Epistemology 7

Foundationalism and Coherentism

 Military Arms Versus Belief
“The Taliban fight for belief, for janat (heaven) and
ghazi (killing infidels).… The army and police fight for
money,” a Taliban religious scholar from Kandahar told
me in 2019. “The Taliban are willing to lose their head
to fight. … How can the army and police compete?” –
U.S. military advisor, Carter Malkasian (June, 2021)
Hannah Arendt argued that human action was
spurred by fears, grievances and past experiences –
a holistic complex of beliefs. = coherentism
The Problem of Evidence for Justification of
Belief
• Premise: if we have knowledge (and we do), then we must
be justified in believing what we know.
• Justified beliefs are beliefs that are in some sense likely to
be true. [we can call this “weak” or “common sense”
justification, as opposed to “strong”/epistemic
justification that we introduced to defeat GPs]
• We said that to be likely to be true in the relevant sense
required that the belief be grounded on evidence (and
that there is no stronger counterevidence).
• This is normally what we mean when we say, “S knows p,”
that is, S has reasons/evidence that make p “likely to be
true.” likely = probably but not absolutely certain –
Wittgenstein: degrees of believing, a scale, not binary.
 Evidence
• I believe that p: it will be dangerous driving home tonight
• I believe that q: the forecaster said there would be black
ice on the roads
• q is evidence for p iff:
1. q
2. Therefore: p [modus ponens]
• is a rationally good argument. The truth of q makes
the truth of p more likely.
• And it certainly looks like a rationally good argument even
though the justification is not complete or infallible = it can
be wrong
 The Justification Requirement

• Now suppose the following:

• (1) I believe that the weather forecaster said that there
will be black ice on the roads for the reason that
[because] you told me that he said that.
• (2) But, what if I think that you are a completely unreliable
informant because you never seem to remember things
properly.
• If this is the case, am I really justified in thinking that it
will be dangerous driving home?
• In other words, (1) loses its ground of rational belief
because of (2).
 The Justification Requirement
• It seems no longer to be justified. It seems that even if
q makes p more likely, if my belief that q is unjustified
(i.e. not likely to be true, in the relevant sense), then
my initial belief can’t be justified.
• That is, even if the weather forecaster said there would
be black ice on the road tonight makes it likely that the
journey home will be dangerous, my initial belief isn’t
justified if my beliefs about the honesty or competence
of the weather forecaster or my friend are not justified.
• So it seems that justified belief that p requires that the
evidence for that belief takes the form of a justified
belief that q (The Principle of Justification). But another
problem appears here.
 The Regress Problem

