PATRIOT ENHANCEMENT SECURITY TRAINING SCHOOL, INC

BOMB THREAT MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

IED RECOGNITION AND
COUNTERMEASURES AWARENESS
 Presented by

DIONICIO MAGNIFICO PSP, PAR, CATS, CSP,

CSMS, CST, CMPP, SRMS, CCSSM, EOD
Accredited PNP SOSIA License
Security Officer / Protection Agent / Private Detective / Security Instructor
TESDA NC II Security Services
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DIONICIO D MAGNIFICO LPT, PhD
(hc)
PAR, CATS, CLSYB, CSSWB, CSP, CSMS, CST, SPT, CMPP, SRMS, CCSSM, SO3
PG-Dip AC | PG-Dip TS | Law Enforcement | Paralegal | Crime Analyst | Forensic
PNP SOSIA Accredited Licensed Security Professional
DOLE Occupational Safety Health Practioner
TESDA National Competency TVET II – Security Services
CAREER SUMMARY

I am a Licensed Security Professional, proficient with Administrative and Security matters for almost 16 yrs. in Armed /
Unarmed Security Industry / Law Enforcement –TECHNICAL EXPERT and SPECIALIZED Trained in Civil Military
Operation and Psychological Operation, VIP Executive - Dignitary Protection (Close in Security), TRIAD Operation,
Unconventional Warfare Operation / Undercover Agent (IO) Operation, Overt & Covert Operation.

I hold current certifications as Physical Security Professional, Certified Security Professional, Certified Security
Management Specialists, Certified Mall Security Protection Professional, Certified Security Risk Management Specialist ,
Certified Campus Security and Safety Specialists, TESDA TVET NC II- Security Services, (Paralegal, Crime Analyst)

Accredited PNP CSG SOSIA -License Security Officer, Protection Agent, Private Detective and Investigator and Security
Trainer
PROFESSIONAL AFFLIATION / ASSOCIATION / ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP

PROFESSIONAL AFFLIATION / ASSOCIATION / ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP

 Member –Certified Security Professionals (CSP) –Philippine Society for Industrial Security, International
 Member- ASIS International (Physical Security Professional)
 Member-ASIS International (Philippines Chapter)
 Member-Asian Professionals of Security Association (APSA) (Philippines Chapter)
 Honorary Member-Association of Chiefs of Police of the Philippines, Inc.
 Member –Certified Security Management Specialists (CSMS) – Philippine Association of Detective and Protective
Agency Operators (PADPAO)
 Member –Mall Security Management Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MSMAP)
 Member –Philippine Association of Security Risk Management Specialists, Inc. (PASRMS)
 Member-Campus Security & Safety Management Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (CSSMAP)
 License Security Professional-Category: Security Officer / Protection Agent / Private Detective / Training Officer /
Instructor / PNP-CSG SOSIA, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
 Executive Officer / Director-Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Agent Association of the Philippines Inc.
(EORAAPI)
 Member-International Association of Bomb Technician and Investigator (IABTI)
 Honorary Member-Explosive Ordnance Disposal Association of the Philippines, Inc. (CL81-3)
 Member – Philippine Army (Ready Reserve Force Component)
 Former- Special Agent of Intelligence Service – Armed Forces of the Philippines
 Member- Association of Professional Private Investigator & Detectives Inc., (APDI)
 Member of Association Accredited Certified Investigator of the Philippines (AACIP)
 Member- Association of Executive Protection Agent of the Philippines (ASEPA)
 Member –Association of Professional Protection Specialists, Inc. (APPSI)
 Member-Protection Agents Association of the Philippines,Inc (PAAP)
 SME Instructor-Army Pool of Instructors
 SME Instructor- Security Trainers
 Member- Fraternal Order of Eagles-TAGUIG EAGLES CLUB
EDUCATION/ TRAINING / SHORT COURSES

 7 October 2017-Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Agent (EORA) Training Course LEVEL II- CERTIFIED POST BLAST ASSISTANT
INVESTIGATORS CRSE Nr.01E-2017 BATCH EXODUS conducted by EORA Association of the Philippines held at GSU,ASCOM,PA,Fort
Bonifacio, Metro Manila
 June 2017 to present -Counter Terrorist -Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Agent (EORA) Training Course conducted by EORA Association
of the Philippines held at GSU,ASCOM,PA,Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila
 18 March 2017 to 3 June 2017- Pre-Licensing Detective Course CL01-2017 conducted by Truth Verifier Citizen Welfare & Security Training
Academy, Inc. a Subsidiary of Truth Verifier System Inc., held at 2 nd Floor, City land Building, 128 Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City
 26 March 2017 - Post Graduate Diploma in Terrorism Studies -LAW ENFORCEMENT & PUBLIC SAFETY ACADEMY
 05 November 2016- Post Graduate Diploma in Applied Criminology-LAW ENFORCEMENT & PUBLIC SAFETY ACADEMY
 24-31 December 2012- Personnel Security Protection Course Class 02-2012(VIP EXECUTIVE Protection / Refresher Course)- conducted by
Police Security Protection Group , held at PNP Training Service School, Camp Crame , Quezon City
 31 July 2011-Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Agent ctw Counter Improvised Explosive Device (EORA-CIED) Class 01-2011. SSTC, EOD
Bn, Army Support Command Fort Bonifacio Metro Manila
 02 June 2011-Small Group Instructor Training Course Class 02-2011- Armed Forces of the Philippines Reserve Component Professional
Development Course, AFP Reserve Command, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City
 27 May 2011-Army Basic Instructor Class 02-2011-Armed Forces of the Philippines Reserve Component Professional Development Course, AFP
Reserve Command, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City
 3 September 2010- Personnel Security Protection Course (PSPC Class 02-2010)- conducted by VIP Executive Protection Specialist Training
Academy Inc. , held at 277 A Alabang Zapote Rd Pamplona III Las Pinas City (Accredited PNP-CSG-SOSIA / TESDA
 21 March 2010-Counter Intelligence Refresher Course Class 01-2011-15 th Infantry Division Ready Reserve, Fort Bonifacio Metro Manila
 23 September 2007-Military Intelligence & Security Training Class 01-2007-Executive Protection & Security Orientation Course- 1303 rd
Community Defense Center, NCRRCDG, ARESCOM, Fort Bonifacio Metro Manila
 06 August 2006-Special Operation Training (SALAAM) Class 01-2006 – National Capital Region Command, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City
 05 March 2006-Information Collection Training (TRIAD) Class 01-2006 National Capital Region Command, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City
 23 August 2005-Unconventional Warfare Trainers Course Class 01-2005- DTU, 9 th Infantry Division Ready Reserve, NCRRCDG, ARESCOM,
Fort Bonifacio Metro Manila
 01 July 2005-Special Psychological Operation Course (SPOC) Class 01-2005- Civil Military Operations (PsyOps) School, Civil Affairs Group,
Fort Bonifacio Metro Manila
 June 2004- VOCATIONAL & TECHNICAL COURSE: General Automotive -PMTC-TESDA
 18 December 2003-Civil Military Operation Course Class 25-2003 - Civil Military Operations (PsyOps) School, Civil Affairs Group, Fort
Bonifacio Metro Manila,
 08 December 2001-Military Intelligence Security Training (RIN) Class 11-2001, Office of the Intelligence G2 PA, NCRRCDG, ARESCOM, Fort
Bonifacio Metro Manila
 18 May 2001- Graduate - Bachelor of Science in Biology -FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY
 CERTIFICATION PROGRAM

