WHAT DOES THE PHILIPPINES WANT?

Protecting the West Philippine Sea in the South China Sea

Dr. Chester B. Cabalza

International Development and Security Cooperation
1. Debunking China’s Historical Claims: The Hague Ruling
1. Debunking China’s Historical Claims: The Hague Ruling
1. Debunking China’s Historical Claims: The Hague Ruling

At present, the Philippines occupies

eight islands in the Kalayaan Island
Group off the Spratlys archipelago,
namely: Kota (Loait Island), Lawak
(Nansham Island), Likas (West York
Island), Panata (Lamkian Cay), Pag-
asa (Thitu Island), Parola (North East
Cay), Patag (Flat Island), and Rizal
(Commodore Reef).
1. Debunking China’s Historical Claims: The Hague Ruling
2015 Mischief Reef 2012 Scarborough Shoal
1. Debunking China’s Historical Claims: The Hague Ruling
Internationalizing the West Philippine Sea Conundrum
An Arbrital Tribunal is one of the four procedural choices for the settlement of disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea or UNCLOS.
 First, the Philippines is not in a position to project force in aid of its claims in the West
Philippine Sea. Nor it should, particularly offensive force. All States Parties to UNCLOS
have an obligation to settle any dispute between them by peaceful means in accordance
with their commitment under the United Nations in such a manner that international peace
and security, and justice, are not endangered.
 Second, most of the South China Sea, a 2.7-million square kilometer area in the middle of
eight of the ten Southeast Asian countries and China, are high seas where transit and
innocent passage is guaranteed under UNCLOS. The right to transit and innocent passage
cannot be impeded and suspended.
 Third, internationalizing the Philippines’ disputes with China by invoking international laws
and norms could, in fact, be an important contribution to the promotion of the rule of law in
our international system where there is no world government. It is of course a reality that,
where there is no effective enforcement authority, might could end up being right.
1. Debunking China’s Historical Claims: The Hague Ruling
The South China Sea Arbitration: Philippines vs. China
On 22 January 2013, the Republic of the Philippines instituted
arbitral proceedings against the People’s Republic of China under
Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (the “Convention”).

The arbitration concerned the role of historic rights and the

source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea,
the status of certain maritime features in the South China
Sea, and the lawfulness of certain actions by China in the
South China Sea that the Philippines alleged to be in
violation of the Convention. China adopted a position of
non-acceptance and non-participation in the
proceedings. The Permanent Court of Arbitration served as
Registry in this arbitration.
2. Testing the Waters: Duterte’s Pivot to China
2017 Rainbow after the Rain 2019 Genver / 2021 Water Canon
 2. Testing the Waters: Duterte’s Pivot to China
Failure of Diplomatic and Economic Rapprochements
On July 12, 2016 – two weeks after President Rodrigo Duterte succeeded the presidency
from Benigno Aquino III, has kept with his early decision to downplay the Philippines
“ace card” to foster warmer ties with Beijing by ignoring the Arbrital Award and called it
‘a piece of paper” to appease Xi Jinping.
 During Duterte’s first state visit to China a few months into his presidency, the
government bannered $24 billion (P1.2 trillion) worth in commitments and aid had
been signed. China has yet to deliver on most of those pledges.
 Failure of the Coast Guard Diplomacy and Rules of behaviour as China becomes
more aggressive with the maritime militia or the ‘little blue men’.
 Business as usual for China in occupying and militarizing the entire South China
Sea
 China warns to go to war with the Philippines if it pursues to break the status
quo.
 Visiting Forces Agreement with the US was almost cancelled.
The Rise of Philippinedization: Philippinedization is not Finlandization

Philippinedization is the process whereby a weaker

state, backed by a powerful country, goes
through great lengths in temporarily refraining
from opposing a neighboring great power by
resorting to economic and diplomatic
rapprochements at the strategic level but
strengthening its national security infrastructure
on the operational level with an eye for potential
conflict in the foreseeable future’. Extending the
definition of Philippinedization for this book, ‘it
broadens the multiplexity of the process that
explains the depths of cultural factors affecting the
broad brush of economics and politics but by
strengthening and diversifying the internal capacity
and external networks to eventually escape from
its current geopolitical dilemma given the
probability of conflict in the future’.
The Rise of Philippinedization: Philippinedization is not Finlandization
The Philippinedization model represents
Ukraine’s journey throughout their independence
in the 1990s to consolidate its diplomatic,
political-economic, and military position in
Eastern Europe, while proactively engaging with
NATO and maintaining cautious relations with its
giant neighbor Russia. While Philippinedization
is an evolving process and not a static concept
of neutrality like Finlandization, the new
framework explains how Ukraine’s engagements
throughout the post-Cold War era were done
with an eye for potential conflict in the future.