1. For any belief held by S, S’s belief that p is not justified

unless S believes that q, where q is good evidence for p
[Belief Principle: only a belief can justify a belief!]
2. Only if the belief that q is justified is the belief that p
justified. (The Justification Requirement)
3. But the belief that q, like the belief that p, must be
subject to the Belief Principle.
4. Therefore, #1-3 require Evidence1 for q
5. But this introduces the Infinite Regress Problem.
 Responses to Regress Problem
• It is important to keep in mind that any theory of epistemic
justification meant to overcome either the regress problem or
scepticism must have as its principal aim to construct the best theory
that is conducive to finding truth.
• Hence any theory of epistemic justification must provide S with some
security that his beliefs are true (or likely to be true) by means of
reflective awareness about his access to truth [what we call
‘internalism’]
• In other words, I am secure in my belief that “p is true” because I
have reflective awareness of how I came (a) to possess p [= causal]
and (b) on what basis p is true – I know the evidence for p
• This refers back to my earlier claim that knowledge is a mental state
of the knower. Causal process is the way I came to believe p
 Foundationalism and Coherentism
• There are two responses to the Infinite Regress Problem:
• [A] Foundationalism (e.g. Chisholm, 1977) claims:
There is a special category of beliefs which are ‘regress-
stoppers’. Inferentialism, or the Belief Principle, does not hold
for all beliefs. These beliefs require no further justification.
Infer x from y you need to provide evidence for y …. Regress…
A Belief that is not inferential, but is self-justifying – regress-
stoppers
• [B] Coherentism (e.g. Bonjour, 1985) claims:
• There are no special regress-stopping beliefs. The regress
argument can be answered by undermining mistaken
assumptions about what is involved in a belief’s being justified.
 [A] Foundationalism about Epistemic
Justification
• Some beliefs are justified given that there are other justified
beliefs which are evidence for them. (Non-basic or
inferentially justified beliefs: as in ‘if q then p’ …..) [but then
we need to justify q]
• Other beliefs are justified independently of their relations to
other beliefs. These are the regress-stoppers. (Basic beliefs or
non-inferentially justified beliefs; such beliefs are foundational
for knowledge)
• If a belief is justified it is either one or the other.
• Sometimes a belief can be justified without being supported
by any further belief = self-justifying belief
 Classical Foundationalism [CF]
• CF argues that knowledge is structured in such a way that
chains of justification end with special self-justifying
foundational belief which do not stand in need of any further
belief.
• Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am.” = regress-stopper = fb
• This is a belief that is immune to doubt because it is certain
and self-evident.
• This belief is indubitable because in doubting it (as the sceptic
tries to do) one proves that one exists in order to doubt it – “I
am doubting p, therefore I must exist in order to doubt.“
• Such a p is infallible because it could not possibly be in error
[= incorrigible – nothing would ever lead me to correct it].
 Regress-stopping beliefs

• What could a regress-stopping belief be?

• Given that what we are interested in is whether a
belief is likely to be true, one possibility is that
there are beliefs that cannot, in the circumstances,
be false = foundational belief -fb- namely,
• Necessary truths = analytic truth, e.g. All bachelors
are unmarried men, 2+2=4, etc.
• Self-validating truths of different kinds: the cogito
argument.
 Problems with CF = Descartes
• The main problem facing CF – how to identify those self-justifying
beliefs that can serve as a foundation for all our other beliefs that
we believe are true. Self-justifying beliefs are evidence!
• How do we decide exactly which of our beliefs can be the
foundations for our non-foundational beliefs? What criteria do
we use to select or restrict foundational beliefs [fb]?
• We think that fb’s should be infallible – beliefs that could not
possibly be wrong;
• Hence our everyday fallible beliefs can be traced back to and
supported by infallible fb’s. “Trace back” – demonstrate the
relation between a (fb) and b (a fallible belief)
• And these fb’s will put a stop to the regress of justification.
 **Problems with CF 2
• There are at least two problems with this claim:
• (1) there are very few infallible beliefs, e.g. Cogito ergo sum
• (2) and these infallible fb’s do not seem capable of supporting
(justifying) our ordinary empirical, contingent beliefs that need
supporting.
• For example: I believe right now that p [“I am sitting at my desk
giving a PowerPoint Presentation”] or [“Hanoi is the capital of
Vietnam”].
• But how are these beliefs supported by “2 + 2 = 4” or “A = A” or
“Bachelors are unmarried men” or “cogito ergo sum” -?
• These infallible fb’s bear no clear relation to my empirical
beliefs about sitting at my desk or the capital of Vietnam.
 Problems with CF 3
• Descartes believed that his belief that “If I am doubting, then I
must exist” was an infallible fb for every other true belief he
could possibly have.
• But it seems counterintuitive to claim that all my beliefs are
dependent upon and justified by “I think (doubt), therefore I
am.”
• How can this justify my belief that Hanoi is the capital of
Vietnam, or that I am sitting at my desk writing a PowerPoint
Presentation?
• Pritchard suggests (p.38) that we should weaken our criteria
for fb’s.
 Solution: Weaken FB’s
• We could weaken the criteria for fb’s:
• No longer infallible beliefs, but include beliefs about our
ordinary experiences. To support our contingent beliefs
• For example, how the world looks to us could count as a
foundational belief: Perception (looking out the window) - fb
• “I see that it is raining” is an immediate perception about the
world that could serve as an foundational belief.
• But why should we count beliefs arising from our immediate
perceptions as fb’s?
• If we count perception as foundational, then we will be
allowing many false beliefs to justify other beliefs. This is
obviously invalid.
 Beliefs justified without evidence?
• If S has beliefs with the following contents, S must believe
something true:
• (1) 2 + 2 = 4: its truth value = T
• (2) [A + not A] is a contradiction = F
• (3) A bachelor is an unmarried man = T
• (4) It looks to me as if [= perception] there is a cup on the
desk = T It looks to me as if = T-- (But ‘p’ is not a Fact: how
things are in the world)
• (5) I exist [cogito ergo sum] = T
• But how about (4)? Why is that necessarily true without
further evidence? 4 is necessarily T, but what does it prove??
 Analysis of (4): Is Perception Self-Justifying?

