Express Trusts:

Constitution & Formalities

II

SEMESTE
EQUITY & TRUS
 CONSTITUTION
• First, not all the cases in the constitution involve
donors intending to create a trust.
• Instead, donors may intend to make outright gifts at
common law.

• Courts address the question whether an invalid gift

at law may be given effect in equity (via a trust).

• It is necessary to first distinguish between the three

modes of disposing of property (absolutely).
 CONSTITUTION
• 2 modes entail trust and the passing of property to
another to hold upon trusts or declaring oneself
trustee of property already held.
S T ST D R

B B
• 3rd involves an outright transfer of legal title (i.e. no
trust is intended).
 GIFTS AT LAW
• Outright legal transfers.

D R
• The formalities and substantive rules required to effect a
legal transfer depend on the subject matter of the transfer.
• i.e transfers of legal interests in land must be in the form of
a deed: s 4 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance
(Cap 219)
• Chattels are transferred either by delivery (with the
necessary intent) or the execution and delivery of a deed of
gift: Anning v Anning (1904) 4 CLR 1049
 GIFTS AT LAW
• Unless the share is dematerialised, a transfer must be
registered with a company’s register of members before it
is effective at law.
• For cheques or other bills of exchange, depending on
whether it is a bearer instrument or an order instrument,
they can either be transferred by delivery alone (bearer
instrument) or by indorsement followed by delivery (order
instrument): see Bills of Exchange Ordinance (Cap 19).
 GIFTS AT LAW
• Examples of indorsements.
 GIFTS AT LAW
• The classic case of a failure of
constitution for an outright legal
gift is Jones v Lock (1865) 1 Ch
App 25.
• A father had returned from a
business trip without a gift for his
infant son.
• When he was reprimanded by the
baby’s nurse, he replied, “Oh, I
gave him a pair of boots, and now
I will give him a handsome
present.”
 GIFTS AT LAW
• He then put a cheque for £900 in
the baby’s hand and said, “Look
you here, I give this to baby; it is
for himself, and I am going to put it
away for him, and will give him a
great deal more along with it.”
• He then locked away the cheque
and passed away six days later.
• The cheque was not a bearer
cheque, so the mere handing of the
cheque to the child without
indorsement could not effect a
transfer.
 GIFTS AT LAW
• According to Lord Cranworth LC:
“I do not think it necessary to go into any of
the authorities cited before me; they all turn
upon the question, whether what has been said
was a declaration of trust or an imperfect gift.
In the latter case the parties would receive no
aid from a Court of equity if they claimed as
volunteers. But when there has been a
declaration of trust, then it will be enforced,
whether there has been consideration or not.
Therefore the question in each case is one of
fact; has there been a gift or not, or has there
been a declaration of trust or not?”
 GIFTS AT LAW
• As we shall see again, “equity will not perfect an
imperfect gift”.
• But notice also the emphasis on volunteers and gifts.
• “Equity will not assist a volunteer.”
• Where the intended beneficiary/transferee is not a
volunteer, equity is quite content to provide
assistance.
 GIFTS AT LAW
• For example, in the context of land law, a failed grant of a
lease for consideration will be reinterpreted as a contract
to grant the same lease: Parker v Taswell (1858) 2 DG &
J 559.

• For another application of the maxim, note that the

remedy of specific performance is not available for a
contract under seal unsupported by consideration.
 DECLARATION OF SELF
AS TRUSTEE
• Where the settlor declares himself trustee of property already held
by him, then the question of constitution is almost exactly co-
extensive with the question of formalities already considered.

• A settlor cannot declare a trust of future property,

which in this context includes property presently
ST existing but which is not legally owned by the settlor.
• Thus, a voluntary settlement by conveyance by the
sister of Lord Ellenborough in Re Ellenborough
[1903] 1 Ch 697 of property she would receive under
her brother’s will was ineffectual.
B
 DECLARATION OF SELF
AS TRUSTEE
• Matters are different when consideration is provided for such
a declaration/purported conveyance upon trusts.

