Weeks 2-3

Environmental Law
B.A. LL.B. 2020 Batch

Spring 2024
Prof. Aakriti Tripathi

Week 2
Understanding The Limits Of Tort Liability And Criminal Liability In
Environmental Concerns
• Nuisance, negligence, trespass, strict liability, and absolute liability

• Criminal liability under Sections 133 to 144 of the Criminal Procedure
Code (Cr. P.C.)
• Class action within the Civil Procedure Code (CPC)
Cases
Compulsory
1. Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichand (1980-SC)
2. Union Carbide Corporation vs Union Of India, AIR 1992 SC 248
3. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Air 1987 SC 1086) – Oleum Gas Leak
Case
4. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Warren Anderson and Others.
Suggested
5. Ram Baij Singh v Babulal (1982 - Allahabad)
Understanding Nuisance
Public Nuisance
• Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichand (1980-SC)
• environmental issues
• obligation of statutory bodies
• public nuisance doctrine under the CrPC
• Facts
• Ratlam city (Madhya Pradesh)
• pungent smell emanating from open drains
• Discharge from an alcohol plant flowing into drains
• Mosquito breeding
• Open defecation in slum areas – lack of sanitation
Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichand (1980-
SC)
Section 268, Indian Penal Code 1860
• Public nuisance. A person is guilty of a public nuisance who does any
act or is guilty of an illegal omission which causes any common injury,
danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who
dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily
cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may
have occasion to use any public right.
• A common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some

convenience or advantage.
SC)
• Section 133, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
133. Conditional order for removal of nuisance.
• (1)Whenever a District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, on receiving
the report of a police officer or other information and on taking such evidence (if any) as he thinks fit, considers –
• (a)that any unlawful obstruction or nuisance should be removed from any public place or from any way, river or channel which is or may be lawfully used by the public; or
• (b)that the conduct of any trade or occupation, or the keeping of any goods or merchandise, is injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community, and that in
consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited or regulated or such goods or merchandise should be removed or the keeping thereof regulated; or
• (c)that the construction of any building, or, the disposal of any substance, as is likely to occasion conflagration to explosion, should be prevented or stopped; or
• (d)that any building, tent or structure, or any tree is in such a condition that it is likely to fall and thereby cause injury to persons living or carrying on business in the
neighbourhood or passing by, and that in consequence the removal, repair or support of such building, tent or structure, or the removal or support of such tree, is necessary;
or
• (e)that any tank, well or excavation adjacent to any such way or public place should be fenced in such manner as to prevent danger arising to the public; or
• (f)that any dangerous animal should be destroyed, confined or otherwise disposed of, such Magistrate may make a conditional order requiring the person causing such
obstruction or nuisance, or carrying on such trade or occupation, or keeping any such goods or merchandise, or owning or possessing or controlling such building, tent,
structure, substance, tank, well or excavation, or owning or possessing such animal or tree, within a time to be fixed in the order –
(i)to remove such obstruction or nuisance; or
(ii)to desist from carrying on, or to remove or regulate in such manner as may be directed, such trade or occupation, or to remove such goods or merchandise, or to regulate the keeping thereof in
such manner as may be directed; or
(iii)to prevent or stop the construction of such building, or to alter the disposal of such substance; or
(iv)to remove, repair or support such building, tent or structure, or to remove or support such trees; or
(v)to fence such tank, well or excavation; or
(vi)to destroy, confine or dispose of such dangerous animal in the manner provided in the said order, or, if he objects so to do, to appear before himself or some other Executive Magistrate
subordinate to him at a time and place to be fixed by the order and show cause, in the manner hereinafter provided, why the order should not be made absolute.
• (2)No order duly made by a Magistrate under this section shall be called in question in any Civil Court.
• Explanation. - A "public place" includes also property belonging to the State, camping grounds and grounds left unoccupied for sanitary or recreative purposes.
SC)
• Section 188, Indian Penal Code, 1860
188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant.—
• Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such
order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his
possession or under his management, disobeys such direction,shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to
cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully
employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine
which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both;and if such disobedience causes or trends to cause
danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend
to one thousand rupees, or with both.
• Explanation.— It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his
disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that
his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm.IllustrationAn order is promulgated by a public
servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, directing that a religious procession shall not pass
down a certain street. A knowingly disobeys the order, and thereby causes danger of riot. A has committed
the offence defined in this section.
Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichand (1980-SC)
• Magistrate - facts proved