 Certified Cybercrime Incident Response Trainor (Level 1) / Cybercrime Incidents Specialization Training for First Responder and
Academicians conducted by Philippine Society of Criminologists and Criminal Justice Professionals ,USDOJ, DOJ, and Cyber Crime Division held at
PNCOAI-Police Non Commissioned Officers Association Incorporated ,Camp Crame Quezon City ,24-25 September 2018
 Certified Campus Security & Safety Management Course (CCSSM) Certification and Review Program conducted Member-Campus Security &
Safety Management Alliance of the Philippines,Inc (CSSMAP) held at Lancaster Hotel, Mandaluyong City, 11-13 July 2018
 Security Risk Management Specialists (SRMS) Certification and Review Program conducted Philippine Association of Security Risk Management
Specialists, Inc. (PASRMS) held at Lancaster Hotel, Mandaluyong City, 2-5 May 2018
 Certified Mall Protection Professional (CMPP) Certification and Review Program conducted Mall Security Management Association of the
Philippines, Inc. held at Alano Hall, Philippine Navy Golf Club, Fort Bonifacio Taguig City, 2-5 May 2018
 Security Industry Regulations Seminar (SIRS) conducted PNP CSG SOSIA and PADPAO III held at Clark Royce Hotel, Clark Pampanga, 27-28
November 2017
 Security Professional Trainers Training Course (SPTTC) conducted PNP CSG SOSIA held at PNP Multipurpose Hall Camp Crame ,Quezon City,
06-10 November 2017
 Certified Security Management Specialist (CSMS) Program conducted Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators
(PADPAO), Inc. held at No.13, 3rd Avenue, Brgy Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Cubao, Quezon City, 17-20 October 2017
 Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Agent (EORA) Training Course LEVEL II- CERTIFIED POST BLAST ASSISTANT INVESTIGATORS
CRSE Nr.01E-2017 BATCH EXODUS conducted by EORA Association of the Philippines held at GSU,ASCOM,PA,Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila 7
October 2017
 Professional Industrial Security Management Program (CERTIFIED SECURITY PROFESIONAL CL403-2017 Batch SIKLAB) conducted
Philippine Society for Industrial Security, Inc. held at UP Techno Portal Conference Room A & B, UP Techno hub, Commonwealth, Quezon City, 4-8
September 2017
 Pre-Licensing Detective Course conducted by Truth Verifier Citizen Welfare & Security Training Academy, Inc. a Subsidiary of Truth Verifier System
Inc., held at 2nd Floor, City land Building, 128 Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City, 18 March 2017 to 3 June 2017
 Certified Counter Anti-Terrorism Specialist (CATS)- conducted by Chartered International Institute of Security Crises Management (CIISCM) held
at Asian Institute Management, Makati City 5-8 May 2015
 Personnel Security Protection Course Class 02-2012 (VIP EXECUTIVE Protection / Refresher Course)- conducted by Police Security Protection
Group , held at PNP Training Service School, Camp Crame , Quezon City 24-31 December 2012
 Personnel Security Protection Course (PSPC Class 02-2010)- conducted by VIP Executive Protection Specialist Training Academy Inc. , held at 277
A Alabang Zapote Rd Pamplona III Las Pinas City (Accredited PNP-CSG-SOSIA / TESDA 3 September 2010
INTRODUCTION
1. THE BOMB
2. BOMB THREATS
3. BOMB THREATS
PROCEDURE/RESPONSE
4. COUNTER MEASURES AGAINST
SABOTAGE
SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
Modern times have given the
terrorists a convenient way of
making political statements that the
world cannot fail to understand – the
BOMB. Bomb threats & bombing
attacks against a variety of targets
proliferate everywhere these events
were incidental or accidental, the
threat of the bomb is real.
BOMB
A device containing explosives together
with explosive train designed to detonate
upon completion of a predetermined series of
events such as dropping, impact, time
influence and disturbance.

LETHAL EFFECT OF EXPLOSION

 BLAST
 FRAGMENTATION
 INCENDIARY
MOST COMMON IED USED BY TERRORISTS IN THE USA

Pipe bombs !
Video 1-
Bombing
PRE POST BLAST CONDITION OF IED
 POSSIBLE LAYOUT OF IED AT DAVAO OVERLAND
TRANSPORT TERMINAL, DAVAO CITY
FEBRUARY 14, 2005 AT 1830H

TOGGLE SWITCH

INITIATOR

MASKING
SLIDING SWITCH TAPE

1/8 POUND C4
EXPLOSIVE

PANASONIC
5110 NOKIA
9V BATERY

TWO 60 MM MORTAR SHELL

 POSSIBLE LAYOUT OF IED AT DAVAO OVERLAND
TRANSPORT TERMINAL, DAVAO CITY
FEBRUARY 14, 2005 AT 1830H

TOGGLE SWITCH

INITIATOR

MASKING
SLIDING SWITCH TAPE

1/8 POUND C4
EXPLOSIVE

PANASONIC
5110 NOKIA
9V BATERY

TWO 60 MM MORTAR SHELL

 POSSIBLE LAYOUT OF IED AT DAVAO OVERLAND
TRANSPORT TERMINAL, DAVAO CITY

SET ON FEBRUARY 14, 2005 AT 1830H

ARMED
SWITCH
INITIATOR

ARMED SWITCH
BATTERY
Video 2- Cell Phone Trigger
 2001
SUCCESSFUL IED RECOVERIES

RECOVERED:
090830 D
200
DESCRIPTION:
Booby-trapped
IED consisting of 2
rds Ctg, 60mm HE as
main charge, 2
READINESS SPEED PRECISION
electric balsting
 2006
SIGNATURE - ISLAMIC TERRORIST
IED

11 0645H OCTOBER 2006-

RECOVERED IED, POBLACION,
MAKILALA, NORTH COTABATO
 Sept 2, 2016
14 dead, 71 hurt in Davao blast, ASG claimed
responsibility

At least 14 dead, dozens wounded in Davao night

market blast— possibly from an improvised
explosion device or IED. Post Blast explosives
experts found shrapnel from 60mm & 81mm mortar
at the crime scene. 2 IEDs, not 1, caused Davao
blast, police say
 May 26, 2017
44 gov’t troops, terrorists killed in Marawi
clashes—AFP

At least 44 have been killed in the ongoing fighting in Marawi

CityArmy tanks packed with soldiers rolled into the southern
Philippine city Thursday to try to restore control after ISIS-
inked militants launched a violent siege that sent thousands
of people fleeing for their lives and raised fears of extremists
,
gaining traction in the country
 Oct 1, 2018
Cotabato bombing foiled after soldiers tipped off

,.
.

P SIONGCO, Maguindanao – Soldiers, acting on

a tip from a concerned citizen, foiled an attempt
bomb Cotabato City on Monday morning after they
,
intercepted a powerful improvised explosive device
(IED) loaded on a passenger jeepney.
 MOST COMMON IED USED BY
TERRORISTS IN THE PHILS 2002-2018
 PREVENTIVE MEASURES
AGAINST BOMBING INCIDENTS
1. Restrict access to the facility.
2. Search all personnel entering the premises, their
vehicle and belongings. No one should be exempted
because:
a. Cleared personnel can be unwittingly used to
transport explosives into the family.
b. An improvised explosive device can be attached
to a vehicle without owner’s knowledge.
c. Personal belongings can be substituted without
owner,s knowledge.
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
AGAINST BOMBING INCIDENTS

3. Thoroughly train guards in what to look for, how to

look for it, and what to do if they find something.

4. Use today's technology

a. Metal detector
b. Explosive detector
c. X-ray machines
d. Trained dogs
e. Robotic Technique
 FUNDAMENTALS OF EXPLOSIVES
EXPLOSIVE FAMILY

LOW EXPLOSIVE HIGH EXPLOSIVE

BLACK POWDER PRIMARY HE

1. LEAD AZIDE
2. LEAD STYPHNATE (deep yellow) b.c.
3. MERCURY FULMINATE (white>yellow)b.c.
4. DDNP-Diazodinitrophenol (light yellow>brown)
5. T

PROPELLANT PYROTECHNICS
SECONDARY HE
1
1. SINGLE BASED-(NC) 2. PETN-Pentaerythritetetranitrate (white) d.c.
1. PHOTOFLASH (pot. chlorate) 3. TETRYL (lig
SMALL ARMS PROPELLANT 2. FLARES
namite 3. SIGNALS
4. SIMULATORS AMMO
MORTAR
CANNON AMMO
5. MISCELLANEOUS TYPES MAIN CHARGE
E PROPELLANT ILLUMINATING
(NC+NG+NGUANADINE) 1. TNT (light yellow) 6. DYNAMITE (brown)
ROCKET PROPELLANT 2. C-4 (white) 7. AMMONIUM PICRATE
3. TETRYTOL 8. NITROG
4. PICRICACID 9. TRITONAL (gray)
5. COMP A 10. COMP B (brown> yellow)
(L.E- UNDERGOES DEFLAGRATION & PRODUCES MECHANICAL EXPLOSION )
( H.E- UNDERGOES DETONATION & PRODUCES CHEMICAL EXPLOSION )
 PROACTIVE RESPONSE-
A. BOMB THREAT RESPONSE SIX (6) POINT STRATEGY

Report
Restore
Clear
Search
Evacuate
Contain/Isolate

BOMB THREAT MANAGEMENT

BOMB THREAT WARNING:
DO NOT TOUCH OR MOVE SUSPECTED
ITEMS; BOMB TECHNICIAN TO BE
NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY; MEDICAL &
TARGET ASSESSMENT; ACCURATE FIRE PERSONNEL ON ALERT

T INFO ON SITE & OCCUPANTS, I.e.