• As Buckley J explained:
“An assignment for value binds the
conscience of the assignor. A court of Equity
as against him will compel him to do that
which ex hypothesi he has not effectually
done. Future property, possibilities, and
expectancies are all assignable in equity for
value: Tailby v Official Receiver. But when the
assurance is not for value, a Court of Equity
will not assist a volunteer.
 DECLARATION OF SELF
AS TRUSTEE
• More recently, an exceptional situation where the settlor wishes to
declare a trust over property he already owns but he intends that he
should only be one of a number of other trustees and the other trustees
do not have legal title to the property has caused controversy.

ST

B
 DECLARATION OF SELF
AS TRUSTEE
• The orthodox view would be that this involves the other mode of
setting up a trust by vesting title in trustees.
• Except that there would be more than one trustee.
• And one of the trustees would
S T1TT2
S be the settlor himself.
• On this view, a failure to
transfer legal title to himself
and the other trustees would
B lead to the failure to constitute
the trust.
 DECLARATION OF SELF
AS TRUSTEE
• However, in T Choithram International SA v Pagarani [2001] 1 WLR
1, the Privy Council held otherwise.
• The settlor, Thakurdas Choithram Pagarani, a rich
businessman who was seriously ill, executed a
deed to establish a charitable foundation via a
trust.
• He was to be one of the trustees of the trust and he
declared that he gave all of his estate to the
foundation (i.e. the charitable trust).
• He then died before he could transfer the legal title
to his shares to the trustees.
 DECLARATION OF SELF
AS TRUSTEE
• Overturning the orthodox analysis of the courts below, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson upheld the trust, remarking:
“The facts of this case are novel and
raise a new point. It is necessary to
make an analysis of the rules of
equity to complete gifts. Although
equity will not aid a volunteer, it will
not strive officiously to defeat a gift.
…”
 DECLARATION OF SELF
AS TRUSTEE
• Overturning the orthodox analysis of the courts below, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson upheld the trust, remarking:

“There can in principle be no distinction

between the case where the donor declares
himself to be sole trustee for a donee or a
purpose and the case where he declares
himself to be one of the trustees for that
donee or purpose. In both cases his
conscience is affected and it would be
unconscionable and contrary to the principles
of equity to allow such a donor to resile from
his gift.”
 DECLARATION OF SELF
AS TRUSTEE

S T1 S ST

B B
 TRANSFER UPON TRUSTS
• Considering then the mode of establishing a trust by vesting title in
trustees.
• In order for such trusts to be properly constituted, not only must
any formality for the trust itself be complied with, but legal title
must effectively be transferred.
S T

B
 TRANSFER UPON TRUSTS
• The trusts analogue of Jones v Lock (1865) 1 Ch
App 25 is the leading case of Milroy v Lord
(1862) 4 De GF & J 264.
• The settlor, Thomas Medley, purported to
transfer shares to Lord to hold on trust for his
niece, Milroy.
• He purported to do so by deed and he handed
over the share certificates to Lord.
 TRANSFER UPON TRUSTS
• However, this was insufficient to transfer legal title to
the shares to Lord, the intended trustee.

• The Court of Appeal held that the trust was not properly
constituted.
• Turner LJ remarked that “here is no equity in this Court
to perfect an imperfect gift.”
 PRELIMINARY SUMMARY
• A donor had to decide which of the three methods he wanted to make
use of to effect his gift.

S T ST D R

B B
• Whichever method he chose, he had to comply with the rules
required by that method.
• If he did not, equity will not give effect to it by applying another
method.
• But the rule came to be subjected to numerous exceptions.
 THE RULE IN RE ROSE
• The most famous exception is that of the rule in Re Rose [1952] Ch
499.
• The settlor had purported to transfer two tranches of shares in a
private company on 30 March 1943. One was intended to be an
absolute gift to his wife. The other was for the transferee to hold
upon trusts.
• He completed the necessary documentation and delivered the same
to the company for registration on 30 March 1943.
documents
executed
transfer

