HAZOP

Hazard & Operability study

For

NAPESCO, KUWAIT
In this presentation

• What is HAZOP
• Need and Process
• Methodology for HAZOP study
• Team Composition
• Role of HAZOP team members
• Limitations of HAZOP study
HAZOP – HAZARD & OPERABILITY STUDY

Hazard
Any operation that could possibly cause a catastrophic
release of toxic, flammable or explosive chemicals or any
action that could result in injury to personnel.
Operability
Any operation inside the design envelope that would
cause a shutdown that could possibly lead to a violation of
environmental, health or safety regulations or negatively
impact profitability.
What is HAZOP? (Hazard & Operability)
Application of a formal systematic critical
examination of the process and engineering
intentions of new or existing facilities to assess the
hazard potential of mal-operation or mal-function of
individual items of equipment and their
consequential effects on the facility as a whole
Objective of HAZOP

• To identify the hazard and operability

problems and to reduce the probability and
consequences of an incident in the process
facilities that would have a detrimental
impact to the personnel, plant, properties
and environment.
Effects to be identified

• Safety and Occupational Health hazards to personnel;

• Damage to equipment i asset / environment;
• Operability / maintainability problems;
• Plant non-availability / limitation and lack of product quality;
• Environmental emissions;
• Construction and commissioning hazards.
WHY HAZOP ?

 A hazard is not realized if the process is always

operated within its design intent
 Codes need to be supplemented with an
imaginative anticipation of hazards in view of
involvement of technology factor
 Creative input of a team is better than of an
individual
 Item can be applied, independent of process
technologies
The Flixborough Disaster

• Explosion at Nypro (UK) Ltd - one of the most serious accidents in the
history of the chemical industry and the most serious in the UK.
• Date and Time - Saturday, 1 June 1974, 16:53
• Consequences - 28 fatalities, many persons onsite and offsite injured, plant
equipment and buildings destroyed, 1821 houses and 167 shops damaged
(some damaged beyond repair).
• $ 232 million damage to plant and additional damage to houses off
site
Remains of the control room where most of the fatalities occurred
Destroyed laboratory building adjacent to the control room
Damaged site building
Dwellings (background) damaged beyond repair. Damaged car and scorched grass
Road tanker impacted by falling structure
Damaged base of ammonia sphere, approx. 350 m to 400 m from leak source
Leak source - location of the (absent) 20” pipe connecting the reactor vessels
A closer view of the connecting pipe’s location
Summary of the Court of Inquiry
(The Flixborough Disaster, HMSO 1975) - A poignant point, much over-looked is highlighted in red.

– The scene was set for disaster at Flixborough when, at

the end of March 1974, one of the reactors in the
cyclohexane oxidation train on the plant was removed
owing to the development of a leak, and the gap
between the flanking reactors bridged by an inadequately
supported by-pass assembly consisting of a 20 inch dog-
leg pipe between two expansion bellows.
– The fact that the bridging of the gap presented
engineering design problems was not appreciated by
anyone at Nypro with the result that there was no proper
design study, no proper consideration of the need for
support, no safety testing, no reference to the relevant
British Standard and no reference to the bellows
manufacturer’s “Designers Guide”.
• As a result of the above omissions, responsibility for
which was very properly admitted by Nypro at an early
stage, the assembly as installed was liable to rupture at
pressures well below safety valve pressure, and at or
below operating temperature. The integrity of a well
designed and constructed plant was thereby destroyed
and, although no-one was aware of it, disaster might
have occurred at any time thereafter
Court Summary (contd.)

• The blame for the defects in the design, support and testing of the by-
pass must be shared between the many individuals concerned, at and
below Board level but it should be made plain that no blame attaches to
these whose task was fabrication and installation. They carried out the
work, which they had been asked to do, properly and carefully. As
between individuals it is not for us to apportion blame. On the 1st June
1974 the assembly was subjected to conditions of pressure and
temperature more severe than any which had previously prevailed but no
higher than careful and conscientious plant operators could be expected
to permit. For the attainment of such pressures and temperatures none
of the Control Room staff at the time can be criticized much less
blamed.
Court summary (Contd.)

