Epistemology 9

Descartes and Scepticism

 Epistemology and Scepticism
• Beginning with Descartes (1596-1650), epistemology has two aspects:
(1) It seeks to define what is knowledge is and (2) it seeks to clarify
how knowledge is gained – usually as a defense against scepticism.
• The first gives us a definition of knowledge; the second gives us a
method for attaining knowledge to defeat the sceptic!
• Because of Descartes, modern epistemology faces the problem of
scepticism. In fact, we could classify various types of epistemology by
their responses to scepticism.
• Scepticism is a form of philosophical doubt about the very possibility of
knowledge. It calls into question whether any of our beliefs about the
world could ever be justified, or proved beyond doubt.
• Scepticism claims: Knowledge is Impossible based on our philosophical
definition -
 The target of philosophical scepticism is the
external world outside the mind (brain)
• The Sceptical Argument:
• (1) p = any proposition about the mind-
independent empirical world (e.g. I am sitting
in a lecture theatre, I have hands, grass is
green, etc.)
• (2) (S) Then, for any S, S cannot know that p
 Descartes’ Project
• “I have always thought that two questions - that of God and that of
the soul - are chief among those that ought to be demonstrated by
the aid of philosophy rather than of theology.”
• “. . . certainly no unbeliever seems capable of being persuaded of
any religion or even of moral virtue, unless these two are first
proven to him by natural reason.” [Meditations, Letter to the
Theology Faculty, §1-2] – “the light of reason” = unrevealed
reasoning – not Revelation – principle of autonomy (Kant): “think
for yourself!” freedom of the mind
• Note: what does Descartes mean by “natural reason”?
• A rational faculty of proof and demonstration = (justifying belief)
independent of faith/theology. How does it function?
• How does reason break out of the circle of faith (religious belief)?
• Descartes’ conclusion is that reason grounds itself without faith or
theology with the aid of epistemology – the foundation of
philosophy, foundation of ontology/metaphysics (Kant agrees)
 Descartes’ Doubt:
autonomy or authority?
• “. . . I realized how many were the false opinions that in my youth I
took to be true, and thus how doubtful were all the things that I
subsequently built upon these opinions.” Jesuit College at “La
Flèche”
• “. . . I realized that for once I had to raze [tear down or destroy)
everything in my life, down to the very bottom, so as to begin again
from the first foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and
lasting in the sciences.” (motivation for doubting everything)
• (Type A Doubt) “But because reason now persuades me that I
should withhold my assent no less carefully from things which are
not plainly certain and indubitable. . .”
• “Whatever I had admitted until now as most true I took in either
from the senses or through the senses; however, I noticed that they
sometimes deceived me.” [Med. I, §17-18] perception is not
reliable! Not trustworthy – the cause of many/most of our beliefs
 Dream Possibility
• (Type B: the dream hypothesis) “As I consider these cases
more intently, I see so plainly that there are no definite signs
to distinguish being awake from being asleep that I am quite
astonished, and this astonishment almost convinces me that I
am sleeping.”
• Descartes is saying that there is no way to distinguish being
awake from being asleep. Therefore, everything we think we
are experiencing as real (even this class), could just be a
dream. How do we know we are not in bed dreaming about
this philosophy class? (modus tollens), if not, then we don’t
know anything.
• Reason seems to be a mental faculty that examines claims to
truth/reality in light of the degree to which doubt is possible.
This is its foundation - the critical light of doubting/reasoning
 The Evil Demon
• (Type C: the evil demon) “A certain opinion has been fixed in my
mind, namely that there exists a God who is able to do anything and
by whom I have been created.”
• “God” for Descartes appears as an infinitely powerful being who
can do anything, create or deceive, according to his will. His will is
omnipotent. He could render even the propositions of logic and
mathematics false.
• But if such a God would have to be good, and therefore could not
be a deceiver, why am I sometimes deceived?
• But there might not be any God and I could be a being of mere
chance: “I would be so imperfect as to be deceived perpetually.”
[Med. I §21] his doubting extends to God = radical doubt – find a
certain foundation – not God because God could be a deceiver –the
light of reason
 How to fight against deception
• So, I could be deceived on all of these matters.
• “Thus I will suppose not a supremely good God, the source of truth, but
rather an evil genius, as clever and deceitful as he is powerful, who has
directed his entire effort to misleading me.”
• “ . . . Certainly it is within my power to take care resolutely to withhold my
assent to what is false, lest this deceiver, powerful and clever as he is,
have an effect on me.” [I §23] What ‘power’ is this?
• Descartes concludes: Beliefs appropriately produced (caused) are beliefs
produced in such a way that one is unlikely to acquire beliefs in that way
unless they are true. See (ii) above. The Principle of Reliabilism as
Method produce only reliable beliefs; he cannot trust God
• “Appropriately produced” means that truth is not accidental (the case of
Smith) to how the belief was produced. The application of a method will
produce beliefs that are incorrigible – if the method is error-proof. What
kind of proposition cannot be corrected? = Foundational belief
 I exist
• “And deceive me as he will, he can never bring it about that
I am nothing so long as I shall think that I am something.” [I
§25]
• “I am; I exist; this is certain. For as long as I think. Because perhaps
it could also come to pass that if I should cease from all thinking I
would then utterly cease to exist. I am therefore precisely only a
thing [res] that thinks; that is a mind, or soul, or intellect, or
reason. Now I am a true thing . . . A thing that thinks.” [I, §27]
• “But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing
that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and which
also imagines and senses.” [I, §28] = mental states – propositional
attitudes – the way we think about a proposition p – we can doubt
p; we can hope that p; we can think about p; we can know that p –
etc.
 Knowledge Defined 3
• We can define Cartesian knowledge another way:

• S knows that p iff:

• (1) S believes p
• (2) p is true
• (3) if p were true, S would believe p
• (4) if p were not true, S would not believe p (tracking – to
follow the truth) namely, the truth to hunt an animal -
• This was proposed by Robert Nozick
• If you understand this argument, then you have understood
Descartes. I will come back to it.
 Descartes’ Argument
• Meditation VI, §78
• “For this reason, from the fact that I know that I exist and that meanwhile
I judge that nothing else clearly belongs to my nature or essence except
that I am a thing that thinks, I rightly conclude that my essence consists in
this alone. Although perhaps I have a body that is very closely joined to
me, nevertheless, because on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea
of myself – insofar as I am a thing that thinks and not an extended thing –
and because on the other hand that I have a distinct idea of a body –
insofar as it is merely an extended thing, and not a thing that thinks – it is
therefore certain that I am truly distinct from my body, and that I can
exist without it.”
• Does the conclusion really follow from the premises? Can I exist without
my body?
 Sailor and Ship Analogy
• But Descartes qualifies the above conclusion at §81:
• “By means of these feelings of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, nature
also teaches that I am present to my body not merely in the way a
seaman is present to his ship, but that I am tightly joined and, so to
speak, mingled together with it, so much so that I make up one single
thing with it. For otherwise, when the body is wounded, I who am
nothing but a thing that thinks, would not sense the pain.” [§81]
• Descartes obviously has a dilemma on his hands: he has shown to his
satisfaction that mind and body are distinct substances, yet they
obvious interact in a very close (“tightly joined,” “mingled together”)
relation.
• Not only does the mind act on the body (i.e. the bodily will), but the
body acts on the mind (sensations of pain, as well as in our passions.)
 Sceptical Scenarios

• A sceptical scenario is one which is

indistinguishable for you ‘from the inside’
from some current experience you have, but
in which for some reason you are radically
deceived about your environment.
• Evil Demons, Gods - Descartes
• Brains in Vats – contemporary philosophy
• The Matrix – the film
 Our Epistemic Limitations about Sceptical
Scenarios

