PRINCIPLES OF

TRAIN OPERATIONS
CONTENTS
 Braking
 Predetermined Braking Distance
 Factors Effects Braking Distance
 Safe Braking Curve
 Safe Braking Model
 Fundamental Requirements For Train Control System
 Operational Requirements
 Functional Safety Requirements
 Supporting Safety Requirements
 PRINCIPLE OF TRAIN OPERATION
• Initially Train run on “Time Interval system”
• The time interval used to vary from 5 minutes to 15 minutes
depending on the total number of trains run in a section.
• Safety was dependent entirely on the vigilance of the drivers
of the following trains.
• To avoid accidents in above mentioned system, another
system was introduced which is called “Space interval
system”.
• In space interval system the whole length of track is divided
into number of small sections called “block sections” and at
any time, there can be only one train in any block section.
• This system was first started in U.K. in 1856 and mid
section collision were avoided by this system.
 BRAKING
• Initially the brakes were only provided in the engine and the
last vehicle which were not adequate enough to stop the train
specially at rising gradient.
• The braking system was improved by providing brakes in
every vehicle in 1874. This system was called “continuous
braking system”.
Predetermined Braking Distance:
• Important approach in design of a signalling & train
control system requires knowledge of predetermined
braking distances for each type of rolling stock operating
on a section of line.
 The distance covered by a train after the brakes are
applied is defined as the braking distance.
• Braking distances can be determined by the following
methods:
 Theoretical calculation
 From dynamic tests performed on the trains
themselves
 A combination of theoretical calculation and dynamic
testing
Factors effects braking distance
Factors
effecting
breaking
Distance

Train Speed Train Load

Condition of Rail/Wheel
Gradient Brake power Types of Brake
Rails Adhesion
Safe Braking Curve:
• One of the key principles of an ATP system is the braking
model concept, a mathematical model applicable to any
land vehicle with a constrained guide.
• It allows predicting the maximum safe speed of the
vehicle, starting from the following data:
 Target distance (a potential obstacle during the route)
 Current speed
 Physical characteristics of the vehicle
• From these data, it’s possible to calculate a curve.
Safe Braking Model:
• From above data, it’s possible to calculate a curve. Once
known the braking pattern, it’s easy to determine what the
maximum speed is at which the vehicle can travel, so
that it can stop safely before the target/danger point.
• The on-board system:
1) Receives data packets from the trackside, containing
virtual signals and speed restrictions along the line.
2) At each instant by instant , the protection curve is
drawn and verify that the current speed of the train is
always below the maximum defined by the model.
FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEM
We have 3 fundamental train control system requirement.
Fundamental
Requirements
for Train
Control Systems

Operational Functional Safety Supporting Safety

Requirements Requirements Requirements
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Operational
Requirements

Safety
Signalling
functionality Reliability and
Facilitate efficient “degraded mode”
should have the maintainability
and effective operation should
minimum must be sufficient
operation and use be provided to
necessary intrusion to fulfill its
of infrastructure minimise reliance
into efficient operational
and rolling stock on human
operation of requirements
intervention
railway
 Operational Requirement # 01

Facilitate efficient
and effective
operation and use
of infrastructure
and rolling stock

Capacity, headway Operational

Design for economic
and speed flexibility (eg. Mininise impact of
railway operations
calculations for joining/splitting time of operation of
(eg minimise
optimum traffic trains, platform signalling system
traction energy use)
flows sharing, shunting)
Operational Requirement # 02

Safety functionality
should have the
minimum necessary
intrusion into efficient
operation of railway

Optimisation of
Avoiding excessive
headways with traffic
locking that constrains
mix and attainable
operational flexibility
speeds
Operational Requirement # 03

Reliability and
maintainability
must be sufficient to
fulfill its operational
requirements

System architecture Back-up and standby

Product and system
and design systems for
reliability testing
philosophy to maintaining full
prior to operation
optimise reliability functionality
Operational Requirement # 04

Signalling “degraded
mode” operation
should be provided to
minimise reliance on
human intervention

Include alternative Override systems to

Degraded mode
signalling routes in maintain essential
signalling and signals
system design functionality
 FUNCTIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Before a train can be authorized to move onto a section of line,

Once authority to enter a section of line is given, security of the route shall be maintained until

The train driver (or ATO) shall be provided with unambiguous information consistent with controlling the train safely
Operational Requirements

Sufficient space should be provided between following trains to permit each to brake to a stand safely

Controls should be in place to prevent or mitigate the consequences of

Protection should be provided for the public and trains at level crossings

Means should be provided to protect engineering works

The signaller shall be provided with timely, unambiguous and consistent information and control facilities to safely
authorise train movements
There should be communication systems between the signaller and others

There should be a means for preventing a train being routed onto a line with which it is not compatible

