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3-Asia and Competing Visions of Regional Order: Free and
Open Indo-Pacific and Belt and Road Initiative
• Introduction
• United States (US) shaped the order in Asia , around its military and economic supremacy, web of alliances
and treaties with countries across Asia.
• In a way, America was the hegemon in Asia since it provided security, sustained stability, supported market
economies and maintained partnerships with an array of political actors in the region. This is now changing.
• In Asia, a rising China is driving a new geo-political balance of power. When the ‘old order’ was being shaped,
Beijing was marginalised in the international political order. China has risen economically, in many ways, by
taking advantage of the old order. New shifts in this order are now taking place. Asia has been interconnected
through increased intra-regionaltrade, investment and multilateral agreements.
• Two hierarchies are discernible. First, the security hierarchy is dominated -US. Second, the economic hierarchy
is dominated by China. Asian countries look to Washington to provide security and boost their military
capabilities. Meanwhile, most of the region’s countries are tied closely to China in the matters of commercial
and economic cooperation.
• This dual hierarchy raises crucial questions for the long-term strategic outlook of Asia and the choices that the
regional countries will make in future.
• Theoretical Framework
• The Asian order is in transition, but what is the order precisely? According to international relations scholarship, the
order refers to those cardinal principles and rules that guide and shape bilateral and multilateral relations.
• When these rules and norms are not followed it leads to disorder and uncertainty. Theoretically, the order is organised
around hegemonic principles or the balance of power framework.Robert Gilpin provided theoretical reasoning behind
hegemonic order. The dominant states use their material capabilities such as power, economy, technology and
ideology to build and sustain order. Gradually, military power and economic resources erode, and new challenges to
the hegemon emerge. Hegemonic wars take place and lead to the emergence of a new order when states gettogether
to set new rules.
• In contrast, the order can also be founded on the balance of power as theorised by Kenneth Waltz. A power
equilibrium among major states in international system can establish and sustain the order. No major power can
dominate the system. Inevitably, the weak or middle nations band together to counter-balance and resist a dominant
power.
• In this context, the current order in Asia exhibits both phenomenon: hegemony and balance. for 5 decades the USA
was a leading power but now the relative power of China has led to the emergence of trends within the regional
order that led to a relative balance of power.
• Theoretically, the choices available to Asian nations can be divided into three categories.
1. First, Asian countries can choose to deepen their existing cooperation with the US as the threat from China increases
2. Second, Asian states can choose buck-passing over balancing. At present, despite its growing economic and military
prowess, China is far from being a direct threat to Asian countries.
3. Third, the middle states can pursue strategic hedging. Asian nations are noticing a ‘decline’ in the US influence over
the long-term. China has developed the capacity to field advanced maritime assets in considerable numbersAsian
states can build a constructive relationship with China through confidence-building measures (CBMs) to enhance
mutual trust.
 Competing Visions of Regional Connectivity
• A- Free and Open Indo-Pacific
• Origins of the FOIP policy lie in Washington’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy the Trump administration reviewed the US’ strategic
posture and withdrew from the 2016 twelve-member Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Later, however, the Trump
administration embraced competitionwith China and advocated the FOIP strategy
• The policy documents, “National Security Strategy” (NSS) of 2017” and “National Defence Strategy” (NDS) of 2018, directly
term China as the ‘strategic competitor’ of the US and its partners.The NSS declared “geopolitical competition” is underway
between “free and repressive visions of world order.” 8 Moreover, the NSS argues Beijing aims to “displace” Washington in
this regionthrough its “state-driven economic model” with the ultimate goal of reordering the “region in its favour.”to
maintaining a favourable power balance in the broader Asia-Pacific region. For achieving its geo-strategic goals, the US is
pursuing a networked security architecture bringing together multilateral and bilateral security partnerships.
• At the core of the FOIP is the concept of ‘Quad,’ comprising of Australia, India, Japan and the US. It aims to counterbalance
expanding Chinese influence in Asia. The stated goal of Quad is to establish and promote a ‘rules-based’ economic and
security order. The former Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson claimed that rules-based order that has supported the economic
rise of China and India is under threat from revisionist China. He called for a ‘strong relationship’ with India for ‘peace,
stability and growing prosperity’ in the Indo-Pacific
• B- Belt and Road Initiative
• The Chinese vision for Asia is two pronged: the BRI to promote regional economic cooperation, and the New Asian Security Concept
to be upheld by the Asian nations. The BRI consists of an overland route, the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and a maritime route ─
the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI).15 The aim is to link edges of the Asian continent from East Asia to Europe and also to
connect Asia with Africa and Europe through land, sea and air corridors
• The BRI is geared towards promoting economic development of the Asian countries through trade and investment while enhancing
connectivity. The secondary aim is to develop and maintain people-to-people contacts in various countries
• The developing countries and existing international institutions lack capital and capacity to meet the rising infrastructure demands.
China, therefore, stepped in to address this gap. To finance these projects, Beijing has established new multilateral institutions: the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Silk Road Fund (SRF). The Chinese officials have repeatedly emphasised that these
new institutions are complementing existing international financial institutions, as China seeks a “bigger role in the existing
international order and system
• Aside from economic drivers, there is a security rationale for the BRI, as well. Beijing is highly dependent on an uninterrupted flow of
imported oil from the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, for the smooth functioning of the Chinese economy. Nearly 80 per cent of
the energy imports of China passes through the Strait of Malacca, where the US navy has a dominating presence. China seeks to
ensure secure routes by circumventing the Malacca Strait through constructing ports and refuelling stations in the Indian Ocean.
Beijing is making investments in the ports across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)-String of pearls. In Djibouti, China has established its
first overseas support base for its military ships.
• In May 2014, Xi Jinping introduced the ‘New Asian Security Concept.China’s security vision is rooted in the concept of common,
comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. Moreover, Beijing has called for “improving” the regional security framework
based on following four objectives: a) Future security framework should be multi-layered, comprehensive and diversified. b) All
countries in the region should pursue adoption of new security framework as a common cause. c) the future regional security
framework should be based on consensus d) the development of a regional security framework should be advanced in parallel
with the development of a regional economic framework. For achieving these objectives, President Xi stated that management of
regional security issues is for the ‘people in Asia,’ as ‘Cold War thinking’ and ‘zero-sum games’ cannot address security challenges of
the AsiaPacific region
Evolving Strategies of the Middle States in the
Region
• The regional countries or middle states of Asia have adopted varied approaches to the Chinese and American
visions for Asia. Their reactions are rooted in the decades-old American presence in Asia, the history of bilateral
relations with China, the fear of being caught up in great power competition and the need to maximise their
security while pursuing their economic goals.
• Asian nations have been eager to join the BRI since its inception.At that time, from 2013 to 2016, China and a
number of Asian countries engaged in extensive infrastructure development cooperation projects. With the
onset of Trump Presidency in the Oval Office, an unease was felt all across Asia. The first year of his presidency
was marked by an uncertain in Asia policy. The Asian countries were unsettled by the US withdrawal from the
TTP, public criticism of the pivot to Asia policy of the Obama administration, and the focus on an ‘America First’
foreign policy.
• Later in November 2017, when Trump visited Asia for the APEC summit, he dilated upon US vision guiding the
FOIP and reiterated the US commitment to Asia.25 From then onwards, most of the Asian states have adopted a
more nuanced approach.
1. Myanmar: Western criticism of the Burmese treatment of the Rohingya minority has increased. Naypyidaw has
banked on Beijing’s support to avoid adverse actions at the(UNSC).both countries agreed to build a China-
Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)Given this, it is likely that Myanmar will press ahead with BRI projects
2. Thailand: the current military government, caused by opposition to the military coup of 2014, have enabled
Bangkok and Beijing to deepen economic cooperation.Beijing has also adjusted the BRI program to link up with
the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), a project initiated by Bangkok in order to foster economic growth and
improve the public services infrastructure, including transportation and logistics in three eastern Thai provinces.
3. Philippines : Under President Duterte, after 2016, the Philippines pursued a new China policy: engaging with China on
SCS issues bilaterally,30 and supporting the BRI to secure Chinese investments. Beijing has reciprocated by pledging over
US$24billion for infrastructure projects in the Philippines, Manila has granted the US military access to its facilities under
the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement which was signed in 2016.
4. Indonesia : In 2018, Beijing and Jakarta inked five agreement worth over US$23billion under the BRI, including setting up
of two hydropower plants.3In response to the FOIP, Indonesia supported ‘Indo-Pacific Cooperation’ at an ASEAN summit in
Singapore in April 2018. Jakarta calls for a strategy that is beneficial to the long-term interests of regional countries;
respects international laws; and is rooted in an ‘inclusive, transparent and comprehensive framework.
5. Malaysia:Under former Prime Minister Najib Razak, Malaysia commenced work on several infrastructure projects under
the BRI. Under new Prime Minister Mahathir, Malaysia first paused and renegotiated projects with China eg- East Coast Rail
Link project at a reduced cost of nearly US$5billion. It maintains a balance between US and China as said by its F.M.
6.Vietnam: Vietnam has a complex relationship with China rooted in the acrimonious history of the border war of 1979
and an ongoing dispute in the SCS, where Despite this complicated history, Hanoi backed the BRI from early on. In 2017,
President Dai Quang attended a Belt and Road Forum. He called for transparent and ‘mutually beneficial’ cooperation.
