor to expand, increasing the pressure inside. This caused the Pilot Operated Relief Valve to open (PORV) draining the steam and water
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Three emergency feed water pumps started but the valves on the emergency feed water lines were closed. The control rods automatically lowered to halt the fission reaction. The radioactive material continued to heat the water causing overheating at the core. As the pressure dropped the PORV should have closed but PORV was stuck open and steam and water was escaping from the reactor .
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In the first 100 minutes one third of the reactors capacity escaped through the PORV. The Emergency Injection Water (EIW) was activated due to low water pressure This sent about 1000 gallons of water per minute into the reactor coolant system. Instead Operator reduced the flow of water into the core to less then 100 gallons per minute fearing that the core would have too much water.
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The level of water in the reactor had dropped below the level of the core. Zirconium alloy of the fuel rod cladding reacted with the steam to produce hydrogen gas.
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As the pressure in the primary system continued to decrease, reactor coolant continued to flow, but it was boiling inside the core. As the system pressure decreased further, steam pockets began to form in the reactor coolant. This departure from nucleate boiling caused steam voids in coolant channels, blocking the flow of liquid coolant and greatly increasing the fuel plate temperature.
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The steam voids also took up more volume than liquid water, causing the pressurizer water level to rise even though coolant was being lost through the open PORV Because of the lack of a dedicated instrument to measure the level of water in the core, operators judged the level of water in the core solely by the level in the pressurizer. Since it was high, they assumed that the core was properly covered with coolant, unaware that because of steam forming in the reactor vessel, the indicator provided false readings.This was a key contributor to the initial failure to recognize the accident as a loss-ofcoolant accident, and led operators to turn off the emergency core cooling pumps, which had automatically started after the PORV stuck and core coolant loss began, due to fears the system was being overfilled.
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Since it was high, they assumed that the core was properly covered with coolant, unaware that because of steam forming in the reactor vessel, the indicator provided false readings.[16] This was a key contributor to the initial failure to recognize the accident as a loss-ofcoolant accident, and led operators to turn off the emergency core cooling pumps, which had automatically started after the PORV stuck and core coolant loss began, due to fears the system was 16 being overfilled.
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Health Effects
Detailed studies of the radiological consequences of the accident have been conducted by the NRC, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health It was estimated that the average dose to about 2 million people in the area was about 1 millirem.
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Compared to the natural radioactive background dose of about 100-125 millirem per year for the area, the collective dose to the community from the accident was very small. The maximum dose to a person at the site boundary would have been less than 100 millirem.
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The accident was caused by a combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component failures. There is no doubt that the accident at Three Mile Island permanently changed both the nuclear industry and the NRC. Public fear and distrust increased, NRCs regulations and oversight became broader and more robust, and management of the plants was scrutinized more carefully. The problems identified from careful analysis of the events during those days have led to permanent and sweeping changes in how NRC regulates its licensees which, in turn, has reduced the risk to public health and safety.
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Upgrading and strengthening of plant design and equipment requirements. Identifying human performance as a critical part of plant safety, revamping operator training and staffing requirements, followed by improved instrumentation and controls for operating the plant, and establishment of fitness-for-duty programs for plant workers to guard against alcohol or drug abuse;
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Regular analysis of plant performance by senior NRC managers who identify those plants needing additional regulatory attention. Expansion of performance-oriented as well as safety-oriented inspections, and the use of risk assessment to identify vulnerabilities of any plant to severe accidents.
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Current Status
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Today, the TMI-2 reactor is permanently shut down and defueled,with the reactor coolant system drained,the radioactive water decontaminated and evaporated, radioactive waste shipped off-site to an appropriate disposal site,reactor fuel and core debris shipped off-site to a Department of Energy facility, and the remainder of the site being monitored. In 2001,FirstEnergy acquired TMI-2 from GPU. FirstEnergy has contracted the monitoring of TMI-2 to Exelon, the 23 current owner and operator of TMI-1.