z

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Marquis: An anti-abortion argument

 Argumentative strategy: Marquis

sets aside debates about whether
the fetus is a person

 Instead, he gives an account of

what makes killing something like
you or me wrong

 Then, he applies that account to

the case of the fetus—and
concludes that abortion is typically
morally wrong
Don Marquis, 1935-
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 Marquis: pro-choice and

A diagnosis
anti-abortion advocates are
stuck at a philosophical
impasse
 There’s a reason why both
sides are convinced of their
view
 And there’s a reason why
neither side convinces the
other
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Marquis: Anti-Abortion Arguments Too
Broad
 The anti-abortion view: Typically claims that it’s wrong to kill a fetus, because a
fetus is biologically human.

—Too broad: Just because a fetus is BIOLOGICALLY human, that

doesn’t mean it’s human in a moral sense (e.g., human cancer cell is human
in biological sense)

Problem: Argument is too broad because it accords too many entities moral
status…

…and implies that killing is forbidden more often than we think it is

Fix? NARROW the category of biologically human—e.g., to ‘human being,’

claim it’s wrong to kill a human BEING…
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Marquis: Anti-Abortion Too Broad

Fix? NARROW the category of biologically human—e.g., to ‘human being,’

claim it’s wrong to kill a human BEING…

…but then why think a fetus is a human being?

More fundamentally, anti-abortion view moves from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’

without explanation: Why think that the biological category of human being is
morally significant in this way?
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Marquis: Pro-choice Arguments Too
Narrow
 The pro-choice view: Typically claims that in virtue of NOT being a person,
it’s okay to terminate the life of a fetus.

 Personhood, in turn, typically granted by a ‘cluster’ of psychological

properties

 Problem: Too narrow: Argument implies too few entities have moral
status…

 …which means the argument implies killing is permissible than we think is

think it’s problematic to kill entities that lack these psychological properties
(e.g., severely cognitively disabled, newborns—c.f. Norcross; Warren)
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Marquis: Pro-Choice Arguments Too
Narrow

 …but then why not also include the fetus?

 More fundamentally, pro-choice view moves from an

‘is’ to an ‘ought’ without explanation: What about being
a person makes it wrong to kill a person? Why do the
relevant psychological characteristics make a moral
difference to the rightness or wrongness of killing?
 Bite the ‘too narrow’ bullet:
Accept that newborns, severely
z cognitively disabled aren’t
Standard pro-choice: Abortion persons, lack moral status
is permissible because fetus isn’t
a person, lacks psychological
properties…
…But what about those who
possess moral status despite
lacking these properties? Try to avoid implication:
Attempt to explain why some
‘marginal’ humans are persons
but fetuses are not

Argument about the moral

(im)permissibility of abortion

Bite the ‘too broad’ bullet:

Standard anti-abortion:
Abortion wrong because fetus is
biologically human…
…But what about biologically
human stuff that lacks moral
status?
Accept that destruction of any
form of human life is always
wrong
Try to avoid implication: Accept
that destruction of human life is
sometimes acceptable, but insist
not in the case of a fetus
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An alternative approach

 Marquis: Start by looking at what makes killing wrong,

in at least most cases, and then we can apply that
account to see if it makes abortion wrong.
 In particular: Try to explain the wrongness of killing in
terms of natural properties that can explain the
wrongness of killing, where the explanation
 (1) Fits with our intuitions
 (2) Is superior to rival explanations that invoke other
natural properties
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The Future Like Ours Account

 Marquis’ explanation: Killing something is wrong (or prima facie

wrong—there’s a presumption against it) because it deprives that
thing of a valuable future
 Future-Like-Ours Account: “The effect of the loss of my biological
life is the loss to me of all those activities, projects, experiences,
and enjoyments which would otherwise have constituted my future
personal life…When I am killed, I am deprived both of what I now
value…but also of what I would come to value. Therefore, when I
die, I am deprived of all of the value of my future. Inflicting this loss
on me is ultimately what makes killing me wrong.”
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Future-Like-Ours Applied to abortion

 Premise 1. If killing something deprives it of a valuable

future, then killing that thing is (prima facie) morally wrong.