China and Vietnam held talks on establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Vietnam to relocate the Chinese factoriesA
major BRI project underway in Vietnam is the Vinh Tan 1 Thermal power plant at a cost of US$1.76 billion. It is being built
in Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) mode. Meanwhile, to meet its security requirements and address concerns related to on-
going Chinese military activity in the SCS, Vietnam has voiced support for the Indo-Pacific concept.
Implications for Asian Security and
Conclsuion
• Asian countries recognise China’s larger role both in trade and in the security of Asia. They are cognizant that it is natural for China to
develop and safeguard its trade routes. They growing influence and prowess with restraint and in a legitimate manner.
• Secondly, Asian states are eager to engage with China in economic cooperation,They do not, however, want to be over-dependent on
China. This has created space for the US to influence the discourse on China’s economic model. Under President Obama, the US
policy-makers had clarity on what they were seeking in Asia. The China policy of the Obama era sought engagement. It had enabled
Asian states to seek a relationship with China based on cooperation. This led to a stable regional balance Trump administration in
January, 2017, however, first led to uncertainty as President Trump questioned the costs of America’s long-standing defense
commitments in Asia. Subsequently, even as the Trump administration embraced the FOIP strategy, Asian states sought to maintain a
balance between Beijing and Washington.
• Fourthly, the Trump administration’s FOIP strategy appears to be a containment-of-China strategy. It is vital that the need to balance
the risingpower of China does not lead to over-reach from Washington and regional states. Beijing, meanwhile, has criticised
American maritime activities, including freedom of navigation operations in the SCS.
• Fifthly, as a collective, Asian states, particularly members of ASEAN, are seeking to maintain a balance between the two sides, and to
refrain as much as possible from siding with either Beijing or Washington. For Asian states, particularly ASEAN members, the
preferable path is where China and the US communicate, build trust, manage and resolve differences, and pursue regional stability.
• To conclude, The BRI and the FOIP are two competing visions for Asia Both countries have different visions for regional security,
where China views America as an outside power, Washington considers Beijing’s actions as undermining stability in the region. With
this as the backdrop, the Trump administration unveiled its FOIP strategy which it believed would address its concerns . For China,
however, the BRI signifies its arrival on the global stage as a great power. For Beijing, the BRI gives it the required strategic depth to
compete with the US in both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The BRI has enabled it to have a presence in countries along
key maritime routes and in the Eurasian heartland.
• In this ongoing competition, Asian states are struggling to chart an independent course. They are dependent on China for trade and
access to new technologies, and also increasingly for their security requirements. Middle states want to maintain a balance in
relations between Beijingand Washington.
 2-China’s “New Concept of Security
• It was officially unveiled by the People Republic ofChina (PRC)in March 1997 at a meeting ofthe Association ofSoutheast AsianNations
(ASEAN) Regional Forum.December 1997,Foreign Minister Qian Qichen outlined andexplained the New Concept ofSecurity In February
1998,Defense Minister Chi Haotian called for the es-tablishment ofa New Concept ofSecurity in a speech in Tokyo.
• At thetime ofits release,it seemed to be merely a repackaging of China’s time-honored Five Principles ofPeaceful Coexistence and eco-nomic
security is just as important as military security.
• China was clearly leaning for-ward in the international community to offer an alternative visionThis was clearly not in line with Deng Xiaoping
’s oft-quoted dictum that in international affairs,China should “keep a low pro-file and never take the lead.”
• China’s New Security Concept The relations among nations should be established on the basis of the Five Principles of PeacefulCoexistence:
1-Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. 2-Mutual non-aggression 3-Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.4-
Equality and mutual benefit. 5-Peaceful coexistence.
• These are the political basis and premise of global and regional security. Each country has theright to choose its own social system,
development strategy, and way of life, and no other countryshould interfere in the internal affairs of any other country in any way or under
any pretext, muchless resort to military threats or aggression.In the economic field, all countries should strengthen mutually beneficial
cooperation, open upto each other, eliminate inequalities and discriminatory policies in economic and trade relations,gradually reduce the
development gaps between countries, and seek common prosperity.Such steps can form the economic basis of global and regional security.
Maintaining a normaland sound economic, trade, and financial order calls for not only a perfect macro-economic man-agement system as
well as a sound system of economic operations, it also calls for strengtheningregional and international economic contacts and cooperation,
so as to jointly create a stable andsecure external economic environment.All countries should promote mutual understanding and trust
through dialogue and coopera-tion, and seek the settlement of divergences and disputes among nations through peaceful means.These are
the realistic ways to guarantee peace and security. Security is mutual, and securitydialogues and cooperation should be aimed at promoting
trust, not at creating confrontations, stillless at directing the spearhead against a third country or infringing upon the security interests of
anyother nation.
• NSC is a criticism of U.S.foreign policy mechanisms or specific U.S.security policies.In effect,Beijing accuses the United States ofperpetuating
a security sys-tem that will prove inherently dangerous and destabilizing,both regionally and globally.
• Why the New Concept of Security?
• Beijing s call for a New Concept ofSecurity is an indication ofChina sdissatisfaction and frustration with the unfolding
international system. China’s much-hoped-for multipolar world has not come about with the cold war ,as Chinese
international relations theorists had pre-dicted.Instead,what they face is an increasingly globalized world with
anincreasingly strong and dominant power—the United States.
• The New Concept ofSecurity clearly was a direct Chinese reaction to policies and actions by the United States that
Beijing perceived as threaten-ing,especially Washington’ s strengthening ofits military alliances. The con-cept continues
to serve as a counterargument to the U.S.assertion thatEast Asia’s economic prosperity — past,present,and future —is a
direct re-sult ofthe peace and stability that is underwritten by the forward presenceofU.S.military forces and military
alliances.
• The concept was clear reaction to the movement of NATO to balkans and central asia via partnership for peace. The
U.S.Atlantic Command ’s combined military exercise with Kazakhstan andRussia —CENTRAZBAT 97—evinced
tremendous concern among Chi-nese security analysts at the time.
• In addition,the New Concept ofSecurity was a reaction to Beijing ’s assessment that in the long term,the United States
would maintain its pri-macy as the sole military superpower by developing and fielding advanceddefense technologies--
BMD and it is cold war mentaility which beijing wanted to end.
• Throughoutthe 1990s,some Asian nations began to view China’s growing nationalpower and Beijing’s perceived regional
aspirations with increasing suspi-cion and concern.These concerns arose from confrontations over theSpratly
Islands,Chinese claims in the South China Sea,and China‘s ap-parent willingness to engage in demonstrations offorce in
the TaiwanStrait,especially in 1995 and 1996.As a result,the New Concept ofSecurity was offered to theregion as part ofa
larger diplomatic effort to debunk the“China threat theory,”
• Other actions taken by the PRC tosoften its image in Southeast Asia included: capitalizing on its favorable image as
a “ responsible actor during the Asian financial crisis, acting in concert with the nuclear club countries to
condemn theSouth Asian nuclear detonations, heralding its “strategic partnerships ”around the globe,
grandstanding about its decision at the 15 th Party Congress to de-mobilize another 500,000 troops from the PLA,
taking modest but welcome steps toward defense transparency ascharacterized by the publication of the July
1998 defense whitepaper and China ’s participation in multilateral Track I and Track IIsecurity forums, agreeing in
principle to take part in talks aimed at establishing acode ofconduct in the South China Sea.
• The Military Dimension
• NSC missed out - M.D- but Jiefangjun Bao carried a lengthy signed article.
• From the viewpoint of military security,the security concept requires:The military force shoulders the important mission of
defending a state’s territorial sovereignty and integrity,resisting foreign aggres-sion,and safeguarding state unification.Therefore,it
is necessary tostrengthen army building,develop armaments,and reform military organizations.The defense policies and military
strategies ofall coun-tries should be defensive,be based on avoiding conflicts and wars,preventing crises,and checking the
escalation ofconflicts.The mili-tary forces ofall countries should play a role in the broader scopesuch as cracking down on terrorism
and drug trafficking,rescuework,and humanitarian aid.All countries should not and are not al-lowed to pursue the doctrine
ofmilitary interference and resort tomilitary force at every turn.The military cooperation and munitionstrade between countries
should be based on the principle which is “not aimed at any third party.”
What all ofthis suggests is that the New Concept ofSecurity is muchmore a political and economic construct than
a military one.It indicatesthat,as usual,the role ofthe PLA will be to support foreign policy throughall ofthe
military diplomacy mechanisms that it usually employs.
• Is the New Concept of Security Viable?
• NO, beacuse Very little in the concept is actionable- bereft ofa framework around which to build a serious al-ternative international security structure
on a global scale, The packaging ofthe concept has in the past been too heavily lacedwith anti-U.S.rhetoric.many are not going to be disposed to sign
on toa construct that often takes on an anti-U.S.flavor.At least three ofthe five major poles in China ‘s multipolar worldorder construct —namely
Japan,Western Europe,and the UnitedStates— seem to have their own ideas about what the post-ColdWar order should look like.And the fourth
pole,Russia,is now straddling both sides ofthe fence,as a result ofthe terrorist eventsofSeptember 11,2001.NATO is not going to disband.Ifanything,it
has been strengthenedby the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and the invocationofArticle 5 pursuant to the attacks on the United States in
Septem-ber 2001.