CONTROVERSIAL, POLITICAL, PROMINENT, etc.

H HOW TO SEARCH, COORDINATE A

SYSTEMATIC SEARCH

REMOTE COMMAND CENTER

R ESTABLISHED AT A SAFE
PERIMETER

E EVACUATE IF NECESSARY
BASED ON THREAT
ANALYSIS

A AWARENESS OF OTHER
TARGETS; BEWARE OF
SECONDARY DEVICES

T TAPE & MAN APPROPRIATE

CORDONS; KEEP PEOPLE OUT
AT ALL COST
 REACTIVE RESPONSE-
B. BOMBING INCIDENT SIX (6) POINT
STRATEGY

Report
Restore
Clear (secondary device)
Investigate
Evacuate
Contain/ Isolate

BOMB INCIDENT PLAN

BOMB CRIME WARNING:
THIS IS THE SCENE OF A SERIOUS

SCENE CRIME FORENSIC EVIDENCE WILL

BE IMPORTANCE

OPERATION
S
SEAL OFF AREA / SAVE CRIME
SCENE

COMMAND CTR ESTABLISHED IN

C SAFE AREA; MANDATORY CTRL
PT FOR PERS & EVIDENCE

E EVACUATE INJURED; LEAVE

OBVIOUSLY DEAD

N
NO NECESSARY DISRUPTION
OF BOMBING CRIME SCENE
BY NON-INVESTIGATING PERS

E
ESSENTIAL PERS ONLY WITHIN
CORDON AREA; FULL AWARE-
NESS OF SECONDARY DEVICES
Video 3- Davao Night Market
Bombing
 BOMB THREAT CONCEPT NR 5

5. THE DESIGN OF HOME-MADE BOMBS

(OR IED) AND SABOTAGE TACTICS ARE
ENDLESS, IT IS ONLY LIMITED BY THE
IMAGINATION OF THE
BOMBER/SABOTEUR.
 BOMB THREAT CONCEPT NR 3

3. “RULE OF THUMB” –
NO TOUCH ON SUSPECTED
ITEM OR BOMB (IED)-

TOUCH”

TRIGGERS”

TRAGEDY ( T3 )
 MILITARY Commercial HME

Potassium Chlorate (White TNT

PETN
Ammonia Nitrate & Aluminum Odorless Powder)
RDX HE
Powder
Sodium Chlorate (Yellow
Ammonium Nitrate & Fuel oil Black Odorle
Powder
C4 Dynamite Peroxide(disinfectant)
TEX Plastic Explosive Nitro Glycerin TATP Common HMEs
Urea Nitrate builtwith Hydrogen
Peroxide

CONTAIN VARIOUS Forms of N2

(exploited bydetection
technologywhich look for
Nitro/Nitrate Gps
IEDs COMPONENTS
Control System
Detonator
Booster
Main Charge
Packaging
BOMB THREAT
A declaration of an intention to
destroy or injure the target by
means of a bomb.

Usually transmitted through

telephone & sometimes by
written notes.
 PLANS TO BE MADE TO
COUNTER BOMB INCIDENTS
1. PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN -
Provide for the protection of property, personnel,
facilities and installations against unauthorized
entry, damage,sabotage and / or other illegal and
criminal acts.
Prevention and is designed to protect not only
against bombing incidents but also a full range of
possible attacks.

2. BOMB INCIDENT PLAN

A plan providing detailed procedures to be
implemented when a bombing attack is
executed or threatened.
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
BOMB INCIDENT PLANS
I - Control
II - Initiation
III - Evacuation
IV - Search
V - Damage Control
VI - Detonation
CHARACTERISTICS OF A
COMMAND CENTER
A. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS:
1. Staffed by persons who have decision
making authority
2. Equipped with communication
system.
3. Have charts, diagrams, sketches and
overlay of the area
4. Preferably mobile
CHARACTERISTICS OF A
COMMAND CENTER
B. ORGANIZATION:
1. Crisis management Committee
2. Area Commander
3. Operating Units
a. Security Elements
b. Damage Control Team
c. Fire fighting Team
d. Evacuation Team
e. Medical Team
BOMB INCIDENT INITIATION
A. BOMB INCIDENT PLAN
1. Receipt of threat or warning
2. Location of a device suspected of being
a bomb
3. Actual detonation of a bomb
B. TELEPHONE THREATS - Maybe received by
mail or message and the most popular
method is by phone.
C. WRITTEN THREATS - Received in writing,
all material must be saved including any
envelop or container.
INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER
 “TWO (2) “MUST DO “ ACTIONS
OF THE INCIDENT CMDR:

(IN CASE OF BOMB THREATS; INCIDENTS,EMERGENCIES OR

CRISIS)

 1. EVALUATE THE THREAT

 2. DETERMINE THE BEST COURSE OF
ACTION “
 COMMAND CENTER
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
CRISIS
EOD or MANAGEMENT
B DISPOSAL COMMITTEE

FINDER or ADMINISTRATOR/
RECEIPIENT AREA COMMANDER

SECURITY DAMAGE FIRE FIGHTING MEDICAL EVACUATION

ELEMENTS CONTROL TEAM TEAM TEAM
Bomb Threat Management Continuum
Receipt of
Threat

Return to
Assess
Work Incident
Commande
r

Evacuation Search
Video 4- Davao Night Market
Bombing
BOMB THREAT CALL CHECKLIST

INSTRUCTIONS
1. Be calm, courteous and above all listen
2. Do not interrupt the caller
3. Keep him/her talking

ASK
1. Exact location of bomb
2. Time set for detonation
3. Description of explosive or container
4. Type of explosive
5. Reason for calling or threat
 RECORD:
1. Date and time of call
2. Exact language used
CALLERS IDENTITY: SPEECH OR ACCENT
__ Male ___ Slow ___ Normal
__ Female ___ Fast ___ Sincere
__ Adult ___ Angry
__ Juvenile ___ Disguised
__ Others ___ Intoxicated
• BACKGROUND NOISES
• DID THE CALLER APPEAR FAMILIAR WITH
THE BUILDING BY HIS/HER DESCRIPTION OF
THE BOMB LOCATION ?
• ENTIRE MESSAGE OF THE CALLER
• NAME THE PERSON RECEIVING THE CALL
 LETTER AND PARCEL BOMB
RECOGNITION POINTS
A LETTER OR MAIL BOMB IS A SMALL EXPLOSIVE
DEVICE THAT IS DELIVERED EITHER BY HAND,
COURIER OR THRU THE MAIL, AND IS ADDRESSED
SPECIFICALLY TO A PRE-SELECTED TARGET &
DESIGNED TO BE DETONATED UPON OPENING.
• Foreign mail, airmail and special delivery
• Restrictive markings such “Confidential, Personal, etc.”
• Excessive postage
• Hand written or poorly typed address
• Incorrect titles
• Titles but no name
• Misspelling of common words
• No return address
• Excessive weight
 D. THREAT EVACUATION
Analyze the threat and take appropriate
response / action. It involve assessing
the credibility of the message and
selecting one of the three possible
response alternatives:

1. TAKE NO ACTION
2. TO SEARCH WITHOUT EVACUATION
3. TO EVACUATE THEN SEARCH
TYPES OF EVACUATION
1. TOTAL EVACUATION
- All occupants must have to leave the
place to a safe area.

2. PARTIAL EVACUATION
- Occupants directly at, below, and above
the location of the bomb will be the only
ones to leave the place to a safe area.
LIMITATIONS OF TOTAL
EVACUATION