 Premise 2. Abortion kills an entity with a valuable future.

 Conclusion. So, abortion is (prima facie) morally wrong.

NOTICE: the ‘prima facie’ qualifier allows for some exceptions.

E.g., a mother’s loss of life would involve losing a valuable
future, too, so it could be permissible to perform a therapeutic
abortion.
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By analogy…

 What makes it wrong to cause needless pain to animals?

 In humans, pain causes suffering, and suffering is a misfortune

 So, just as suffering is a misfortune for humans, we should conclude it’s a misfortune for
nonhuman animals

 Moral Phenomenon to be Explained Natural Properties that Explain

 Wrongness of inflicting needless pain on animals :: Suffering

 Wrongness of abortion :: Loss of valuable future

 Bite the ‘too narrow’ bullet:
Accept that newborns, severely
z cognitively disabled aren’t
Standard pro-choice: Abortion persons, lack moral status
is permissible because fetus isn’t
a person, lacks psychological
properties…
…But what about those who
possess moral status despite
lacking these properties? Try to avoid implication:
Attempt to explain why some
‘marginal’ humans are persons
but fetuses are not

Argument about the moral

(im)permissibility of abortion

Bite the ‘too broad’ bullet:

Standard anti-abortion:
Abortion wrong because fetus is
biologically human…
…But what about biologically
human stuff that lacks moral
status?
Accept that destruction of any
form of human life is always
wrong
Try to avoid implication: Accept
that destruction of human life is
sometimes acceptable, but insist
not in the case of a fetus
 z Bite the ‘too narrow’ bullet:
Standard pro-choice: Standard Accept that newborns, severely
pro-choice: Abortion is permissible cognitively disabled aren’t persons
because fetus isn’t a person, lacks
psychological properties…
…But what about those who
possess moral status despite
lacking these properties?

Try to avoid implication: Attempt

to explain why some ‘marginal’
Argument about the humans are persons but fetuses are
(im)permissibility of abortion not

Unlike standard pro-choice arguments, the Future-Like-Ours Account doesn’t treat actual
possession of psychological characteristics as explanatory; doesn’t make reference to
personhood
—Avoids being ‘too narrow,’ counting too few entities as having moral status
—Avoids the implication that killing newborns, ‘marginal’ humans is morally permissible
because those individuals have valuable futures
 Unlike standard anti-abortion arguments, the Future-Like-
z Ours Account doesn’t treat mere biology as explanatory;
—Avoids being ’too broad,’ counting too much as having
moral status
—Avoids the implication that destroying human cancer
cells, euthanasia is always wrong, since those are not
things with valuable futures

Argument about the

(im)permissibility of abortion

Bite the ‘too broad’ bullet:

Accept that destruction of any
form of human life is always
wrong

Standard anti-abortion:
Standard anti-abortion:
Abortion wrong because fetus is
biologically human… Try to avoid implication: Accept
…But what about biologically that destruction of human life is
human stuff that lacks moral sometimes acceptable, but insist
status? not in the case of a fetus
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Alternatives?
 Premise 1. The Future-Like-Ours Account: If killing something
deprives it of a valuable future, then killing that thing is (prima facie)
morally wrong.
 Marquis provides support for Premise 1 by considering (and
rejecting) some rivals:
 A) Desire Account: What makes killing wrong is that it interferes
with the fulfillment of a strong and fundamental desire, the
fulfillment of which is necessary for the fulfillment of any other
desires we might have.
 B) Discontinuation Account: What makes killing wrong is the
discontinuation of valuable experiences some entity is having
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Alternatives?

 A) Desire Account: What makes killing wrong is that it interferes

with the fulfillment of a strong and fundamental desire, the
fulfillment of which is necessary for the fulfillment of any other
desires we might have.

 —Objection 1: We think it’s wrong to kill those who have no desire

to live.

 —Objection 2: Life itself isn’t what we desire— “we desire life

because we value the goods of this life”
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Alternatives?
 B) Discontinuation Account: What makes killing wrong is the discontinuation of
the experience of living.