30 Mar1943
 THE RULE IN RE ROSE
• As it was a private company, the directors had the power to refuse
to register the transfers. However, they eventually registered the
transfers on 30 June 1943.
• The settlor then died in 16 February 1947.
• By the English rules of estate duty, if the transfers were effective
before 10 April 1943, then no estate duty was due. Otherwise,
estate duty would be payable in respect of the shares.
cut-off date
documents

settlor dies
registered
executed

transfer
transfer

30 Mar 1943 10 Apr 47 30 Jun 1943 16 Feb 1947

 THE RULE IN RE ROSE
• If Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De GF & J 264 and Jones
v Lock (1865) 1 Ch App 25 were strictly followed, it
might be thought that the gifts would only be
regarded as effective on 30 June 1943 so that estate
duty would be payable.
cut-off date
documents

settlor dies
registered
executed

transfer
transfer

30 Mar 1943 10 Apr 47 30 Jun 1943 16 Feb 1947

 THE RULE IN RE ROSE
• However, the Court of Appeal held that, although the
transfers were not legally effective until June, they were
nevertheless effective in equity before then because the
settlor had done everything in his power to effect the transfer
by 30 March 1943.
• Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De GF & J 264 was distinguished.
cut-off date
documents

settlor dies
registered
executed

transfer
transfer

30 Mar 1943 10 Apr 47 30 Jun 1943 16 Feb 1947

 THE RULE IN RE ROSE
• The Court of Appeal in Re Rose [1952] Ch 499 relied upon
another earlier Court of Appeal decision in another case, also
coincidentally called Re Rose [1949] Ch 78.
• The testator here bequeathed shares in a company to one
Hook but the bequest was interpreted to only be effective if
there had been no inter vivos transfer.
• In August 1944, the testator executed a voluntary transfer of
the shares to Hook, and delivered to him the certificates.
• The directors of the company, however, in the exercise of
their powers refused at first to register the transfer but did so
finally in March, 1946.
 THE RULE IN RE ROSE
• The testator however died in January 1946.
• The Court of Appeal held that as the testator had
done all that he needed to do to vest legal title to the
shares in Hook, equity should treat the transfer as
effective in the meantime.
• Contrast the case of Re Fry [1946] Ch 312, which
was distinguished by the court.
 THE RULE IN RE ROSE
• In Re Fry [1946] Ch 312, the donor needed to
obtain the consent of Her Majesty’s Treasury
in order to transfer shares by reason of the
restrictions imposed on the transfer of
securities under the Defence (Finance)
Regulations 1939.
• Although he had applied for the consent, it
had not been obtained before his death.
 THE RULE IN RE ROSE