Facilities should be provided to stop a train in an emergency

Functional Safety Requirement # 01

Before a train can be

authorised to move
onto a section of line,

(a) the line should be proved (b) the line should be proved
secure clear

 Block systems
 Train detection
 Points
 Permissive working
 Route setting and locking
Functional Safety Requirement # 02

Once authority to enter a

section of line is given,
security of the route shall be
maintained until

(b) OR the authority is

rescinded and the train
(a) EITHER the whole
has stopped, or has
train has passed through
sufficient space to stop,
short of the section

Route holding and Approach locking of

releasing routes
 Functional Safety Requirement # 03

The train driver (or ATO) shall

be provided with unambiguous
information consistent with
controlling the train safely

Automatic
Route/ speed
train
signalling Lineside Lineside In-cab
operation/
and aspect signals signs displays
driverless
sequences
trains
Functional Safety Requirement # 04

Sufficient space should

be provided between
following trains to
permit each to brake to
a stand safely

Braking distance
Lineside signal spacing
calculations
Functional Safety Requirement # 05

Controls should be in place to

prevent or mitigate the
consequences of

(a) a train passing the end point of

its authority to move (c) a train (or vehicle) moving
(b) a train exceeding the maximum without authorisation
permitted speed

 Overlaps
 Flank protection & other interlocking protection Train stabling and starting
 Train protection & warning systems procedures
 Automatic Train Protection systems
Functional Safety Requirement # 06

Protection should
be provided for the
public and trains
at level crossings

Pedestrian
Vehicular crossings Crossing use/abuse
crossings – various
– various types monitoring systems
types
Functional Safety Requirement # 07

Means should be
provided to
protect
engineering works

Possession and Warning systems Imposition of

lock-out systems for track workers speed restrictions
Functional Safety Requirement # 08

The signaller shall be

provided with timely,
unambiguous and consistent
information and control
facilities to safely authorise
train movements

Other
Signalling automated
Automatic
control & Train and support Alarm
route
indication describers systems for systems
setting
systems traffic
management
Functional Safety Requirement # 09

There should be
communication
systems between the
signaller and others

Emergency comms
Telephone systems Radio systems
systems
Functional Safety Requirement # 10

There should be a
means for preventing
a train being routed
onto a line with which
it is not compatible

Use of operational
Routing control via
procedures and
signalling system
timetabling
Functional Safety Requirement # 11

Facilities should
be provided to
stop a train in
an emergency

Emergency stop Voice

control via communication
signalling system systems
 SUPPORTING SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
The level of safety performance should meet specific targets

The signalling system and operating rules should be mutually compatible

Specification and design of the system should take account of the human factors associated with its
safe use
Supporting Safety
Requirements

Any failure of the system should maintain or revert to a state that preserves the safety of the trains

The signalling system shall not interact unsafely with any other railway systems or equipment

The signalling system shall be resilient to unwanted adverse external influences

The arrangements for system maintenance of modification should be appropriate for the safe
operation of the system

Personnel who use, operate and maintain the signalling system shall be demonstrably competent
Supporting Safety Requirement # 01

The level of safety

performance
should meet
specific targets

Identification, Specification and

assessment and demonstration of
control of risks safety performance
Supporting Safety Requirement # 02

The signalling
system and
operating rules
should be mutually
compatible

Integrated approach Rules for operation

to design of system in degraded modes as
and rules well as normal
Supporting Safety Requirement # 03

Specification and
design of the system
should take account of
the human factors
associated with its safe
use

Apportionment of Simulate operation of

functions between system with users (in all
system and users modes)
Supporting Safety Requirement # 04

Any failure of the

system should
maintain or revert to a
state that preserves the
safety of the trains

Design philosophy (eg

Failure modes and
“fail-safe”, fault
effects analysis
tolerance)
Supporting Safety Requirement # 05

The signalling system

shall not interact
unsafely with any
other railway systems
or equipment

Design of interfaces to Electromagnetic

ensure safety compatibility with
compatibility other railway systems
Supporting Safety Requirement # 06

The signalling
system shall be
resilient to
unwanted adverse
external influences

Relisience to harsh
Resilience to Electromagnetic
environments, inc
external threats e.g. immunity to non-
weather, climate
cyber terrorism, railway systems
change
Supporting Safety Requirement # 07

The arrangements for

system maintenance of
modification should be
appropriate for the safe
operation of the system

Maintenance Design to Condition

specs to ensure prevent monitoring and Ease of
RAMS targets inadvertent diagnostic aids modification to
continue to be errors during for system
met maintenance maintenance
Supporting Safety Requirement # 08

Personnel who use,

operate and maintain
the signalling system
shall be demonstrably
competent

Health and fatigue

Selection, training and
Periodic re-assessment management /
initial assessment of
of competence monitoring of
personnel
personnel
REGARDS
Chief Signal & Telecom Engineer/Operations
P.R. HQ. Office, Lahore