• Is the New Concept of Security an Empty Concept?
• In an ironic twist ofcircum-stance,there is one region ofthe world in which the concept is being givenform,where it is in the process ofbeing
operationalized,and in which new security policy precedents are taking shape.That region is in Central Asia,where the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) is operating.this is the first time that the PRC has taken the lead,an active role,in the creation ofa multilateral security
organization.The Shanghai Five and its successor,the SCO,have been and con-tinue to be hailed by the Chinese as the epitome ofwhat the New
ConceptofSecurity is supposed to be about.As they see it,the SCO is primarily concerned with security but has political and economic components
aswell.It is about mutual security and working out differences amicably.Itis about enhancing collective security“without being aimed at a third party”
• The concept has not taken hold in the primary region in Asia forwhich it was originally intended —Southeast Asia beacuse US position is strong and
they see china a troublemaker.
• Conclusion
• New Concept ofSecurity does not seem to have had muchofan impact around the globe,he New Concept ofSecurity has not had the greatest
impactwhere it was originally intended,the anti-American packaging that the new concept has in thepast often been wrapped in detracts from it.the
New Concept ofSecurity probably will have limited influ-ence beyond the Chinese periphery.Chinese leaders will continue invoking the New Concept
ofSe-curity in meetings with foreign officials and at international gatheringsThe events ofSeptember 11 have underscored the key weakness of the
New Concept ofSecurity as originally formulated.The new concept ismainly a preventative formula.It offers ways in which nations should con-duct their
relations to avoid conflict or,in the worst case,to resolve secu-rity differences.It does not offer much in the way ofwhat should happenwhen political
relations and negotiation break down.It may turn out that the terrorist attacks,and especially the U.S.and the international community response to
them,will define post-ColdWar international security relations in ways no one,not even the Chi-nese,could have imagined. And there is a hope that
both USA and China cooperate in the post cold war.
3-The New SecurityConcept China’s 21st Century Security
Strategy for aMulti-polar World
 4-Afghan Peace Process: Future Prospects
• Introduction
• Since the US invasion of Afghanistan, there have been numerous attempts to establish a meaningful dialogue with the Taliban in
an effort for peace.- no success. In Afghanistan, peace efforts have been made as early as 2001 when Hamid Karzai, as the interim
head declared an amnesty for common Taliban fighters.1In another attempt to strengthen the peace programme, President Karzai
set up the akhim-e-Solh (PTS) in February 2004 to promote reconciliation.
• In the year 2007 (September), a temporary breakthrough was witnessed when the Taliban indicated their willingness to talk to the
Afghan government. However, the Taliban soon backtracked, sticking to their original demands of a complete withdrawal of foreign
troops followed by the establishment of Shariah.
• Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, established the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) headed by the former Afghan President,
Burhanuddin Rabbani, the HPC was the official arm of the government responsible for negotiating peace.
• Kabul’s Role Since 2014
• National Unity Government (NUG) was tasked with reaching out to the Afghan Taliban and initiating dialogue with the Taliban.
President ghani made efforts and eganged with different ethnic nd political factions.On an international level, he reached out to
China, the Arab world and in particular Pakistan, seeking support for establishing a dialogue with the group. therefore, talks in
Doha from 2011-2013, track two initiatives like Pugwash in May 2015, Urumqi in June 2015 and multilateral ones such as the
Murree Peace Process in July 2015, Heart of Asia’ Ministerial Conference in December 2015 and the 2016 Quadrilateral
Coordination Group (QCG) to name a few.
• As no success was seen, therefore , the NUG initiated the Kabul Process in June 2017 when numerous peace initiatives towards the
Taliban failed to deliver. This development paved the way for the first “Afghan-led and -owned” modality of establishing security
cooperation at the regional level curbing the menace of terrorism and reinvigorating the otherwise stalled peace process.
• This ALAO initiative to solve the problems without the outside influence fell flat. As it was not inclusive and it made government realize that all talibans
inclusion is important.President Ghani tried to cajole them towards peace talks by offering to hold the talks at a mutually agreeable place, as well as
pledging the group an opportunity to open a representative office in Kabul once tangible progress is made in the talks.However, the Taliban rejected
Kabul’s offer, terming it as an attempt to not only endorse but prolong the foreign occupation of Afghanistan , perhaps because Kabul’s prerequisites for
the peace talks were “recognition of the Afghan constitution, continuity of the reforms of educating and advancing the rights of women, as well as the
renunciation of violence and links with terrorist groups.
• While the first Kabul process was an applaudable initiative, but it did not done much as taliban refused to entartain it. The second round of the Kabul
initiative in February 2018, however, redeemed the failures of its predecessor and marked the beginning of the peace process with the Taliban. During the
second round of Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation,
• To recognise the Taliban as a legitimate political group. To give the Taliban an autonomous office in Kabul. To release the Taliban prisoners. To remove
the Taliban from international blacklists. To give them security guarantees. To ensure a ceasefire along with giving offers to reintegrate and provide
support for employment if they were willing to join the peace process.President Ghani proposed:
• More significantly, for the first time in the history of the peace process, Ghani offered to hold new elections with the Taliban and a constitutional review, an
issue that has been on the Taliban’s agenda for a long while.In return for these momentous reforms, the group was expected to recognise the Ghani
administration as legitimate and uphold the rule of law particularly women rights.
• Ghan’si laboir paid off on june 5, 2018 and ceasire on eid june 2018, he inkled it as a chance to taliban to rethink their policy.Talibans reciprocated and
offered 3 days ceasefire.Taliban Spokesperson stated that it is evident by the ceasefire that the Taliban’s aspirations and demands align with the Afghan
people – removal of foreign elements and establishment of Islamic government25 and this proves, he maintained that they are a coherent group that can
be trusted.

• Taliban
• Who ever is the leader of talibans , talibans are following the ideology of the mulla Omar. after his death there were many division ocurred especially when
Mulla Mansoor was appointed, however many divided factions showed loyalty later , even Mulla omar son and brother. Mulah mansoor was seen as a
pragmatic leader of taliban who are working to changed the image of the taliban from more violent to pragmatic party capable to govern afghanistan.
• After his death, a more neutral leader haibatullah was appointed so that all leader keep united. In his leadership , afghanistan more
inclined towards the peace - y writing a letter in February 2018 to President Trump and the American people, calling for “peaceful
dialogue.”36 Since then, this was further followed by several significant developments such as the group’s acceptance of a three-day
ceasefire in June 2018, several rounds of negotiations with the US in Doha,38 Taliban’s active and public participation in the Moscow
Format and Moscow talks.
• They have abandoned their demand for a military victory, and ready to talk with US for their withdrawal, the showed positive signs for
women rights, open foreign policy, power sharing, Similarly, they have budged on their demand for a constitution embedded in the
rigid Islamic principles.
• Recognition for a Peaceful Settlement
• One of the most important factors that have led to strong prospects for successful peace dialogue in Afghanistan is the US divergence
from their old stance of not directly negotiating with the Taliban. Previously, the US had pushed for a direct bilateral dialogue between
Kabul-Taliban.However, with the US change of stance and willingness to accept the Taliban’s demands for direct talks resulted in the
meaningful manifestation of direct US-Taliban talks what is known as the Doha Peace Talks eventually leading to the signing of the
USTaliban peace deal on February 29, 2020.

• Doha Peace Talks

• Qatar acted as mediator between Kabul and talibance since 2011.In 2013, the initiative was able to reach a major milestone as it was
successful in opening up a political office for the group in Doha to pursue peace talks. the milestone was short lived as karzai
government back tracked.Talibans believed that they were decieved by the US and kabul. Even though the US and Qatar made several
attempts to salvage peace talks, the efforts failed to deliver until more recently, with the initiation of the Doha talks in July 2018.
• The 1st round of talks b/w Alice wells and talibans - july 2018 it failed , in september 2018, zalmy khalilzad was appointed. n october
2018 second round of talks were started but nothing much gained and 3rd round of talks were started in november 2018- no gains,
4th round of talks january 2019 took peace process in a positive direction. “both sides made significant progress on vital issues such
as counter-terrorism assurances, troop withdrawal, intra-Afghan dialogue, and a comprehensive ceasefire.
• Unfortunately, both sides failed to capitalise on the positive momentum of the fourth round as it also failed to achieve any
tangible progress. Khalilzad summed up the stumbling blocks “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed and everything
must include an intra-Afghan dialogue and comprehensive ceasefire.”