The current spectacle deserves analytical merit

that may disentangle itself from a geopolitical
dilemma in the future. That is, Ukraine is
currently in the loop of “Philippinedization.”
 3. Reversing the Tide: PH return to US Alliance
2023 State Visit to China
2023 Additional EDCA Sites

“I am here not to talk

about our past. I am
here to tell you about our
future.”
 3. Reversing the Tide: PH return to US Alliance
China’s Grey Zone Strategy in the South China Sea

Aug 2023 Water Canon Attack

Feb 2023 Military Laser Grade Attack

Sept 2023 Coral Damage

4. Revitalized Military Modernization & Collective Deterrence

Lacking in Philippine Responses

Legal Actions Meaning Acted

Archipelagic Archipelago becomes a Yes
Doctrine single unit

Maritime Zones Rights & obligations of x

Act PH over maritime zones

Archipelagic Sea Designated sea lanes x

Lanes Act and air routes of foreign
ships & aircrafts for
continuous and
expeditious passages

• The Philippines as a natural boundary between the

South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.
4. Revitalized Military Modernization & Collective Deterrence

Identified Probable Archipelagic Sea Lanes

 North Luzon: Balintang Channel &

Babuyan Channel
 Central PH: Verde Island Passage,
Sibuyan Sea, San Bernardino Strait,
Mindoro Strait, Tablas Strait
 Sulu Sea and Balabac Strait
 Southern PH: Surigao Strait, Bohol
Sea, Basilan Strait, Sibutu Passage
Innovating the ASEAN WAY?
5+2+3

Role of Minilateralism
4. Revitalized Military Modernization & Collective Deterrence

Middle Power Syndrome

4. Revitalized Military Modernization & Collective Deterrence
World’s Largest Navies (2023)

Rank Country Nr of Combat Nr of Submarines Military Spending Navy/ Aircrafts

Ships

1 China 730 59 292 B 437

2 Russia 598 49 86 B 310
3 North Kor 519 71
4 USA 484 67 877 B 2464
5 Sweden 367 5 8 B
6 Indonesia 324 4 9 B 50
7 Italy 313 8 33 B 104
8 India 295 17 81 B 239
9 Thailand 292 0 6 B 40
25 Philippines 93 0 4 B 17
 Cooperation Maritime
Policy
with Dialogue Rules-Based
Innovations
Partners Order

collective deterrence
4. Revitalized Military Modernization & Collective Deterrence

Japan was one of the first states to project the notion of an

‘open and free’ Indo-Pacific. PM Shinzo Abe called the zone
as the ‘sea of prosperity’ governed by ‘freedom, rule of law,
and the market economy, that is ‘free from force or
coercion’
4. Revitalized Military Modernization & Collective Deterrence

India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific is

an extension of its Look East (now
Act East) Policy. New Delhi
believes that a multipolar Indo-
Pacific will serve as the best
platform to enhance its global
standing and global strategic
ambitions.
4. Revitalized Military Modernization & Collective Deterrence

ASEAN embrace the Indo-

Pacific through the ASEAN
Outlook at the Indo-Pacific.

Four strategy: maritime

cooperation, connectivity,
sustainable development, and
economy.
4. Revitalized Military Modernization & Collective Deterrence

In the European Union’s Strategy for

Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific we pledge
a growing engagement and invite our
partners to join us in addressing
common challenges. We envision deeper
partnerships on sustainable prosperity and
the environment, digital connectivity, and
security, including human security.
4. Revitalized Military Modernization & Collective Deterrence
 5. What Does the Philippines Want?
National Security Policy 2023-2028

 Marcos Jr. emphasizes his political slogan of unity—recognizing the contemporary

seismic transformation in the Philippine national security landscape.
 The new NSP guns for a holistic approach to security—aiming to address non-
traditional forms such as cyberspace issues.
 Manila aspires to become an economic hub in the region and attain an upper-
middle-income status.
 The NSP 2023-2028 also values the revitalized US-Philippines security relations.
 In sum, the NSP 2023-2028 aspires to steer Philippine policy towards a more
progressive direction in two ways: (1) A holistic approach to security which aims to
protect the nation-state against technological conundrums and ensure steady
economic growth; (2) Rekindling its once-dented relations with the United States.
Although the NSP proposes a more promising policy in comparison to the
previous administration, certain ambiguities still need to be addressed—such as
its new status as a middle power.
5. What Does the Philippines Want?