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MODULE 1:

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS


RECENT M&A DEALS?

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M&A DEFINITIONS

1. Merger or consolidation:
Merger: absorption of one firm by another
Consolidation: an entirely new firm is created
For both:
partners of (more or less) equal size
creates a new entity after major restructuring of activities
often reflected by change of name

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M&A DEFINITIONS

2. Acquisition of stock
clearly dominant partner
company that is acquired (“target”) is integrated into existing
structure of the buying company (“bidder”)

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M&A DEFINITIONS

3. Acquisition of assets
One firm can acquire another by buying all of its assets
No exchange of ownership
Choose which assets/liabilities to buy

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M&A DEFINITIONS

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M&A DEFINITIONS

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M&A DEFINITIONS

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M&A DEFINITIONS
Horizontal merger: bidder and target operate and compete
in the same kind of business activity

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M&A DEFINITIONS
Vertical merger: bidder and target are in different stages of
production.
The buyer expands backward or forward

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M&A DEFINITIONS
Conglomerate merger: bidder and target operate in
unrelated business activities

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M&A MARKET IN INDIA

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M&A MARKET IN INDIA

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M&A MARKET IN INDIA

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TOP 10 M&A (GLOBAL)

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M&A MOTIVES
WHAT DRIVES M&A ACTIVITY?

Hubris? ≠ Agency problems

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WHAT DRIVES M&A ACTIVITY?

Advantages to being big


Brand A well-known brand is valuable
Economies of scope Ability to spread corporate costs, including
investment in systems development, risk
management
Economies of scale In both manufacturing and services
Cost of capital Easier to raise capital and at a lower cost
Financial synergies The diversification effect may allow for
transfer of cash amongst divisions, from
‘cash cows’ to ‘growth’ divisions
Ability to attract Larger companies are better able to attract
talent and afford high-priced, skilled professionals
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WHAT DRIVES M&A ACTIVITY?

Potential disadvantages of being big:


Overconfidence
Empire building
Prestige
Value-destroying M&As: difficulties to integrate

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WHAT DRIVES M&A ACTIVITY?

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WHAT DRIVES M&A ACTIVITY?

Market mania?

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WHAT DRIVES M&A ACTIVITY?

Overvaluation of stock? Or undervaluation?

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WHAT DRIVES M&A ACTIVITY?

Industry shocks?

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WHAT DRIVES M&A ACTIVITY?

Market power?

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ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES

Government intervention to prevent firms from


reducing competition through M&As
US: Justice department + Federal Trade Commission
Europe: European Commission + local governments
India: Competition Commission of India (CCI) established in 2009

Examples:
Hostile bid on Aer Lingus by Ryanair
AT&T – Time Warner (2018)
HBO – Warner Bros – Turner
Redesign entertainment business
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2012: Universal Music buys EMI from Citigroup (1.9 bio USD)
Antitrust? Market share:
Combination: 40%
Sony: 23%
Warner: 15%

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WHAT DRIVES M&A ACTIVITY?

Synergies?

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SYNERGIES
SYNERGIES

Firm A is considering acquiring firm B.


V: value
Synergy = VAB - (VA + VB)

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SYNERGIES

Where does synergy come from?

Refer to incremental values of the acquisition


Four categories:
Revenue enhancement
Cost reduction
Lower taxes
Lower capital requirements

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SYNERGIES

Revenue enhancement come from:


marketing gains
strategic benefits
market power

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SYNERGIES

Cost reduction:
Economy of scale
Economies of vertical integration
Technology transfer
Complementary resources
Elimination of inefficient management

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SYNERGIES

Tax gains:
The use of tax losses: use the losses of the unprofitable firm to
offset the other firm’s income

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SYNERGIES

Reduced Capital Requirements:


Fixed capital (e.g. headquarters buildings, plants, R&D)
Working capital: the inventory-to-sales ratio and the cash-to-sales
ratio often decrease as firm size increases

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EXAMPLE: UBS  CREDIT SUISSE DEAL

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Why was Credit Suisse hit so hard?
Tuesday (14/3): Credit Suisse published its annual report for 2022 saying the bank
had identified "material weaknesses" in controls over financial reporting and not yet
stemmed customer outflows.