• The fifth round of talks took place between February and March 2019. Lasting for 11 days, these were among the highest
level of talks between the two sides.Hope for peace was once more reignited in May 2019 during the sixth round of talks,
when Zalmay Khalilzad met with Mullah Baradar where talks continued to revolve around “full withdrawal of foreign forces”
and “preventing Afghanistan from harming others.”The seventh round of talks took place on July 1, 2019the most important
development in the seventh round was the announcement of an intra-Afghan dialogue on July 7-8., 2019, between a sixty-
member delegation from Kabul consisting of members of the Ghani government in a personal capacity and different
political factions and a 16 member delegation from the Taliban
• In a meeting both side recognized the pain of war, taliban reduced violence and showed respect to women rights.The eight
round of talks took place from August 3-12, 2019, in which both parties voiced confidence towards a prospective peace
agreement.65 This was shorty followed by the ninth round which took place form August 22, 2019.66 Following the 9th
round, on September 2, 2019 Zalmay Khalilzad declared that both the US and Taliban had “an agreement in
principle.However, on September 7, 2019, President Trump cancelled a clandestine meeting with the Taliban, as well as a
separate one with President Ghani at Camp David due to the killing of a US soldier by the Taliban

• Revival of Talks
• An agreement was signed on February 29, 2020.Aimed at ending nearly two decades of bloodshed, the momentous
agreement was based on four main issues: (i) temporary ceasefire, (ii) withdrawal of foreign forces within a fourteen month
period, (iii) talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government and (iv) assurances that the Taliban will not participate in
or aid others in threatening the security of the US and its allies.
• the Ghani-Abdullah vendetta over the presidential elections as well as the inclusion of additional preconditions set by
President Ghani in the initial release of prisoners. Moreover, the additional challenge triggered by the ongoing Covid-19
pandemic that has claimed 807 Afghan lives led to delays in the talks.
• On May 17, 2020, Abdullah Abdullah was appointed as Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR)- Ended Political uncertainity
and gave attention to the peace process.This was followed by the Taliban declaring a 3-day ceasefire during Eid celebrations from May 24-26,
2020Hence, after months of uncertainty and utter confusion, the Afghan Government and the Afghan Taliban finally engaged officially, in direct talks
for the first time on September 12, 2020.
• However, so far all interactions have been limited to rules, regulations, and logistics leading to limited progress.The fact remains that this will be a
complex and long-drawn process, and deep cleavages and several long-standing issues of mistrust and suspicion will need to be overcome for the talks
to succeed.
• Assertion of Regional Actors
• Russia: With the exception of the Russia-China-Pakistan Trilateral Dialogue on Afghanistan which held its first session in 2013, Russia has been
minimally involved in the Afghan peace process in the past. However, Moscow’s involvements, since 2018, warrant renewed praise and
attention.Russia stance is that there can be no peace in Afghanistan without the involvement and inclusion of the Afghan Taliban.On November 2018,
the first instalment of these talks took place in Moscow, known as the Moscow Format.Furthermore, in February and May 2019, intra-Afghan talks took
place in Moscow promoting an Afghan-led and-owned process in which Russia encouraged all Afghan factions to get engaged in talks.The May 2019
intra-Afghan dialogue was especially a breakthrough.Russia objective is to fight against ISKP as well as bringing peace and stability in the Afghanistan.
Another reason ,s its desire to showcase itself as a leading player and advocate for peace, aposition that has been undermined by the US unilateralism.
• China Since 2014, China has moved away from its limited role in Afghanistan, to a more proactive one by not only supporting but also facilitating the
Afghan Peace process.hosting Afghan Taliban delegations to being a part of the Murree Peace Process in 2015, member of the QCG, Russia-China-
Pakistan Trilateral Dialogue and the China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Trilateral Dialogue. However, in the recent years, China has taken on a far more
significant role in Afghanistan’s peace process. This was exemplified in the June 2018 Taliban-Kabul ceasefire in which Beijing played the role of a
mediator..This new role of China became more apparent in June 2019, when Mullah Baradar headed a Taliban delegation to Beijing to discuss China’s
role in the region..
• Pakistan Apart from the Murree Peace Process of 2015, Pakistan hosted the “Lahore Process” of 2019 Apart from the Murree Peace
Process of 2015, Pakistan hosted the “Lahore Process” of 2019,the Lahore Process, like most of such conferences, failed to secure any
concrete developments in the peace process, it highlighted the need for constructive Pak-Afghan relations based on mutual trust.
Pakistan also played role in taliban ceasefire.June 2020, Pakistan appointed Muhammad Sadiq, Pakistan’s former Ambassador to Kabul,
as Pakistan’s Special Representative to Afghanistan.and met with taliban and afghan government members in doha for peace proces.
PM Imran hosted Abdullah Abdullah, and the latter acknowledged pakistan efforts.
• Future of Afghanistan: several impediments continue to stand in the way of peace: the ongoing violence by the
Taliban; external and internal spoilers as well as differences and divisions within Afghanistan.The group must realise that
violence cannot be used as a means to further their goals. If the Taliban truly want peace, they must honor their commitment
across the board and not differentiate between the US and Afghan government ─ those they can kill and those they cannot.
• Kabul should focus on political and national reconciliation as well as national and social healing ─ critical factors that have been
missing from the Afghan equation. Therefore, it is essential that the HCNR is given full autonomy to pursue peace without the
creation of unnecessary hurdles, be it from within the Afghan government or other quarters.Now that the talks are under way,
critical aspects essential for peace that were overlooked in the US-Taliban deal need to be addressed and focused upon by the
contact groups such as: withdrawal of troops, ceasefire and a future political structure.
• Withdrawl: the US must ensure a responsible withdrawal without undue haste. A hasty withdrawal would have catastrophic
consequences not only for Afghanistan but the region, as ISKP is very active in the the country.
• Ceasefire : In September 2020, President Ashraf Ghani called on the Taliban to enter into a humanitarian and nationwide
ceasefire.
• Counter-Terrorism Guarantees the fact that they have resisted ISKP since its inception in Afghanistan since 2014 and have been
engaged in bloody fight against the ISKP, which demonstrates the Taliban’s desire to disassociate itself from such groups.
• Future Political Set-up : While the Taliban have time and again claimed that they do not aspire for a monopoly of power and
envisage an inclusive Afghanistan, there needs to be more clarity on their part regarding what kind of government they will be
willing to participate in. Similarly, the Taliban’s position on the constitution remains ambiguous to say the least. Hence, it is
essential that Kabul as well as the Taliban’s positions are ascertained

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 5- 5th GW AND HYBRID WARFARE ITS IMPLICATIONS
AND RESPONSE OPTIONS
• INTRODUCTION: The 5GW has been studied since the 9/11 incident. It is defined as the use of “all mean whatsoever” – means
that involve the force of arms and means that do not involve the force of arms, means that involve military power and means that do not
involve military power, means that entail casualties, and means that do not entail casualties – to force the enemy to serve one’s own
interest. Its first identifiable manifestations occurred in the United States during the anthrax attacks of 2001.
• The distinctive lines between war and peace have faded to a greater extent. Space for classical state vs state, military to military
confrontation is being captured by state vs nonstate actors and criminal groups. Of late the concepts of 5GW, hybrid threats and Hybrid
War have come under sharp focus amongst military and security academia, world over. Pakistan since its inception has confronted
multifaceted challenges however, in recent pastsouth Asian security environment has changed dramatically, with few key developments
dominating security agendas. Therefore, without ignoring the internal fissures / fault-lines and the nature of threat to country from hostile
countries, warrants a critical examination of the situation by identifying the hybrid threat confronting by Pakistan with a view to suggest
aresponse that could enable the state to build resilience to these threats
• STRATEGIC APPRAISAL The modern world is characterized by explosion of knowledge, information and rapid advancements in almost all
facets of human life. Military art and science are no exception to this ever-growing transformation and expansion.Non-Kinetic challenges to
the states are more pronounced than Kinetic ones in today’s world. it is the Non-Kineticism which is more seriously explored now a days by
nations and societies to advance their interests. Any evaluation or analysis of wars and conflicts will be incomplete without a context to the
prevailing situation at global and regional level.

• Global Environment. World is transiting from unipolartiy to multipolarity which is ikely to give rise to sub-conventional warfare.
• Morphed Threat Dynamics.Transiting world order and prevalent uncertainties with reduced credibility of superpower assurances has
also morphed the threat dynamics,
• US Rebalance to Asia/Indo-Pacific strategy create security challanges for Pakistan.
• Expanding Cyberspace. Expanding cyberspace provides fertile ground for battle of narratives and also acts as enabler for
hybrid threats
• Climate Change. Global warming and changing climate is increasingly affecting the national security paradigm of states.
Threat of water wars further complicates the situation and makes human security a challenge for states like Pakistan.
• Regional Environment : That posses threat to Pakistan’s security.
• 1- Instability in afghanistan, 2- Middle east crisis 3-Iran and West tensions 4- Border disputes.
• Domestic Environment : Governance, Economy , Terrorism, CPEC challanges , Rule of Law, Democracy etc there is a need
to review our strengths and weaknesses or existing fault lines.
• Strengths / Opportunities
• Geo-strategic location and relevance for regional and global agendas / An awakening civil society. /An independent and
assertive judiciary /An essentially working democratic structure with optimism in its functionality. /An elaborate security
apparatus with credible conventional andunconventional deterrence capabilities. /A well-developed infrastructure and an
industrious human resource /Economic potential and abundant natural resources awaitin realization.
• Fault Lines Countrywide will and cohesion /Declining economy and its negative impact on masses./ Overly personalized
political discourse. / Radicalization / extremism and sub-nationalism / Religious, social, economic and ethnic divide and
deteriorating human security situation.. Absence of a well-defined National Security Management System.
EVOLUTION OF GENERATIONS OF WARFARE
. Historians have widely noticed the social,political and economic factors in shaping evolution of conflict Cultural and
intellectual changes have played a powerful role as thinking about the future have influenced the way we speculate about
war so much that we often use them.