• Re Fry [1946] Ch 312

• Under those circumstances, Romer J
held that the intended gift was
incomplete and therefore inoperative.
• The shares accordingly formed part of
the donor’s residuary estate.
 THE RULE IN RE ROSE
• More recently, the English Court of Appeal extended
the principle in Re Rose even further in the case of
Pennington v Waine [2002] 1 WLR 2075.
• The donor wished to transfer 400 shares to her
nephew and appoint him as a director of the
company and informed him as such.
• The requisite share transfer documents were
executed and delivered to the company’s auditor.
 THE RULE IN RE ROSE
• Pennington v Waine [2002] 1 WLR 2075.
• Donor died before the auditor had delivered the
form to the company.
• Technically, the principle in Re Rose had not been
complied with.
 THE RULE IN RE ROSE
Pennington v Waine [2002] 1 WLR 2075.
• Relying on both the principle in Re Rose as well as T Choithram
International SA v Pagarani [2001] 1 WLR 1 to uphold the gift in
equity.
• The majority judgment was given by Arden LJ (with whom
Schiemann LJ agreed).
• According to Arden LJ, “equity has tempered the wind (of the
principle that equity will not assist a volunteer) to the shorn lamb
(the donee) by utilising the constructive trust. … [and] by applying
a benevolent construction to words of gift.”
• “[A] stage was reached when it would have been unconscionable
for [the donor] to recall the gift.”
 THE RULE IN RE ROSE
Pennington v Waine [2002] 1 WLR 2075.
• Clarke LJ upheld the gift on a different, equally controversial,
basis.
• According to his Lordship, the donor intended to assign an
equitable interest in the shares to her nephew so that she held the
same on trust for him.
• This is difficult to follow for two reasons.
• First, the methods used by the donor suggested that she intended a
legal transfer.
• Secondly, until a trust is imposed on the shares, there is no separate
equitable title that can be transferred: see Westdeutsche Landesbank
Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669.
 THE RULE IN STRONG V BIRD
• Exception to the strict rule in Milroy v Lord is the so-
called rule in Strong v Bird.
• By this rule, where the donee of a promised gift receives
the legal title to the gift in another capacity, the gift will
be “perfected”.
• Usually, the rule applies where the donee receives the
property as the donor’s executor: Re Stewart [1908] 2 Ch
251.
• However, it has also been applied where the donee
receives the property as the donor’s administrator: Re
James [1935] Ch 449.
 THE RULE IN
RE RALLI’S WILL TRUSTS
• A similar rule has been applied to constitute an unconstituted trust in
Re Ralli’s Will Trusts [1964] Ch 288.
• A testator left his residuary estate on trust for his widow for life,
remainder to his daughters Irene and Helen.
• Helen’s marriage settlement contained a covenant to settle existing and
after-acquired property upon trusts.
• Helen predeceased her mother, so she never transferred her interest
from under her father’s will to the trustee of the settlement.
• However, the trustee of the settlement was also coincidentally the
trustee of the testator’s will.
 THE RULE IN
RE RALLI’S WILL TRUSTS
• Buckley J held that the vesting of the property in the
trustee was sufficient to constitute the trusts of
Helen’s marriage settlement even though he
acquired title to the property in his capacity as
trustee of the testator’s will:
“In my judgment the circumstance that the plaintiff
holds the fund because he was appointed a trustee of
the will is irrelevant. He is at law the owner of the
fund, and the means by which he became so have no
effect upon the quality of his legal ownership.”
 DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA
• There is also a special category of gifts that need to
be considered under the doctrine of donatio mortis
causa or gifts made in contemplation of death.
• Effectively, the doctrine of donation mortis causa
enables equity to validate certain gifts, which will
only have effect upon the donor’s death, even
though the formalities required for testamentary
gifts have not been satisfied.
• There are three conditions for the doctrine to apply:
 DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA
(1) The gift must have been made in contemplation of the
donor’s impending death in the near future for a specific
reason (e.g. terminal illness or a hazardous journey);
(2) The gift must be conditional on death;
(3) The property (or its essential indica of title) must have
been passed to the donee with the intent that the donor is
“parting with dominion” (ie. control).
• In Sen v Headley [1991] Ch 425, it was held that giving the
donee the keys to a box containing the title deeds of land was
sufficient parting with dominion.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• What then of covenants (i.e. promises) to
settle property (usually after-acquired)?
• Clearly, at the time the covenant is made, the
trust of the property is not constituted.
• Why do parties make such covenants rather
than completely constitute the trust?
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Because you cannot transfer (either at law or in
equity) what you do not own.
• Most covenants to settle deal with after-acquired or
future property.
• This area of the law is now, of course, affected by
the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Ordinance
(Cap 623).
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• But the Ordinance may not apply in all cases
so the earlier case law is still important.
• The first point to note is that covenants to
settle are only a problem for volunteers.
• If an intended beneficiary is not a volunteer,
then there is no problem with enforcement.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• However, just because a deed is used does not allow
an intended beneficiary to sue.
• This is for the same reason that promises under seal
unsupported by consideration are not specifically
enforced in equity.
• “Equity will not assist a volunteer.”
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• As many of the cases involve old marriage settlement, it is
important to note that marriage is consideration and that the
consideration extends to the spouse and any issue of the marriage:
Pullan v Koe [1913] 1 Ch 9.
• But other relatives (Re D’Angibou (1880) 15 Ch D 228) and next
of kin (Re Plumptre’s Marriage Settlement [1910] 1 Ch 609) are
not within the marriage consideration.
• Traditionally, consideration provided by a third party also did not
enable the intended beneficiaries to enforce the covenant: Re
Cook’s Settlement Trusts [1965] Ch 902.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Enable the third party to sue upon the covenant and
seek specific enforcement.
• In Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58, a coal merchant
agreed with his nephew that he would transfer his
business to his nephew in return for the nephew
promising to employ him as a consultant and paying his
widow £5 a week for life upon his death.
• After the merchant’s death, his nephew ceased paying
his widow.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Enable the third party to sue upon the covenant and
seek specific enforcement.
• In Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58,

