THE MULTI CREW FLIGHT

DECK AND AUTOMATION

Captain Ed Pooley
The Air Safety Consultancy & FSF
European Advisory Committee

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 1

Forum Brussels 2015
AUTOMATION HAS ARRIVED
 It has done so in company with the means for
greater navigational accuracy and the fuel use
efficiency which this has facilitated.
 Did we see it coming? - Yes
 Did we fully appreciate what the operational
safety consequences would be? - No
 Have we yet responded effectively? - No

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 2

Forum Brussels 2015
 WHAT ARE THE ISSUES?
 There is no question that the effect of automation on
safety over the past 25 years has been overwhelmingly
good - arguably the main reason for the low fatal
accident rate.
 But the evidence shows that there are still problems at
both the HMI and with manual handling at reduced
levels of automation availability.
 Before we look further, perhaps it is worth remembering
the journey we are on here. The unwritten but ultimate
objective of automation is the eventual removal of pilots
from the flight deck. But before that we have to keep
the system safe for a generation.

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 3

Forum Brussels 2015
NEAR MISSES v ACCIDENTS
 We know that we can always expect more ‘near
misses’ than actual accidents but….
 In the case of occurrences involving the
management of automation or its absence, it
may well be that there are rather more ‘near-
misses’ in proportion to accidents than in the
case of accidents without automation status
being a significant contributory factor.
 If this is indeed true, it would be a ratio that we
could not rely on remaining favourable and a
reason for action in itself.

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 4

Forum Brussels 2015
 THE CONTEXT FOR HIGH
LEVELS OF AUTOMATION
 It is exceptionally reliable
 Its use is usually mandated for most of the flight
 Its rise has come at the same time as:
 the simplicity of GNSS navigation
 increasingly prescriptive instructions on how to fly
 Together, these factors have resulted in:
 Virtually no manual flying in normal operations
 A dramatic reduction in ad hoc decision making in
favour of following the right procedure.

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 5

Forum Brussels 2015
 THE RESULT?
 The unexpected has not vanished, it is just much less
prevalent.
 Pilot competency is required in two entirely different
ways of operating and all the combinations in between
yet most of their training and experience is focused on
the normal and the ‘predictable’ abnormal.
 At the standard mandatory training level, there has so
far been just a modest concession in content and no
recognition that more training time is required to assure
competence in the rarely used as well as the normally
used.

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 6

Forum Brussels 2015
 ‘SAFETY NET’ EFFECTIVENESS
IS LIMITED
 The most obvious tactical defences
against automation misuse or non
availability and/or its consequences are:
 More and better Alerting
 Effective (cross) Monitoring in the flight
deck
 Flight Envelope Protection
 It is easy to conclude that none of these
deliver at the level we would like
Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 7
Forum Brussels 2015
 HAS THERE BEEN A
MITIGATING TRANSITION
FACTOR?
 Maybe, but it won’t last much longer.
 The generation of pilots who had the benefit of careers
which transitioned them to very high levels of
automation only after significant exposure to low levels
of automation have (except in Japan!) almost all retired.
 This means that any protection from the consequences
of lower than normal automation functionality for
whatever reason afforded by an older Captain with this
‘traditional’ background has nearly vanished.

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 8

Forum Brussels 2015
 WHERE DO WE GO FROM
HERE?
 Embrace the ‘foundation benefit’ of the move to
competency-based training and assessment instead of
the achievement of minimum performance in the
conduct of prescribed manoeuvres.
 Recognise that preparation for the rare and unexpected
event where normal automation is no longer available
and for which there may be limited or no SOPs requires
meaningful representative practice which will allow
demonstration of flight path control competence in
unscripted or only partially scripted events.
 Provide more practical training for the skills with the
least everyday use and support this with improved
‘knowledge-assurance’ to inform both the normal
management of automation by SOPs and any reversion
towards a manual take over.

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 9

Forum Brussels 2015
 CURRENT PILOT TRAINING &
COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT
 Improve the initial training of pilots for aircraft type
ratings, both in objectives and scope.
 Ensure that recurrent training validates continued
competence in least-used skills at appropriate intervals
using cost effective methods.
 Fully justify the presence of a second fully trained pilot
on the flight deck by improving the effectiveness of
monitoring.
 Remove unnecessary complexity from the flight deck
and ensure that a holistic operational view is taken of
the overall effect of the HMI as encountered.

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 10

Forum Brussels 2015
 NEW PILOTS - LICENSING
 Review the process of determining competency for initial
issue of a professional pilot licence.
 Ab-initio professional licensing of fixed wing transport
pilots in the European tradition has been founded on
assessment of competence at licence issue rather than
deferment of too much of this to subsequent employers.
 A review of whether present licensing requirements have
altered this balance is needed with corrective action if it
is concluded that it has done so, since best practice
alone will not spread everywhere.

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 11

Forum Brussels 2015
 AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION
 Widespread awareness of HMI automation safety issues
dates back to at least 1992 (the Mont Saint-Odile A320
accident).
 Since then, the more obvious examples of poor specific
elements in the flight deck HMI have been fixed but
attention to the subject has not kept pace with the
nature of modern piloting and today’s pilots.
 Aeroplane Type Certification could almost certainly
contribute more to safety by more effective assessment
of the collective HMI effect of flight deck design and use
this to set minimum ‘whole system’ standards.

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 12

Forum Brussels 2015
 CONCLUDING SUMMARY
 The combination of the changing nature of pilots and
piloting does not equip us to face the safety-related
future of automation with confidence.
 Best Practice with or without a degree of regulatory
flexibility is currently able to contain the safety
consequences of highly reliable, all-embracing and
almost-always-used automation for the fortunate few.
 But the baseline requirements for licence issue, pilot
type rating issue and recurrent training/assessment are
not. Both the methods and time required to assure
competency need a fundamental overhaul.
 The aeroplane type certification approach to overall HMI
issues in automated flight decks needs revisiting once
again and all the manufacturers of highly automated
aeroplanes need to help with this.

Safety and Automation The Air Safety Consultancy 13

Forum Brussels 2015