• Defining generations of Warfare
• First Generation : warfare reflects
tactics of the era of the smoothbore
musket, the tactics of line and column.
Second Generation. Second generation
warfare was a response to the rifled
musket, breechloaders, barbed wire,
the machine gun, and indirect fire.
Tacticswere based on fire and movement,
and they remained essentially linear.
Thedefense still attempted to prevent
all penetrations, and in the attack a

laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small groups. Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy
reliance on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French maxim, "the artillery conquers, the infantry
occupies."
Third Generation. Third generation warfare was also a response to the ncrease in battlefield firepower. However, the driving force
was primarily ideas, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on infiltration to bypass and
collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them.The defense was in depth and often invited
penetration, which set the enemy up for a counterattack. the addition of a new technological element-tanks-brought about a major
shift at the operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg
• Fourth Generation. This is perhaps the shortest era and can be easily defined as transitional in nature. Where states
took on non-state actors or vice versa. A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or religion; highly
sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media, are key characteristics of this
generation. Fourth generation warfare uses all available networks political, economic, social, and military to convince the
enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It
is an evolved form of insurgency
• Transition to Next Generation. Current events suggest that there are a number of ongoing major developments in 4GW
• Strategic Shift. Strategically, insurgent campaigns have shifted from military campaigns supported by information
operations to strategic communications campaigns supported by guerrilla and terrorist operations.
• Organizational Shift. The emergence of civil war as a part of insurgency is based on the major organizational shift that
has occurred since Mao formulated his concept. It reflects the continuous, worldwide shift from hierarchical to networked
organizations.
• Shift in Participants.Even within a single country, the highly diverse armed groups that make up a modern insurgency
have widely differing motivations. These motivations can be reactionary, opportunistic and ideological as well.
• EMERGENCE OF 5GW AND UNDERSTANDING HYBRID WARFARE
• “The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden.” Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui
• “Warfare that uses all means whatsoever - means that involve force or arms and means that do not involve force or
arms; means that involve mil power and means that do not involve mil power; means that entail casualties and
means that do not entail casualties to force an enemy to serve one’s own interests” book, titled Unrestricted
Warfare, published in 1999, Col Liang and Xiangsui
• “5GW is an extension of Asymmetrical and Insurgent Warfare, whereby the enemy uses all means, conventional and unconventional
tactics. It includes political, religious and social causes; incorporates information operations campaigns (internet and 24 hours news
cycle) can be conducted by organization or un-organized groups; may be nation state led or non-nation state led to disrupt and defeat
opponents in order to achieve their will”
• Theory of 5GW: Anthrax and Ricin attacks on Capitol Hill during 2001, may be early examples of 5GW6 . Both sets of attacks require
specialized knowledge, including attacks upon federal government offices and facilities
, succeeded in disrupting governmental processes and created widespread
fear in the public Military scholars and thinkers have ident four basic
elements that form the basis for shaping the future evolution of war
.• New domains of conflict. • Changing nature of adversaries
. • Changing nature of objectives. • Changing
ature of force.in modern era of war these elements of war
generally remained as“Constants”. However, in the
postmodern era of war, developments in the fields of technology,
politics, economy and social organizations have been
phenomenal. Globalization has resulted integration
of IT with all other concurrent and emerging technologies
triggering a boost in their development trajectory. As a result
, the war has been pushed beyond the purely military realm
by transforming its basic elements, necessitating a review of
their understanding.1
1. New Domains of Conflict: Fifth generation warfare transcends fourth generation warfare by expanding the domains of conflict
even further to include the physical (including land, air, and sea), information (including cyber), cognitive, and social (including
political) domains
• Physical Domain: e. It spans the traditional land, sea, air, and space domains where military forces execute operations, and where
most conventional warfare is conducted
• Information Domain. The domain where information is created, manipulated, and shared. It spans the cyber domain.
• Cognitive Domain.The domain where intent, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures reside. It is the domain where decisive
concepts emerge.
• Social Domain. It is where humans interact, exchange information, form shared awareness and understandings, and make
collaborative decisions. It is also the domain of culture, religion, values, attitudes, and beliefs, and where political decisions related to
the “will of the community” are made.
2. Changing Nature of Adversaries. “It empowers an entity with the economic and technical means, and motivated by self-interest,
with the ability to wage war . super-empowered individuals, groups, gangs, ethnic or religious interests groups, social and political
networks which have the potential to form extremely powerful combinations, generally referred to as “supracombinations”
3. Changing Nature of Objectives. This can be described by relating the evolution of objectives with corresponding defeat
mechanisms.For understanding defeat mechanism a useful frame of reference can be Wass de Czege’s notion of three operational
defeat mechanisms of attrition; dislocation, and disintegration. This notion can be extended to include annihilation, attrition of
resources, maneuver, attrition of will, and implosion as defeat mechanism corresponding to the five generations of war. 5GW
practioners remain vulnerable to military defeat through use of implosion or the inward collapse of their organizations by inducing
inertia, as a defeat mechanism. “By viewing networks and supra-combinations as processes rather than entities, it becomes possible to
attack their sub processes including leadership development; alliance building; public and ideological outreach; acquisition of funding,
material, shelter and support; recruitment; organization of efforts; indoctrination and training of personnel.
4-Changing Nature of Force
• “Force as a concept” expands tremendously to include any and every means, kinetic or non- kinetic, military or non-military and when skillfully applied in
different combinations can successfully defeat a military adversary.

• Understanding the Hybrid Warfare:

In order to dwell upon the concept of hybrid warfare, it is important to discuss the salient aspects first, which are given below:
• Salient Aspects. Hybrid warfare is often explained with the following aspects:
• Characteristics of Adversaries A hybrid adversary can be state or non-state.- E.G Isreal- Hezbolla War, Syrian Civil war and then Russian Involvement in
Ukraine.
• Methods and Tactics of Adversaries : Methods and tactics include conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, irregular formations, terrorist acts,
indiscriminate violence, and criminal activities
• Flexibility and Adaptability: For example, the Islamic State’s response to the U.S aerial bombing campaign was to quickly reduce the use of checkpoints,
large convoys, and cell phones. IS militants are also dispersed among the civilian population. Civilian collateral damage from airstrikes can be used as an
effective recruiting tool.
• Use of Advanced Weapons and Technology:
• Battlefields. A hybrid war takes place on three distinct battlefields: the conventional battlefield, the indigenous population of the conflict zone, and the
international community

• Phases of Hybrid Warfare: ( Make a box of 4 blocks and add these phases in them)
• Phase - 1- the aggressor uses subversive activities to destabilize the target stateThese activities are mainly targeted to attack the public morale and the
will to resist the intervention.
• Phase - 2. In this phase the target state is subjected to proxy warfare which has a deep destabilizing effect. For example, in the Middle East, proxy wars
between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
• Phase - 3.The aggressor uses coercion in this phase to substitute his will to the target’s. -physical and physiological. In physical coercion, target state is
subjected to use or threat of use of military forces, whereas diplomatic isolation is the best form of physiological coercion.
• Phase - 4. After having successfully completed the initial phases, the aggressor openly uses conventional forces against
the target to achieve the desired objective.
• Difference between 5GW and Hybrid Warfare:
• 5GW
• • It is primarily evolved from previous four generations of warfare. • Major components include
information and cyber threats. • This type of warfare can be waged by states/ non-state actors. • It is a
blend of kinetic and non-kinetic warfare. • 5GW is mainly waged in social and cognitive domain. • The
proponents of 5GW avoid conventional military confrontation.
• Hybrid Warfare
• • Hybrid warfare is a mixture of first three generations of warfare with either fourth or fifth generation
warfare. • Major components of Hybrid Warfare include kinetic operations along with non-kinetic
operations. • This form of warfare can only be waged by a state capable of launching conventional war
onto the adversaryOppressor state may employ non-state actors as tools to fulfill the objective. • It is
predominantly kinetic form of warfare. • Hybrid warfare is waged primarily in physical and conventional/
sub conventional domain. • Hybrid warfare seeks conventional military confrontation as the last decisive
option. • It mainly aims at regime change/ overpowering target state.
• PREVAILING THREAT OF 5GW / HYBRID WARFARE TO PAKISTAN:
• We face many external threats, whereas, on internal front, we face host of challengers with varying objectives, ranging
from political anarchy to separatist demands. External forces can synchronize with internal players, to posea hybrid threat.
External and internal threats if not curtailed can merge to achieve short term goals and then can go to create situations
leading to our regression on core issues.
• Non-State Actors. Unlike the 4GW or the insurgency warfare (e.g. Vietnam, Afghanistan) the non-state actors are no
longer mere proxies of a country but are the prime threat to its existence - Example- TTP,ISIS,Sectarian org (Explain them)
• State Actors. Hybrid threat waged by a state against another state has four strands i.e. political subversion, proxies,
coercive deterrence and intervention.
• Political Subversion ( Expalin in the form of headings) - Diplomatic. Economic (CPEC), Military., Nuclear assets.
• Psychological Subversion. Psychological subversion is being done through demoralization and destabilization
• Proxy Warfare :
• Establishing Front Groups. Front groups have been created and various religious organization have also used the
humanitarian cover to further their agendas.