• Although she was not able to sue upon the contract

because she was not privy to it, she was appointed
administratrix of her husband’s estate and successfully
sought specific performance in that capacity.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• If a beneficiary is a party to the deed containing the covenants to
settle, then it is possible for them to sue to recover damages at
common law: Cannon v Hartley [1949] Ch 213.
• What about the trustees? Can they decide to sue upon the
covenant?
• The cases suggest that they may not: Re Pryce [1917] 1 Ch 234; Re
Kay’s Settlement [1939] Ch 329; Re Cook’s Settlement Trusts
[1965] Ch 902.
• These cases have been criticised (see Virgo at p 136) but may
arguably be justified.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Re Cook’s Settlement Trusts [1965] Ch 902. In 1934, by an agreement
and settlement of family property between Sir Herbert Cook, Sir
Francis Cook (being his son), and the trustees of the settlement,
certain pictures became the absolute property of Sir Francis Cook.

Sir Herbert Cook (left)

Sir Francis Cook (right)
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• In clause 6 of that settlement, Sir Francis covenanted that if any of those
pictures should be sold during his lifetime, the net proceeds of sale should
be paid to the trustees of the settlement to be held upon the trusts of the
settlement.

• In 1962, Sir Francis gave a

Rembrandt out of that collection to
his wife, who wished to sell it.
• The trustees applied to court to ask
if they were obliged to take steps
to enforce the performance of the
covenant.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
Re Cook’s Settlement Trusts [1965] Ch 902.
• Counsel attempted to distinguish the previous cases of Re
Pryce [1917] 1 Ch 234 and Re Kay’s Settlement [1939] Ch
329 on the basis that in this case, Sir Herbert had provided
consideration for the settlement even though he was not a
beneficiary thereunder.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
Re Cook’s Settlement Trusts [1965] Ch 902.
• Buckley J, however, disagreed that this was relevant:
“A plaintiff is not entitled to claim equitable relief against
another merely because the latter's conduct is
unmeritorious. Conduct by A which is unconscientious in
relation to B so as to entitle B to equitable relief may not
be unconscientious in relation to C so that C will have no
standing to claim relief notwithstanding that the conduct
in question may affect C.”
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
Re Cook’s Settlement Trusts [1965] Ch 902.
• A declaration was granted “that the trustees ought not to take
proceedings against the settlor to enforce his covenant.”
• All three cases have been criticised for exceeding the remit of the
court.
• It has been argued (notably by Elliott) that the courts had been asked
if the trustees were obliged to take action upon the covenants.
• Accordingly, they could have simply answered that the trustees were
not so obliged, but which would have left the trustees free to decide
whether to take action or not.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Instead, all three courts exceeded their remit by
ordering the trustees not to take proceedings, depriving
them of their free choice for no good reason.
• Although it is true that none of the courts have given
any rational basis for their decision, the outcomes of all
three cases are nevertheless explicable.
• First, a distinction must be drawn between the covenant
and the subject matter of the covenant (which in Re
Cook’s Settlement Trusts, would have been the proceeds
of sale).
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• The proceeds of sale was future property at the time of the
settlement and hence could not be the subject matter of a trust.
• The covenant, however, existed.
• As the trustees were covenantees in the capacity of trustees, it is
clear that they are not intended to benefit from the covenants
themselves.
• In other words, they held the covenants on trust.
• Once the court determined that the covenants were not held on
trust for the beneficiaries of the settlement, then the covenants
must be held on resulting trust for the covenantor, in this case Sir
Francis.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Since Sir Francis did not wish the trustees to act upon the
covenant, it is utterly sensible for the court to order the
trustees not to sue upon it.
• Note also that the issue of absence of “loss” on the part
of the trustee is misguided because we are here
concerned not with consequential loss but loss of a
nature akin to Wrotham Park damages.
• For these purposes, the fact that the trustees were not
intended to benefit from the covenant is irrelevant.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Most controversially, however, the court may consider that there
has been a completely constituted trust of the promise to settle so
that there is no issue at all of failure of constitution: Lloyd’s v
Harper (1880) 16 Ch D 290; Fletcher v Fletcher [1844] 4 Hare
67.
• To understand these cases, you must distinguish the promise to
settle from the property intended to be settled.
• For example, suppose A promises that he will settle Blackacre
(which he expects to receive upon his father’s death) upon trusts,
the promise (a chose in action) is a distinct property from
Blackacre.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Whereas Blackacre is future property vis-a-vis A, the
promise is not future property since it comes into
existence at the time of the covenant/promise to settle.
• The difficulty is one of discerning intention.
• In Fletcher v Fletcher (1844) 4 Hare 67, Mr Fletcher
covenanted with trustees to pay them £60,000 which
they were to hold upon certain trusts.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Fletcher v Fletcher (1844) 4 Hare 67, As events unfolded, the
beneficiary of these trusts was his illegitimate son, Jacob.
• The trustees were unaware of the deed, which was found among
the settlor’s papers after his death and they did not wish to
establish the trust except under an order of the court.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Wigram VC held that Jacob was entitled to enforce the
covenant against the settlor’s executor.
• According to Wigram VC:
“According to the authorities, I cannot do
anything to perfect the liability of the
author of the trust, if it is not already
perfect. This covenant, however, is already
perfect. The covenantor is liable at law,
and the Court is not called upon to do any
act to perfect it.”
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Wigram VC held that Jacob was entitled to enforce the covenant
against the settlor’s executor.

