Contemporary Epistemology 8

Perception
 Perception and the World
• Perception is the central way in which we get
knowledge about the world.
• Kant thought of it as our direct connection with the
real physical world. – {Representations of the world,
conceptual semantic – meaningful –thinkable –
concept “cold,” “hot” or “light” (waves, photons):
perception of? Like “bald”}
• (1) But how direct and reliable is perception?
• (2) To what extent can it serve as a justification for
knowledge?
The Problem of Perceptual Knowledge
• It is clear that a great deal of our knowledge comes from perception –
from our senses. FACT – the way things really are – “really” “truly” [mind-
independent] = ontology (theory of being/reality) – metaphysical
questions: but what is a “fact”? What is visible to us, i.e. an appearance?
• Sensation seems then to be our most reliable and most direct access to
the world of “facts.”
• As Pritchard writes, “Part of the problem is that the way things look isn’t
always the way things are; appearances can be deception.” (p.69) – Plato :
appearance not reality
• Mirages and illusions teach us the need to refine and adapt our epistemic
attitudes towards our sensory experiences.
• We know the unexpected oasis before us could possibly be a mirage; the
stick in the water is not really bent.
 Perceptual Error
• The mere existence of perceptual error (the bent stick and the
mirage) is not problematic, since we can usually account for it
and adapt our beliefs accordingly.
• But Pritchard asks us to compare (a) the visual impression
caused by a genuine (real – fact) seeing of an oasis on the
horizon to (b) the corresponding visual impression of an
illusory [not real, not a fact] seeing of an oasis on the horizon
caused by an hallucination. (a) + (b) = same semantic content!
• But these two visual impressions could be exactly the same
visual impression [a=b] -- there’s no difference between the
seeing [R1] of the genuine oasis and the seeing [R2] of the
hallucination – [R1 = R2]: BUT one is real, the other unreal
 Perceptual Error 2

• If this is the case – the identity of (a) and (b) – then it

seems that what we actually experience in (a) and (b) is
not the world itself, but something other than the world
as it is. For us, i.e. our perception: R1 = R2
• If the perceptual content of (a) and (b) is identical, then
we are experiencing something common between them –
that is, not a direct contact with the world, but a visual
impression [a mental representation] that may or may not
give us reliable knowledge about how the world is in itself
outside of our visual field. The two visual fields appear
the same
 Perceptual Error 3
• This is why it now looks justified: our use of the term “it seems
to me that …” whenever we talk about perception. This
sentence is always T – but not knowledge – it can be a justified
false belief!
• What “seems like” – a seeming – indicates is an indirect access
to the world, not immediate or direct.
• Perception gives us an internal seeming, which may or may not
lead to accurate (true) beliefs about the world.
• That is, belief is an inference from perception: I see x; it seems
to be that x; hence I conclude (infer) that x.
• Hence: I believe or I know that x – but this an inference
• Hence not a direct access to the world -
 Perceptual Error 4
• Therefore the difference between (a) and (b) above is that
• (a) generates a true belief about the world;
• Whereas (b) generates a false belief.
• But remember: the semantic content of (a) and (b) remain
identical! = the meaning of what I see or what appears to me.
• If perception is indirect, then it seems that we are never
actually in contact with the world (as we thought) – we are not
actually perceiving a world external to our senses, but “a
world” within us [what would Kant say to this? Mental
Representation] that requires the assistance/security of reason
(=judgment) to protect it from error and deception.
 Perception as Indirect Realism**
• Perceptual knowledge does not put us in direct contact with the
world – it rests on inference [modus ponens: if p then q]. “if I
perceive water [E – E1], then there is water” [E1water= H2O]
• Hence it is no more privileged than any other indirect knowledge
of the world – testimony, evidence, memory, scientific reasoning,
etc. Sometimes what we “see” (perceive) as “water” is not H2O.
• Indirect realism stems from the argument above that perceptual
experience is not directly of the world itself but merely the
impression of the world in us, from which we have to infer[by the
use of reason = science] how the world really is.
• We infer how the world is from how it seems to be to us.
• But this once again invites scepticism (or regress).
 Primary and Secondary Qualities*
• John Locke distinguished primary and secondary qualities of things:
• A primary quality is a feature of an object that the object has independently
of it being perceived by us – i.e. shape, weight
• A secondary quality is a feature of an object that depends upon the
perceiver – for instance color.
• For color depends not just on something about how an object refracts light,
but also on how a perceiver’s (a human or an animal) eyesight registers
the reflected light – how we perceive it – about us!
• But normally objects generate visual impressions that are the same in all
perceivers of the same species.
• That is, we assume they do – but can we ever be sure. This is the problem
of the color “grue” which I could be seeing when you see blue or green.
When you see blue, I see “grue” and when you see green, I see “grue.” [I’m
not sure we can solve this problem]
 More on Seeing and Seeming to See

• One can seem to see an O in front of one’s face

without seeing an O in front of one.
• (or it can visually appear to one as if there is an O in
front of one without there being…etc.)
• Or one can seem to see an O which is F in front of
one without seeing it as an O which is F in front of
one.
• (To see an O requires that there is an O there. To see
an O which is F requires that there is an O which is F
there. )
• This raises a number of questions.
 Questions about Perception