—Objection: Consider a case where someone is in agonizing pain such that we think
mercy killing (voluntary active euthanasia) might be morally appropriate, at least in
principle.

In that case, it’s the FUTURE of agonizing pain that makes killing appropriate, not a
past experience of intolerable pain. One’s past experiences do not explain what
makes killing wrong.

But the discontinuation account claims it’s in virtue of having a past that killing is
wrong

Since the discontinuation account gives this faulty explanation, we should reject it
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Marquis’ Main Argument

 Recall Marquis’s main argument:

 Premise 1. If killing something deprives it of a valuable future, then

killing that thing is (prima facie) morally wrong.

 Premise 2. Abortion kills an entity with a valuable future.

 Conclusion. So, abortion is (prima facie) morally wrong.

Could one deny Premise 2—that a fetus is an entity with a valuable
future?
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An objection to Marquis’ argument

Objection to Premise 2. Abortion kills an entity with a valuable

future.

P1. Something has a valuable future only if that thing values it

P2. A fetus cannot value its future

C. So, a fetus lacks a valuable future

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An objection to Marquis’ argument

Objection to Premise 2. Abortion kills an entity with a valuable

future.

P1. Something has a valuable future only if that thing values it

P2. A fetus cannot value its future

C. So, a fetus lacks a valuable future

Marquis objects: We should reject (P1)—something can be valuable

to me even if I don’t value it (e.g., person rescued from suicide who
goes on to lead a valuable life)
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What does Marquis’ argument imply
about contraception?
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An absurd implication?

 Premise 1. The Future-Like-Ours Account: If killing something deprives it of a

valuable future, then killing that thing is (prima facie) morally wrong.

 Premise 2. The use of contraception kills some entity with a valuable future.

 Conclusion. So, the use of contraception is (prima facie) morally wrong.

 Marquis: But that’s an absurd conclusion—one that casts doubt on my argument

 So, if my argument is to succeed, we need to reject one of the premises.

 …Notice that at least some anti-abortion advocates might happily accept this conclusion
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An absurd implication?

 Premise 2. The use of contraception kills some entity with

a valuable future.
 Marquis: should reject premise 2: The use of
contraception does not KILL an entity with a valuable
future, it merely fails to MAXIMIZE the number of entities
with a valuable future.
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What does contraception (allegedly)
harm?
 Entities that might be harmed by contraception:

 (1) ‘Some sperm or other’

 (2) ‘Some ovum or other’

 (3) ‘A sperm and an ovum separately’

 (4) ‘A sperm and an ovum together’

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What does contraception (allegedly)
harm?
 Entities that might be harmed by contraception:

 (1) ‘Some sperm or other’

 (2) ‘Some ovum or other’

 (3) ‘A sperm and an ovum separately’

 (4) ‘A sperm and an ovum together’

It would be arbitrary to claim just the sperm or

the ovum is harmed
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What does contraception harm?

 Entities that might be harmed by contraception:

 (3) ‘A sperm and an ovum separately’

 (4) ‘A sperm and an ovum together’

To claim that contraception harms a sperm and an ovum separately

basically claims that contraception harms TWO entities, but the harm of
abortion is only supposed to affect ONE entity
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Final reply

 “One might attempt to avoid this problem by holding that contraception

deprives the combination of sperm and ovum of a valuable future like ours.
But…at the time of contraception, there are hundreds of millions of sperm,
one (released) ovum and millions of possible combinations of all of these.
There is no actual combination at all.

 Is the subject of loss to be a merely possible combination? Which one? This

alternative does not yield an actual subject of harm either.

 Accordingly, the immorality of contraception is not entailed by the loss of a

future-like-ours argument simply because there is no nonaribtrarily
identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception.”
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A reconstruction

 P1. Anything that can lose a valuable future must be an actual entity rather
than a possible entity.

 P2. The non-actual sperm and ovum combinations are not actual entities.

 P3. Contraception only prevents at the existence of these non-actual

entities.

 C. So, the non-actual sperm and ovum combinations prevented by

contraception does not deprive anything of a valuable future.

 Objection: Why accept P1?