Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Admin Chapter 3 and 4
Admin Chapter 3 and 4
GROUP II
CHAPTER IV:
COMMENCEMENT OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
CHAPTER III : DE FACTO OFFICERS
DE FACTO DOCTRINE
- It is the principle which holds that a person, who, by
the proper authority, is admitted and sworn into office
is deemed to be rightfully in such office until:
- (a) by judicial declaration in a proper proceeding he
is ousted therefrom; or
- (b) his admission thereto is declared void.
CHAPTER III : DE FACTO OFFICERS
REASONS FOR DE FACTO OFFICER
DOCTRINE
MAIN REASON - Public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under
color of title, an office created by valid statute deemed valid insofar as the
public concerned.
- Protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official
act of persons discharging the duties of an office without lawful officers.
- It is to ensure the orderly functioning of government. The public cannot
afford to check the validity of the officer's title each time they transact
with him.
CHAPTER III : DE FACTO OFFICERS
A. DEFINITION
One who has reputation of being the officer that he assumes to be, and yet
is not a good officer in point of law.
He must have acted as an officer for such a length of tie under color of title
and under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the public
and public authorities as to afford a presumption of election or
appointment and induce people, without inquiry, and relying on the
supposition that he is the officer he assumes to be.
When is a person a de facto officer?
(1) Without a known appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or
acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his
action, supposing him to be the officer he assumes to be;
(2) Under color of a known and valid appointment but have failed to conform to some condition,
precedent or requirement, as to take an oath, file a bond or the like;
(3) Under color of a known appointment or election, void, because the officer was not eligible, or
because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some
defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to
the public;
A party suing or defending in his own right as a public officer must show that
he is an officer de jure. It is not sufficient that he be merely a de facto officer.
2) As regards the public and third persons
The acts of a de facto officer are valid as to third persons and the public until
his title to office is adjudged insufficient.
The title of a de facto officer and the validity of his acts cannot be collaterally
questioned in proceedings to which he is not a party, or which were not
instituted to determine the very question.
REMEDY
Quo warranto proceeding
A special form of legal action used to resolve a dispute over whether a specific
person has the legal right to hold the public office that he or she occupies.
Used to test a person’s legal right to hold an office, not to evaluate the person’s
performance in the office.
Facts:
Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of
candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with the Comelec.
Three days later, or on September 18, 1961, Monroy filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. The
Comelec approved the withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961, Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of
Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office
upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.
Issue:
Whether or not Monroy cease to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed on
September 15, 1961?
Held:
It is the general rule, then, i.e., 'that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the
salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good
faith and under color of title, that applies in the present case. The resulting hardship occasioned by the operation of
this rule to the de facto officer who did actual work is recognized; but it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de
facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the
protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an
office without being lawful officers. The question of compensation involves different principles and concepts,
however. Here, it is possession of title, not of the office, that is decisive. A de facto officer, not having good title, takes
the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received
during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.
RULING: WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is, as it is hereby, affirmed in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
CHAPTER III: DE FACTO OFFICERS
ENTITLEMENT TO SALARIES
Where there is NO DE JURE officer, the officer de facto who in good faith
has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties is legally entitled
to emoluments.
CHAPTER III: DE FACTO OFFICERS
CASE: GENERAL MANAGER, PPA v. MONSERATE
FACTS:
Julieta Monserate was an employee of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) . The PPA was
reorganized in 1988. Monserate applied for the permanent position of Manager II of the Resource
Management Division. Monserate was confirmed by the CSC and thereafter discharged the functions
of the office. Ramon Anino filed an appeal with the PPA Appeals Board, protesting the appointment.
The Board sustained the protest and upheld the appointment of Anino in place of Monserate.
Monserate filed with the CSC a protest against Anino's appointment which the CSC dismissed.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the selection and appointment
of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service. However, the moment the discretionary power of
appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, such
appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except
for cause.
Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the revocation of respondent's appointment by
demoting her. When the CA reinstated Monserate to her post, it merely restored her appointment to the said
position to which her right to security of tenure had already attached. Her position as Manager II never
became vacant since her demotion was void. In this jurisdiction, "an appointment to a non-vacant position in
the civil service is null and void ab initio."
CHAPTER IV:
COMMENCEMENT
OF OFFICIAL
RELATIONS
CHAPTER IV: COMMENCEMENT OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
A. Election
-is a mode of filling a public office, by which the enfranchised citizenry is
able to participate directly in the conduct of the government, through the
selection by them of the functionaries who will represent them therein
B. Appointment
C. Others:
a. Succession by operation of Law
b. Direct provision of law (e.g. ex officio officers)
Fariñas v COMELEC, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003.
