UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE CONGO

JOINT MISSION ANALYSIS CELL

 OVERVIEW
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE CONGO

• A JOINTLY STAFFED INTEGRATED STRUCTURE ESTABLISHED

TO SUPPORT PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING BY THE HEAD
OF MISSION (HOM) AND THE SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM (SMT).
• PURPOSE IS TO COLLECT AND SYNTHESIZE MULTI-SOURCE
INFORMATION TO PRODUCE MEDIUM-TERM (7 DAYS TO 6
MONTHS) AND LONG-TERM INTEGRATED ANALYSIS AND PROVIDE IT
TO SMT FOR MISSION PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING
AS WELL AS SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF RISK ASSESSMENTS.
• JMAC IS NOT A DECISION MAKING BODY.
 ROLES AND FUNCTIONS
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE CONGO

EARLY WARNING THROUGH INTEGRATED PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS OF

EMERGING CRISIS

SUPPORT CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM

 ORGANISATION
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE CONGO

CHIEF JMAC

HQ
DY CHIEF JMAC

HEAD NORTHERN TEAM HEAD KINSHASA/ WEST DRC TEAM HEAD SOUTHERN TEAM

MAIN TOPICS MAIN TOPICS MAIN TOPICS

(NATURAL RESOURCES, AGS,) AOR of WEST DRC (SOUTH KIVU, KATANGA
AOR: BAS-UELE, HAUT-UELE, ITURI, NK (SECURITY SERVICES, DDRRR. GIS, WTA, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia , Angola,
HUMANITARIAN, ELECTIONS) WTA, DDR

International
International International
JMAC MIL 1

JMAC MIL 3 JMAC MIL 2

JMAC MIL 4

UNV
UNV NATIONAL
NATIONAL
UNPOL 1
UNPOL 1

LEGEND
International NATIONAL UNV MILITARY UN POLICE
 JMAC INFORMATION SOURCES
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE CONGO

UN SOURCES EXTERNAL SOURCES

JMAC ‘S own Informal

Mil Component
Sources

JOINT MISSION
MILOBS Media(National /
ANALYSIS CELL International)
UNPOL
(JMAC)
Govt Sources
DD/RRR

NGOs
Civil Agencies
 JMAC: CO-LOCATION AND INTEGRATION
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE CONGO

FHQ G2 Mil
Info Branch JOC

Military
Reports Joint
Mission Analysis
Police
Cell
(JMAC) Mission
Information Reporting

Agencies’ Other
Information Organizations’
Liaisons Information
Liaisons

THE CO-LOCATION WITH JOC AND G2 BRANCH

ENHANCES CROSS-CHECKING CAPABILITIES AND
AVOIDS DUPLICATION OF EFFORT
 THE INFORMATION CYCLE
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE CONGO

ASSESSME
NT AND
PLANNING

DISSEM COLLE
INATE CT

ANALY COLLA
SE TE
 JMAC PRODUCTS
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE CONGO

Products Periodicity

Weekly Threat Assessment Weekly

Profiles On Request

Threat and Risk Analysis Quarterly

Threat Assessment of Territories Monthly

Scenario Papers On Request

Presentations Weekly

Trend Analysis Weekly

Warning Note On Request

Incident Analysis On Request

Risk Mapping Quarterly

Note to File Weekly

 JMAC PRODUCT USERS
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE CONGO

SRSG, DSRSGs, MISSION

FC AND SENIOR COMPONENTS
MANAGEMENT AND OFFICES

INTEGRATED JOINT
PROGRAMME
MANAGERS (DDR, OPERATIONS
ELECTIONS, ETC.) CENTRE

UN
 SAMPLE JMAC PRODUCTS
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE CONGO

PROFILING RISK MAPPING

Main security challenges
at a glance
 12

Main security challenges @ a glance

South Sudan Refugees &
CAR Refugees & incursions
incursions

LR
A

Legend MM FRPI

Refugees ADF
Congolese and Rwandan
FDLR
Armed group activity Refugees & regional dynamics
MM
Inter-community violence

RM
FDLR
FNL
FOREBU
MM Burundian Refugees & cross-border
dynamics
MM

r
de
-b or
ss
cro
& MM
e es
e fug
R cs
C i
DR nam
d y
REGIONAL DIMENSION
 Main security trends in
Eastern DRC and Kasai
 Main security trends in Bas and Haut Uele

1
1
1

 Residual but persistent threat posed by the LRA 1

• LRA strength assessed at 150 combatants scattered in 3 countries. Group is in survival mode (lootings,
ambushes) but still involved in illegal trafficking (ie. ivory) towards Sudan. LRA incidents have
significantly decreased (341 in 2016; 174 in 2017), but monitoring LRA exactions in areas with no
MONUSCO presence (eg. Bas-Uele Province) remains a challenge.
• In DRC: group led by Oliwa and the dissident group led by Doctor Achaye are the most important.
• The departure of AURTF and USSF mid 2017 has reduced the military pressure on the LRA.
 Increase humanitarian pressure due to constant arrivals of refugees from CAR (+160.000) and
South Soudan (+82000).
• Risk that the situation deteriorates due to difficulties to assist vulnerable persons, presence of armed
elements within the refugees, co-existence with other Congolese armed groups
 Insecurity and POC related concerns due to the presence of poachers and loose armed elements
notably from South Sudan. Note: SS elements committing majority of poaching (Jan-Aug peak season)
 Main security dynamics in Sector North
 FRPI : the main threat for the civilian population in the South of Irumu 1