1. RISK OF INJURY
2. RESPONSE IMPAIRMENT
3. PANIC
4. DISRUPTION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES
5. LOSS OF PRODUCTION
PARTIAL EVACUATION
REQUIRES A FAR HIGHER DEGREE OF
PLANNING, TRAINING, SUPERVISION AND
COORDINATION
ADVANTAGES:
1. Effective when the threat includes the
specific location of the bomb.
2. Reduces the risk of injury.
3. Personnel essential to the search can
remain.
4. Critical services can continue.
5. Production loss can be minimized.
 BASIC SEARCH SYSTEM
SUPERVISORY SEARCH - A covert technique when the occupants
are not to be advised of the bomb threat. it is carried out by
supervisory personnel who will search their respective areas with
notifying the occupants.
OCCUPANT SEARCH - An overt operation with occupant s
searching own work areas. Search personnel are familiar with the
area being searched and are able to identify unusual or suspiciou
objects more readily than others. It involves danger to the occupan
conducting the search. It requires a minimum degree of prior trai
and practice.
TEAM SEARCH - Carried out by specially trained personnel
organized into teams. The safest and most thorough technique for
bomb search but also the lowest and most expensive. It includes
security personnel, trained occupants, supervisors and law
enforcement Officers.
 EVACUATION PROCEDURES
ACTORS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED IN PLANNING
In evacuation any building, people must be routed
through the most public areas of the building, corridors
& stairways.
Routes of evacuation & priorities for removing people
from a building when a bomb threat is received & an
explosives or incendiary devices found.
Before giving the order to evacuate, the commander
should consider the following:
1. The Caller – what did he say? Did the caller sounds
seriously
2. Has this been a recurring thing?
3. Employees excused from work?
 EVACUATION PROCEDURES
ACTORS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED IN PLANNING
Some of the questions that must be answered &
provided for in preparing the bomb-threat plan are:
1. Who has the authority to order the evacuation?
2. Who makes the decision to permit reentry into the building
following a search in which a bomb is found?
3. How will evacuation be signaled?
4. If evacuation is ordered, what procedures will be followed?
5. Who will be part of the evacuation team?
6. To what area do you evacuate the occupants?
7. What are the responsibilities of the occupants?
GENERAL RULES IN SEARCHING
1. Divide the area and select a search
2. Start from the bottom and work up.
3. Start back-to back and work toward each other.
4. Go around the walls and proceed toward the center of
the room.
5. Check that all doors and windows are open to minimize
primary damage from the blast and secondary damage
from fragmentation.
6. Evacuate the building.
7. Do not permit re-entry into the building until the device
has been removed/disarmed, and the building declared
safe for re-entry.
As a Search Officer, you
may have to search, or
request a search of:
 Private residences
 Public appearance venues
 Hotel accommodation
 Buildings and warehouses
 Office blocks
FORGET THIS
 What to look for
 Package is labeled suspiciously
 Similar package described in a threat
 Foreign to premises
 Questionable as to origin
 Suspicious in size, shape, weight & sound
 Signs of footprints,scrapes etc
 Presence of pieces of tape,wire, string or
explosive wrappings
 Furniture or fittings tampered with
 Search principles
 Maintain a systematic search sequence
 Maintain a buffer between teams
 Ensure rest periods
 Check windows and doors before opening
if possible
 Do not transmit radio/telephone within 25m
of an actual or suspected IED
 Search sequence
 Outside to inside
 Bottom to top
 When searching
 Divide your own areas of responsibility
into smaller search sectors e.g. divide
rooms into height areas:
Floor to waist
Waist to top of head
Head to ceiling
False ceiling
 Outside
 Pay attention to areas accessible to
public
 Garbage bins
 Shrubbery
 Vehicles / Ornaments
 Pay special attention to the evacuation
route and assembly areas
External Search Patterns -
Residential
External Search Patterns - Business
SEARCH OUTSIDE AREAS
External Search Patterns
SEARCH INTERNAL PUBLIC AREAS
 Interior public access areas

 When satisfied with external search,

commence a search of interior public
access areas (toilets, lifts, reception)

 After searches of these areas, continue

into the more secure areas
 LIKELY PLACES / AREAS
INSIDE
 Carry bags, packages etc. left in reception
areas
 furniture, potted plants, smokers trays, etc.
 rubbish bins, waste paper baskets
 public toilets
 toilet tank reservoirs
 lifts, stairways, cupboards under stairways
 lockers, filing cabinets
 LIKELY PLACES / AREAS
INSIDE
 behind pictures and clocks
 behind sinks and plumbing (could be
suspended)
 inside stoves, refrigerators, cupboard
areas
 broom cupboards
Search Patterns – Office Buildings
 DEVICE PLACEMENT FOR BOMBINGS & ATTEMPTED BOMBINGS,1991-1995 (ATF ) U.S.A
DEVICE 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 TOTAL
PLACEMENT
CAR SEATS 46 48 44 35 34 207

GAS TANKS 26 25 20 22 24 117

TRUNKS 1 3 0 2 6 12
UNDER 72 63 65 43 50 293
VEHICLES

INSIDE 134 125 111 132 93

BUILDINGS 595
OUTSIDE 353 380 320 441 268
BUILDINGS 1,762
PARKING 23 28 20 19 25 115
LOTS

MEN’S ROOMS 31 30 34 27 24 146

WOMEN’S 2 0 1 0 0 3
ROOMS

STORAGE 2 5 8 7 1 23
ROOMS

TRASH CANSS 39 51 26 30 31 177

Search Pattern – Interior, Multi
Level
Audio/Visual Checks
Detailed Object Inspection
First Sweep
DEVIDE ROOM BY HEIGHT FOR SEARCH
SEARCH ROOM BY HEIGHT & ASSIGNED AREA,
OVERLAP FOR BETTER COVERAGE
ROOM SEARCH – STOP, LOOK & LISTEN
 Equipment is
limited by the
skill of the
operator.

Equipment is a
tool to assist
you in your
duties.

It does not
replace manual
 Action on find

A WHERE A SUSPECT DEVICE IS FOUND OR LOCATED

DO NOT TOUCH
SECURE AREA AND INFORM
SUPERVISOR
 IMPORTANT
 Do not terminate the search upon
finding one suspicious item.

 The search should normally continue

until the whole premises has been done.
 Minimum Safety Cordon

If a suspect IED is located a

minimum safety cordon of
150 metres should be
established
 AREA SEARCH
1. Exterior Search - Extends outward of about 25 to 50
feet and include the parking areas and the vehicles
parked on it. 25% of available personnel
2. Public Search - Includes reception rooms, lobbies,
elevators, stairs, rest rooms and hallways. 25% of
available personnel.
3. Detailed Room Search - Includes searches of individual
rooms. Minimum of 2 & maximum of 3 persons. 50% of
available personnel
a. Audio Check d. Second Sweep
b. Organization e. Third Sweep
c. First Sweep f. Fourth Sweep
 VEHICLE SEARCH
CAR BOMB
A large explosive device that is transported
to, or into a target by means of a vehicle.
SEARCH PROCEDURES
Starting on the outside & working into interior
with the search starting on the floor & working
up to the roof or top of the vehicle
• Outside / inside of vehicle • Lowbed vehicle
• Boot • Door of vehicle
• Spare wheel • Engine compartment
• Underneath the vehicle
VEHICLE BOMB EXPLOSION & EVACUATION DISTANCE TABLES
FALLING

ATF VEHICLE
DESCRIPTION
MAXIMUM
EXPLOSIVES
LETHAL
AIR BLAST MINIMUM
EVACUATION
HAZARD
GLASS

CAPACITY RANGE
DISTANCE
COMPACT 100 1,500 1,250
500 ft. ft. ft.
SEDAN lbs. 30 mts. 457 mts. 381 mts.
227
kgs.
(In Trunk)
FULL SIZE 1,000 lbs. 125 1,750 1,750
455 ft. ft. ft.
SEDAN kgs. 38 mts. 534 mts. 534 mts.
(In Trunk)
PASSENGER 4,000 200 2,750 2,750 ft.
VAN lbs. ft. ft.
or
838 mts
1,818 kgs. 61 mts. 838 mts.
CARGO VAN
10,000 lbs. 300 3,750 3,750
4,545 ft. ft. ft.
SMALL
kgs. 91 mts. 1,143 mts. 1,143 mts.
BOX VAN
(14 FT BOX)
30,000 450 6,500 6,500
BOX VAN lbs.
OR WATER
ft. ft. ft.
13,636 kgs.
 VBIED Search Procedures

Contents:

Definitions
 VBIED Tactics
 IED Components
 Explosive Effects


Do’s and Don’ts Vehicle Inspections

Potential Threat
 Driver Interview
Search
 Procedures
 References
 EXPLOSIVE EFFECTS
An explosion of an IED results in results in he release of tremendous energy in a
short space of time. Three effects are created:
Blast: Broken, crushed, or deformed items
Thermal: Burned, charred, or deformed items
Response Considerations Evacuation Considerations
Communicate the need for evacuation
to those in the immediate area of the
Response Teams and personnel
should be aware of the
Determine the approximate “evacuation
additional threats posed by
distance.” Refer to the Bomb Threat
secondary devices and multiple Stand-Off Card
simultaneous devices.
Conduct evacuation away from the
threat. Evacuation should always take
place in a direction consistently away
from the th
Prevent others from approaching

Office for Bombing Prevention 5

 VEHICLE INSPECTIONS
Safety First
Turn engine off
Do not wear loose or dangling jewelry
Wear brightly colored vests to be seen easily
Position yourself so that you are visible to traffic
ys establish eye contact with driver before approaching the vehicle
re the engine is off and the brake is set prior to inspecting a vehicle
usts, radiators, and other components. They may be hot.
Wear gloves for extra protection
n blades. Fans may turn on even though the engine is not running
Do not smoke while inspecting

Be Professional
vidual and Do Not let your guard down
inspecting
Do Not allow yourself to become vulnerable with vehicles
Be aware of all current situations: respect to other vehicle occupants.
Threats to yourDo
company
Not inspect a vehicle with the engine running
National
Do Not Terror
perform Advisories
a search that exceeds the scope of
Available local support your authority.
Maintain cultural awareness Do Not touch or move objects of concern

h inspection technique to
ensure no areas are missed or duplicated

Office for Bombing Prevention 6

 S. I. N.
SIN is an acronym to help you remember what to do in the event a potential threat is discovered

Secure the vehicle with appropriate perimeter. Using the stand-off card as a guide.