1. What is it for one to see an O?

2. What is it to seem to see an O?
3. What is the relation between seeing an O or
seeming to see an O and propositional
knowledge about O?
4. What if all O’s are F’s? [e.g. light is a wave…]
These questions all make sense, but how
can we answer them?
 A Puzzle about Seeing
• So is it necessary and sufficient for a person to see an O that one
seems to see as an O and that there is an O in front of the person?
• Veridical Hallucination: Suppose one hallucinates an O as in front
of one, and there really is an O in front of one? [God?]
• You don’t see an O in that case do you? So what else do we need
for seeing O other than seeming to see an O and O’s presence?
• Perhaps as well as (i) seeming to see an O and (ii) there existing an
O which matches features of the experience, there needs to be (iii)
a causal link between the object and the experience.
• [this is similar to one response to GPs – ensure that there is a
causal connection between one’s beliefs and the way things are =
a type of epistemic justification]
 The nature of seeming to see

• Question 2 is ‘What is it to seem to see an O’?

• What is it for things to perceptually appear to one a
certain way?
• How is that type of experience to be understood?
• What is it for something to be a perceptual
experience, say, of a cup on the table?
• One solution: Kant’s distinction of appearance and
thing-in-itself
The Muller-Lyer Illusion
The Café Wall Illusion
Depth Perception
 Explanation
• The retina is “saying” that the two shafts are the
same length but the brain is interpreting the Muller-
Lyer as a depth issue, with the shaft that looks like
an outside corner being closer and the shaft that
looks like an inside corner being farther away. In
other words, the retina is saying "two shafts equal"
and the brain is saying "outside shaft shorter than
inside shaft". The brain usually wins differences like
this. Thus, the brain sees │ as longer than l.
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optical_illusion
 Seeing and Seeming to See*

• Our thought about this question starts with

the idea that one can seem to see an O
without seeing an O. (Hallucination is
possible)
• And one can seem to see an O which is F
without seeing an O which is F. (Illusion is
possible).
 The Argument from Illusion

• When you seem to see a table, there is something

present to your mind (and perceived by you).
• In the case of illusion, imagine that you are moving
away from an object in your visual field and this object
becomes smaller as you move away.
• But this object becoming smaller is not the table
(because it seems to get smaller and the actual table
is not getting smaller).
• So what one sees is a special, mind-dependent object,
a “sense-datum” in the mind and not the table.
 Evaluating the Sense-Datum Theory

• Does anything in our experience suggest to us that what

we see, or are directly presented with are mind-
dependent objects?
• Aren’t these mind-dependent objects too weird to figure
in our ontology?
• Because of the fact of mind-dependent objects, aren’t
there going to be epistemological difficulties concerning
our knowledge of mind-independent objects?
• For instance, how can we ever know the difference
between the two kinds of objects?
 Perceptual Sources of Knowledge

• It seems difficult to think that seeing something

could be propositional knowledge or that
seeming to see something could be propositional
knowledge.
• But seeing and seeming to see things seem to be
sources of knowledge. (After all, how do you now
know that you are sitting in a classroom lecture?)
• (Something is a source of knowledge, if it is a
way of arriving at knowledge)
 Perception as a Source of Knowledge**

• Earlier we distinguished between two different

kinds of answers to ‘How do you know?’ or ‘Why do
you believe?’ questions.
• = causes and reasons for belief
• One type of answer identifies how it came about
that you had the belief that you did (causal
explanations).
• Others identify something about the belief that
makes it likely, in the circumstances, to be true.
(Epistemic reasons for belief)
 The Problem: Senses of ‘Source’

• It certainly seems that seeing things or seeming to see

things can be an explanation of how one came to believe
something. So perception seems to be a source in the first
sense.
• But it also seems to be the case that seeing things or
seeming to see things may be an answer to the ‘Why
believe that?’ question that identifies epistemic reasons
for that belief.
• There’s something about perceptual or seeming-
perceptual states that provides subjects with reasons or
evidence for their beliefs about the world.
 The nature of our perceptual reasons
• Remember structural worries from regress… i.e. no belief is ever justified;
it requires other beliefs…
• It might seem obvious that if it looks to you as if there is a white cup on
the table, then that gives one a reason to think that there is a white cup
on the table. (Whether it looks to you as if there is a white cup is a
propositional appearance state or a combination of a state of being
related to a sense-datum which includes a belief about how one is
appeared to)
• But what explains how one’s belief in some such epistemic principle (i.e. if
I am in certain perceptual states [say, awake] then my environment is
probably a certain way) is justified?
• This leads to a new regress.
 The Status of Beliefs about Epistemic Principles
concerning Perception

• Empirical: Could these beliefs be empirically justified?

• A Priori: Could it be somehow a priori justified that if the
world appears to one a certain way, then the world probably
is that way?
• Reliabilism: All that is necessary for one to have a justified
perceptual belief is that it be true that if one is appeared to
some way, then the world generally is that way. It is not
necessary that one have a justified belief in that principle.
• But this last claim would not be at all problematic for Kant,
because “the world for us” just is appearance and nothing
more – what Kant calls “mere appearance.”