• ordered the municipality to provide the amenities
• to abate the nuisance by constructing proper drains
• failure would entail prosecution under sec. 188 of I.P.C.
• Municipality claimed insufficiency of funds
• SLP by the Municipality before SC on the question “whether a Court
can by affirmative action compel a statutory body to carry out its duty
to the community by constructing sanitation facilities at great cost
and on a time-bound basis.”
SC)
Held:
• Wherever there is a public nuisance, the presence of s. 133 Criminal Procedure Code must be felt and any contrary opinion
is contrary to the law.
• The public power of the Magistrate under the Code is a public duty to the members of the public who are victims of the
nuisance and so he shall exercise, it when the jurisdictional facts are present.
• The Magistrate's responsibility under s. 133 Cr.P.C. is to order removal of such nuisance within a time to be fixed in the
order. This is a public duty implicit in the public power to be exercised on behalf of the public and pursuant to a public
proceeding. Failure to comply with the direction will be visited with a punishment contemplated by s. 188 I.P.C.
• The Municipal Commissioner or other executive authority bound by the order under s. 133 Criminal Procedure Code shall
obey the direction because disobedience, if causes obstruction or annoyance or injury to any persons lawfully pursuing
their employment, shall be punished with simple imprisonment or fine as prescribed in the section. The offence is
aggravated if the disobedience tends to cause danger to human health or safety.
• Public nuisance, because of pollutants being discharged by big factories to the detriment of the poorer sections, is a
challenge to the social justice component of the rule of law.
• The imperative tone of s. 133 Criminal Procedure Code read with the punitive temper of s. 188 I.P.C. make the prohibitory
act a mandatory duty.
• The Criminal Procedure Code operates against statutory bodies and others regardless of the cash in their coffers, even as
human rights under Part III of the Constitution have to be respected by the State regardless of budgetary provision.
• Section 123 M. P. Municipalities Act 1961 has no saving clause when the municipal council is
penniless.
• Although the Cr.P.C. and I.P.C. are of ancient vintage the new social justice orientation imparted
to them by the Constitution of India makes them a remedial weapon of versatile use. Social
Justice is due to the people and, therefore, the people must be able to trigger off the jurisdiction
vested for their benefit in any public functionary like a Magistrate under s. 133
Criminal Procedure Code. In the exercise of such power, the judiciary must be informed by the
broader principle of access to justice necessitated by the conditions of developing countries and
obligated by Art. 38 of the Constitution.
• A responsible municipal council constituted for the precise purpose of preserving public health
and providing better finances cannot run away from its principal duty by pleading financial
inability. Decency and dignity are non- negotiable facets of human rights and are a first charge
on local self-governing bodies. Similarly, providing drainage systems not pompous and attractive,
but in working condition and sufficient to meet the needs of the people-cannot be evaded if the
municipality is to justify its existence.
• The Court, armed with the provisions of the two Codes and justified by the obligation under s. 123 of the Act,
must adventure into positive directions as it has done in the present case. Section 133 Criminal Procedure Code
authorises the prescription of a time-limit for carrying out the order. The same provision spells out the power to
give specific directives.
• The state will realise that Art. 47 makes it a paramount principle of governance that steps are taken for the
improvement of public health as amongst its primary duties. The municipality also will slim its budget on low
priority items and elitist projects to use the savings on sanitation and public health.
• Where Directive Principles have found statutory expression in Do's and Don'ts the court will not sit idly by and
allow municipal government to become a statutory mockery. The law will relentlessly be enforced and the plea
of poor finance will be poor alibi when people in misery cry for justice. The dynamics of the judicial process
have a new `enforcement' dimension not merely through some of the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code (as here) but also through activated tort consciousness. The officers in charge and
even the elected representatives will have to face the penalty of the law if what the Constitution and follow up
legislation direct them to do are defied or denied wrongfully. The wages of violation is punishment, corporate
and personal.
• [The Court approved a scheme of construction work to be undertaken by the Municipality for the elimination of the
insanitary conditions and directed that the work be commenced within two months and that the Magistrate inspect the
progress of the work every three months and see that it is implemented.
Dr. Ram Raj Singh v Babulal (1982 -
Allahabad)
Private Nuisance
Facts
• The grievance of the plaintiff-appellant was that the brick-grinding
machine was generating dust which polluted the atmosphere and
entered the consulting chamber of the plaintiff-appellant and caused
physical inconvenience to him and his Patients who came to his
chamber. It was further stated that the said machine had been set up
by the defendant-respondent without any permission or licence from
the Municipal Board.
Allahabad)
• Issue
The plaintiff-appellant commenced the action giving rise to this second appeal for
