Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Changing Nature of Warfare
Changing Nature of Warfare
Changing Nature of Warfare
NATURE OF
WARFARE
NICK
ESSIEN
OUTLINE
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GENERATIONS OF WARFARE
FIRST GENERATION Warfare
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SUMMARY
The First Generation battlefield was usually a battlefield of
order, and it created a culture of order in state militaries.
Second Generation War also preserved the military culture of
order. Second Generation militaries focused inward on rules,
processes and procedure, seeking to achieve perfection of detail
in execution.
Third Generation War, as defined, diverges from the military
culture of order. Here the focus is external, to the situation, the
enemy and the desired result. Leaders at every level are expected
to produce the results, even if this means deviating
from orders. Third Generation military culture values initiative
over obedience, and it relies on self-discipline rather than
imposed discipline, because only self-discipline is compatible
with initiative.
Given its complex nature, 4GW can be seen as a shift towards 13
even greater disorder in the battle space.
The National Interest
Nigeria's fundamental principles of foreign policy have remained
consistent since gaining independence in October 1960, with the national
interest being the primary factor in determining the country's position in
international affairs (Ashiru, 2013). In his work published in 1987,
Oshuntokun provides valuable insight into the elements that make up
Nigeria's national interest. He argues that it encompasses internal
cohesion, national unity, the establishment of an equitable and content
society, providing equal opportunities for everyone to pursue their desired
career paths and ensuring employment for those who are willing to work.
Additionally, it entails preserving the traditional rights of freedom of
speech, political association, religion, and equality before the law. Along
with these, there is a need to defend the humanity and rights of all black
men through deliberate actions and policies..
• Once we agree about our national interest then it follows that these national interests are worth
defending. However, it is important to note that Nigeria's national interests have been largely
determined and defined by the various leaderships.
• The defence of her sovereignty, independence • (iii) The promotion of equality and self-
and territorial integrity; reliance in Africa and the rest of the
• (ii) The creation of the necessary political and developing world;
economic condition in the country, Africa and • (iv) The promotion and defense of justice
the rest of the world, which will facilitate the and respect for human dignity especially the
defence of the independence and territorial
dignity of the black man; and
integrity of all African countries while at the
same foster national self-reliance and rapid • (v) The defence and promotion of
economic development; international peace and security."
• France, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, and the United States also followed Britain's example of
unwillingness. Due to national interest, Gowon's regime had no choice but to turn to the Soviet
Union and its satellite states for the supply of offensive weapons. This decision was made to defend
Nigeria's territory and maintain its sovereignty over the entire nation. As a result, Gowon's regime
radically shifted Nigeria's foreign policy from the pro-Western attitude inherited from Balewa,
which it had initially been willing to follow (Dauda, 2006:16).
• Hence, this has given credence to scholars who viewed Nigeria's national interest as "anything that
will enhance the capacity of Nigerians to defend their national security"and "foreign policy, if it
means anything is the strategy of defending a nation's national interest through diplomacy and when
diplomacy fails the same interest may be defended through war and the force of arms"
• It is commonly believed by some foreign policy analysts that Nigeria's foreign policy choices have not
been influenced by its national interests over the years. For instance, Nigeria spent billions of dollars to
restore peace in Sierra Leone and Liberia, without receiving any significant economic, social, or
political benefits in return. This is despite the fact that Nigerians themselves do not enjoy basic
fundamental rights or social welfare within their own country. Critics have pointed out that Nigeria's
foreign policy lacks nationalism, and while Nigeria boasts a strong profile of peacekeeping experience
abroad, the reality at home is quite different. In fact, Nigeria has stretched itself thin over the years to
maintain peace in other countries, while the situation at home remains far from ideal.
• This explains the social decadence, infrastructural backwardness, and growing insecurity that manifests
in the Boko Haram insurgency, militancy in the Niger Delta and incidences of high profile kidnap.
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CONTINUATION
• One of the positive impacts of the oil economy boom for instance, as Aluko (1981) points out, is
that efforts to reconcile with geographic neighbours and achieve a sub-regional leadership role were
facilitated by Nigeria’s boom. The petroleum price increases of the early 1970s and the Arab energy
embargo of 1973 generated an enormous rise in Nigerian state revenue. At the same time, Nigeria
was attracting increased foreign direct investment. The Federal Government of Nigeria used this
new income to pursue a more ambitious sub-regional economic foreign policy action. For instance,
Nigeria provided financial assistance to its neighbours, with the aim of weaning them off
dependence on France. In 1974, the state announced that it would sell oil at concessionary prices to
its energy-poor neighbours. Nigeria also used regional economic integration as a means of
advancing its leadership and reducing local French influence.
• One of the positive impacts of the oil economy boom for instance, as Aluko (1981) points out, is
that efforts to reconcile with geographic neighbours and achieve a sub-regional leadership role were
facilitated by Nigeria’s boom. The petroleum price increases of the early 1970s and the Arab energy
embargo of 1973 generated an enormous rise in Nigerian state revenue. At the same time, Nigeria
was attracting increased foreign direct investment. The Federal Government of Nigeria used this
new income to pursue a more ambitious sub-regional economic foreign policy action. For instance,
Nigeria provided financial assistance to its neighbours, with the aim of weaning them off
dependence on France. In 1974, the state announced that it would sell oil at concessionary prices to
its energy-poor neighbours. Nigeria also used regional economic integration as a means of
advancing its leadership and reducing local French influence.
• the essential of an economic diplomacy foreign policy framework was inspired by the economic
pressures that were exerted on the Nigerian economy as a result of the introduction of the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 during the Ibrahim Babangida's administration. The focus
was on export promotion, encouragement of direct foreign investment, debt rescheduling,
embracing of neo-liberal economic measures and deep involvement in the interplay of the capitalist
international political economy. The political wing of the economic diplomacy agenda was that
Nigeria will ingratiate itself and cultivate the goodwill and friendship of the leading countries of
Europe, North America and Japan. However, because of the mononature of the Nigeria economy,
the country lacked the economic infrastructure to use economy as a major instrument of diplomatic
engagement.
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• Regionally, the country was overshadowed by Ghana, governed by the
Strategic Location charismatic President, Kwame Nkrumah (Ihonvbere, 1991). Nigeria was also
of the Country resisting French encirclement; all of Nigeria’s geographic neighbours are
francophone states strongly influenced by their former colonial superpowers,
even after they achieved formal independence. As such, this French
encirclement impacted Nigeria’s foreign policy actions.
• However, the Post-civil war leadership of Nigeria also went to greater lengths
to reduce France’s influence on Nigeria's African neighbours and to reconcile
with other states in the subregion, including civil war enemies, such as Côte
d’Ivoire, and earlier rivals, like Ghana (Ihonvbere, 1991). Nigeria needed to be
less isolated. The principle of good neighbourliness became a security concern,
as well as a normative principle (Aluko, 1981). Hence, efforts to reconcile with
geographic neighbours and achieve a sub-regional leadership role were
facilitated by Nigeria’s oil boom. The petroleum price increases of the early
1970s and the Arab energy embargo of 1973 generated an enormous rise in
Nigerian state revenue
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