• Infiltrating the Institutions of the State. It has four stages namely gaining information, spreading rumours, corruption
and talent spots to have their agents in major organizations.
• CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED WAY FORWARD
• first four generations of warfare can be labeled as: • 1GW - War of Line and Column • 2GW - Trench Warfare • 3GW - Maneuver Warfare •
4GW - Irregular Warfare • 4GW vs 5GW. Difference between 4GW and 5GW is of Motives, Technology and Empowered Individuals. Hybrid
Warfare. This form of warfare is a combination of conventional andun-conventional warfare (1GW, 2GW and 3GW combined with 4GW and /
or5GW).
• Conclusions Relevant to 5GW :Attacks in cyber domain can
disable official websites and networks, disrupt or disable essential
services, steal or alter classified data and cripple financial systems
& electricity grids, among other possibilities. 5GW is a kinetic
application tool of Smart Power which, while
remaining under full blown military / kinetic applications, works
to convince enemy's political decision makers that their strategic
goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefits.a deliberate
attempt to manage public’s perception on a subject through sensitization
Conclusions Relevant to Hybrid Warfare In the 21st Century, diplomacy has eclipsed military as the most important instrument of statecraft, as it
alone can now impair the will of an adversary to a level of extracting willingness, without resorting to kinetic actions or with limited conventional
actions. Power of information and media is undeniable in today’s world, a nothing can escape its glare. Thus, public messaging has now become
the prime means for initiating and, thereafter, application of nonkinetic means. Narratives and counter narratives are today’ accepted norms of
statecraft with the aim of moulding attitudes, behaviours and decisions of target audience, through multi-mediatools in order to further own
interests. • Non Kineticism is the root to application of Hybrid means. Kinetic means can be land, air and sea power. Whereas NonKinetic means
are information, technology, culture, ideology, media, movies, pacts, legal barriers, financial and military aids, EBOs, espionage and intelligence
apparatus including cybernetics and psychological tools.
Presence of multiple threats and vulnerabilities provide ample ground for furthering hybrid war against Pakistan.
• Recommendations:
1. Short Term Measure :
 Unveil A Multilateral Intelligence-Sharing Mechanism- Pak shall propose all regional states & US, Russia shall share
intelligence with one another.
 Make a Case at the United Nations:to regain international image and to utilize this global platform to inform the
world about its forthcoming actions.
 National Strategy Evolution of national strategy must take place side by side through evolving trends of war-fighting.
Institutions need to evolve mechanisms which will produce constant feedback and independent think-tanks are best
suited for the task.
 Clarity of terminal goals and objectives. While formulating counter strategy one must have clarity of terminal goals
and objectives which will ultimately help in designing mission, requirement of force, material and medium. Some key
goals to be set against vulnerabilities identified in preceding paras are:- • National cohesion. • Political stability. •
Strong economy. • De-radicalisation of masses. • Ethno-religious harmony. • Ensuring provision of justice.
 Awareness at Gross Root Level.:
 Projection of Military Engagements The projection will make up the mind of opponent or force opponent to ease out
the way for safe passage. Projection must be done through effective media campaigns and stronger liaison within
agencies.
 Execute Aggressive Conventional Military Operations. Aggressive kinetic / military operations must be conducted
against the asymmetric / irregular component of such threats. That’s the only possible way to use weak links within
the hostile forces.
 Ensuring Success of CPEC : Bring other parties, excute projects timely , ensure transparency , ensure its security.
 Exposing Anti-Pakistan Designs Regionally and Globally:
• Mid Term Measures
 War Fighting Concepts. In line with the changing threat spectrum, war-fighting concepts of Pakistani Armed Forces must
evolve too.Evaluation of doctrines with regards to Hybrid war. Integration / fusion of various defence organisations within
armed forces, thereby ensuring seamless intelligence sharing at all levels.Re-hashing of techniques and procedures at lower
and higher levels. Enhancing capability of battalions.
 Economic / Financial Reforms.
 Speed of Information. Communication infrastructure and tools should allow faster transmission of information: as close to
real-time as possible. A country should develop all modern and primitive modes of communication to build a Strategic
Communication Network. A forum be formed to ensure conception and implementation in this field.
 Strategic Economy. Economic infrastructure should be able to defend itself against global recessions, enemies sabotage and
natural disasters. Economy should ensure continuous supply of food and energy, as both will ensure sound economy in turn.
 • Technological Advancements. Technology will likely to remain the single most important factor in evolving trends of war-
fighting. Pakistan is on the right path of attaining the newest of technologies.
• Long Term Measures
 Information Control.
 Inter-Ministerial Cooperation.Inter-Agency Working Groups, at experts’ level be created, for various issues for operations
planning. Their sub-groups can serve to solve ministerial issues at lower levels
 Utility of Think Tanks and Narrative Culture. Use think Tanks, Promotion of freedom of expression and investment in
people becomes the urgent course of action for neutralizing the hybrid war tactics used against Pakistan. Development of
quality human resource is necessary for effectively calibrating and disseminating Pakistan’s perspective in international
arena where competing narratives battle for and against a nation overwhelmingly.
Specific Capabilities to Counter Hybrid War. Specific capabilities are a hallmark of any solution
against the hybrid threats / warfare discussed in preceding paras. Therefore, it is highly advisable to formulate and
implement measures that create specific capabilities to counter threats of any hybrid war against Pakistan. Some of
these are listed below:- • Counter/conduct Irregular Warfare (IW) • Cyber Defence • Information Operations (INFO
OPS) • Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) • Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) • Civil-Military Operations
(CIMIC) • Special Operations Forces (SOF)• Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN)
 Provision of General Capabilities of Institutions. Government needs to ensure development and provision of
necessary capabilities in all domains. Police, gendarmerie, civil protection, administration, and justice to name a few
can be starters. Provision of specific training, together with military components, must also be ensured concurrently.
 AdaptableMilitary Power. Military power should be strong, flexible enough to absorb and respond to developing
trends in warfare.Following must be ensured in this regard:- • Modernisation of military equipment and intelligence
means War-gaming and preparing for all possible scenarios • Speeding up the process of Net Enabled and Net-
Centric capabilities
 6- The Indian Hybrid Warfare Strategy: Implications for
Pakistan
• Introduction:war now is not fought in the battlefields where we can classify the protagonists as victors or losers.
Now war is fought on different avenues. The mode of warfare techniques in modern times are not just contained to
conventional means but has encompassed both conventional and non-conventional tactics and strategies - it is also
called hybrid warfare or fifth generation warfare.
• Hybrid warfare strategy is actually the use of all elements of the national power against the adversary which involves
the technological and cognitive warfare, the subset of which is then the information warfare. The perception
management and the thought process of the individual camp of the adversary is used as a tool of exploitation to
achieve the political objectives and aims. It is an asymmetric and irregular form of warfare that includes the element
of ambiguity as well as deniability. The target may not know where it is being attacked from, and the weapons are,
at times, abstractive or cognitive and the enemy is always in denial of those attacks.
• Lessons from the Russian Experiences in Crimea : Russia used both conventional as well as non-conventional
modes of warfare - which are the components of Hybrid warfare - to annex Crimea. The factors of deniability and
ambiguity were also there. irregular warfare is executed on a dual premise, that is to say that it either includes a
support of the population or support of the regime.In the first case, in the support of the population, it would
include supporting an insurgent movement, and in the second case, in the support of the regime it would include
supporting the government to suppress a secessionist movement. This has been the case in Crimea where the
support of the population was executed as policy of Irregular warfare by Russia (Erol & Oguz, 2015). The
government of Crimea was challenged by a resistance group with the backing of Russia guised in military uniform
without revealing their identities,
• Apart from the use of hard power, soft power usage has also been observed in Crimean case as the activities of little
green men in the non_x0002_conventional fronts provide a manifestation. The regime changes and the use of proxy wars
is another element of the hybrid warfare. Russia has been initially denying all the claims made of its involvement in
Crimea, Russia had this leverage of deniability because the guised military men had not revealed their identities. It was
later revealed however by some leaked documents that Putin actually ordered his men to annex Crimea.
• As discussed before, information warfare is also an important subset of hybrid warfare and is used as an empowered tool
against the adversary. In the case study of Russian annexation of Crimea, the use of information warfare tactics has
extensively been used. In March 2014, Ukraine accused Russia of disrupting communication systems through cyber-
attacks as well as hacking news websites and defacing social media with propaganda messages.
• Theoretical Framework: Strategic Interaction Theory: Strategic Interaction theory explains the asymmetric conflict and
posits the tactics a weaker party uses in order to win a war. The use of offensive and defensive strategies is made by the
strong actor and the weak actor respectively. The strong actor uses the barbarism in order to change the will of the
adversary and to eliminate its capacity via coercion and pain infliction. While the weak actor uses guerrilla warfare
strategies which Kautilya has termed as „concealed warAs the US ability to win war in in Afghanistan is in question,
despite of being a strong actor, but Taliban are using GWS and targeting their will to fight. Then, there is the
• concept of indirect offense vs. direct defense where the indirect offensive strategy is used to target the defender‟s will to
resist. Economic sanctions and strategic bombing are forms of indirect offense against direct defense where actor is
strong. The domestic factors of an adversary state can also be targeted in this case that further exploits the situation for
the defender. The strategic interaction theory provides some implications for Pakistan which confronts an adversary
having hegemonic ambitions, i.e. India. How a weak power can win the war implies some strategies given by the strategic
interaction theory which are relevant in case of India and Pakistan.