permanent injunction to restrain the defendant-respondent from running his brick-
grinding machine.
• Plaintiff
The plaintiff-appellant has been denied the relief sought by him on the ground that
brick grinding machine of the defendant did not cause any substantial injury or
special damage to the plaintiff. Learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff has
argued before me that the two courts below have not correctly appreciated the
meaning of the expressions 'substantial injury' and 'special damgage,' as used in
law.
Allahabad)
• Defendant
The defendant-respondent contested the suit. He did not deny that the
machine was erected by him in April, 1965. He contended that no dust
emanated during the process of grinding bricks and there was no
question of any pollution being caused in the atmosphere. He further
stated that the bricks were moistened before being subjected to grinding
process and no dust resulted therefrom. He further stated that his
machine did not produce any noise and according to him, the erection
and working of the machine did not cause any nuisance--whether public
or private. He concluded by saying that the suit had been filed against
him only on account of enmity and the same was not legally sustainable.
Allahabad)
Law
Now ordinarily it is a right of the owner of a property to use it in any manner he likes.
Human beings are, however, social animals. The right to enjoy one's properly is, therefore,
necessarily restricted so as to enable the owner of an adjoining property to use his own
properly in a beneficial manner. No person has a right to make such user of his property as
materially interferes with the similar right of his neighbour to enjoy his properly. The
relations of the members of the society are necessarily to be governed by the principles of
"live and let live" and "give and lake." The rights of the owner of a property to use his own
property are necessarily to be limited by the similar rights in others.
The expression "special damage" is used in law to indicate a damage caused to a party in
contradistinction to damage caused to the public at large. The damage caused to public at
large on account of a nuisance is referred in law as a public nuisance. The expression
"public nuisance" has been defined in Section 268 of the I.P.C.
Allahabad)
• I have already stated that a person is ordinarily entitled to do any thing on his own
property provided that doing of such a thing is lawful. His conduct, however, becomes a
private nuisance when the consequence of his acts no longer remain confined to his
own property but spill over in a substantial manner to the properly belonging to another
person. However, any thing done by a person on his property, repercussions of which
are felt on the neighbour's land, may not always be a nuisance. The consequences of
any thing done by the owner of a land on his own land which are also fell over the
neighbouring land may be of such a trivial nature that no reasonable person would
object to the same nO precise or universal formula has been devised to determine the
distinction between a trivial consequence of an act or a consequence which can be
termed to be of substantial magnitude. The test which has always been found to be use-
ful in distinguishing the two sets of cases is the test of ascertaining the reaction of a
reasonable person according to the ordinary usage of mankind living in a particular
society in respect of the thing complained of.
Allahabad)
• The offence of public nuisance has been made punishable under Chapter XIV of the said Code. A public nuisance
may also be abated by a criminal Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 133 of the Cr. P. C. 1973.
However, there may be cases where a single act may amount to a public nuisance and also give rise to a cause of
action to an individual to sue on the basis of private nuisance. For instance, if night soil is heaped by the side of a
public highway, it may be a nuisance to the general public and the persons who pass along the said highway. At the
same time it may be a private nuisance to a person who lives in a house which adjoins the place where the night soil
is collected. All that the law requires is that when an act amounts to public nuisance, an individual can sue in his
own right only if he is able to prove special damage to himself i. a, damage which is personal to him as opposed to
the damage or inconvenience caused to the public at large or to a section of the public.
• The expression 'special damage' was found by the text book writers to be somewhat inaccurate and confusing. In
later editions of the text books such as 'Salmond on Torts', the expression which has been used is 'particular
damage'. It actually follows from the findings recorded by the two Courts below that the plaintiff had succeeded in
establishing damage which was particular to himself. It has been held by the court of appeal that dust emanated
from the crushing of bricks was a public hazard and was bound to cause injury to the health of the persons. It has
further held that dust from bricks entered in sufficient quantity into the consulting chamber of the plaintiff-
appellant so that a thin red coating was visible on the clothes of the persons sitting there. In view of these findings it
is difficult to comprehend how it could be said that the plaintiff had failed to prove that special damage was not
being caused to him on account of the offending brick grinding machine.
Allahabad)
• Coming to the question of substantial injury, I have already indicated above that every
injury is considered to be substantial which a reasonable person considers to be so. In