Isolate the vehicle and deny entry.

Notify chain of command and response team.
Typical Q & A Look for obvious signs of stress:
There are four types of questions
Shaking
ect involvement from the subject
The vehicle inspection has two critical elements:
signed to elicit a psychological reaction from the
seinterviewvisit? Whatdriver the of the of the
and the inspection vehicle
are youof your
. Nervousness
carrying?
Control – Designed to evoke a known lie, a probable lie, Sweating
or an emotional response and used as a gauge to
determine truth or deception: Have you ever smuggled Goose bumps
er had explosive or any other
illegal devices in your possession?
Overly Tense
Symptomatic – Used to determine whether an outside
ce is bothering the subject: Is something wrong? Shift in attitude
Are you worried that your vehicle will be inspected?
Neutral – Should not cause the subject any concern and
igned to give some indication of the individual’s
t is your name? Where do you
live? How long has your trip been?

Office for Bombing Prevention 7

 VEHICLE INSPECTION

Office for Bombing Prevention 8

 VEHICLE INSPECTION
VehicleInspection

Front of Vehicle
 Checkwindshield If
 Checkthe headlightwiring Suspicious
 Lookfor fresh bodywork Item is
 Inspectthe bumper found :
 Inspectarea between front grilland radiator
ehood fits flush with front quarter panels
 Checkweight and operationof hood
8
S.
o Searchfor scuff marks
o Searchfor missing paintor handprints on the hood
o Thedrivershouldknowaboutany repairsmade tovehicle I.
8

N.
Office for Bombing Prevention

Engine Compartment
Check battery box for anything unusual
Look for odd or additional wires from battery
Feel radiator for cold spots
Vehicle windshield washer
Check container for false compartment
Inspection
Inspect the air cleaner
Inspect firewall for modifications
o Look for new welds, shiny bolts 9

Office for Bombing Prevention o Observe a clean engine in dirty car 9

 Vehicle Inspection
VEHICLE INSPECTION
Drivers Front Side
 Driver’s side quarter panel / fenders
Vehicle Inspection
 Look inside wheel well
o Tap on tires (should sound hollow)
o  SearchDriver’ s Side
new tiresTires
Look for Drivers Side
o for unusually clean/dirty lug nuts
Look Swing door to test weight
o for unusually clean/dirty hubcaps
Look
Check rocker panel
Check interior in a quartered/halved fashion
10
o This depends on if the vehicle is a 2 or 4 door
depth
Check ceiling Check compartments
for for out of the o LookInspectanythingnew welds ordinary
If 10
Office Bombing Prevention VehicleforInspection 11 11
o Check for taped items
Item is Driver’s Side Interior
OfficeforBombingPrevention

found : Observeeverything within view (packages/devices)

S.
Feel for unusual or bulges
VehicleInspection for repairs
lumpsbulges, ripsin
Smell for strange odors

orfront and/or rear seat

Check center console for false compartments

I.
Check in the dash vents roof lining
Stress cracks in windshield (no stone impact mark)
Inspect dash for new, damaged or scratched screws
12
Driver’sSideInterior
12
Checkunder floormats
Lookfor plugged Officewires
and for for BombingPrevention switches

N.
REPEATthis for each area that has a door.
Checkunder seat
Checkfor a thickfloor
Ensureno lights are on when vehicle is off

13 13

Office for Bombing Prevention 10

 Vehicle

Drivers Back Side

 Driver’s side quarter panel / fenders
o Tap on tires (should sound hollow)
o Look forinside
new wheel Look
tires well
o Look for Search
unusually Driver’Side
clean/dirty s Tires
lug nuts
o Look for unusually clean/dirty hubcaps
Vehicle Inspection
 As you move to the car rear check the gas cap area
Car Rear Area If
Office for Bombing Prevention Suspicious
14 14
Lookfor new bodywork
Item is
Lookat the back of the bumper
trationcurrent) found :
Movetrunk lid to test weight
Check the taillight wires
S.
ew (packages/devices)
Smell for strange odors
I.
nusually thick floor
Inspect spare tire compartment Prevention
Passenger’s Rear Side N.
Office for Bombing
15
Vehicle Inspection15
Check side quarter panel / fenders
Look inside wheel well
Search Tires
Tap on tires (should sound hollow)
Look foro new tires
Look for unusuallyo clean/dirty lug nuts
Look for unusuallyoclean/dirty hubcaps
16 16

Office for Bombing Prevention

As you move upthe car check the gas cap area
11
 Vehicle Inspection
VEHICLE INSPECTION
Passenger’s Side
 Swing door to test weight
 Check rocker panel
heck interior in a quartered/halved fashion
o This depends on if the vehicle is a 2 or 4 door
 Check compartments
 Check ceiling depth
welds
17 17
o Check for taped items

Passenger Side Interior

If Check lining
impact
Stress cracks in windshield (no stoneroof mark) bulges, rips or repairs
Vehiclefor
packages/devices)Inspection
Office for Bombing Prevention
vents
Inspect
in thedash
dash for new, damaged or scratched screws
Item is Passenger
Lookfor
Feel for unusual lumps or bulges in front and/or rear seat
plugged Side Interior
or false compartments
Check for a thick flo

eck under seat S. 18 18

Check under floor mats for wires and switches

I. o
Tap on tires (should sound hollow)
for new
Passenger’s
19 Front 19Side
REPEAT this for each area that has a

o
Look Office for Bombing tires Prevention

N. Look 
o forclean/dirty
unusually ut
id lug nuts pl / fd
Lookhubcaps
o Look for unusually clean/dirty insidewheel well
Sea
Office for Bombing Prevention 20
12
 Video 5 &6- Pakistan &
Oklahoma Truck Bombings
 SECURITY VIOLATIONS -LESSONS
LEARNED IN PAST BOMBING
INCIDENTS

VIOLATION OF
SAFETY DISTANCE

SEPTEMBER 20 , 2008
Suicide truck bomb guts Pakistan Marriott hotel, ISLAMAD, PAKISTAN,60 DEAD 200
INJURED
The bomb went off close to 8 p.m., It left a vast crater some 30 feet deep in front of the
building . estimated the truck carried more than 2,200 pounds explosives
the dump truck exploded about 60 feet (19M) away from the hotel at two heavy metal
barriers blocking the entrance. ( STANDARD INHABITED BUILDING (IBD) DISTANCE-
162 ft-323 ft ( 50-100 M)- -Public road/ parking lot safety distance to a protected building)
WHAT TO LOOK FOR DURING
SEARCH ?
117
117
1. COMPONENTS OF IED ?
IED and Explosive Effects Fundamentals

IED Components: “PIES”

Explosive
Initiator
Switch

Power source

Office for Bombing Prevention

The five components common to most modern IEDs.

