Narrative theories

Recap features of (a human) sense of self

A subject of Distinct from other

A mental thing
experience things

A single thing, at A single thing,

one time over time
(synchronic unity) (diachronic unity)
Recap: theories of self (Parfit, 1987, p. 20)
‘An Ego Theorist claims that, if we ask what
unifies someone’s consciousness at any time –
what makes it true, for example, that I can
now both see what I am typing and hear the
wind outside my window – the answer is that
these are both experiences which are being
had by me, this person, at this time.’

‘According to the Bundle Theory, we can’t

explain either the unity of consciousness at
any time, or the unity of a whole life, by
referring to a person. Instead we must claim
that there are long series of different mental
states and events … Each series is thus like a
bundle tied up with string.’
Introducing narrative
theories
• Narrative theories of the self aim
to capture how there could be
long-term continuity for the self
(as reflected in our sense of self),
without positing something like
an Ego theory.
• They make a link between the
self and a narrative, of some
form.
 Narrative
theories

The self is not

The self is real
real

Hermeneutical Dennett: The self

narrative theories is a useful fiction
1. Hermeneutical
narrative views
THE SELF IS CONSTITUTED BY NARRATIVE
Hermeneutical narrative
theories
• ‘there are genuine human selves
whose self-conception and mode
of life constitute their selfhood’
(Schechtman, 2011, p. 398)
Hermeneutical narrative views

Hermeneutic: ‘a method ‘it conceives of selves as

or principle of fundamentally self-
interpretation’ interpreting beings’
• (Merriem-Webster) • (Schechtman 2011, p. 395)
The lives of ‘Selves, on this view, are beings
selves are who lead their lives rather than
narrative in merely having a history, and
structure: leading the life of a self is taken
inherently to involve
selves are understanding one’s life as a
constituted by narrative and enacting the
narrative narrative one sees as one’s life.’
(Schechtman 2011, p. 395)
Importance of agency: selves lead their
lives

Intelligibility
Agents are
requires
intelligible to
Selves are agents interpreting
themselves and to
actions within a
others
narrative
Interpreting within a
narrative
MacIntyre: ‘digging, gardening, taking
exercise, preparing for winter, or pleasing
one’s wife’ (Schechtman 2011, p. 396)
 Understand the behaviour within a context of
intersecting stories, understand the agent’s
intentions, motivations, etc.
 i.e. to tell a story that explains the actions

‘Intelligibility requires an aim or purpose at

which action is directed, but purpose requires
evaluation – a valued outcome we hope to
bring about.’ (Schechtman 2011, p. 403)
Embodied and
embedded
• ‘one is a self only among
other selves. A self can
never be described
without reference to those
who surround it’
• (Taylor 1989, Sources of the Self,
p. 35)
Extra features of (a human) sense of self?
A subject of Distinct from
A mental thing
experience other things

A single thing, at A single thing,

one time over time AN AGENT
(synchronic unity) (diachronic unity)

EMBODIED
2.
Dennett’s
narrative
view
Self as the centre of narrative
gravity
 ‘Rather than constituting
Narrative ourselves as selves as the
theories hermeneutical view has it, in
Dennett’s view the brain
constitutes a fictional
The self is not protagonist by telling a story.
The self is real
real
On the former view, there are
genuine human selves whose
Hermeneutical Dennett: The self-conception and mode of
narrative self is a useful life constitute their selfhood;
theories fiction on the latter there are no such
things.’ (Schechtman 2011, p.
398)
Key claim: Selves are not real

The self ‘is an abstraction you

use as part of a theoretical
apparatus to understand, and
predict, and make sense of, the
behaviour of some very
complicated things.’ (Dennett,
1992, pp. 114-115)
 Analogy 1: Centre of gravity – Centre of
narrative gravity
Jasper.o.chang, CC BY-SA 3.0
<https://creativecommons.org/lice
nses/by-sa/3.0>, via Wikimedia
Commons

Centre of gravity Centre of narrative gravity

• A model of a unified agent that helps the complex
body to function in complex environments
• Also a model for prediction, explanation,
manipulation
 Analogy 2:
Spiderwebs – webs
of narrative
• ‘Out of [the human] brain it
Image from Gallagher, S. 2000.
‘Philosophical conceptions of the
spins a web of words and deeds,
self: implications for cognitive
science’. Trends in Cognitive
and, like the other creatures, it
Sciences. p. 6
doesn’t have to know what it’s
doing; it just does it.’ (Dennett,
D. (1991). Consciousness
Explained. Penguin, p. 416)
The self is a fictional
object!
 Objection: Doesn’t it takes a real self to
create a fictional self?

Author: Protagonist: a
something fiction
real Creates • Ishmael
• Herman • The narrative
Melville self
• The self
Dennett’s reply: ‘Call me Gilbert’
The author does not need to be a
real self:
Is the computer generating the
story a self named ‘Gilbert’?
 Even if Fictional Gilbert and
the robot share similar
features?
 Dennett says ‘no’
The author does not need to be something a
real self
‘Call me Ishmael’ ‘Call me Gilbert’ ‘Call me Mary’
Author: Hermann Author: a robot Author: the brain, body
Melville
Easy to think of as a We won’t say that We are tricked into
‘self’ there is a ‘self’ thinking that selves are
real because the
narratives roughly
coincide with the
movements of our
bodies
Dealing with split ‘One can discover multiple selves in a person
brain, DID, etc. just as unproblematically as one could find
Early Young Rabbit and Late Young Rabbit
in the imagined Updike novels: All that has
to be the case is that the story will not cohere
around one self, one imaginary point, but
coheres … around two different imaginary
points.’ (Dennett, 1992, p. 114)
How does Dennett’s account fair with
accounting for these features?

A subject of Distinct from other

A mental thing
experience things

A single thing, at A single thing,

one time over time
(synchronic unity) (diachronic unity)
Velleman’s objection (in Schechtman,
2011)
• Why wouldn’t a real self not
emerge from the narrative
activity of the brain?
• ‘I am Gilbert’:
 Gilbert could potentially direct
future behaviour, not just
narrate past behaviour: an
agent
 Analogy with a centre of
gravity breaks down: no longer
just predictive, also creative