• Kautilya’s Undeclared Warfare Strategy To achieve the political goals, the ruler must have all elements of power whether they are
economic, social or military. Kautilya suggests that there are three types of warfare, “open warfare, concealed warfare, and silent
warfare” Silent war, is the one in which the normal business of the state carries on as usual without any disruption. People of the land
are not aware of any activities related to war and even at the official level the relations of the states are established normally. The
battleground in this kind of war is established through spies and undercover operatives who intend to create internal divide in the
enemy state by assassinating key figures.
• Pakistan and India N-states and they employ non-conventional means including asymmetrical and irregular warfare that is usually covert
and is used to achieve the political objectives.Pakistan Army Chief General Bajwa stated “Pakistan is facing enormous challenges both
in conventional and sub_x0002_conventional means and that our enemy knows that they cannot beat us fair and square, and thus
have subjected us to cruel, evil, and protracted hybrid warfare” India has been in a continuous effort to sabotage stability in Pakistan
to achieve its political gains
• As a result of globalization, it is not possible for a state to survive alone. For survival, a state needs to interact with its neighbors and
other nations of the world. So, there is a strategic interaction that may be societal, economic, diplomatic, political, informational,
infrastructural, and environmental as well as on different other heads. And war is possible on all of these fronts. Modern war is fought
via policies.
• The critical vulnerability is what the adversary should know in order to attack within the spectrum of a particular framework. Pakistan is
facing the ethnic conflict issue in home and India knows this fact. So, India best uses its capabilities to exploit the situation and there is a
crippling of the society of which Pakistan cannot put the blame on India because element of deniability is the beauty of hybrid warfare
technique.
• Of the many categories that occupy hybrid warfare, some important ones are: Conventional, Cyber, Political, Environmental,
Informational and Infrastructural. The capabilities are dependent on the vulnerabilities of the opponent. The weak sectors of Pakistan
are more prone to the attacks of India. Apart from the conventional warfare and tactics, India has been using non_x0002_conventional
methods against Pakistan. Pakistan is a security centric state which India is well aware of. So strategic interactiorevealed to india that
pakistan is more concerned of security therefore attack the foundations of it- Economy and Development.
• A number of precedents and evidences are available which clearly show that India is involved in the exploitation of different sectors
where it finds the vacuum. Kulbushan Yadav‟s case and Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval‟s doctrine against Pakistan support
this argument. Certain arenas where Pakistan is vulnerable and is been exploited by its adversaries can be:
• First, Strategic interaction in terms of economy is relevant as Pakistan‟s economic conditions are vulnerable in context of
CPEC and regional system.
• Second, environmental factor is another non-traditional threat where again Pakistan is vulnerable and gives enemy a
chance to further exploit the situation. India has control over the water flow from the Himalayan Karakorum range that
flows in the Indus valley.
• Third, ethnic and the sectarian conflicts as the critical vulnerability within a country strengthen the hybrid warfare
capabilities of the adversary. Balochistan separatist movement is getting stronger and some of the Baloch people have
hatred sentiments against the state and the establishment. Poverty and lack of education further exacerbate the
situation. According to a recent report 60% of Pakistan‟s population lives in rural areas with their basic needs not
satisfied and it is easy to exploit this population against the state. As an example, the deep sectarian, ethnic, and
economic divisions in Syrian society were exploited by both Iran and ISIL with a view to achieving their strategic
objectives.
• Fourth, cyber security paradigm is also of fundamental importance with the advancement of technology. The method of
warfare has changed and the cyber security breaches pose big challenges and have effect on the foreign policy of states
and the bilateral ties.
• Apart from these domains, terrorism breeding in Pakistan is also a critical vulnerability. Indian sponsored terrorism in
Afghanistan and operating in Pakistan are also a serious threat to the state‟s security and stability. Narcoterrorism in this
category cannot be ignored.
• According to Christopher Paul, Hybrid warfare is a conflict that “blurs the distinction between war and peace,and
combatants and non-combatants”
• US marine strategic vision group has concluded that: “Hybrid wars combine a range of different modes of warfare,
including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence, and
coercion and criminal disorder”
• Implications for Pakistan: A strong hold on domestic grounds weakens the hybrid warfare capabilities of
adversary.
• Conclusion Kautilya in his teachings does not remain limited to the discussion of spies-K.B,Yadav but he
also deliberates on the further extension of diplomacy which he refers to as offensive diplomacy and is of
the view that offensive diplomacy as a policy posture must be adopted by states. He views diplomacy as a
step by step process in which the purpose is to overpower the enemy in a „subtle act of war‟ with the
purpose to secure victory. Putting theory into practice we then see the display of Kautilya‟s teachings in
India‟s foreign policy where it has blamed Pakistan with impunity that it was involved in the recent terrorist
attacks that took place in IHK. On a regional level, India‟s effort on a multilateral level to involve regional
states such as Bangladesh and Afghanistan to boycott the meeting of South Asian Association for Regional
Co-operation (SAARC).
7-Soft Power
 8-Short of War-How to Keep U.S.-Chinese Confrontation
From Ending in Calamity by Kevin Rudd
• The Chinese Communist Party is increasingly con#dent that by the decade’s end, China’s economy will #nally surpass that
of the United States as the world’s largest in terms of GDP at market exchange rates.Taking the number one slot will
turbocharge Beijing’s con#dence, assertiveness, and leverage in its dealings with Washington, and it will make China’s
central bank more likely to 4oat the yuan, open its capital account, and challenge the U.S. dollar as the main global
reserve currency.A new policy plan, announced last fall, aims to allow China to dominate in all new technology domains,
including arti#cial intelligence, by 2035. And Beijing now intends to complete its military modernization program by 2027
with the main goal of giving China a decisive edge in all conceivable scenarios for a con4ict with the United States over
Taiwan.
• Managed strategic competition would involve establishing certain hard limits on each country’s security policies and
conduct but would allow for full and open competition in the diplomatic, economic, and ideological realms. It would also
make it possible for Washington and Beijing to cooperate in certain areas, through bilateral arrangements and also
multilateral forums.
• BEIJING’S LONG VIEW:
• The only thing that could lead the Chinese people to rise up against the party-state, however, is their own frustration with
the CCP’s poor performance on addressing unemployment, its radical mismanagement of a natural disaster (such as a
pandemic), or its massive extension of what is already intense political repression. Outside encouragement of such
discontent, especially from the United States, is unlikely to help and quite likely to hinder any change.
• Xi one of his main goals is to remain in power until 2035, COVID-19 pandemic, whose Chinese origins put the CCP on the
defensive. But by the year’s end, o0cial Chinese media were hailing him
• Xi has carried out a massive crackdown on China’s Uighur minority in the region of Xinjiang; launched campaigns of repression in
Hong Kong, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet; and sti/ed dissent among intellectuals, lawyers, artists, and religious organizations across
China. China economy is strong enough capable to bear the sanctions by the USA, and other countries will not follow suit the USA
because of fear of china’s retaliation.
• so to avoid criticism Beijing has become more active in international forums, including the UN Human Rights Council- where it
campaigns to push back against long-established universal norms on human rights, and criticize USA for its abuses.
• Xi in order to aviod the USA effect to hit its economy and rise, china introduced “dual circulation economy”: its shift away from export
dependency and toward domestic consumption as the long-term driver of economic growth and its plan to rely on the gravitational
pull of the world’s biggest consumer market to attract foreign investors and suppliers to China on Beijing’s terms. And Technological
advancement and manufacturing to reduce China’s dependence on imports of certain core technologies, such as semiconductors.
• Xi appears to have concluded that China and Taiwan are now further away from peaceful reuni)cation than at any time in the past 70
years.Xi’s strategy now is clear: to vastly increase the level of military power that China can exert in the Taiwan Strait, to the extent
that the United States would become unwilling to fight a battle that Washington itselfjudged it would probably lose.Without U.S.
backing, Xi believes, Taiwan would either capitulate or #ght on its own and lose.
• As for China’s maritime and territorial claims in the East China and South China Seas, Xi will not concede an inch. Beijing will continue
to sustain pressure on its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea actively contesting freedom-of-navigation operations.
• . In the East China Sea, China will continue to increase its military pressure on Japan around the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, but
as in Southeast Asia, here too Beijing is unlikely to risk an armed confict, particularly given the unequivocal nature of the U.S. security
guarantee to Japan.
• AMERICA THROUGH XI’S EYES
• The United States is experiencing a steady, irreversible structural decline. The Trump administration damaged U.S. alliances,
abandoned trade liberalization, withdrew the United States from its leadership of the postwar international order, and crippled U.S.
diplomatic capacity.Washington, Xi believes, is highly unlikely to recover its credibility and con*dence as a regional and global leader.
• Xi’s concern is not just a potential military con,ict but also any rapid and radical economic decoupling. the Biden administration,
realizing that the United States will soon be unable to match Chinese power on its own, might form an e!ective coalition of countries
across the democratic capitalist President Joe Biden’s proposal to hold a summit of the world’s major democracies represents a %rst
step on that path, which is why China acted rapidly to secure new trade and investment agreements in Asia and Europe before the
new administration came into o&ce.