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repealed Section
67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code). The petitioners assert that Section 14
of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals
Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a
similar limitation to appointive officials
Respondents contends that there is no violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A substantial
distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of
their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by popular
will. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Fariñas v COMELEC, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective
officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones.
HELD:
NO. The Court examined the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006, which
repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. The petitioners argued that the repeal violated
the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it treated elective officials differently from
appointive officials. The Court, however, found that substantial distinctions exist between elective
officials and appointive officials.
Elective Officials and Appointive Official
ELECTIVE APPOINTIVE
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under
Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials,
as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to
vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political
and electoral activities.
Moreover, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the
wisdom of this classification. Hence, equal protection is not infringed
DESIGNATION APPOINTMENT
CHAPTER IV: COMMENCEMENT OF OFFICIAL
RELATIONS
APPOINTMENT
A. FORMATION OF OFFICIAL RELATION
(a) Election
(b) Appointment
CHAPTER IV: COMMENCEMENT OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
A.APPOINTMENT
Appointment is a selection by the authority vested with power of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. It is an act
of designation by the executive officer, board, or body, to whom that
power has been delegated of the person who is to exercise the duties
and responsibilities of a given position.
Four Elements of a Valid, Effective, and Completed Appointment
1. Congress may appoint its own officials and staff [See Springer v. Government, 277 U.S. 189 (1928)].
2. When the Constitution vests the powers in another branch of the State (i.e. Judiciary, Sec. 5(6), Art. VIII) or an independent office (e.g. Constitutional
Commissions, Sec. 4, Art. IX-A; Ombudsman, Sec. 6, Art. XI; Commission on Human Rights, Sec. 18(10), Art. XIII).
Classification of Appointments
PERMANENT vs TEMPORARY
Classification of Appointments
REGULAR vs AD INTERIM
C. Presidential Appointments
Par. 1, Sec. 16, Art. VII, Constitution. The President shall nominate
and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
Four Groups of Officers the President is Authorized to Appoint
[Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974 (1987)]
1. Specifically enumerated under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, i.e.:
b. Ambassadors;
d. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain;
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone
CHAPTER IV: COMMENCEMENT OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
B. APPOINTMENT TO THE CIVIL SERVICE
a. Policy Determining Position – one vested with the power of formulating a method of action for
the government or any of its subdivisions.
b. Highly Confidential Position– an office where the duties are not merely clerical. The
performance of which requires skill, judgment, trust, and confidence; and involves the responsibility of
the other which he represents.
c. Highly Technical Office – an office which requires skills or training in the highest degree.
(Quiason, Jr and Agpalo, The Civil Service Law,
NOTE: Entrance to any of these 3 offices DO NOT REQUIRE competitive examination or civil
service eligibility. (Agpalo, Law on Public Officers, 2005)199
Appointments in the Civil Service may be either permanent or temporary
➔ A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in
accordance with the provisions of laws, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof.
➔ In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a
vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements
for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility:
Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the
appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
Accordingly, it has been ruled that “temporary appointees may be terminated at any time even
without cause. They have no fixed tenure.
❖ CLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE
❏ Primarily Confidential – the officer enjoys primarily such close intimacy with the
appointing authority which insures freedom intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom of misgiving of betrayal of personal trust on confidential matters of the
state [De Los Santos v. Mallare (1950)]. The position characterized by the close
proximity of positions of the appointee as well as the high degree of trust and
confidence inherent in their relationship [Civil Service Comm’n v. Javier (2008)].
PERSONNEL ACTIONS
★ PROMOTION
Movement from one position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized
by law and is usually accompanied by an increase in pay.
★ TRANSFER
Movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service.
★ REINSTATEMENT
Technically the issuance of a new appointment and is discretionary on the part of the appointing power.
★ REEMPLOYMENT
Names of persons who have been appointed permanently to positions in the career service and who
have been separated as a result of reduction in force and/or reorganization, shall be entered in a list
from which selection for reemployment shall be made.
★ DETAIL
Movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment.
★ REASSIGNMENT
An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the SAME agency.
★ DEMOTION
The movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with
diminution in duties, responsibilities, status, or rank which may or may not involve reduction in salary.
REFERENCES:
● The Law of Public Officers ( Cruz, 2007)
● Administrative Law on Public Officers and Election Law (Agpalo, 2007)