• According to recent versions of the foundationalist

position, the Belief Principle is incorrect because some
beliefs can be supported by things which aren’t beliefs.
• In (4) our evidence for the belief: ‘that p’ can be that it
perceptually looks to one that p.
• That is not a further belief. It stops the regress because
the belief principle and justification principle are
inapplicable to it.
• If p has the form “It looks to me…” or “it seems to me
….”[not about facts] and/or “I feel a pain ….”[is a fact],
then it needs no further justification – it is self-
justifying. = knowing = internal to my mind
 The justification of empirical belief

• Take the first conception of basic belief: 2+2=4

• Your belief that you are sitting listening to a
lecture is not a belief of this kind. (It can be
false).
• So if it is justified, it must be that one has
other beliefs, which constitute evidence for it,
which are (ultimately) of this kind.
• But which? Suppose I have a belief that it
looks to me that φ (phi Greek letter)
 The justification of empirical belief
• Suppose I believe that my belief that it looks to me as if p doesn’t
make it likely that p is true. Suppose I believe I am a “brain-in-a-
vat” (BIV), or colour-blind. Then were I to believe that p (as a
fact) on the basis of my belief that “it looks to me as if p”, I would
have an unjustified false belief. Why? Because I am a Brain In a
Vat! Or I am colour-blind!
• So it seems that in order for p to be justified I need to believe:
• (i) If I believe that it looks to me as if p, then p (but p could be
false)
• (ii) But this must be a justified belief. But how? (It does not seem
to be a necessary truth or self-validating belief)
• (iii) I have to believe, for example, that I am not colour-blind or a
BIV. But how do I know this? Don’t I need evidence for these
beliefs? Scepticism about perception (?)
 The Master Argument [Bonjour (1985)]: Anti-
Foundational Beliefs

1. S’s belief that ‘p’ is justified because it possesses feature F

(it is a necessary truth, or self-validating, or is based on
perception = fb’s)
2. But for S’s belief ‘that p’ to be justified, S must possess a
justified belief that his belief possesses feature F. (Suppose
he believed it didn’t have that feature!)
3. For S’s belief that p to be justified, S must have a justified
belief that beliefs with feature F are likely to be true. (In the
case of perceptually justified belief, this is the difficulty of
inference from one belief to another: the justifying belief is
itself a belief – isn’t it?) Why should I believe my senses?
Why should I believe my Perceptions?
4. If so, then there are no basic foundational beliefs.
 [B] The coherence theory of justification

• According to a coherence theory of justification,

there is no distinction between basic and non-basic
beliefs.
• All beliefs are justified in virtue of their relation to
other beliefs.
• According to the classical version of the coherence
theory, each belief derives its justification from its
relations to the whole system of the subject’s
beliefs.
• A belief is justified if it ‘coheres’ with the system.
 A Practical Theory
• Those philosophers who accept coherentism argue that it is the
actual way people justify their beliefs – that is, by seeing if a
single belief coheres with other beliefs that are accepted as true.
• Hence, the particular beliefs that we hold reflect a general
world-view- that is, a set of background beliefs about the world
and reality. For example, the Pre-Copernican world-view that the
sun orbits the earth.
• NB: The people who lived before Copernicus had a justified
belief in the earth as the center of the universe.
• All beliefs are justified in light of our background belief.
• [Donald Davidson has an argument based on language that the
vast majority of our beliefs must be true in order for linguistic
communication to be possible]
 What is ‘coherence?’