• Xi’s general diplomatic strategy toward the Biden administration will be to de-escalate immediate tensions, stabilize the bilateral
relationship as early as possibleTo this end, Beijing will look to fully reopen the lines of high-level military communication with
Washington that were largely cut o! during the Trump administration. Finally, Beijing may moderate its military activity in the
immediate period ahead .
• Xi will wait for any clear signal from Washington that part of the price for stabilizing the U.S.-Chinese relationship would be an end to
such coercive measures against U.S. partners.
• Xi hopes that greater collaboration on climate will help stabilize the U.S.-Chinese relationship more generally, ashe knows that Biden
will want to be able to demonstrate that his engagement with Beijing led to reductions in Chinese carbon emissions.
• UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT
• China was able to exploit the many cracks that developed between liberal democracies as they tried to navigate Trump’s
protectionism, climate change denialism, nationalism, and contempt for all forms of multilateralism. China achieved victories such as
the massive Asia-Paci#c free-trade deal known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the EU-China
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, which will enmesh the Chinese and European economies to a far greater degree than
Washington would like.
• Biden’s advisers also understand that in order to restore U.S. power abroad, they must rebuild the U.S. economy at home in ways that
will reduce the country’s staggering inequality and increase economic opportunities for all Americans To lend his strategy credibility,
Biden will have to make sure the U.S. military stays several steps ahead of China’s increasingly sophisticated array of military
capabilities.
• United States will soon require the combined heft of its allies to maintain an overall balance of power against an adversary. China will
keep trying to peel countries away from the United States—such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the
United Kingdom—using a combination of economic carrots and sticks.
• To prevent China from succeeding, the Biden administration needs to commit itself to fully opening the U.S. economy to its major strategic
partners. But even before Trump’s pivot to protectionism, that was not the case. Washington has long burdened even its closest allies with
formidable tari, and nontari, barriers to trade, investment, capital, technology, and talent. To do so, Biden must overcome the protectionist
impulses that Trump exploited and build support for new trade agreements anchored in open markets.
• The Biden administration will also strive to restore the United States’ leadership in multilateral institutions such as the UN, the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. The most pressing priorities are *xing the World Trade Organization’s
broken dispute-resolution process, rejoining the Paris agreement on climate change, increasing the capitalization of both the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (to provide credible alternatives to China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and its Belt and Road
Initiative).
• MANAGED STRATEGIC COMPETITION:
• The idea of managed strategic competition is anchored in a deeply realist view of the global order. It accepts that states will continue to seek
security by building a balance of power in their favor, while recognizing that in doing so they are likely to create security dilemmas for other
states whose fundamental interests may be disadvantaged by their actions. The trick in this case is to reduce the risk to both sides as the
competition between them unfolds by jointly crafting a limited number of rules of the road that will help prevent war.
• The ,rst step to building such a framework would be to identify a few immediate stepsBoth sides must abstain, for example, from cyberattacks
targeting critical infrastructure. Washington must return to strictly adhering to the “one China” policy, especially by ending the Trump
administration’s provocative and unnecessary high-level visits to Taipei. For its part, Beijing must dial back its recent pattern of provocative
military exercises, deployments, and maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait. In the South China Sea, Beijing must not reclaim or militarize any more
islands and must commit to respecting freedom of navigation and aircraft movement without challenge; for its part, the United States and its
allies could then (and only then) reduce the number of operations they carry out in the sea. Similarly, China and Japan could cut back their
military deployments in the East China Sea by mutual agreement over time.
• Even amid escalating competition, however, there will be some room for cooperation in a number of critical areas. This occurred even
between the United States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. It should certainly be possible now between the United States
and China, when the stakes are not nearly as high.
• Cooperation can be on CTBT,Climate change, North korea and preventing iran from getting nuclear weapon..They could undertake a series of
con#dence-building measures across the IndoPaci#c region, such as coordinated disaster-response and humanitarian missions. They could
work together to improve global #nancial stability.
 Opening Up the Order
• The vaccine race involved transnational networks of researchers, foundations, and businesses, all motivated by di!erent incentives yet
working together for a common cause.
• Still, with the rise of China, the fraying of the postwar liberal international order, and the drawbridge-up mentality accelerated by the
pandemic, realpolitik is back in vogue, leading some to propose recentering international relations on a small group of powerful states.
• We do not need new bureaucracies,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres has written. “But we do need a networked
multilateralism that links global and regional institutions. We also need an inclusive multilateralism that engages businesses, cities,
universities and movements.” It is a dark time for global politics. States are adapting to a world of multiple power centers and complex
issues that require coordination at every level of society. Four years of erratic, personality-driven leadership in the United States under
President Donald Trump, moreover, have left the liberal order in tatters. To repair it, leaders need to tap the talent and resources
outside the state. Humanity cannot a$ord to go back to a world in which only states matter.
• THE CASE FOR EXPANSION
• States create international orders to, well, establish order—that is, to fight chaos, solve problems, and govern. The liberal international
order is a subset of this idea, a set of institutions, laws, rules, procedures, and practices that shaped international cooperation after
World War II. But the world cannot successfully address twenty-#rst-century
• threats and challenges, such as climate change, pandemic disease, cybercon4ict, and inequality, without mobilizing a new set of
actors. Existing institutions, although valuable, were built for a world of concentrated power, in which a handful of states called the
shots. Today, power is much more di!use, with nonstate actors strong enough to both create international problems and help solve
them.
• Accordingly, the current order needs to expand not by di!erentiating between various kinds of states but by making room for new
categories of nonstate actors.Unilateral action by national governments was often decisive in curbing the disease. Despite all the
criticism they have received, international organizations were also essential. The World Health Organization- shipped tests and millions
of pieces of protective gear to more than 100 countries.
• Also critical, however, were many other actors outside the state-by the end of 2020, the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation had donated $1.75 billion to the global COVID-19 response. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness
Innovations, a global vaccine-development partnership of public, private, and civil society organizations, raised $1.3
billion for COVID-19 vaccine candidates, two of which, the Moderna vaccine and the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine, are
already being administered to the public.
• Offcials below the national level also played a vital role. In the United States,governors convened regional task forces
and together procured supplies of ventilators and protective equipment.
• Michael Bloomberg, the billionaire philanthropist and former New York City mayor, provided funding and
organizational and technical assistance to create a contact-tracing army in the city. Apple and Google partnered to
develop tools that could notify smartphone users if they came into contact with people infected by the virus. The
response to the COVID-19 pandemic is only one example of how global actors, not states alone, drive solutions to
complex problems.
• GROWING NETWORKS
• Still, nation-states will not disappear, nor even diminish in importance. Populist leaders have also demonstrated both
the capacity to reassert traditional conceptions of sovereignty and the appeal of that strategy to many of their citizens-
Trump.Five giant technology companies—Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft—have a combined market
capitalization of roughly $7 trillion, greater than the GDP of every country except China and the United States. Since
2000, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, has helped immunize more than 822 million children in the developing world.
• MAPPING THE NETWORKED WORLD
• The world of global networks is a messy and contested space.- One fighting CC and other promotiing terrorism.But
COVID-19 has shown that successfully responding to contemporary challenges requires mobilizing global actors. One
way to marshal these forces is to expand the liberal order down.
• The goal should be a horizontal and open system that harnesses the power and efficacy of both governments and global actors.A hub
could be an existing international or regional organization, a coalition of nongovernmental organizations, or a new secretariat within the
UN system speci#cally created for the purposeGavi is the clearest example of this hub-based approach. The Gates Foundation helped
found Gavi in 2000 as an alliance of governments, international organizations, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations.
• a new global order should begin by mapping the networked world. A good place tostart would be to look at the actors working on each
of the UN’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—targets the world has agreed must be met by 2030 to achieve global peace and
prosperity. The relevant actors include UN special agencies and a-liates; regional groups-EU, Organization of american states,
corporations likeCoca-Cola, Siemens, and Tata; large philanthropies such as the Gates Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Aga
Khan Foundation; and research centers, private institutes, think tanks, and civic and faith groups.
• HUBS AND SPOKES
• he UN is a useful example of this phenomenon. Initiatives and institutions often grow out of the UN because nearly all countries are
already a part of its structure and because it has a record of credibility and expertise. The UN should, however, pursue a more
deliberate strategy to ensure that its many programs, commissions, and sub-organizations become problem-solving hubs. The secretary-
general could, for example, connect a global network of mayors and governors to the UN Refugee Agency to help with refugee
resettlement. Or, to combat climate change, the UN Environment Program could work with the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate
and Energy, , a partnership between Bloomberg Philanthropies and the European Union that has brought together more than 7,000
local executives.
• A NEW LIBERAL ORDER
• the state-based international order—visible, organized, demarcated & the tangled webs of businesses, civil society organizations,
foundations, universities, and other actors—an evolving, complex system that, although harder to conceptualize, is no less important to
world a-airs. The two exist side by side or, more precisely, on top of each other.If leaders bring together parts of both systems in a more
coherent vision of a liberal order, the United States and its allies could build the capacity necessary to meet today’s global challenges.

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 CPEC: A TOOL FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND
LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM
• Introduction
• socio-economic
• development of a broader region is not only conceivable but also possible by
• establishing people-to-people contact