HAZOP M@ND

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HAZOP: Hazard and

Operability Study

By :
Manish Dubey
CARA Notes M@nD
Objective
- To know the basic concept of HAZOP study

- To know the methodology of HAZOP study

- To form a team and press into action

CARA Notes M@nD


What is HAZOP?
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a
structured and systematic examination of a planned or
existing process or operation in order to identify and
evaluate problems that may represent risks to
personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation.

 Needs team involvement


HAZOP keeps all team members
focused on the same topic and enables
them to work as a team
 Use guide words

CARA Notes M@nD


Introduction
 This Technique was developed by I.C.I. Limited in
England, in early 70’s
 A team effort
 A study leader to guide the study
 A review of piping & instrumentation diagram
(P&ID’s)
 Design construction & installation to ensure that
recommendation are implement.
 Design commissioning

CARA Notes M@nD


WHEN IS HAZOP CARRIED OUT?
 Preliminary HAZOP is carried out at the completion
of line diagram, process and instrumentation diagrams and
before detailed design.
 -Preliminary HAZOP helps in identifying problems at an initial
stage, thereby providing options for changing designs, generating
alternatives.
 -Conventional HAZOP applied late in design and for major
modifications, only limited treatment options for hazards remains
Conceptual/Design Stage
Design Freeze Stage
Pre Start-up Stage
Operational Stage
CARA Notes M@nD
TERMINOLOGY USED IN HAZOP STUDY
a. STUDY NODES - The locations (on piping and instrumentation
drawings and procedures) at which the process parameters are
investigated for deviations.

b. INTENTION - The intention defines how the plant is expected to


operate in the absence of deviations at the study nodes. This can
take a number of forms and can either be descriptive or
diagrammatic; e.g., flow sheets, line diagrams, P&IDS.

c. DEVIATIONS - These are departures from the intention which


are discovered by systematically applying the guide words (e.g.,
"more pressure").
Guide word + Parameter  Deviation

CARA Notes M@nD


TERMINOLOGY USED IN HAZOP STUDY
d. CAUSES - These are the reasons why deviations might occur.
Once a deviation has been shown to have a credible cause, it can
be treated as a meaningful deviation. These causes can be
hardware failures, human errors, an unanticipated process state
(e.g., change of composition), external disruptions (e.g., loss of
power), etc.

e. CONSEQUENCES - These are the results of the deviations


should they occur (e.g., release of toxic materials). Trivial
consequences, relative to the study objective, are dropped.

f. GUIDE WORDS - These are simple words which are used to


qualify or quantify the intention in order to guide and stimulate
the brainstorming process and so discover deviations.

CARA Notes M@nD


SOME TYPICAL PARAMETERS
Parameters: Aspects of a process that describe it physically or
in terms of what is happening.
Flow
Temperature
Pressure
Viscosity
Composition
Phase
Level

CARA Notes M@nD


GUIDE WORDS
These are simple words, which are used to qualify the
intentions in order to guide and stimulate the thinking
process and so discover deviations.
No / Not
More
Less
Reverse
Other Than
As Well As
Part of
CARA Notes M@nD
Guide words Usage
Guide word Deviation

No No forward flow/ reverse flow


More of More of any relevant physical property there than should be Eg:
higher flow , higher temperature, higher viscosity

Less of less of any relevant physical property there than should be Eg: lower
flow , lower temperature, lower viscosity

Part of Composition of system different from what it should be Eg; change in


ratio of component or component missing etc

As well as A transfer of some component in addition to the intended component.


Eg: transfer of water with benzene in the transfer line.

More than More component present in the system


Not If some thing is not operating Eg: control valve
Other than What else can apart from normal operation Eg; static electricity
CARA Notes M@nD
INFORMATION NEEDED
Process and instrumentation drawings
Flow diagrams, material and energy balances
Information on any vender packages
Piping plans and calculations

CARA Notes M@nD


Prerequisites
As a basis for the HAZOP study the following
information should be available:
 Process flow diagrams
 Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs)
 Layout diagrams
 Material safety data sheets
 Provisional operating instructions
 Heat and material balances
 Equipment data sheets Start-up and emergency shut-
down procedures

CARA Notes M@nD


HAZOP PROCEDURE
1. Divide the system into sections (i.e., reactor, storage)
2. Choose a study node (i.e., line, vessel, pump, operating
instruction)
3. Describe the design intent
4. Select a process parameter
5. Apply a guide-word
6. Determine cause(s)
7. Evaluate consequences/problems
8. Recommend action: What? When? Who?
9. Record information
10. Repeat procedure (from step 2)

CARA Notes M@nD


THE HAZOP PROCEDURE MAY BE
ILLUSTRATED AS FOLLOWS:

CARA Notes M@nD


MERITS OF ‘HAZOP’
Powerful and flexible
Useful for large / small organization
Useful for new / existing operations
Based on the principles of total loss control