• Strength of 400-500 combatants (affiliation often loose). Strongly involved in

exactions against civilians (lootings, ambushes, sexual violence) notably in the
Bukiringi, Aveba and Gety areas. The number of FRPI incidents are quasi constant
(378 in 2016; 350 in 2017).
• FRPI reported as committing 80% of the exactions, but ‘FRPI’ label sometimes used
loosely to describe criminality.
• The fragmentation of the FRPI may have weakened its operational cohesion, and
the ability of Col. Mbadu. to command all elements.
• FRPI activity continued despite nine joint military operations against them
• Ongoing process to engage them politically.
• Law and order challenge: police remains weak and influenced by AG

1
 Main security trends in the Grand Nord Kivu
 Resumption of ADF activities 1
• Attacks against civilians significantly decreased in 2017. However, killing of 26
civilians (Oct.) Temporarily kidnappings increased in 2017.
• FARDC became the main ADF target. Multiplication of attacks since September vs
FARDC, MONUSCO.
• Current two main hotspots: Mbau/ Kamango, vicinity of Beni (Mayongoze, Boikene). 1
• Recent ADF-attributed attacks indicate Muslim affiliation, but group is not
proselytising

 Sharp increase in activities of Mai-Mai Mazembe (loose network of Nande AGs

in Lubero / Butembo), motivated by the Kabila regime opposition 2

• Significant increase in area of influence since 2016.

• Multiplication of attacks against state symbols (FARDC and education system) 2
3 4
 Expansion of NDC/Renové (mainly Nyanga) 3
• One of the most powerful AGs in North Kivu. Extension of its area of influence from
Walikale to Lubero. Increased strength (450-500 comb.)
• Primarily motivated by economic interests (mining, taxation)
• Existence of de facto non-aggression pact with FARDC (supported against FDLR).

 Mai-Mai Charles (Nande): weakened but resilient 4

• Weakened since “Right Hook” Ops launched in June 2017 and scattered in smaller
groups (Lac Edouard/ VNP). Disturbance of its illegal financial network.
Demonstrate resilience (350 comb).
 Main security trends in the Petit Nord Kivu

 Rutshuru, Bwito chefferie : escalation of armed group violence 1

• Significant upsurge in clashes between armed groups (Mai-Mai Mazembe,

Nyatura) and the FARDC against the background of inter-ethnic tensions between
Hutu, Nande, Hunde and Tutsi in the general area of Kitshanga and Nyanzale

 Masisi territory: 2
• Increasing clashes over land conflicts and the control of natural resources
involving armed groups (Nyatura, APCLS), the FARDC and politicians
• Overall fragmentation of AG landscape – increasing inter-AG rivalry for control of
taxation and other revenue sources

1
 FDLR-FOCA (Rwandan and Congolese Hutu) 3
• Reduction of their area of influence and manpower since the split with CNRD in 3
May 2016 (800 comb). 2
• Close collaboration with certain Nyatura factions (Domi, John Love) since 2017.
• Maintain an organisational structure despite repetitive joint Ops against them
• FDLR continue however to surrender (rank-and-file)
FDLR-FOCA surrenders in 2015: 310 ; 2016: 244; as of Oct 2017: 277
In comparison only 53 CNRD surrendered
 Main security trends in South Kivu Octobr
e 2017
 Increased number and activities of Burundian rebel groups in Uvira
1
• HQs of main Burundian AGs (RED-TABARA, FNL-Nzabampema, and FPB)
near Rwandan and Burundian borders
• Regular cross-border movement (Rwa and Bur) and alliances with local AGs
• Number of direct clashes with GoDRC nearly doubled from 14 (2016) to 26 RM / FLC
(October 2017) 3
• Used by Rwanda as proxies to destabilize Bujumbura
• Heighten tensions between DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania
RM / FPP
• Yet, face ongoing internal power-struggles