• Coherence as consistency (beliefs are true together):

• The grass is green, the sky is blue, Simon is six feet
tall, 2 + 2 = 4, Spain won the World Cup in 2010 and
the European Cup in 2012.
• Coherence as explanatory (evidential):
• M murdered N. Why? M was seen with bloodstains
on his shirt, M had a motive for killing N, M’s
footprints were found in N’s garden the morning
after the murder – all these beliefs indicate M is the
murderer.
 Explanatory coherence

• Two propositions can be evidence for each

other. Each can make the truth of one another
more likely.
• p: S murdered M by stabbing him
• q: M’s bloodstains are on S’s boots
• Each of these propositions make the truth of
the other more likely than it would have been
otherwise.
 The coherence of beliefs

• A system is coherent if each proposition

makes the truth of the collection of the other
beliefs more likely (and vice versa)
• Any belief that p which is added to the system
will be coherent iff the truth of p makes the
truth of the system of beliefs more likely, and
the truth of the system of beliefs makes the
truth of p more likely.
 BonJour (1985) on the Regress Problem

• “According to the envisaged coherence theory, the

relation between the various particular beliefs is
correctly to be conceived, not as one of linear
dependence, but rather as one of mutual and reciprocal
support. There is no ultimate relation of epistemic
priority among the members of a system and
consequently no basis for a true regress…. (T)he
justification of a particular belief finally depends, not on
other particular beliefs as the linear conception of
justification would have it, but instead on the overall
system and its coherence.” (BonJour (1985), p.91-2)
 Coherentists on Epistemic Regress

• The epistemic regress problem assumes a linear view of

justification.
• The assumption is that the belief that p, if it is justified at
all, must be justified by some particular belief that q (so
that it’s status as an epistemically good belief depends
just on the status of this particular further belief).
• But justification is not linear it is holistic. The status of a
belief as justified depends not on whether it is justified
by the belief that q but by its relation to a set of other
beliefs.
 What’s so (epistemically) good about
coherence?

• Some sets of coherent propositions are not true. (e.g. The Lord of
the Rings films based on the novels of J. R. R. Tolkien; or any
fantasy film – Star Wars, etc.)
• Given that there is not a necessary relation between the
coherence of a set of beliefs (between the propositions believed)
and the system of beliefs being true, why is coherence a sign or
mark of truth? Why should coherence with a set of beliefs make it
likely that the proposition believed is true? [Wittgenstein]
• I can also have very coherent dreams and fantasies.
• Perhaps the Taliban have coherent beliefs.
 Problems of coherence

• The belief that a coherent system of beliefs is

justified because:
• (i) It is self-evident. (Coherentist can’t think
that, because it is to concede that some beliefs
are basic)
• (ii) It coheres with the system of beliefs
(Circular) – that is, it claims that belief a is
justified because of beliefs b, c, and d, but belief
b is justified because of beliefs a, c, and d, etc.
 Sources of belief

• Surely how one acquires and maintains beliefs is relevant

to their justificatory status as well as what the evidential
relations are between them.
• If one believes a coherent set of propositions because
one imagined them all or believed that they are true
because one dreamt that they were true, then those
beliefs are not justified.
• So a coherence theorist needs to build in some
constraints on how beliefs can be arrived at.
• Externalism: JTB are grasped better from the third person
point of view – that is, outside the mind of S.