• The more severe conditions of pressure and temperature were

sufficient to and did cause the assembly to rupture, and thus to
release large quantities of cyclohexane. Such cyclohexane formed a
cloud of vapour (mixed with air) which exploded. The alternative
theory which was advanced before us, namely that the assembly
failed as a result of a small external explosion following prior
rupture of a nearly 8 inch line, although superficially credible,
proved on detailed examination, to be founded on a sequence of
improbabilities and coincidences so great as to leave us in no doubt
that it should be rejected. There was, in our judgment no prior
explosion.
What could have prevented this accident?
HAZOP - Hazard Vs Operability
Relative Percentage : Operability to Hazard
Status Operability Hazards
of Plant Problem Identified Identified

(%) (%)

New 60
40
Existing 70
30
When HAZOP Should
Be Done?
• Drawing board
• Construction
• during process modifications
• Whenever accident occurs
• Decided by safety audit or Dow index
• There is change of management
• Review for existing facility between 18
months – 5 years
PURPOSE OF HAZOP

Cause

Deviation from intended design and use

Consequences

Hazard
 HAZOP Process
Begin study
Select a node
Define the design intention
Select a parameter
Specify the intention
Select a guideword
Develop deviation
Identify credible causes
Note significant consequences for each cause
Note existing safeguards
Document recommendations, if any
Assign responsibility for recommendation
Any other deviation? (yes)
Any other guide word? (yes)
Any other parameter? (yes)
Any other node? (yes)
Study Complete
Node
A node is a location on a process diagram (usually P&ID’s)
at which process parameters are investigated for deviations.
Nodes are points where the process parameters have an
identified design intent.

Nodes are usually pipe sections or vessels.

Plant components (e.g..., pumps, compressors, exchangers)
are found within nodes
P&ID No.Of No.Of Pipe No.of
Classification Equipemnets lines Interlocks

Simple 1 to 4 1 to 9 <2

Standard 5 to 6 10 to 20 2 to 4

Complex >6 >30 >10

Very Complex >6 >30 >10

Parameter
A parameter is an aspect of the process that describes it
physically, chemically, or in terms of what is
happening.

Parameters are usually classified as specific or general.

• Specific parameters are those that
describe aspects of the process.
• General parameters are those that
describe aspects of design intent remaining after
the specific parameters have been removed
 Common Parameters

Specific General
Flow Addition, Reaction
Temperature Maintenance, Testing
Pressure Instrumentation
Composition Sampling, Relief
Phase Corrosion / Erosion
Level Safety
Reaction Process & Safety
Guide Words
Guide words are simple words or phases used to qualify or
quantify the intention and associated parameters in order to
discover deviations.

There are seven standard guide words.

 Standard Guide Words

Guide Word Meaning

No Negation of the design intent
More Quantitative increase
Less Quantitative decrease
As Well As Qualitative increase
Part of Qualitative decrease
Reverse Logical opposite of the intent
Other Than Complete Substitution
In addition to the seven standard guide words, the following
auxiliary guide words may be considered :

- How ? How is the step to be accomplished ? Are

adequate facilities provided to allow the operator
to perform the step as specified ?
- Why ? Is the step or operation really needed ?
- When ? Is timing of the step or operation important ?
- Where ? Is it important where the step is performed ?
And so on
Intention
The intention defines how the system is expected to operate
at the nodes. It thus provides a point of reference for
developing deviations.

Deviations
Deviations are departures from the design intention that are
discovered by systematically applying the guidewords to
each parameter at each node.
E.g. “more” + “temperature” = “higher temperature”
Causes

Human error which are acts of omission or commission by an

operator, designer, constructor or other person creating a hazard that
could possibly result in a release of hazardous or flammable material.

Equipment failure in which a mechanical, structural or operating

failure results in the release of hazardous or flammable material.