Wednesday (15/3):

Thursday (16/3): In an attempt to shore up confidence in the country’s banking


sector, The Swiss National Bank was forced to provide an emergency $54B credit line
to Credit Suisse. Yet, this failed to give confidence.
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UBS  CREDIT SUISSE DEAL

Deal value: $3.3 billion


Debt holders Credit Suisse: write down of $17bn
additional tier 1 bonds
Shareholders Credit Suisse: very low offer price
(10% compared to stock price 3 years before)
UBS: Estimated synergies of $10 billion

42 © Vlerick Business School


M&A PERFORMANCE
WHY IMPORTANT?  PRACTICE!!
Acquiring companies: info on investor preferences/expectations,
learn for future acquisitions
Hedge funds and other investors: detect abnormal returns that
can be exploited
Consulting companies: impact of strategic/financial decisions
(e.g., M&As, stock splits, dividend changes,…)
Government: impact of new regulation (e.g., banking regulation,
antitrust, disclosure of executive remuneration,…)
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): detect insider
trading

44 © Vlerick Business School


M&A PERFORMANCE: STOCK PRICE REACTIONS

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METHODOLOGIES

1. Event studies

2. Long-term stock performance

3. Accounting performance
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1. EVENT STUDIES
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EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY

The purpose is to investigate the impact of an


event on the value or stock price of a company

Examples: Abnormal
return
M&As
Earnings announcements
Regulatory changes

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EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY

An abnormal return: the difference between


the actual stock return (R) and the expected
return if the event had not occurred (E(R)).

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EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY

Assumption: market
efficiency

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EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY

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EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY
How to estimate the expected return E(R)

Mean adjusted model: E[Rit] = average daily return for i


during estimation window
Market adjusted model: E[Rit] = Rmt
Market model (most used!)

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CHOICE OF WINDOWS

Estimation window: [T0,T1]

Reasonably long but also need a clean period [T1 , T2]

Event window: [T2,T3]


Period around the announcement date
Capture price run-up
No confusing events ( event window shouldn’t be too long either)
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CHOICE OF WINDOWS
Examples of M&A studies:
Estimation window Event window

Chang (1998) [-210,-11] [-1,0]


Cybo-ottone and Murgia (2000) [-270,-21] [-20,+20]

Campa and Hernando (2004) [-205,-6 ] [-1,+1]

Martynova and Renneboog (2006) [-300,-61] [-60,+60]

Luypaert and Huyghebaert (2013) [-250,-51] [-50,+50]


 Try different event windows: [-35,+5]

- Short versus long?


- Symmetric versus asymmetric?
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UPS TRIED TO ACQUIRE TNT
On March 19, 2012, United Parcel Service (UPS)
announced its intention to acquire TNT Express (offer of
€9.5 per share). However, the deal fell through in
January 2013 after it was announced that UPS had failed
to obtain permission from the European Commission and
as such had been blocked on competition grounds.
In April 2015, FedEx announced its agreed intention to
buy TNT Express (offer of €8 per share). On January 8,
2016, the European Commission unconditionally
approved the acquisition by FedEx. The deal was
completed on May 25, 2016.
Source: Wikipedia

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STOCK PRICE EVOLUTION TNT EXPRESS

57 © Vlerick Business School


HOW DO RIVALS
TYPICALLY REACT?
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RIVAL STOCK PRICE EFFECTS

Company Return Dollar impact


Lafarge 8.90% $2.02 billion
Holcim 6.86% $1.83 billion
CRH 4.04% $845 million
Cemex 3.63% $677 million
HeidelbergCement 3.40% $586 million

60 © Vlerick Business School


RIVAL STOCK PRICE EFFECTS

Positive externalities for rivals:


Collusion  increase market power
Future acquisition probability
Merger waves
Target stock price movements

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RIVAL STOCK PRICE EFFECTS

Negative externalities for rivals:


Merging firms: efficiency improvements
Dominant player: intensified competition
Pre-emptive mergers