Container

Power Source
Initiator Main Charge
Switch

Multiple switches are sometimes A booster is sometimes present

present and connected together in the IED explosive trai
Heat
Switches Mechanical Energy Main
Initiator Booster
Chemical Energy Charge
Electrical Energy
ArmingFiring
EORA LESSONS 1-2-3
IED and Explosive Effects Fundamentals

Switch Functioning

Arming Switch Firing Switch

Initiator
Power
Supply Test Light

Office for Bombing Prevention

IED and Explosive Effects Fundamentals

Switch Functioning

Arming Switch Firing Switch

Initiator
Power
Supply Test Light

Office for Bombing Prevention

IED and Explosive Effects Fundamentals

Switch Functioning

Arming Switch Firing Switch

Initiator
Power
Supply Test Light

Office for Bombing Prevention

IED and Explosive Effects Fundamentals

PIES

“PIES” = IED No “P” = No IED

Office for Bombing Prevention
Explosive Train: Disruption
Primer Igniter Main Charge

plos ives
Ex

Separation will prevent the

charge from detonating
IED Components
 Power Supply
 Initiator
 Explosive
 Switch

 Container
Power Supply
Initiators
Explosives
Switches
Containers
Imagination is the
ONLY limit!
Explosives Stimuli
 Friction
 Impact
 Shock
 Heat
 ED – Electrostatic Discharge

 Radio Frequencies
Common Types of IEDs
2.HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES (HME) ?
 Acetone
Hazards
• Extremely flammable
• Explosive vapors can travel
• Eye, skin, respiratory irritant
• Vapors can cause drowsiness,
dizziness, and numbness in
hands and feet
• Should not be near chemicals
rich in oxygen
Commercial Uses
• Fingernail polish remover
• Paint remover
• Glassware cleaner for college
and high school labs
• Laboratory and industrial solvent
Sources
• Beauty supply stores
• Chemical supply stores
• Drug stores
• Hardware supply stores
• Paint supply stores
• Household supply stores

Possible HME Product

• TATP, pg XX

Example Commercial
Product Packaging

Also see NIOSH, CAS 67-64-1, ICSC 0087,

RTECS AL3150000, and ERG 127 (v 2004)

# - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -

 Aluminum Powder

Key Identifiers
• Powder
• Silver, gray, black
• May look whitish
• Odorless
• Small quantities, up to a
gallon: plastic and steel
containers
• Large quantities, 5 gallons
or more: steel containers
• Other names: Aluminum
Aluminum Powder
Equipment
Safety:
• Dust mask or respirator, if
large quantities present
• Safety glasses, chemical
goggles, face shields
• Protective clothing
Hazards
• Extremely flammable
• Vapors can be explosive
• Vapors may be present in
adjacent areas
• Contact with water can Typical Chemical
release flammable gases Supply Packaging
• Should not be near water,
moisture, acids, and
chemicals rich in oxygen

- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - #

Aluminum Powder
Commercial Uses
• Paints
• Pyrotechnics
• Manufacture of engines, cars, structural members, etc.

Sources
• Hardware supply stores
• Paint supply stores
• Chemical supply stores
• Pyrotechnic stores

Possible HME Product

• Ammonium Nitrate Mixtures, pg xx
• Flash Powders, pg xx

Example Commercial
Product Packaging

Also see NIOSH, CAS 7429-90-5, ICSC 0988,

RTECS BD0330000, and ERG 138, 169, 170 (v 2004)

# - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -

 Ammonium Nitrate

Key Identifiers NH4NO3

• Spherical pellets, granular, crystalline,
or powder
• Colorless or white
• Odorless
• Small quantities, up to 5 gallons: plastic
or glass containers
• Large quantities, more than 5 gallons:
plastic or paper bags
• Other names: Nitrate of Ammonium
Equipment
Safety:
• Dust mask or respirator,
if large quantities present
• Safety glasses
• Impermeable gloves
Typical Chemical
• Protective clothing Supply Packaging

Explosive
Fertilizer GradeGrade Pellets
Pellets

- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - #

monium Nitrate
Hazards
• Eye, skin, respiratory irritant
• Ammonium nitrate by itself can be explosive
• Addition of powdered metals or fuels can be
explosive
• Should not be near combustibles, acids,
flammables, and heat
• Should not be stored in direct sunlight
Commercial Uses
• Fertilizers
• Explosives
• First aid cold packs

Sources
• Farm and feed stores
• Agricultural supply stores
• Chemical supply stores Example
Commercial
• First aid supplies Product
Packaging
Possible HME Product
• Ammonium Nitrate Mixtures, pg XX

Also see CAS 6484-52-2, ICSC 0216, RTECS

BR9050000, and ERG 140 (v 2004)
# - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
 Citric Acid

Key Identifiers C6H8O7

• Crystalline
• White or colorless
• Odorless
• Small quantities, up to 5 pounds: baggies, glass,
or plastic containers
• Large quantities, more than 5 pounds: plastic
containers, plastic / paper sacks
• May be available in tablet form
• Other names: Hydrogen citrate, sour salt

Typical
Chemical
Supply
Packaging

Equipment
Safety:
• Dust mask or respirator, if large quantities present
• Safety glasses
• Impermeable gloves
• Protective clothing

- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - #

 Citric Acid
Hazards
• Incompatible with chemicals rich in oxygen or bases
• Severe eye irritant
• Skin and respiratory irritant
• Prolonged or repeated exposure may cause allergic
reaction in some individuals
ommercial Uses
• Food additives
• Water softeners
ources
• Pharmacies
• Health food stores
• Chemical supply stores

Example Commercial
Product Packaging

ossible HME Product

• HMTD, pg xx

Also see CAS 77-62-9, ICSC 0855,

and RTECS GE7350000

# - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -

 Ethylene Glycol

Key Identifiers C2H6O2

• Liquid, syrupy, viscous
• Clear, colorless (pure chemical form)
• Odorless
• Small quantities, up to 5 gallons: glass or plastic

: plastic or steel

noethylene glycol

Equipment
Safety:
• Respirator, if large quantities present
• Chemical goggles
• Impermeable gloves and aprons
• Protective clothing

hoods
Hazards
estion can cause blindness and death
• Mild eye, skin, respiratory irritant

acids, heat, and salts

- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - #

Ethylene Glycol
Commercial Uses
• Plastic manufacture
• Antifreeze
• Commercial explosives
Sources
• Automotive stores
• Chemical supply stores
Possible HME Product
• EGDN, pg xx

Example Commercial
Product Packaging

Antifreeze

Also see NIOSH, CAS 107-21-1, ICSC 0179,

and RTECS KW2975000

# - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -

 Hexamine

Key Identifiers C6H12N4

• Crystalline or solid
• White
• Slight ammonia-like odor
• Small quantities: Up to 5 pounds, plastic bags
or containers
• Large quantities: More than 5 pounds,
containers or woven bags
• Other names:
Hexamethylenetetramine,
Methenamine
Equipment
Safety:
• Dust mask or respirator, if
in dust form Hexamine Tablets
• Impermeable gloves
• Protective clothing
• Ventilated area, if in dust
form (open windows,
doors, fans, fume hoods)
Hazards
• Flammable
• Eye, skin, respiratory
irritant
• Should not be near
metals, peroxides, and
chemicals rich in oxygen
• Should not be near heat,
humidity, and acids

Hexamine Tablet Burning

- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - #

 Hexamine
Commercial Uses
• stove fuel tablets
Camp
Antibiotics
•
Military
• explosives
Pyrotechnics
•
Sources
•
Hardware supply stores
Camping
• / army surplus stores
Chemical
• supply stores
Pyrotechnic
• supply stores

Camp Stove Fuel Tablets Camp Stove Kit

Possible HME Product

• HMTD, pg xx
• R-Salt

Also see CAS 100-97-0, ICSC 1228, RTECS

MN4725000, and ERG 133 (v 2004)

# - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -

 Hydrochloric Acid
Key Identifiers HCI
• Liquid
• Colorless to light yellow to greenish-yellow
• Pungent, acrid, sour odor
• Corrosive, leaves burn marks
• Will burn nose
• Makes eyes water
• Can liberate chlorine gas
• Various concentrations available
• Small quantities, up to a gallon: glass or plastic
containers (varies by concentration)
• Large quantities, up to 55 gallons: lined steel drums,
plastic containers
• Other names: Muriatic Acid
Equipment
Safety:
• Respirator, if large quantities
present
• Safety glasses, chemical
goggles, face shields
• Impermeable gloves
• Acid-resistant aprons
• Ventilated area (open doors,
windows, fans, fume hoods)
Hazards
• Severe eye, skin, respiratory
irritant (severity depends on
concentration)
• Ingestion may cause death
• Corrosive
• Should not be near anything Typical Chemical
except other acids Supply Packaging

- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - #

Hydrochloric Acid
Commercial Uses
• Manufacture of plastics and some chemicals
• Cleaning products

Sources
• Industrial supply stores
• Chemical supply stores
• Building supply stores

Possible HME Product

• TATP, pg xx
• MEKP, pg XX

Example Commercial
Product Packaging

Also see NIOSH, CAS 7647-01-0, ICSC 0163,

RTECS MW4025000, and ERG 157 (v 2004)

# - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -

 Hydrogen Peroxide

Key Identifiers H2O2

• Liquid
• Clear, colorless
• Slightly pungent, caustic odor
• Corrosive, leaves burn marks
• Whitens skin on contact
• Skin blisters
• Peels paint, whitens materials
• Various concentrations available
• Easily concentrates to higher levels
• Beautician grade may require state license to purchase
35% Concentration
• Small quantities, up to a half gallon: from Chemical Supply
glass or plastic containers (varies by concentration)
• Large quantities, 30 to 55 gallons: plastic, aluminum, or
stainless steel drums (varies by concentration)
• Other names: Dihydrogen Dioxide, Hydroperoxide
Equipment
Safety:
• Dust mask or respirator, if large quantities or high
concentrations present
• Safety glasses, chemical goggles, face shields
• Impermeable gloves and acid-resistant aprons
• Ventilated area, if large quantities present or
concentrating (open windows, doors, fans, fume hoods)
Hazards
• Eye, skin, respiratory irritant (severity depends on
concentration)
• Inhaled vapors can cause breathing difficulties
• Concentrated vapors accumulate at ground level
• Corrosive
• Should not be near heat, light
• Should not be near metals, metal salts, rust, dust
• Should not be near flammable and combustible materials

- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - #

Hydrogen Peroxide (HP)

50% Concentrations from Chemical Supply in Various Quantities

Commercial Uses
•
Bleaching pulp and textiles
Bleaching
• hair
Disinfectants
•
Environmental
• clean-up
Pool• water softeners
Therapeutic
• health baths
Sources Beautician Grade HP

• Drug stores (under 8% concentrations)

• Beauty supply stores (to about 35%
concentrations)
• Internet (up to 35% concentrations)
• Chemical supply stores (up to 98%
concentrations)
Possible HME Product
• HMTD, pg XX Example
• TATP, pg XX
Commercial
• Hydrogen Peroxide Product
Packaging
Mixtures, pg XX

Also see NIOSH, CAS 7722-84-1, ICSC 0164, RTECS

MX900000, MX0887000, and ERG 140, 143 (v 2004)
# - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
2. SUSPICIOUS LETTERS AND
PACKAGES ?
 LETTER AND PARCEL BOMB
RECOGNITION POINTS
A LETTER OR MAIL BOMB IS A SMALL EXPLOSIVE
DEVICE THAT IS DELIVERED EITHER BY HAND,
COURIER OR THRU THE MAIL, AND IS ADDRESSED
SPECIFICALLY TO A PRE-SELECTED TARGET &
DESIGNED TO BE DETONATED UPON OPENING.
• Foreign mail, airmail and special delivery
• Restrictive markings such “Confidential, Personal, etc.”
• Excessive postage
• Hand written or poorly typed address
• Incorrect titles
• Titles but no name
• Misspelling of common words
• No return address
• Excessive weight
 BOMBS & SUSPICIOUS ITEMS
Immediately upon locating an item suspected of
being a bomb, search personnel must notify
the command center. No person other than
a bomb technician should touch such item.

The use of logic in searching has both

advantages & limitations.

When the search has been completed, the

official-in-charge should made some
announcement that no explosive or bombs
have been found.
IV. SEARCH

DONT’S IN HANDLING SUSPECTED PACKAGES

1. Don’t submerge in water due to conductivity of

electric circuit and possibility of violent
reaction with chemical agents

2. Don’t indiscriminately shock or jar suspected

package due to the possibility of disturbing the
triggering device

3. Don’t attempt to open the package

 IV. SEARCH

DON’T’S IN HANDLING SUSPECTED PACKAGES

4. Don’t cut string or unlatch box or package due

to possibility of pressure release type device

5. Don’t puncture or cut box with metallic object

as the possibility of an electric probe proof may
be employed

6. Don’t accept identification markings to any

suspected package as legitimate
 IV. SEARCH

DONT’S IN HANDLING SUSPECTED PACKAGES

7. Don’t allow radio transmission in near vicinity of

suspected package as explosion may occur due
to static electricity emitted by transmitter (radio).

8. Don’t pass metallic tools or things over near the

vicinity of suspected package until identification
of contents due to magnetic device.

9. Don’t under estimate the size of package like a

pack of cigarette or lighter which could be a
powerful explosive.
3. SUSPECTED ITEMS ?
“SUSPECTED ITEM RULE”

ANY LIQUID, SOLID OR GAS

WHICH LOOKS LIKE IT IS
CONNECTED TO A SINGLE OR A
SERIES OF CONNECTIONS JUST
LIKE AN EXPLOSIVE TRAIN
6. Bombing incidents & property destructions were
mainly attributed:
a. Undetected intrusion of lawless elements
b.Security violations of safety distances 50-
100 M from the protected building to public
roads and/ or parking lots.

UNDETECTED INTRUSIONS COMPLACENT SECURITY

VIOLATIONS EXPLOSIVE
SAFETY DISTANC
 SEARCH EQUIPMENT
1. Flashlight
2. Multi Purpose pocket knife
3. Medical or electronic stethoscope
4. Screw drivers
5. Probing rod
6. Hand mirror
7. Masking tape
8. Marking pen
DAMAGE CONTROL TECHNIQUE
1. FIRE AND MEDICAL SERVICE
STANDBY
2. DISCONNECTION OF UTILITIES
3. EVACUATION
4. VENTING
5. REMOVAL OF FLAMMABLE
MATERIALS
6. BARRIER
7. BOMB BLANKET
 COUNTER MEASURE
AGAINST SABOTAGE
1. SECURITY EDUCATION
2. USE OF AN EFFICIENT SECURITY FORCE
3. IDENTIFICATION & MOVEMENT CONTROL
4. USE OF PHYSICAL SECURITY AIDS /
BARRIERS
5. DESIGNATION OF RESTRICTED AREAS
6. SEARCHES / INSPECTION OF INCOMING
VEHICLES
7. GOOD HOUSEKEEPING
SUMMARY
This presentation serves only as a
guide & is not intended to be anything
more. The ultimate determination of how
to handle a threat must be made by the
individual responsible for the threatened
facility.
 Incident Triangle Model
OPPORTUNITY

TARGET ATTACKER
Remove one element to
eliminate the threat
 CRITICAL INFORMATION
FLOWS

PRE-INCIDENT INCIDENT POST-INCIDENT

DETERRENCE
DETERRENCE
RESPONSE
- Internal RECOVERY
- External
PREPAREDNESS
PREPAREDNESS
SECURITY INCIDENT CAUSATION MODEL

Loss REACTIVE ANALYSIS

Upper Volcano
Easy to See Incident

Hidden Causes
Lower Volcano
Hard to See

PROACTIVE ANALYSIS

Management Failures
CAPACITY BUILDING
PNP THREE-TIERED DEFENSE
SYSTEM (TTDS)

The TTDS rests on a

foundation of
community partnership
with the involvement
of the entire society.

Partnership amongst
LGA’s / LGU’s & the
private sector, as well
as the community.
PNP THREE-TIERED DEFENSE
SYSTEM (TTDS)

Intelligence
- Prediction

Target Hardening
- Denial

Incident Management
- Response to a
critical incident
 BOMBING
PREVENTION

To Counter
Terrorists ,you need to learn how
Terrorist Bombers think, operate , act
, build and initiate IEDs, so you can
easily disrupt their IED circuitry
-Sphinx Jones
 Financer
Supplier
Transporter
Exploiter
Builder Boom
Planner
Emplacer Event Management
Protect
Trigerman
Detect
Predict & Prevent
Neutralize
Exploit

1y 1mth 1wk 1d 1hr 1min 1s 1min 1hr 1day

TODAY’S SITUATION
 WHY ARE WE HERE TODAY ? In other
words is there still any real threat in the
new South Africa or are we doomsday
profits ?
 THE THOUSAND YEARS OF PEACE
SYNDROME ! This must be the oldest
psychological ailment in South Africa

1/18/2019 166
TODAY’S SITUATION (cont.)
 and I believe a quick refresher in our
countries recent history is in order.
 Late 60’s to early 90’s – Various political
groupings embarked on an armed
struggle leading to various acts of
sabotage.

1/18/2019 167
TODAY’S SITUATION (cont.)
 Before and during ’94 – Right wing
groupings in South Africa went on a path
of resistance against the planned
political changes of the time. This led to
various acts of sabotage.
 Period ’98 to ’01 – PAGAD sprang out of
the closet and bombings were rampant
in the Western Cape.