 Mai-Mai Yakutumba (Babembe) and its coalition (CNPSC) 1

2 Burundia
n
• Main destabilizing factor in Fizi and geographic expansion into nearby
region
• Core strength est. 400 combatants (excluding Yakutumba proxies)
• Politico-military opposition to Kabila Regime
• Sharp increase in number of CNPSC attacks against GoDRC since May ‘17 CNPSC
• Coalition grew with min. 10 AG adhering from Fizi, Shabunda, Mwenga,
Kabambare , Kalemie, Nyunzu
• Ongoing recruitment and continuing cross-border arms traffic 2
• Coalition-building continues and GoDRC reaction is ineffective CNPSC
• On going FARDC Ops against Yakutumba 3 CNPSC
RM / FPP
 Raia Mutomboki phenomenon (northern part of SK)
RM / FLC
Burundia
• Number of RM incidents decreased from 124 in 2016 to 66 in Oct 2017.
n
• RM halted factional infighting and instead created alliances to fight GoDRC
• High probability that certain RM factions formed an alliance with Yakutumba
 Main security trends in Maniema
 Conflicts over exploitation of natural Resources: MM Malaika & MMAP 1
• Sharp worsening of situation in 2017 due to conflict over exploitation rights at
the BANRO Namoya Mining SA concession mixed with a power-struggle
between heavyweight Presidential Majority politicians. C Simba
MM
2
• Mai-Mai Malaika (aka Anges de Libération de l’Esclavagisme de Salamabila,
ALES) since 2016 and Mai-Mai Apa na Pale (MMAP) since 2017 provoked
militarization of the border between Maniema and South Kivu – principally
affecting in Kabambare Territory.

• Cross-border alliance MM Yakutumba / CNPSC: transforming community

grievances vis-à-vis BANRO to national objective to topple Kabila.

• Heavy-handed counter-insurgency operations launched since 19 November by

FARDC and Commando reinforcements exacerbated an existing humanitarian
catastrophe.
Humanitarian indicators are in red in Kabambare. This includes troubling
protection indicators, high food insecurity, and a risk of future epidemics
CMM Malaika
 Long-standing presence of Mai-Mai Simba / “Gen” Mando in Maiko Reserve 1
2
• 300 active Mai-Mai, including CAAG, involved in (illicit) poaching, ivory, gold MM Apa na Pale
and diamond exploitation in Maiko Natural Reserve in Lubutu. Namoya
Legend Concession
• Showed readiness to surrender, but in rebellion since 1964, self-defense logic Armed Group
against ICCN, illicit exploitation, contacts with FARDC, absence of military Presence
pressure, and absence of PNDDR III are factors reducing its likelihood.
 Main security trends in Tanganyika, Haut Katanga, Haut Lomami & Lualaba
 Interethnic violence embodied by Twa and Bantu 2 1
militias 1
1
• Present in Tanganyika, notably in Nyunzu, 1
Kalemie, and Moba 1
• Twa clashing with GoDRC and Bantu militia due
to struggle over local power and representation
• Some Twa leader aligned with Yakutumba’s
CNPSC since September 2017
3
• Recent renewed mobilization by Twa reversing 3 3
2
years of local level mediation efforts
• Bantu occasionally acting as GoDRC proxies 1
• High risk of interethnic violence, high SGBV
rates
2
 Mai-Mai Apa Na Pale

• Present in Maniema and northern Tanganyika

• Allied with Yakutumba’s CNPSC 3
• Clashes with security forces since mid 2017
• Pushing for control of artisanal mining sites

 Reaction of TaBwa militias (Kasuku, Kalenge,

3
Shabani)

• Mobilizing dormant Kata-Katanga (Moba/Pweto)

• Activities surging since mid-2017
• Attacking GoDRC security forces
• Causing refugee flows to Zambia, negatively
affecting bilateral relations GoDRC-GoZambia
 Main security trends in Kasai
 Improvement of the security situation but still affected by
remnant Kamuina Nsapu (KN) and Bana Mura / Ecurie Mbembe
activities as well as by security forces misconduct

 Kamuina Nsapu

• Anti-Government militia. Created in 2011. Mainly composed of Luba.

• The murder of its chief on 12 August 2016 triggered clashes
between August 2016 and March 2017.
• Thousands of victims and 1 millions of IDPs and refugees notably
towards Angola and Zambia.
• The security situation significantly improved in April 2017 when
Congolese authorities handed over Kamuina Nsapu body to the
family.
• Violent clashes ended after the Peace Conference in September
2017
• Subsistence of active KN pocket (Est of Tshikapa)

 Bana Mura and Ecurie Mbembe

• Emerge beginning of 2017 to face KN threat. Mainly composed of

Tshokwe and Pende
• Involved in inter-ethnic clashes and prevent return of Luba refugees
• Fight for the control natural resources, notably mining sites

 FARDC

• Involved in many blind exactions against civilians accused of

belonging to KN / lack of logistical support /harassment / check
points
 Likely security landscape between September 2017 and February 2018 (cont’d)

The security landscape will likely be affected by the evolution of the political
process.

Assumption: GoDRC struggles or is unable to keep the situation under control

(unclear how fast )

Likely developments with impact on security:

 A drastic and fast deterioration of the security situation

 Severe restriction of FOM and access (including Humanitarian)
 Rebellious movements in the East (and the West to a lesser impact) will likely
rise and claim “liberated zones”
 State authority might be challenged at significant level.
 The territorial integrity of the DRC might be threatened
 DRC Hotspots Political-Electoral violence as of Data as of 31 Oct 2017

31/10/17
Mapping criteria
History of violence during past electoral cycles

Long-term conflict

Major shifts in local power dynamics anticipated

Geographical
concentration of politicians

Important economic resources

IDPs/Refugee factor

Priority hotspots
(urban areas likely to be affected earlier)

Areas not yet affected

(likely to be affected next)

Risk of Political-Electoral Violence

Very High
High
Medium
Thank you