External Events in which items outside the unit being reviewed affect
the operation of the unit to the extent that the release of hazardous or
flammable material is possible. External events include upsets on
adjacent units affecting the safe operation of the unit (or node) being
studied, loss of utilities, and exposure from weather and seismic
activity.
Potential hazards

• Fire
• Explosion
• Detonation
• Toxicity
• Corrosion
• Radiation
• Noise
• Vibration
• Noxious material
• Electrocution
• Asphyxia
• Mechanical failure
Safeguards – Qualifying factors

• Those systems, engineered designs and written procedures that are

designed to prevent a catastrophic release of hazardous or flammable
material.
• Those systems that are designed to detect and give early warning
following the initiating cause of a release of hazardous or flammable
material.
• Those systems or written procedures that mitigate the consequences
of a release of hazardous or flammable material.
 HAZOP - Model Worksheet
Name of the company :
Node :
Parameter : Intention :
Team members:

Guide Deviation Causes Consequences Existing Risk Risk Sl. Recommendations

word Safeguards Ranking category No.
S L R
Risk Ranking Table
Recommendations to contain hazards

• A change in the process (recipe, materials etc)

• A change in process conditions ( pressure, temperature etc.)
• An alteration to the physical design
• A change of operating method

Basis for choosing an option

• Actions removing the cause of hazard

• Actions reducing the consequences
Support required from Client

• Provision of data / records

• Availability of team members

• Process planned at premises

• Duration of study
 Team Composition
Team Leader - Consultant
Team Members
Process engineer
Mechanical engineer
Electrical Engineer
Instrumentation engineer
Q.C. scientist
Project engineer
Safety
TEAM COMPOSITION IN CASE OF PROJECTS

• HAZOP Study Leader (Further referred as "Leader").

• scribe or Note Taker.
• Independent Process Engineer (HAZOP facilitator)
• Project Process Engineer - Process Engineer involved in the Design
Of the system under consideration.
• Project Design Engineers - Mechanical & Instrumentation engineers
On full time basis and other discipline engineers as and when
required.
• Representatives from KOC Operations, Maintenance, Fire,
• Safety, H&E, Inspection & Corrosion and Standards as
applicable.
Role of the team members

• Role of study leader

• Role of team member

• Time taken
Records & Documents required

• Process Flow diagrams

• P&l Diagrams including for Vendor Packages
• Cause & Effect diagrams
• Plot Plan
• Equipment Data Sheets
• Equipment Layout 1 Piping Layout drawings
• Piping Class specifications
• Hazardous Area Classification drawings
• Emergency Shutdown System details
• Emergency Depressurising System details
• Preliminary Fire Fighting System details
• Fire and Gas System Layout
• Safety philosophy as applicable
• Process Design basis as applicable with process description
• Operating and Control Philosophy
• Material Selection Diagrams
Contractor conducted study at KOC

• In case HAZOP study is included in the study the contractor should

send the schedule to KOC giving the following details:
– Detailed HAZOP Study plan with schedule.
– The individual proposed as HAZOP Study Leader with all credentials.
– The composition of the HAZOP Study team, with the credentials of
– the participants.
– The HAZOP Study follow-up and reporting procedure.

The Contractor shall conduct the final phase of HAZOP Review in the
presence of KOC representatives, prior to the submission of final report /
recommendation t o KOC.
Contents of final report

• Scope and Objective.

• Details of identified hazard and operability problems.
• Recommendations for mitigation of problems.
• Recommendations for any further studies, if required.
• Summary.
• Conclusion.
• HAZOP Study Worksheet.
• List of Drawings and documentation used.
• Reference to previous studies, data bases etc. that were used in
the course of Study.
 HAZOP Summary
(a) Prior screening of units using available
quantification technique
(b) Inclusion of probability factors into the selection of
nodes
(c) Focusing on critical parameters to identify
hazardous outcome
(d) Separation of Hazard and Operability problems
(e) Realistic assessment of time factor in the HAZOP
study
(f) To draw up a practical follow-up action plan
Limitations

• Analysis of problems is qualitative

• Will not cover all low frequency catastrophic event or multifailure
events
• Effectiveness of depends on
– Accuracy and extent of information
– Knowledge and experience of team members
– Competence of team leader or chairman
 Strengths of CMSRSL

• Has a pool of expertise

• Knows the requirements of clients
• Blends the techniques and the practice
• Has multinational exposure
• Follows the international technique introduced by
CIA, UK
• Has training and leading capabilities
• Flexibility and knowledge sharing
• Presentation skills
• Served for major petrochemical and fertilizer
complexes in India and Asia
 Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd.

www.cholarisk.com

A joint venture between Murugappa Group and MS Insurance of Japan