CARA Notes M@nD


PROBLEMS AND ISSUES ABOUT
‘HAZOP’
People who talk too much
Distraction – phones, beepers
Not committed full time
Too much experience – cannot visualise an accident
Too little experience

CARA Notes M@nD


Methodology – Report format
Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguards Action

E.g. Potential Consequences of Any existing Actions to


Flow/No cause of the the cause and the devices that remove the
deviation deviation itself prevent the cause or
cause or make mitigate the
its conse-
consequeces quences
less painful

CARA Notes M@nD


CLASS EXERCISE
 Consider, as a simple example, the continuous process
shown in Figure. In this process, the phosphoric acid and
ammonia are mixed, and a non-hazardous product,
diammonium phosphate (DAP), results if the reaction of
ammonia is complete. If too little phosphoric acid is added,
the reaction is incomplete, and ammonia is produced. Too
little ammonia available to the reactor results in a safe but
undesirable product. The Hazop team is assigned to
investigate "Personnel Hazards from the Reaction".

CARA Notes M@nD


CLASS EXERCISE
Continuous process example for HAZOP technique

CARA Notes M@nD


Node:1 Process parameter: flow
Intention:-Phosphoric acid feed solution to the reactor at a rate of X gpm
and Y psig

Guide Deviation Causes Consequences Action


Word Required
No No Flow At Study Valve A Falls Closed Excess Ammonia In Automatic
Node 1 Reactor And Release Closure Of Valve
Phosphoric Acid Supply To Work Area B On Loss Of
Exhausted Flow From
Phosphoric Acid
Supply.
Plug In Pipe, Pipe
Ruptures

More Increased Flow Excess Phosphoric


At Study Node 1 Acid Degrades
---- Product But Presents -----
No Hazard To
Workplace.
Less Reduced Flow At Valve A Partially Closed Excess Ammonia In Automatic
Source Reactor And Release Closure Of Valve
Formatting Partial Plug Or Leak In To Work Area. B Based On
Pipe Amount Released Is Reduced Flow In
Related To Pipe From
Quantitative Phosphoric Acid
Reduction In Supply. Supply. Set Point
Team Member Dependent On
Assigned To Calculate Toxicity Versus
Toxicity Level Versus Reduced Flow
CARA Notes M@nD
Flow Reduction Calculations
Guide Deviation Causes Consequences Action Required
Word

Part Of Decreased Vendor Delivers Wrong Material Excess Ammonia In Add Check Of
Concentratio Or Concentration Reactor And Release Phosphoric Acid
n Of To Work Area. Supply Tank
Phosphoric Error In Charging Phosphoric Acid Amount Released Is Concentration After
Acid At Study Supply Tank Related To Charging
Node 1 Quantitative Procedures
Reduction In Supply.
Team Member
Assigned To Calculate
Toxicity Level Versus
Flow Reduction

Reverse Reverse Flow No Reasonable Mechanism For


At Study Reverse Flow. ----- -----
Node 1

Other Than Material Wrong Delivery From Vendor Depends On Plant Procedures To
Other Than Wrong Material Chosen From Substitution; Team Provide Check On
Phosphoric Plant Warehouse Member Assigned To Material Chosen
Acid In Line Test Potential Before Charging
A Substitutions Based Phosphoric Acid
On Availability Of Supply Tank.
Other Materials At
Site And Similarity In
Appearance

CARA Notes M@nD


Node:2 Process parameter: flow
Intention:-Deliver 20% ammonia solution to the reactor at Y gpm and Z psig

Guide Deviation Causes Consequences Action required


word
High High flow at Ammonia feed line Untreated Consider adding an
study node 2 control valve B fails ammonia solution alarm/shutdown of the
to open. carry over to the system for high ammonia
Operator sets DAP storage tank solution flow to the
ammonia flow rate and release to the reactor.
too high. work area. Ensure periodic
maintenance and
inspection for valve B is
adequate.
No Leakage at Corrosion Small, continuous Ensure adequate
flow ammonia erosion leak of ammonia ventilation exists for
tank external impacts to the enclosed enclosed work area.
Gasket and packing work area
failures
Maintenance errors

CARA Notes M@nD


Node:3 Process parameter: flow
Intention:-Deliver product flow to the storage tank at X gpm and Y psig.

Guide Deviation Causes Consequences Action


word required

Reverse reverse flow at no reasonable


study node 1 mechanism for ----- -----
reverse flow.

CARA Notes M@nD


Finally...,
HAZOP is an essential tool for hazard
identification and have been used successfully to
improve the safety and operability of both new and
existing chemical plant. The technique is not confined
to the chemical and pharmaceutical industries and
has also been used successfully in a number of other
industries, including the off-shore oil and food
industries.

CARA Notes M@nD


THANK YOU

CARA Notes M@nD

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