assessing the nature of substantial injury, the test to be applied is again the
appraisement made of the injury by a reasonable person belonging to the society. The
expression does not take into account the susceptibilities of hyper sensitive person or
persons attuned to a dainty mode of living. No other meaning can be assigned or has
been assigned to the expression "substantial injury." In view of the fact found by the two
courts below concurrently, it was impossible to hold that no substantial injury was being
caused to the plaintiff-appellant. Causing of actual damage by the act complained of as a
nuisance is besides the point. If actual damage or actual injury were to be the criterion a
person will have to wait before the injury becomes palpable or demonstrable before
instituting a suit or its abatement. My opinion, on this point is fortified by the views of
the text book writers and the decided cases. Any act would amount to a private nuisance
which can reasonably said to cause injury, discomfort or annoyance to a person.
Allahabad)
• A permanent injunction is issued against the defendant-respondent
restraining him from using Ms brick grinding machine
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Air 1987 SC 1086) – Oleum Gas Leak Case
• The petitioners - writ petition under Art. 32, sought a direction for
closure of the various units of Shriram Foods & Fertilizers Industries
on the ground that they were hazardous to the community.
• During the pendency of the petition, there was escape of oleum gas
from one of the units.
• The Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board and the Delhi Bar Association
filed applications for award of compensation to the persons who had
suffered harm on account of escape of oleum gas.
• A Bench of three Hon'ble Judges while permitting Shriram to restart its power plant as also
other plants subject to certain conditions, referred the applications for compensation to a
larger Bench of five Judges because issues of great constitutional importance
1. What is the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 32 since
the applications for compensation are sought to be maintained under that Article;
2. Whether Art. 21 is available against Shriram which is owned by Delhi Cloth Mills Limited,
a public company limited by shares and which is engaged in an industry vital to public
interest and with potential to affect the life and health of the people; and
3. What is the measure of liability of an enterprise which is engaged in an hazardous or
inherently dangerous industry, if by reason of an accident occurring in such industry,
persons die or are injured. Does the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1866 Law Report 1
Exchequer 265) apply or is there any other principle on which the liability can be
determined.
1. The question whether a private corporation like Shriram would fall within the scope and ambit of Art. 12 so as to
be amenable to the discipline of Art. 21 is left for proper and detailed consideration at a later stage if it becomes
necessary to do so.
2. The Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board is directed to take up the cases of all those who claim to have suffered on
account of oleum gas and to file actions on their behalf in the appropriate Court for claiming compensation and
the Delhi Administration is directed to provide necessary funds to the Board for the purpose.
3. Where there is a violation of a fundamental or other legal right of a person or class of persons who by reason of
poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position cannot approach a Court of law for justice,
it would be open to any public-spirited individual or social action group to bring an action for vindication of the
fundamental or other legal right of such individual or class of individuals and this can be done not only by filing
regular writ petition under Art. 226 in the High Court and under Art. 32 in this Court, but also by addressing a
letter to the Court.
1. Even if a letter is addressed to an individual Judge of the Court, it should be entertained, provided of course it is by or on
behalf of a person in custody or on behalf of a woman or a child or a class or deprived or disadvantaged persons.
2. Letters addressed to individual Justices of this Court should not be rejected merely because they fail to conform to the
preferred form of address nor should the Court adopt a rigid stance that no letters will be entertained unless they are
supported by an affidavit. If the Court were to insist on an affidavit as a condition of entertaining the letters the entire object
and purpose of epistolary jurisdiction would be frustrated because most of the poor and disadvantaged persons will then not
be able to have easy access to the Court and even the social action groups will find it difficult to approach the Court.
• Article 32 does not merely confer power on this Court to issue direction,
order or writ for enforcement of the fundamental rights but it also lays a
constitutional obligation on this Court to protect the fundamental rights
of the people and for that purpose this Court has all incidental and
ancillary powers including the power to forge new remedies and fashion
new strategies designed to enforce the fundamental rights. It is in
realisation of this constitutional obligation that this Court has, in the
past, innovated new methods and strategies for the purpose of securing
enforcement of the fundamental rights, particularly in the case of the
poor and the disadvantaged who are denied their basic human rights
and to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning.
• The power of the Court is not only injunctive in ambit, that is, preventing the infringement of fundamental