• According to Wigram VC:

“One question made in argument has
been, whether there can be a trust of
a covenant the benefit of which shall
belong to a third party; but I cannot
think there is any difficulty in that.”
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• As a result of the generosity of construction in the
past, the trust of a promise was once posited as a
possible means of evading the privity rule in
contract: Arthur L Corbin, “Contracts for the
Benefit of Third Parties” (1930) 46 LQR 12.
• However, the modern view is that the courts will
not lightly infer that a trust of a promise.

• Thus, in Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corpn of New York [1933]

AC 70, Lord Wright explained that “the intention to constitute the trust must be
affirmatively proved: the intention cannot necessarily be inferred from the mere
general words of the [contract].”
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• With effect from 1 January 2016, all of the foregoing
must be considered in light of the Contracts (Rights of
Third Parties) Ordinance (Cap 623).
• According to the CRTPO, a third party may enforce a
term of a contract if the contract expressly provides that
s/he may do so: s 4(1)(a).
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• Alternatively, s/he may do so if the term of a contract
purports to confer a benefit on the third party (s 4(1)(b))
provided it is not the case that, on a proper construction
of the contract, the term was not intended to be
enforceable by the third party (s 4(3)).

• Section 4(1)(b) read together with s 4(3) appears to

reverse in effect the modern strict approach to trusts of
covenant.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• But important differences still follow.
• Because s 5(1) makes available such remedies as would
be available if the third party is a party to the contract,
since third parties are mostly volunteers, it is likely that
the remedy of specific performance would not be
available.
 TRUSTS OF COVENANTS
• But important differences still follow.
• The Ordinance does not apply to any covenant entered
into before 1 January 2016.
• There are also important exclusions, including covenants
relating to land: s 3(2)(c).
• The list of exclusions in Hong Kong is longer than that
for the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
Core Readings:
• Graham Virgo, The Principles of Equity & Trusts, 3rd edition, 123-141

Additional Optional Readings:

• Abigail Doggett, “Explaining Re Rose: the Search goes on?” (2003) 62
CLJ 263
• Hans Tjio and Yeo Tiong Min, “Re Rose Revisited: the Shorn Lamb’s
Equity” [2002] LMCLQ 296
• DW Elliott, “The Power of Trustees to Enforce Covenants in Favour of
Volunteers” (1960) 76 LQR 100
• JD Feltham, “Intention to Create a Trust of a Promise to Settle
Property” (1982) 98 LQR 17
• Robert Stevens, “The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999”
(2004) 120 LQR 292