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C2.Strategy and Tactics of Distributive Bargaining
C2.Strategy and Tactics of Distributive Bargaining
Party A - Seller
Party B - Buyer
2-6
Party A - Seller
Alternative
Initial Offer Target Point Walkaway Point
Party B - Buyer
2-8
Fundamental Strategies
• Push for settlement near opponent’s resistance point
• Get the other party to change their resistance point
• If settlement range is negative, either:
• Get the other side to change their resistance point
• Modify your own resistance point
• Convince the other party that the settlement is the best possible
2-9
Positions Taken
During Negotiations
• Opening offer
• Where will you start?
• Opening stance
• What is your attitude?
• Competitive? Moderate?
• Initial concessions
• Should any be made? If so, how large?
2-16
Positions Taken
During Negotiations
• The role of concessions
• Without them, there is either capitulation or deadlock
• Patterns of concession making
• The pattern contains valuable information
• Final offer (making a commitment)
• “This is all I can do”
2-17
Commitments:
Tactical Considerations
• Establishing a commitment
• Three properties:
• Finality
• Specificity
• Consequences
• Preventing the other party from committing prematurely
• Their commitment reduces your flexibility
2-18
Commitments:
Tactical Considerations
• Ways to abandon a committed position
• Plan a way out
• Let it die silently
• Restate the commitment in more general terms
• Minimize the damage to the relationship if the other backs off
2-19
Key steps
• Positions Taken during Negotiation.
• Commitment.
• Closing the Deal.
The entire process of making an opening offer
and then ending up with a mutually agreeable
settlement is known as the negotiation dance
(Raiffa 1982)
1.1 Basic Structure: Terms and Concepts
Position: e.g. target/preferred/reservation points
Offer: e.g. initial/opening/renewed/revised
Concession
Commitment
Bargaining Zone (ZOPA)/Settlement Zone: Negotiated
Agreement
vs ZONA; Compromise
Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement: BATNA
Settlement Point (p.37)
Bargaining Mix (p.37): e.g. Multiple Equal Offers (MEOs)
Pie= ZOPA?
1.2 Fundamental Strategies
• “Tell me the bare • “Why don’t you tell us
minimum you would the very maximum that
accept from us, and I’ll you are willing to pay,
see if I can throw in and we’ll see if we can
something extra.” shave off a bit”
1.2 Fundamental Strategies: Bottom line
• The more you can learn about the other party’s target, resistance
point, motives, feelings of confidence, and so on, the more able you
will be to strike a favorable agreement.
• To influence the other party’s perception, however, they must
establish some points effectively and convincingly.
1.2 Fundamental Strategies: Influence… (how?)
=George’s concessions
4 =Mario’s concessions
0 1 2 3 4 5
Concession Number
让步的方式 ( 刘宏 , 2010 年第 134 页 )
Approaches:
• To deny his or her the necessary time.
• To ignore or downplay a threat by not
acknowledging the other party’s commitment,
or even by making a joke about it. (e.g. “You
don’t really mean that,” OR “I know you cannot
be serious about really going through with
that,” ….)
2.7.4 Finding Ways to Abandon a Committed Position
(pp.57-8)