Legitimacy and the future of

1
the UNSC
IR Theory II: Norms and International Institutions
Class 27 – Dr. Vinícius Guilherme Rodrigues Vieira
FGV RI, 27 April 2024
  Resolutions and Power Politics at the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC)
 Are resolutions legitimate?
In the  Yes, but subject to (ideological) contestation
 How does great power struggle impact UNSC legitimacy?
previous
 Pressure for reform and openness to civil society
class
  Legitimacy and the future of the UNSC
 How is it possible to expand it?
In this class
 Would pathologies be mitigated?
Welcome new
permanent
members
Expandeded membership enhances
legitimacy? 4
5
6
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8 And about small powers???
 Effectiveness matters more than legitimacy? As reported by Tørstad (2023,
10), “[a] Liechtensteiner diplomat illustratively recalls that”:

“I came to the conclusion that enlargement is [ ... ] for a small state like us, not that
important. That [ ... ] the working methods are more important. Because it does not
matter how the Council is enlarged [ ... ]. It is not going to increase our chances to
serve on the Council significantly. Plus, [ ... ] if we were to serve every thirtieth year,
it would not make a difference. So, what is interesting for us is the other twenty-eight
years. Because we have to implement all decisions that the Council adopts, and we
are very interested in an effective Security Council. And so, this is why we started
working more on working methods issues”.
9 Alternative: enhance transparency

 It has already been tried without success, as Tørstad (2023, 2) claims: “The main
hypothesis of this article is that transparency reform leads to enhanced perceptions of
the Council as a legitimate authority by UN member-states”.
 “The empirical analysis is based on an original dataset of 4,303 legitimacy statements
made by UN members in annual UNGA debates over the periods 1990–2006 (pre-
reform) and 2006–18 (post-reform)”.
 “Contrary to my expectations, the data from these debates show that UN members’
perceptions of procedural legitimacy decreased after the introduction of the
transparency reform”.
10 Transparancy and utilitarianism
 More accountability has normative consequences though: “In an ideal sense,
institutional transparency can be understood as the timely access of stakeholders to
all relevant information at low or no costs”.
 “The absence of this information is commonly portrayed as a principal–agent
problem, wherein an actor (the principal) has entrusted another actor (the agent) to
perform a given task (Hirschmann, 2020)”.
 “The principal–agent relationship contains an information asymmetry to the
agent’s advantage, relating to both how and why decisions are reached (De Fine
Licht et al., 2014)”.
 “Increasing transparency can reduce uncertainty about the agent’s intentions,
reasons, and procedures, which in turn can enhance the principal’s confidence in
delegating powers to the agent (De Fine Licht et al., 2014)” (Tørstad 2023, 3).
11 It matters as interventionism increased
 “…[T]he post-Cold War Council has adopted an increasing share of Chapter VII
decisions. Chapter VII of the Charter refers to the Council’s coercive measures –
including sanctions (Art. 41) and the use of force (Art. 42) – and is generally
invoked when Council members want to signal that a resolution is to be understood
as mandatory to implement (Sievers & Daws, 2014)”.
 “Hence, Chapter VII measures interfere more aggressively in domestic affairs
than the other means at the Council’s disposal (e.g. the conciliatory measures listed
in Chapter VI)”.
 “While the Council only adopted 22 Chapter VII resolutions in total over the period
1946-1989, 42 such resolutions were passed in 2016 alone (UN, 2019)”(Tørstad
2023, 6).
12
13

Assessing the
impact of
transparency

 Implementation of Note 507 | United Nations Security Council

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15
16 Rebellion
within the
UNSC???
 Formative
Task: read the
links available
at Eclass and
think of the
sources of
legitimacy at
the UNSC
17 Back to new permanent members

 Incentives for great power coordination (Gould and Rablen 2017, 161): “The
most promising reform proposal among those we consider is one in which two
Permanent Members (PMs) would have to cast votes against a resolution to block
it (WV)”.
 “Its success owes to the fact that, by reducing the voting power of the PMs, it
dilutes the distribution of expected voting power away from these countries”.
 “Regrettably, however, this reform proposal appears stymied in the short-and
even medium-term, for no PM is willing to relinquish its right of veto, and the
constitutional ability of the PMs to retain these powers seems impregnable”.
18 Back to new permanent members
 “Accordingly, those hoping for a
major change in the efficiency and
equity of the UNSC in the short-run
are likely to be disappointed. On
the other hand, despite their
constitutional power”.
 “Fassbender (2004) argues that,
if the rest of the world could
agree on a common way forward,
the PMs would have little choice
but to concede ground” (Gould
and Rablen 2017, 161).
19 At least it would...
 Avoid laundering (remember Unit 1);
 Why: sanctions reflect mainly the action of the US and EU governments.
According to Brzoska (2015, 1348), who also reports (p. 1341) that;
 “The majority of UN sanctions are preceded by unilateral or regional sanctions.
Of the 23 cases of sanctions contained in the TSC data, 18 (78 per cent) were
preceded by national or regional sanctions”.
 “Governments that use sanctions clearly have an interest in building UN sanctions
on earlier sanctions”.
 “The imposition of national or regional sanctions prior to UN sanctions would
seem to indicate the urgency with which the sanctioning governments seek to
apply pressure on a given target”.
20 Potential consequences of reform

 Procedural legitimacy would still be a problem;

 Just think of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and UNSC presidency (
Russia takes over UN Security Council presidency: What it means f
or Ukraine | DW News – YouTube
).
 Would reform compromise efficiency???
 Sanctions may be increasingly ineffective
 But do not forget peacekeeping….
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OyJULAN7-so
 21

Focus on Africa
(imperial
echoes)
22 UNGA Rebellion???
23 UNGA Rebellion???
24 Sharing responsabilities

 Potential orchestration????
 Bringing-in countries like Japan that seek legitimate great power status
(Suzuki 2008, 60) Brazil in Haiti fits such argument too;
 Remember the OSCE, yet it crumbled with great power disputes.
 Beyond the Global North???
 As seen in unit 2 (regionalism interacts with multilateralism)
 West African Leaders Agree to Create Regional Peacekeeping Force – YouTu
be
 Or does legitimacy depend on power?
 Unipolarity and/or ideological convergence matter the most?
25
  Legitimacy and the future of the UNSC
 How is it possible to expand it?
 By welcoming regional powers
26 Keep on
 Would pathologies be mitigated?
Mind  For realists (and constructivists), no!
  Summary on Power and Legitimacy + Presentations
27 Next Class