• For any proposition, H, that says that a sceptical

scenario obtains (is true), we don’t seem able to know
that it is false. Hence, we are unable to refute the
scenario.
• For by the nature of a sceptical scenario, we cannot
distinguish the situation that we are in now from a
corresponding situation in which we are radically
deceived but things seem just the same way to us. We
could be in a matrix – controlled by aliens – the
universe (not spatial) is a computer programme!
• But given that we cannot know that we are not brains-
in-vats, or being deceived by demons, how could we
possibly know that we are sitting here in a lecture?
(and so on for any other proposition that one might
think one knows.) – modus tollens: you don’t know q
unless you know not-p
 The Argument from Ignorance
1. Premise: you do not know that you are not in a
sceptical scenario – not a brain in a vat
2. Premise**: But, if you do not know that you are
not in a sceptical scenario, you do not know that
you are sitting in a classroom listening to a lecture
on epistemology. [Is this true? Do you agree?] =
modus tollens (logical operation is valid)
3. Therefore, you do not know that you are sitting
here.
(and so on for any empirical proposition…)
 The Closure Principle and Inference
(closure= complete a chain of inferences)
• Why is premise 2 true? “Closure” – means a process
of valid inferences…that ‘closes’ doubting.
• If S knows that p, and S knows that if p then q, then S
knows that q = modus ponens (valid)
• This seems unproblematic.
• Closure Principle. Definition: If I know that I am
sitting in my office writing a lecture, and if I know
that if I am sitting in my office writing a lecture (p),
then I am not at home drinking coffee (q), then I
know that I am not at home drinking coffee. Modus
ponens – valid inference from p.
 Closure and Ignorance Putnam
• Here’s why this is relevant.
• Could you be sitting here *and* be a Brain in a Vat, deceived into thinking
you were sitting here? Logically: YES
• (possible world semantics – modal logic: there is a possible world in which I
am a brain-in-a-vat and deceived about being in a classroom – this is valid)
But some brother at lunch replies:
• “No: You know that if (p) you are sitting here eating lunch, you are not a BIV.”
[common sense response]
• So, if you did know you were sitting here, and closure holds, then given that
you know this (p), you would know that you are not a BIV (q) – common
sense and valid inference!
• If a, then b = modus pones – inference = closure
• But you do not know this. You can’t. So by modus tollens, you do not know
you are sitting here:
• If p then ¬ q -- [p = brain in a vat and q = sitting in a
classroom], then all I know is that I am a thinking but a
deceived mind (brain) and I am not sitting in a
classroom.
 The Closure Principle 1
• Closure: Most of us think we can safely enlarge our
knowledge base by accepting things that are entailed (implied)
by (or logically implied by) things we know. Roughly
speaking, the set of things we know is closed under entailment
(or under deduction or logical implication), so we know that a
given claim is true upon recognizing, and accepting thereby,
that it follows from what we know. “if p, then q” modus
ponens
• Still, it seems reasonable to think that if we do know that some
proposition is true then we are in a position to know, of the
things that follow from it, that they, too, are true.
 Closure Principle and Reliabilism

• ** unless the inference involves a tracking [hunting an animal – follow

the evidence being objective] procedure: my grandmother knows that I
am a wonderful grandson, but if I were not a wonderful grandson, she
would also know that.
• Tracking principle: if p is true, S believes p:
• But were p false, S would not believe p. – my grandmother still believes
[p], I am wonderful! A lack of tracking – hence no epistemic
justification!
• A closely related idea is that it is rational (justifiable) for us to believe
anything that follows from [implied/entailed] what it is rational for us to
believe [self-evident]. This idea is intimately related to the thesis that
knowledge is “closed”, since, according to some theorists, knowing p
entails justifiably believing p.
 Reliabilism
• Reliabilism is an approach to epistemology that emphasizes the truth-
conduciveness [x leads to y] of a belief-forming process, method.
• F.P. Ramsey (1931), who said that a belief is knowledge if it is true, certain
and obtained by a reliable process = epistemic justification
• Fred Dretske’s “Conclusive Reasons” (1971), which proposed that S’s
belief that p qualifies as knowledge just in case S believes p because of
reasons he possesses that would not obtain unless p were true. In other
words, S’s reasons—the way an object appears to S, for example—are a
reliable indicator of the truth of p. A belief is reliable if the causal process
is reliable! Not fully tracking – because my grandmother believes her
belief has been reliably caused. -== memory – my memory is good –
about the last 10 hours – what did I do at 6 am this morning! Our
memories are reliable - but on August 20, 2012??
• See more: Zagzebski: intellectual virtues