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OTHER APPLICATIONS OF EVENT STUDIES

Analyst’s earnings forecasts


Rating announcements
Dot com name changes
Discrimination effects
Misbehaviour of managers

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ANALYST’S EARNINGS FORECASTS

Source: Francis, J. and Soffer L., Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 193-211

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RATING ANNOUNCEMENTS

Source: Hand, J.R.M., Holthausen, R.W. and Leftwich R.W., Journal of Finance, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1992), pp. 733-752

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DOT COM NAME CHANGES

Source: Cooper, M.J., Dimitrov, O. and Raghavendra R., Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, No. 6 (2001), pp. 2371-2388

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THE AGENCY COSTS OF MANAGERIAL INDISCRETIONS:
SEX, LIES, DRUGS AND FIRM VALUE (YORE, A)

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2. LONG-TERM STOCK
PERFORMANCE
BUY AND HOLD ABNORMAL RETURNS (BHARS)

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LONG-TERM STOCK PERFORMANCE

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3. ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE
LONG-TERM ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE

Evaluating the succes of management decisions


by analyzing changes in operating performance

Measures of operating (accounting) performance

Compare performance with benchmark


performance

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DETERMINANTS OF PERFORMANCE
DETERMINANTS OF M&A PROFITABILITY

When is most value being created?


Diversifying versus focusing deal?
Large or small targets?
Cross-border or domestic deals?
Cash versus stock payment?
Serial or occasional acquirers?
Public or private targets?

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WHEN IS MOST VALUE BEING CREATED?

Diversifying versus focusing deal?

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WHEN IS MOST VALUE BEING CREATED?

Large or small targets?

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WHEN IS MOST VALUE BEING CREATED?

Cross-border or domestic deals?

WHY?
- Cultural distance
- Integration difficulties

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WHEN IS MOST VALUE BEING CREATED?

Cash or stock payment?

WHY?
- Cash signals confidence in
M&A synergy potential
- Equity signals overvaluation

Only true for public targets,


not for private targets!!!

WHY?
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WHEN IS MOST VALUE BEING CREATED?

Serial or occasional acquirers?

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WHEN IS MOST VALUE BEING CREATED?

Public or private targets?

WHY?
- Higher information asymmetry
- Liquidity discount
- Fewer interested bidders
- More bargaining power

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”TIMING IS KEY”
MERGER WAVES

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ACQUIRER RETURNS INSIDE/OUTSIDE WAVES

Reasons?

- Reduced monitoring
- Lower penalties for
bad decisions
- Herding behaviour
- Excess cash
- Higher offer prices

Source: Duchin and Schmidt (2013), Riding the merger wave: Uncertainty, reduced monitoring, and
bad acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics.

Within waves, earlier acquisitions produce higher bidder returns, than


the later acquisitions in the wave
Source: Goel and Thakor (2010), Review of Financial Studies

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“CEO, CFO,THE BOARD AND INTERNAL M&A TEAM DETERMINE
M&A SUCCESS…”
IT’S ABOUT THE CEO, NOT THE FIRM…

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2013

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DO NOT BUY FIRMS WITH A NARCISTIC CEO

The narcissism indicator is estimated using the proportions of first-person singular


(I, me, my, mine, myself) to total first-person pronouns (I, me, my, mine, myself,
we, us, our, ours, ourselves) in CEO speech

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BOARD OF DIRECTORS

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BOARD CHARACTERISTIC IMPACT ON ACQUIRER RETURNS
BOARD SIZE NO IMPACT
FOREIGN DIRECTORS NO IMPACT
GENDER DIVERSITY MARGINALLY POSITIVE
AGE DIVERSITY MARGINALLY POSITIVE
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS STRONGLY POSITIVE
CEO DUALITY NEGATIVE (IN DIVERSIFYING M&A)
THE ROLE OF INTERNAL M&A TEAMS

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“…BUT THE RIGHT ADVISORS CAN HELP THEM”
Yes!
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!

Questions?

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To do after this session

Read the case: “Anheuser-Busch - Inbev”

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