1/18/2019 168
Don’t Become a Victim
Effects of Explosion
 Blast pressure
 Thermal / Incendiary
 Fragmentation
 Pipe Bomb Injury
 Bomber injured while
assembling pipe bomb

•Bomber killed while

transporting pipe bomb
Propane Cylinder Venting Anhydrous
Ammonia and Suspect Injured by
Failure of Cylinder
 Types of Threats
 Phoned
Written
Verbal

Types of Threats
Phoned
Written
Verbal
 Reasons for Threats
 To disrupt the normal activities of the
target
 To save lives by giving a warning to
allow for evacuation
 To make a propaganda statement or
take credit for a certain act

Reasons for Threats

ctivities of
the target
lives by giving a warning
to allow for evacuation
tatement
or take credit for a certain act
 Bomb Prevention
 Locate and eliminate hiding places
 Control vehicle approach rou
areas
 Tighten building security and
to the property or entry to
 Provide for effective control o

Bomb Prevention

oach routes
and parking areas
Tighten building security and
rol access to the property or
entry to buildings
 Bomb Prevention
 Keep exits unobstructed at all times
 Inspect all vehicles prior to entry
 Insure adequate inside, outside, and
emergency lighting
 Use electronic or photographic surv

Bomb Prevention
Keep exits unobstructed at all
times

de, outside,
and emergency lighting
electronic or photographic
surveillance
 Bomb Prevention - Continued
 Establish procedures for periodic
inspection of first aid supplies, fi
extinguishers, and other emergen
equipment to maintain adequate
proper working order

Bomb Prevention

inspection of first aid supplies,

fire extinguishers, and other
o maintain
ate stock in proper working
order
 Bomb Prevention - Continued
 Inspect surveillance and security
measures periodically
 Have security patrols watch for
suspicious objects or persons

Bomb Prevention
ty
measures periodically
patrols watch for
suspicious objects or persons
 Bomb Prevention - Continued
 Inspect incoming containers, parcels,
packages, and persons
 Packages having unusual sh
 Parcels possessing dispropo
size ratios
 Install items such a magnet
equipment
Bomb Prevention
ncoming containers,
sons

Parcels possessing
rtionate weight to size
ratios

and x-ray equipment

 Bomb Prevention - Continued
 Control access to sensitive information
and materials
 Develop a mail screening procedure

Bomb Prevention
ensitive
information and materials
evelop a mail screening
procedure
 Bomb Threat Planning
 Planning
 Receipt of a Threat
 Search
 Evacuation

mb Threat Planning

Planning
Receipt of a Threat
Search
Evacuation
 Plan Implementation
 Tape record the bomb threat
 Serve as evidence
 Provides the actual caller’s voice –
analyze – voice print
 Install an instant activation device
 Legal issues
Plan Implementation

the bomb threat

Serve as evidence
ice –
analyze – voice print
evice
Legal issues
Bomb Threat Checklist

Bomb Threat Checklist

 Evacuation
 No action
 Evacuation on each threat
 Covert search without
evacuation
 Overt search without evacuation
 Partial evacuation after
discovery of a suspect device
 Complete evacuation
Evacuation
No action
Evacuation on each threat
n
thout evacuation
y
of a suspect device
Complete evacuation
 Investigation of Bomb Threats
 Investigate vs. Ignore
 Leads – recordings – voice recognition
suspects - checklist
 Witness interviews – recipient of call -
 Suspect interviews – known - unknow

Investigate vs. Ignore

Leads – recordings – voice
nition – suspects - checklist
ecipient of
call - others
Suspect interviews – known -
unknown
 Summary
 Identify possible targets and their
vulnerabilities
 Identify procedures for handling bomb
threats
 Stress the importance of bomb threat
management plan
Summary
ets and their
vulnerabilities
tify procedures for handling
bomb threats
Stress the importance of bomb
threat management plan
 “DON’T LEAVE EVERYTHING TO CHANCE
BE PREPARED”

“TO BE FOREWARNED IS TO BE
FOREARMED”

“ BE THE HUNTER, NOT THE HUNTED”

 BOMB THREAT CONCEPT NR 3

3. “RULE OF THUMB” –
NO TOUCH ON SUSPECTED
ITEM OR BOMB (IED)-

TOUCH”

TRIGGERS”

TRAGEDY ( T3 )
 NCR BOMB SQUAD HOT LINES
EMERGENCY HOTLINE-911 COMPLAINTS HOTLINE-8888
ARMY BOMB SQUAD - HOTLINE- CELL# 09778513889
845-9555 LOCAL – 4310(FORT BONIFACIO
PNP BOMB SQUAD - 721-8544 (CP CRAME)
PNP BOMB DATA CENTER SOCO- 412-0063 to 65

EPD Bomb Squads - Meralco Avenue, Pasig City - (02) 6379109

Mandaluyong City Bomb Squad - (02) 5322145 / (02) 5327978
Pasig City Bomb Squad - C. Raymundo, Caniogan, Pasig City - (02) 4777955

San Juan City Bomb Squad - (San Juan City Police Station, Pinaglabanan, (02) 7242515
MPD Bomb Squad - United Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila - (02) 5231251
QCPD Bomb Squad - Camp Karingal, Quezon City - (02) 4360949

NPD Bomb Squads

Malabon City Bomb Squad - (02) 2819999

SPD Bomb Squads - Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City - (02) 7754095

Las Pinas City Bomb Squad - (02) 8749201
Muntinlpa City Bomb Squad - (02) 8622611
Paranaque City Bomb Squad - Bgy San Dionisio, Paranaque City - (02) 8262877
Pasay City EOD - (02) 8317433
Taguig City EOD - (02) 6423582
5EODT, 1EODD 12, 19, 20EODT, 5EODD &
Cp Melchor de la Cruz PHILIPPINE ARMY EOD EODT (P) Malacañang
Upi, Gamu, Isabela TEAMS 6, 9, 10, 11 & 22 EODT

14EODT, 1EODD and 11EODT, HEODD,

Ft. Magsaysay Fort Bonifacio, Makati

City
Palayan City 2EODT, 4EODD

15ODT, 1EODD Cp Nakar

Cp Gen Servillano Lucena City

Aquino
21EODT, 4EODD
Tarlac
3EODT, 1EODD Lakadula Drive
Cp Delgado, Iloilo City Legaspi City

18EODT, 3EODD
17EODT, 2EODD
Bancasi
Cp Lapu Lapu, Cebu City
Butuan City
7EODT, 2EODD
4EODT, 3EODD
Cp Lukban, Catbalogan,
Samar Cp Evangelista
Cagayan de Oro City
23EODT, 3EODD
Malagutay, Zamboanga 16EODT, 6EODD
City
Panacan
8 & 25 EODT, 6EODD
Davao City
PC Hill, Cotabato City
24EODT, 6EODD
1EDOT, 3EODD
General Santos City
Isabela, Basilan
END OF PRESENTATION

. .
NIDAER

NOISIC
E OD
QUESTIONS ?
FINAL STRATEGIC OUTPUT -THESIS IN
BOMBING PREVENTION

FIVE (5) –POINT

CORPORATE BOMB SECURITY
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
 5-POINT – CORPORATE BOMB SECURITY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
(ASSET PROTECTION /BOMBING PREVENTION)

PRO ACTIVE PHASE REACTIVE PHAS

(PREVENT)
(DETER)
(Aggressive Preparations)
“Capacity building/Asset
Crisis & Consequence Mgt
Protection”
PREDICT PREPARE PROTECT DETECT PERFORM
BOMB
THREAT/
INCIDENT IMPLEMENT
BOMB THREAT/
UPDATE PHYS SCTY Perimeter Wall
PLAN INCIDENT PLAN
PERS SCTY Sensor/Guard/
DOC SCTY
INPUT K9/Integrated RISK ANALYSIS /
SECURITY
(POLICY/PROGRAM) SURVEY
System/HHMD
SECURITY PLAN/
ORGANIZE Current INTSUM

EXPLOSIVE
SCTY TRACE & CHEM ID
ACTION
TRAIN
OPNS
Contingency SCTY
Planning
COMMO
Security Plan, /CYBER SCTY
nt Plan EQUIP/BUY /Video Analy
SCTY EQUIPT EVACUATIO
SECURITY (I)solate/Mark/
BAGGAGE X-RAYCordon
INSPECTION/ SCREENING
(Full/Partial)
Maintain & /AUDIT BODY SCANNER Squad/Da
Schedules Pre-
ADJUSTMENT OF
ADJUSTMENT Readiness /
CONTINGENCY PLANS/
ASSET PROTECTION/
arranged
SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES) Bomb Drills/ Evac Assy
Search /Evac LOSS PREVENTION Point
DRUG PREVENTION Rehearsals
SECURITY INVESTIGATION POST ACTION
NT (REOCCUPATON)
POST ACTION FEEDBACK (CLEAR &
RETURN TO
WORK)

(Note: This model is applicable to all kinds of perceived Threats, where its corresponding
Contingency Plan can be performed immediately, at any given time, by the designated Incident