right but it is also remedial in scope and provides relief against a breach of the fundamental right already
committed.
• The power of the Court to grant such remedial relief may include the power to award compensation in
appropriate cases. The infringement of the fundamental right must be gross and patent, that is
incontrovertible and ex facie glaring and either such infringement should be on a large scale affecting the
fundamental rights of a large number of persons or it should appear unjust or unduly harsh or op- pressing
on account of their poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position to require the
person or persons affected by such infringement to initiate and pursue action in the Civil Courts.
• Ordinarily a petition under Art. 32 should not be used as a substitute for enforcement of the right to claim
compensation for infringement of a fundamental right through the ordinary process of Civil Court. It is only
in exceptional cases that compensation may be awarded in a petition under Art. 32.
• The applications for compensation in the instant writ petition are for enforcement of the fundamental right
to life enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution and while dealing with such applications the Court cannot
adopt a hyper-technical approach which would defeat the ends of justice. The Court must look at the
substance and not the form. Therefore, the instant applications for compensation are maintainable under
Art. 32.
• The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra) laid down a principle of liability that if a person who
brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do harm and such thing
escapes and does damage to another, he is liable to compensate for the damage caused. This
rule applies only to non-natural user of the land and it does not apply to things naturally on
the land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of
the person injured or where the thing which escapes is present by the consent of the person
injured or in certain cases where there is statutory authority. This rule evolved in the 19th
century at a time when all these developments of science and technology had not taken place
cannot afford any guidance in evolving any standard of liability consistent with the
constitutional norms and the needs of the present day economy and social structure. In a
modern industrial society with highly developed scientific knowledge and technology where
hazardous or inherently dangerous industries are necessary to carry on as part of
developmental programme, the Court need not feel inhibited by this rule merely because the
new law does not recognise the rule of strict and absolute liability in case of an enterprise
engaged in hazardous and dangerous activity.
• Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic
developments taking place in the country. Law cannot afford to remain static. The Court cannot allow judicial
thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or in any other foreign country. Although
this Court should be prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes, but it has to build up its own
jurisprudence, evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems
which arise in a highly industrialised economy. If it is found that it is necessary to construct a new principle of law to
deal with -an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or
inherently dangerous industries which are concommitant to an industrial economy the Court should not hesitate to
evolve such principles of liability merely because it has not been so done in England.
• This Court has throughout the last few years expanded the horizon of Art. 12 primarily to inject respect for human-
rights and social conscience in corporate structure. The purpose of expansion has not been to destroy the raison
d'etre of creating corporations but to advance the human rights jurisprudence. The apprehension that including
within the ambit of Art. 12 and thus subjecting to the discipline of Art. 21 those private corporations whose
activities have the potential of affecting the life and health of the people, would deal a death blow to the policy of
encouraging and permitting private enterpreneurial activity is not well founded. It is through creative interpretation
and bold innovation that the human-rights jurisprudence has been developed in India to a remarkable extent and
this forward march of the human rights movement cannot be allowed to be halted by unfounded apprehensions
expressed by status quoists.
• An enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of
the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute non-delegable duty to the community to ensure
that if any harm results to anyone, the enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity the enterprise
must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm irrespective of the fact that the enterprise had taken all reasonable care and that the
harm occurred without any negligence on its part.
• If the enterprise is permitted to carry on an hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that such
permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account of such activity as an appropriate item of its
overheads. The enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard against hazards or dangers and to provide warning against potential
hazards.
• The measure of compensation in such kind of cases must be co-related to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such
compensation must have a deter- rent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of
compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of an accident in carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity
by the enterprise.
• The historical context in which the American doctrine of State action evolved in the united States is irrelevant for the purpose of Indian
Courts, especially in view of Art. 15(2) of the Indian Constitution. But, it is the principle behind the doctrine of State aid, control and
regulation so impregnating a private activity as to give it the colour of State action which can be applied to the limited extent to which it can
be Indianised and harmoniously blended with Indian constitutional 825 jurisprudence. Indian Courts are not bound by the American
exposition of constitutional law. The provisions of American Constitution cannot always be applied to Indian conditions or to the provisions
of Indian Constitution and whilst some of the principles adumberated by the American decisions may provide a useful guide, close adherence
to those principles while applying them to the provisions of the Indian Constitution is not to be favoured, because the social conditions in
India are different.
The Bhopal Gas Leak Tragedy
• (1969) Union Carbide India Limited’s (UCIL) plant at Bhopal designed
by its holding company Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), U.S.A
(which held 50.9% of UCIL’s equity) was built in 1969 as a formulation
factory for UCC’s SEVIN brand of pesticides, produced by reacting
Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) and alpha naphthol.
• (1975) Sevin kills pests by paralysing their nervous systems. At this
time MIC was imported from the US in steel containers. Plant set up
on land taken on long-term lease from State of Madhya Pradesh.
• (1978) The alpha naphtol manufacturing unit was set up and a year
later the MIC unit was set up at UCIL’s plant in Bhopal
• (December 1984) At 8.30 p.m. the workers under instructions from their
supervisors began a water-washing exercise to clear the pipes choked with solid
wastes. The water entered the MIC tank past leaking valves and set off an
exothermic ‘runaway reaction’ causing the concrete casing of tank 610 to split and
the contents leaking into the air.
• (December 1984) Because of no warning given to residents or about precautions
they should take, many of them ran on to the streets to meet a certain death. A
suo-motu FIR was recorded by the SHO at P.S. Hanumanganj on 03.12.84 against
UCC, UCIL and its executives and employees under s.304A IPC.
- 3828 died on the day of the disaster (the unofficial toll is feared to be much higher – by
2003 over 15,000 death claims have been processed)
- Over 30,000 injured on the fateful day (a figure that now stands at 5.5 lakhs)
- 2544 animals killed
• (December 1984) Case was handed over to the CBI. The Government of
Madhya Pradesh on December 6, 1984 set up a Commission of Inquiry
called the Bhopal Poisonous Gas Leakage Inquiry Commission, presided
over by N.K. Singh a sitting judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court.
• (December 1984) Warren Anderson (A1), Keshub Mahindra (A2) and
V.P.Gokhale (A3) were arrested and released on bail on the same day. A1
was escorted out to Delhi on Chief Minister’s special plane.
• (December 1984) Nearly 145 claims were filed on behalf of victims in
various US courts. These were consolidated and placed before the
Southern District Court, New York presided over by Judge John Keenan.
• (March 1985) Parliament enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing
of Claims) Act 1985 whereby Union of India would be the sole plaintiff in a
suit against the UCC and other defendants for compensation arising out of
the disaster
• (April 1985) Union of India filed a complaint on behalf of all victims in
Keenan’s court.
• (December 1985) The N.K.Singh Commission of Inquiry wound up on
December 15, 1985 with the Government of Madhya Pradesh not extending
its term of one year. A week thereafter, the Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research (CSIR) submitted a detailed report squarely implicating
the UCC for faulty design of the plant as well as its reckless disregard of
operational safety.
• (May 1986) Accepting the forum non conveniens defence, Judge Keenan dismissed the
claim conditional upon UCC submitting to the jurisdiction of Indian courts.
• In 1986, two writ petitions were filed in Supreme Court of India challenging the validity of the
Claims Act.
• (September 1986) Union of India filed a suit against UCC in the Bhopal District Court.
• (January 1987) Against the order dated May 12, 1986 of Judge Keenan, appeals were
filed by the 145 individual plaintiffs and the UCC. By order dated January 4, 1987, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disposed of the appeals by modifying the
conditions subject to which the suit by Union of India had been dismissed.
• (October 1987) Union of India’s further petition for a writ of certiorari against the order
of the Court of Appeals was declined by the U.S. Supreme Court on October 5, 1987.
• (December 1987) CBI filed a charge sheet in the court of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Bhopal charging accused for offences under s. 304 Part II IPC and
other offences.
• (December 1987) An interim compensation of Rs. 350 crores was ordered by
Judge Deo, District Judge, Bhopal.
• (April 1987) This was challenged before the High Court at Jabalpur. By judgment
dated April 4, 1988 the High Court reduced the interim compensation to Rs.250
crores. UCC challenged this further before the Supreme Court
• (February 1989) Supreme Court approved a Settlement arrived at in the appeal by
UCC whereby 470 million $ was to be paid by it and UCIL to the Union of India in
