Province of Cam Sur Vs Dato

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G.R. No.

104639 July 14, 1995


PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR through its GOVERNOR, SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN and PROVINCIAL TREASURER, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TITO B. DATO, respondent.

This is a dispute over the employment status of the


respondent, Tito Dato, who was appointed as Assistant
Provincial Warden in Camarines Sur. He was later found to
have a temporary appointment due to lack of civil service
eligibility, which led to the denial of his claim for backwages
and reinstatement.
• Facts:
• Tito Dato was appointed as a Private Agent on January 1, 1960, and after 12 years, he was promoted to
Assistant Provincial Warden (October 12, 1972). (by the then Governor Apolonio Maleniza)
• Dato’s appointment is temporary because he did not possess the required civil service eligibility for the
position, and his temporary appointment was renewed annually.
• On January 1, 1974, the governor (then Governor Felix Alfelor, Sr) approved a change in Dato's
employment status from temporary to permanent, based on his representation that he had passed the
civil service examination for supervising security guards.
• The Civil Service Commission (CSC) did not approve the change in status, stating that Dato still lacked
the necessary eligibility.
• No further appointment was extended to Dato.
Facts:
• On March 16, 1976, Dato was suspended indefinitely after criminal charges were filed against him.
(allegedly conniving and/or con senting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who
escaped from confinement)
• On March 19, 1976, the head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the CSC wrote a letter to the governor,
informing him that Dato's status had been changed from temporary to permanent, retroactive to June
11, 1974 because he already passed the examination for supervising guards.
• During that time, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suppressed the appropriation for the position of
Assistant Provincial Warden and removed Dato's name from the petitioner's plantilla.
• Dato was later acquitted of the charges and requested reinstatement and backwages, which were
denied.
• Dato filed an action for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pili.
• The trial court ruled in favor of Dato, ordering the petitioner to pay him backwages and attorney's fees.
• Upon appeal of the petitioner, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision but with modification on the
order of payment of backwages. (ordering the payment of backwages during the entire period of
Dato's suspension)
• The petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Dato was a permanent employee at the time of his suspension on March 16, 1976

Petitioner contends that when the Governor Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the
employment status of Dato, from temporary to permanent, which the CSC approved as
only temporary pending validation of the results of private respondent's examination for
supervising security guard, the private respondent's appointment in effect remained temporary.
Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner. According to the SC Dato’s subsequent qualification
for civil service eligibility did not automatically (ipso facto), convert his temporary status to that
of permanent.
For the case of Dato, what is required is a new appointment since a permanent
appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment — these are two distinct
acts of the appointing authority
Ruling:
The SC took note of a letter which the respondent used to rest his case. It was a letter from Mr. Rama,
Unit Head of the Civil Service Commission dated 3 days after his suspension, March 19, 1976 which
stated that, Dato’s eligibility took effect on June 11, 1974. Mr. Rama, as stated on the letter, approved
also the conversion of his temporary appointment to permanent one effective June 11, 1974.
According to the court, that approval of the permanent appointment of Dato, by the CSC, as stated in its
letter, is an arrogation or an assumption of power which actually belongs to the appointing authority.
When it issued its letter dated March 19, 1976, it already took the position of the appointing
authority, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the appointment
authority.
The SC cited that in its decision on the case of Luego vs. CSC, it ruled that CSC, has power to approve
or disapprove appointments based on the eligibility, but it does not have the power to appoint or direct an
appointing authority to change the appointment.
In this case, CSC should have ended its participation in the appointment of Dato on January 1,
1974, when it confirmed the temporary status of Dato who lacked the proper civil service
eligibility.
Don’t read this na!
(The SC also emphasized that the CSC can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen
to fill a position, the proper word is to attest whether such person is qualified or not. And once
he has fulfilled the attestation, its participation in the appointment process ends.)
Ruling:

The SC ruled that Tito Dato, being merely a temporary employee, was not entitled to the relief
he sought, including his claim for backwages for the entire period of his suspension. The ruling
of the CA was reversed and the petition for mandamus was denied.
In the end, the Court stated that the letter has no probative value, it being photocopy and not
even signed by the proper officer of the CSC.
Points on the attestation (Luego vs. CSC)

• Approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he
has been named.
• As we have repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check to assure
compliance with Civil Service Laws
• Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
• If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
• Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not the person appointed
meets all the required conditions laid down by the law.
• Section 9 (h) the power and functions of CSC, Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional to positions in the civil
service, except those presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and
jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
• However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored parts, will make it clear that all the Commission is actually
allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to
be employed by the Commission when it acts on--or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment
made by the proper authorities.
• A (writ of) mandamus is an order from a court to an inferior government official ordering the
government official to properly fulfill their official duties or correct an abuse of discretion.
• WHERE APPOINTING POWER RESIDES Inherently belongs to the people The selection of
persons to perform the functions of government is primarily a prerogative of the people. Since
the people are the source of government, the power of selecting persons for public office
inherently belongs to them. But the people cannot always be called upon to act immediately
when the selection of an official is necessary. It may be said, therefore, that the power of
appointment to public offices belongs to where the people have chosen to place it by their
Constitution or laws. Entrusted to designated elected and appointed public officials The
appointment of public officials is generally looked upon a properly belonging to the executive
department. Appointments may also be made by Congress or the courts, but when so made
should be taken as an incident to the discharge of functions within their respective spheres. The
exceptions made in favor of Congress as to appointments to office strengthen rather than
weaken the grant of power to appoint officers in the executive. Absent any contrary statutory
provision, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or discipline.
Case of ferrer :What did supreme court say on mere designation of certain positions. What is the doctrine laid down?
Why is it not subject to mandamus?
What happens when there is a mere appointment? where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.

It may be recalled anytime.


In several cases until ferrer, if temporary until fixed period for a particular purpose, it cannot be recalled anytime except for cause. Meaning it can
not be revoked until the end of term.
Upon expiration of the term, there is no termination

Annissa – what was the basis of the SC on the reason?


SC held that the appointment with proviso terminated Ambas vs. buenaceda. The termination for poor academic performance and low ranking was a valid cause for
termination.

Ending on light trail transit.

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