full and final settlement of all claims and criminal proceedings would stand
quashed
• (May 1989) Following widespread protests over the manner of arriving at the settlement
and quashing criminal proceedings, Supreme Court agreed to review the settlement.
• (December 1989) Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Claims Act applying the
doctrine of parens patriae [Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 613].
• (October 1991) Supreme Court declined to reopen the settlement justifying it under
Article 142 of the Constitution. However, the criminal proceedings were directed to be
revived. The court expressed a hope that UCC will contribute Rs. 50 crore to setting up of
a hospital at Bhopal for the victims
• (February 1992) The CJM Bhopal declared A1 Warren Anderson A10 UCC and A11 UCC
(Eastern, Hongkong) as proclaimed offenders. The CJM directed that if parties do not
appear on March 27, 1992 he will order attachment of UCC’s shares in UCIL under s.82
Cr.PC.
• (June 1992) Trial of the Indian accused was separated and committed to Sessions Court.
• (October 1992) By an order dated February 24, 1989 the Settlement
Fund of 420 million US $ had been directed to be kept in a separate
dollar account with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in the name of the
Registrar of the Supreme Court. On an application by the Union of
India, the court on October 16, 1992 permitted the account to be now
held in the name of the Welfare Commissioner, subject to the
condition that RBI would not release any part of the amount except
on a certificate by the Welfare Commissioner that the amount
withdrawn was for payment of compensation to the claimants
• (April 1993) Charges framed by the Sessions Court, Bhopal against
Indian accused for offences under s.304 Part II IPC
• (May 1993) The Supreme Court directed continuation of interim relief to the victims
from June 1, 1993 and permitted Union of India to withdraw Rs.120 crores from the
Settlement Fund for this purpose.
• (September 1995) Krishna Mohan Shukla, a lawyer practising in the Supreme Court
filed a PIL drawing its attention to numerous illegalities in the matter of
categorisation, processing and adjudication of claims by the Deputy Welfare
Commissioners under the Scheme. It was stated that at lok adalats held under the
Scheme, many claimants were being compelled to accept a low compensation of
Rs.25,000/- in full and final settlement of the claim and further such order could not
be appealed. A three-member Committee was appointed by the Supreme Court by
its order dated September 19, 1985 to examine the factual position. In its report
dated November 14, 1995, the Committee confirmed many of the petitioner’s
contentions and concluded “all is not well in the matter of disbursement of claims.”
• (May 1996) In the petition by Krishna Mohan Shukla, the Supreme
Court by order dated May 1, 1996 struck down certain circulars issued
by the Welfare Commissioner under which a Deputy Welfare
commissioner could not revise the category under which the claimant
was classified unless the Welfare Commissioner approved it. It called
for details of the cases settled in lok adalats.
• (September 1996) Indian accused failed in their challenge to the order
framing charges before the High Court at Jabalpur. They then
approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petitions. By
judgment dated September 13, 1996, the Supreme Court diluted the
charges against the Indian accused from s.304 Part II IPC to s.304A IPC.
• (November 2000) Fresh class action litigation filed in the court of the Southern
District New York by Sajida Bano, Haseena Bi and five other victims directly
affected by the contamination and five Bhopal victims groups claiming damages
under 15 counts. Counts 9 to 15 related to common law environmental claims.
• (August 2000) Judge Keenan dismissed the class action claim on the ground
that the 1989 settlement covers all future claims.
• (November 2001) The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirms in part but
remanded claims on counts 9 to 15 to Judge Keenan. In discovery proceedings
before Judge Keenan UCC submitted over 4000 documents.
• (March 2003) Judge Keenan dismissed the suit of Hasina Bi again – this time on
grounds of limitation.
• (June 2004) After victims went on a hunger strike in Delhi, the Union of India
submitted a memo before Judge Keenan stating it has no objection to
decontamination being undertaken by UCC at UCC’s cost.
• (July 2004) In a representative application by 36 victims, Abdul Samad Khan and
others, Supreme Court directed disbursement of balance compensation.
• (September 2004) In another writ petition by the Bhopal groups for medical relief and
rehabilitation, Supreme Court finalised the terms of reference of two committees – an
Advisory Committee and a Monitoring Committee - appointed by it.
• (October 2004) In the Abdul Samad Khan application, the Supreme Court directed the
disbursement of balance compensation to commence from November 15, 2004 and
conclude by April 1, 2005. The court accepted the Action Plan prepared by the
Welfare Commissioner
• (June 2010) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Warren Anderson and Others
Judgement by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal
• (March 2023) Judgement of the Supreme Court

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Environmental Law

B.A. LL.B. 2020 Batch

Prof. Aakriti Tripathi

• Nuisance, negligence, trespass, strict liability, and absolute liability

• A common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some

• Magistrate - facts proved

• (March 2023) Judgement of the Supreme Court

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